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Abstract	
Decision-making is a significant part of the business of board level activity in NHS 
organizations, including the recently created Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). 
This research explores the behaviour of decision-makers within a CCG as part of 
a detailed case study focussing on a major strategic decision and looking at 
the various influences present. The aim being not merely to describe the decision and 
its outcomes, but to investigate the social interactions of those charged with making 
the decision and how the influences shape the eventual outcome.   
The analysis used the concept of the negotiated order, analysing the texts produced 
in a series of decision-making meetings and qualitative interviews with the decision-
making participants. Data was analysed through critical discourse analysis within a 
case study research methodology.  Thus, the textual data and generated narratives 
provided the evidence for how the social relationships and interactions emerged in the 
case study. The decision-making process demonstrated the negotiated order being 
created through the power relations of the participants with formed coalitions using 
and re-shaping cognitive frames. The interpretation of the research findings produced 
a social power model for organizational decision-making, shaped by the use 
and exchange of frames within the discourse.  
This is considered an original contribution to knowledge and supports the 
further development of the concept of the negotiated order and the use of cognitive 
frames within organizations. There are a number of implications for 
management practice that may improve decision-making and help further explorations 
into upper-echelon behaviour. The research is one of the first to explore the clinically 
led NHS CCGs and is and a rare example of detailed scrutiny into NHS decision-
making. Furthermore, the research has a relatively unique position of the researcher 
as a participant observer already established as a senior position within the 
organization being studied. This provides a significant contribution to the body of 
knowledge and research practice of ethnography.  
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Chapter	1	-	Introduction	
In the beginning 
Theodore Sorensen’s (1963) monograph on decision-making remains an important 
historical text, covering an eventful period of USA history. It contains an illuminating 
foreword from the man for whom Sorensen worked as speech writer and advisor, US 
President John F. Kennedy. Allison (1999) quotes from Kennedy’s foreword to title his 
seminal case study on decision-making, The Essence of Decision (cited by Yin (2009) 
as a case study exemplar). In this thesis, however, the starting point is not that of the 
‘essence of the decision’, but Kennedy’s later description of the decision-making 
process as: “dark and tangled stretches in the decision-making process – mysterious 
even to those who may be the most intimately involved” (Sorensen 1963, p.xiii). The 
twin aims of the study become both to describe the tangled stretches of decision-
making in its real-world context and to illuminate the process, so the stretches 
observed may appear a little less dark. The approach taken to shed light on decision-
making taking place in the NHS was that of ethnography: a longer-time study including 
observational assessment of the process in action. This aimed to explore in real-time, 
in situ, the real-world practice of decision-making at work. The conclusion may be that 
with such study, the observation of decision-making may become less dark. Inevitably, 
even in the presence of the brightest sun, the cast of shadows will create darker 
patches. But it may not be the darkness that obstructs understanding of what is 
happening in the theatre of decision. The complication to providing clarity may be 
related more to the ‘tangled’ nature of the stretches, than the absence of light.  
One possible reason for the apparent tangling complexity may be the difficulties during 
major decision-making of achieving a consensus amongst those involved. This may 
be, perhaps, not just achieving an agreement as to what to do: but even of agreeing 
what has happened and what presented information can mean to the decision. Thus, 
the dark and tangled stretches may appear so, due to the struggle to find a common 
language, information sources, and interpretations to that information. Achieving 
something close to an objective assessment may be possible. Indeed, it may be 
possible in the world of fiction, as Daniel Dennett describes in considering readers’ 
consistent views of Sherlock Holmes above: “All interpreters agree that Holmes was 
smarter than Watson; in crashing obviousness lies objectivity” (Dennett 1992, p.80). 
But in the dark and tangled stretches will crashing obviousness emerge?2  
The genesis of the project considered not only the need to observe the process of 
decision-making, and the ways in which consensus to deliver a decision was 
established: but also, the ways individuals and groups interact to shape interpretation 
of the subjects under consideration. From differing starting points Strauss (1963) and 
Cyert and March (1992) described processes of negotiation within organizations. This 
led to the introduction of the concept of the negotiated order (Strauss 1963, 1982, 
Watson 2002) as an interpretive lens with which to study how decision makers behave 
in the case study. Thus, during this journey of exploration the scene was illuminated 
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by the light of consistent observation and engagement with decision-makers over an 
extended period. The illumination identified the patterns of individual and group 
behaviour in framing and re-framing interpretive schemas of the decision subject. This 
process did not necessarily produce an objective assessment of ‘truth’: but a means 
of reconciling competing views and interests to establish a basis for agreement, 
compromise, and acceptance. Such negotiation and accommodation is not merely a 
struggle to find objectivity, crashing in its obviousness or not. For all strategic decisions 
the passions and emotions of the decision-makers will be influential. These passions 
and emotions may not be seen as merely distraction or ‘decision bias’ but as a part of 
human decision-making. If Hume is right, then the inputs of human passions are not 
only necessary but welcome.  
Analysing the research and developing theory in this thesis involved consideration as 
to how the ‘reasons and passions’ worked to create a negotiated order and thus how 
power manifested itself in the organization. Early review of theories of power included 
the well-established power model of Lukes (2005). Latterly the theory development 
suggested that even such a multi-dimensional model may not sufficiently address the 
understanding of power dimensions in the organization. A different model for social 
power may be required and although other sources provided alternatives (such as 
Haugaard 2003) a novel solution was the project’s conclusion.   
Thus, through the dark and tangled stretches, in a world free from objectivity, an 
organizational order was formed through the competing organizational powers, driven 
by reason, passion, frustration, fear, and bewilderment.  
Research questions and objectives 
The researcher’s previous post-graduate research was also on NHS decision-making, 
focusing on use of evidence in decision-making in a Primary Care Trust (PCT) (Cox, 
2012). The research here builds on that research and intended to provide more 
detailed exploration of NHS decision-making through using multiple research methods, 
such as ethnography in a more detailed examination.  
The research question for the project was: 
What are the factors that influence strategic decisions in healthcare 
commissioning: a negotiated order perspective? 
The perspective underpinning this research project emerged from consideration of 
NHS CCGs. CCGs emerged in a context of acute financial challenge (Appleby 2009) 
within an economic era described as an ‘age of austerity’. This challenge promotes 
greater focus on the allocation of scarce resources. As a major part of the 
commissioning process is resource allocation, CCGs have come under increasing 
pressure to justify their decisions: requiring demonstration of efficiency and 
effectiveness in their decision-making processes. The project explored strategic 
decision-making by a CCG in this political and economic context. The practical 
problem facing a senior executive managing an NHS organization is that of how to 
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manage the potential influences and the factors which may distort the decision-making 
environment away from optimal decisions. Furthermore, the practitioner is required to 
assess how the overall strategic decision-making process can be planned and 
managed with the aim of improving how decisions are made. 
The objectives of the research, in the context of a real-world decision-making process, 
were to examine: 
• How do the influencing factors on decision makers present themselves, how do 
interest groups become involved in the process and how do they exert 
influence?  
• How does this influence manifest itself in relation to the CCG’s cultural and 
power dimensions (its negotiated order)? 
• How may decision-making processes be improved to maximize utilization of 
resources consistent with the NHS and CCG strategies? 
The decision underpinning the case study emerged in mid 2015. The case related to 
the future commissioning of community healthcare services for the CCG locality. 
Although all research data relates to real events and real people names and event 
titles have been changed to preserve anonymity.  
Background, motivation, and practitioner context 
The research project was undertaken in the United Kingdom National Health Service 
(NHS) focussed on the management decision-making in the commissioning (resource 
allocation) parts of the service. The NHS is a tax-funded service, providing 
comprehensive healthcare services to the whole of the resident population. The NHS 
benchmarks well with international comparators for value money and its ability to 
achieve positive health outcomes at relatively low cost (Davis 2014, Squires and 
Anderson 2015, see Appendix 1 for an overview of comparative commissioning). Such 
relatively efficiency, however, does require consideration to the most appropriate 
allocation of scarce resources. The tasks of deciding on resource allocation fall in large 
part on the system designated as commissioning: those bodies tasked with planning 
services to address identified care needs within the available resources of money, 
buildings, and workforce.   
The researcher has been a Chief Officer in a Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG): 
one of the NHS organizations created through the NHS reforms of the Coalition 
government (2010-15) (Department of Health, 2010), and enacted in the 2012 Health 
and Social Care Act (Great Britain 2012). The direction of the 2010 white paper 
(Department of Health 2010) was to shift responsibility for NHS decision-making to 
clinical leaders, particularly General Practitioners (GPs). The intention being to put 
more control under local ‘family doctors’3 who were seen by the then Secretary of 
State, Andrew Lansley, as being those most sensitive to understanding patient need 
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and of finding ways of satisfying that need. This focus on GPs was softened slightly as 
legislation moved from white paper to act of parliament (including a delay in the 
process, referred to as the ‘pause’ (Timmins 2012)). Nevertheless, the outcome in 
CCGs was a much higher level of clinical input than any previous commissioning body, 
with the board level decision body, a CCG Governing Body, typically having a majority 
of practicing clinicians amongst their membership.  
An element of the practitioner context for this research is the role and functioning of 
the GP leaders within this new commissioning system. The timing of the study was in 
the very early stages of this new system becoming operational. As such it may be seen 
as a useful test of how the system responds to strategic decision-making challenges 
and whether this new clinical leadership provides additional value to its public. The 
value adding of the clinical input may be seen to be in its contribution to strategy, and 
strategic thinking that support creating patient and public value (Moore 1995). It may 
also assume that medical professionals will be better able to source, interpret, and use 
available evidence in support of effective decision-making. The concept of evidence-
based decision-making in healthcare is now well established (Gray 2009, Greenhalgh 
2010). This primarily applies to medical and thus operational level decision-making, 
not complex strategic decisions: however, the approach of evidence-based decision-
making generally, and as applied within medicine, may be seen as a consistent, 
rational approach to use knowledge to make effective choices. Evans (2003) is one 
author to summarize the hierarchy of evidence:  
 
Figure 1 - The Hierarchy of Evidence (adapted from Evans 2003) 
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Thus, CCG clinicians may be seen as being trained in the understanding of evidence 
and its uses, although primarily in the context of being a clinical practitioner. 
Furthermore, clinicians may often occupy a position of ‘expert’ providing expert 
opinion; itself a form of evidence (see the hierarchy above). The research thus starts 
to explore how, in the real-world environment, evidence will be used, and indeed 
whether the CCG clinicians, as experts, maintain the ordering of the evidence 
hierarchy.  
The presence of local clinicians in shaping strategic decision-making may improve the 
creation of public value and improve the use of evidence. It may, however, have to be 
balanced against the potential conflicts of interest. For example, the National Audit 
Office (2015) paper identifies potential conflicts of interest present within GPs in CCGs: 
such conflicts may then offset the benefits gained by their clinical expertise. As, 
discussed above, the importance of an expert opinion may become distorted due to 
conflicts of interest, external influences, and the position of CCG leaders within the 
decision-making process.  
A test for clinical commissioning in its CCG incarnation is also whether placing the 
responsibility largely with one clinical sub-set, General Practitioners, is the best form 
to achieve clinically informed service planning, design, and reconfiguration. Although 
very much in the spirit of the Lansley reforms of empowering family doctors 
(Department of Health 2010), there appears to be little evidence, other than the 
fundholding experience of the 1990s (Webster 2002), that GPs are necessarily the 
right clinicians to decide on resource allocation. Fundholding itself was a test of GPs 
directing resource to best effect and had limited evaluation (Kay 2002). Furthermore, 
there was no test of whether GPs would be any better at resource allocation and 
commissioning than other clinical groups. In this context there is a further assessment 
of whether, if the NHS wants to establish clinical leadership, its current configuration 
of this mainly sitting with GPs is the right approach. For the practitioner there is the 
question of whether this configuration is the best model to support optimal decision-
making.  
The GP clinical leaders on CCGs may legitimately be seen as clinical experts: they 
may not, necessarily, also be seen as ‘experts’ in the process of healthcare 
commissioning or strategic management. As such there may be a danger of GPs 
mistaking their experience and knowledge in clinical practice for expertise in strategic 
healthcare commissioning. That is not to say GPs may not be expert commissioners: 
but rather that training as a medical practitioner may not automatically allow an 
individual to perform as an expert in healthcare strategy and resource allocation. 
A practical problem for the researcher, thus, being how to maximize the benefit of 
clinical input into strategic commissioning without the impact of potentially distorting 
affects. In such cases, the senior executive may need to assess whether their role is: 
to facilitate clinical decision-making and allow the resident clinical experts to deliver 
evidential decisions; to encourage the critical evaluation of the locally provided clinical 
leadership and guide a path that avoids the various potential distortions; or, perhaps, 
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to promote challenge of the local clinicians and assume they are but one of a range of 
decision-makers, who even with their clinical background have no special status in a 
decision process.  
For the practicing manager or leader in such a decision process, there may need to 
be consideration also to the resources allocated to the search for evidence. Where, a 
hierarchy of evidence is stated, as above, the implication may be that in the absence 
of the higher quality levels of evidence substitution with lower levels will necessarily 
be adequate. Thus, where few or no published studies exist, expert opinion may be 
considered sufficient. For the practitioner, consideration may be given to whether the 
process may need to explore and generate further higher quality evidence, if this may 
improve the ultimate quality of decision-making. Against this, inevitably, will be the 
balancing need to make decisions against corporate timescales to achieve time-limited 
objectives, a further potentially distorting factor in any process.  
CCGs are in 2018 responsible for the majority of NHS commissioning spend: funding 
a range of services, including most hospital and community care, mental health 
services, urgent care and ambulance services. Commissioning organizations do not 
deliver healthcare, they commission it: a sophisticated form of purchasing from a range 
of providers. Thus, whilst provider organizations will spend a significant amount of time 
managing operational issues of care delivery, including staff and buildings, 
commissioners are spared most of such responsibility. But they do have responsibility 
for deciding on healthcare strategy and decisions of how to spend, increasingly scarce, 
public sector resources on healthcare. The present NHS operates in an environment 
of financial challenge (Appleby et al. 2009). Although the financial resources may be 
restricted, the public expectation regarding access to high-quality healthcare will 
almost certainly continue to increase (Appleby 2009). Thus, the decisions on how to 
spend scarce funds will be increasingly important.  
The thesis explores the process of strategic decision-making by commissioners. 
Although all statutory NHS bodies will have something called a strategy, it is often felt 
that the forces influencing decision-making have a more significant impact on the 
decisions taken than the formal strategy itself. It may even be questioned whether a 
CCG in the current NHS can have its own strategy, in terms of a directional statement 
broadly within its own control.  
Discussions on decision-making when it is easy are, predictably, easy. But complex 
decision, such as how to commission a new urgent care service, involving services 
that span different care elements (primary care, secondary care, social care) and 
different organizations (both public and private sector) are difficult. Decision-makers 
may expect an orderly walk through a decision process, including a rigorous 
assessment of the evidence base, aligned to corporate strategy, with a defined 
outcome at the end. But it often doesn’t go that way. 
Is the difficulty level a necessary part of the commissioning business? Or is it 
exacerbated by an inadequate use of evidence-based approaches, or an inadequate 
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use of strategic thinking? Importantly, how do the people making decisions behave 
and interact and how do these relationships shape the decision outcomes? The aim 
of the research was to explore the area of NHS strategic commissioning decision-
making.  
Strategic context and organizational strategy 
(A more general, overall history of the NHS as an institution, supplemented by analysis 
of the financial history of the NHS is provided as supplementary information as 
Appendices 2 and 3. As current strategic decisions in the NHS will inevitably have a 
financial dimension, particularly in an age of austerity, this is felt to provide important 
wider background information for a general audience.)  
The decision underpinning the case study emerged in mid 2015 just after the General 
Election of May 2015. The research was conducted within a CCG during 2015. The 
CCG was one of the smaller CCGs covering a patient population of approximately 
130,000 people, registered with 15 different General Practitioner (GP) surgeries 
across the CCG area. CCGs are ‘membership bodies’ accountable to the GP practices 
within their own locality. From the introduction of the 2012 Health and Social Care Act 
(Great Britain 2012) all GP practices are required to belong to a CCG. The CCG locality 
was broadly split across two main areas: a largely urban area of a seaside town 
(Ellerton), with some wards of high socio-economic deprivation; and a geographically 
dispersed rural area (Nortondale) with a central point of a market town (Notlam). 
Ellerton contained a District General Hospital providing a range of acute hospital 
services run by a large NHS Foundation Trust based in a neighbouring city. Ellerton 
also had an inpatient Mental Health unit. The Ellerton population of approximately 
100,000 is geographically remote from other large urban areas and provides a 
challenge to service providers due to its distance from other major units (for example 
other Accident and Emergency departments). Due this geographical distance from 
other areas its population is considered to aspire for as many services as possible to 
be provided locally. (Transport to other centres being considered poor by some of the 
population.) The Nortondale population, whilst rurally remote, is often closer to other 
larger centres than Ellerton. Both Ellerton and Nortondale are within the boundary of 
a large shire Local Authority (South Ridingshire). South Ridingshire includes a number 
of more prosperous areas with less deprivation than Ellerton, and the most deprived 
wards in the council lie in Ellerton district. Both Ellerton and Nortondale have 
experienced difficulties in securing social care providers and, like the local NHS 
providers (hospitals and GP surgeries), recruiting appropriately trained staff to work in 
the care sector is seen as a significant challenge.  
The CCG was established in 2013.  Prior to this the Ellerton and Nortondale areas 
were part of a much larger Primary Care Trust (PCT) that covered South Ridingshire 
and a small city authority. The PCT has experienced financial difficulties and was also 
perceived by GPs in Ellerton and Nortondale to be more focussed on the other parts 
of the county (where the PCT headquarters were based). The emergence of the 2010 
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white paper and development of CCGs had promoted a greater focus on local clinical 
leadership and encouraged GPs in the CCG area to work together to establish a more 
locally focussed commissioning body covering the two adjacent areas. The CCG 
operated in shadow form in 2012-13 before going live as a statutory body in 2013.   
The CCG achieved its financial targets in the two preceding years up to the time of the 
case study and were predicting (and secured) achievement of financial targets in the 
2015-16 year. As of the financial year of 2015-16 the CCG had a commissioning 
budget of circa £165 million for its 130,000 population. The CCG had a mixed 
performance across a number of NHS performance measures, demonstrating 
significant improvement in some areas, particularly that of Mental Health. A consistent 
area of performance pressure from the start of the CCG was that of emergency 
hospital admissions and achievement of the A&E Emergency Care Standard (ECS) of 
patients waiting no longer than four hours for treatment or admission. The difficulties 
around emergency care were considered in the CCG to stem, in part, from an 
inadequate provision and quality of ‘community services’: those provided in patients 
own homes in collaboration with GPs and social services. Consequently, the 
improvement of community-based services formed part of the CCG’s overall strategy 
and was one of its stated three strategic objectives, that of strengthening and 
integrated home-based care.  
Case study decision-making subject 
The subject of the case study related to the issue of future commissioning of 
community healthcare services for the Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) locality. 
The clinical services contained within the commissioned service lines included: 
Community Nursing; Community Therapy; one Community Hospital (in Notlam); a 
range of specialist nursing services; and certain specialist out of hospital services such 
as Podiatry. The total potential financial value of the services under consideration 
equated to approximately £12 million across two main contracts, both with NHS 
Foundation Trusts. The local Foundation Trust (FT) ran the majority of these 
community services (with a value of £10m) in addition to managing the Ellerton District 
Hospital. The other FT was based remotely from Ellerton but provided a range of 
services across South Ridingshire.   
The community services had previously been provided by the PCT. As stated above 
the PCT had been financially challenged throughout its lifetime and was considered 
not to have invested heavily in its community services, in part as financial savings and 
‘slippage’ (inadvertent cost reduction through delayed investment) supported the 
PCT’s financial position. The services transferred from the PCT to the FT under an 
initiative started in the latter part of the Labour administration (1997-2010), 
subsequently completed in the early part of the Coalition government (2010-2015). 
This initiative was named Transforming Community Services (TCS). This saw PCTs 
moving to becoming commissioner only organizations, losing the elements of provider 
care. (In the case of the PCT in question it ran a number of community and mental 
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health services.) The speed with which the large-scale transfers were enacted was 
often facilitated by the use of ‘vertical integration’ moving the community services 
under the ownership and management of an established NHS acute provider, in this 
case an established acute FT. The transfer to the local FT included the range of 
services within the £10m financial envelope and included over 200 members of staff. 
The summary of the services included within the definition of community healthcare 
services was: 
• Facility-based rehabilitation and intermediate care 
• Domiciliary rehabilitation and therapy services, including physiotherapy and 
occupational therapy. 
• District and community nursing services 
• Specialist nursing and therapy services (including diabetic specialists, 
dietitians, and tissue viability specialists) 
• Care home in reach support 
• Rapid response home based care support 
• Bed-based palliative care services 
• Case management for patients with long-term health conditions 
In addition to this list a further range of services, with a financial value of approximately 
£2 million was provided by the more remote FT provider, as part of a network of wider 
countywide service provision (including Podiatry and specialist wheelchair provision). 
These services were also to be considered as part of the commissioning decision-
making.  
The case study subject may be considered of strategic importance for wider NHS 
planning, and thus potentially producing generalizable research conclusions, for two 
main reasons. Firstly, the services under consideration within the study represented 
close to 10% of the overall CCG commissioning resource, representing a financially 
significant commissioning decision. Furthermore, the services were of central 
importance to the strategic development of healthcare commissioning for the CCG, as 
indeed such services are to most if not all NHS commissioners. The CCG, as with the 
NHS, had a direction of moving more healthcare out of acute hospital provision and 
into care in community setting, sometimes described as ‘care closer to home’. For 
such transfer to be effective the services outside of hospital need to be of sufficient 
capacity and quality. Although the range of care provision will include that of primary 
care (most obviously General Practice) and social care (as commissioned by Local 
Authorities) it will also involve community healthcare services: such as those 
considered in the case study. This objective of more community-based care was 
considered to be an opportunity to both reduce wider system costs (by avoiding some 
patients using expensive hospital-based care) and to improve system performance 
(by, for example, reducing the burden of patient using A&E).  
Secondly, the possibility of the use of open market procurement provided an example 
of how NHS organizations (and the wider public sector) may respond to future re-
provision of services. The publication of the Coalition Government’s white paper in 
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2010 (Department of Health 2010) signalled a central policy with a greater emphasis 
on the use of competition in healthcare. Although subsequent translation of the political 
direction into actual policy resulted in a more ambiguous assessment of ‘competition’ 
(for example, the NHS England Five Year Forward View (5YFV) does not explicitly 
mention competition at all) there remained a likelihood that where services need re-
provision, tendering would be considered. One factor supporting the use of tendering 
being the aforementioned political direction to competition; another being the 
possibility that NHS commissioners may be able to respond to the ‘age of austerity’ 
through using tenders to drive down cost. In the previous financial year, the CCG had 
successfully run an open market tender for its Urgent Care services (including GP Out 
of hours services, GP Walk-in centre, and a Minor Injury Unit). The tendered service 
was operational from April 2015, immediately before the start of the case study.  
The decision facing the CCG in the case study may be considered representative of 
similar challenges facing other NHS and public sector bodies. Three strategic 
dimensions may be considered applicable to other organizations: firstly, how to 
improve the quality of services considered to be performing less than optimally; 
secondly, how to change services to support a move to achieve care closer to home; 
and thirdly, whether to use competition through open market procurement to achieve 
strategic objectives (particularly in the age of austerity).  
The task facing the CCG was that of deciding what to do with this group of services in 
support of achieving its strategic objectives. This required an assessment of the quality 
and performance of the current services. Where their performance may be considered 
insufficient, the CCG would then to need to decide how it would improve them in 
support of its broader aim of transforming out of hospital services to achieve its 
corporate objectives. In one sense this decision is a strategic decision primarily 
concerned with the implementation of a strategic objective, rather the development of 
a strategy itself.  
The decision-makers and the decision-making bodies 
The CCG governance structure provides a committee system with decision-making 
responsibilities. The bodies involved in decision-making in this case study were: 
Ø Governing Body.  
Ø Business Committee. 
Ø Ad hoc project meetings for community commissioning. 
The Governing Body (GB) is the CCG’s overarching leading body and is, therefore, 
ultimately responsible for its major decisions. It is analogous to other leading decision-
making committees such as school Governing Bodies and limited company (or FT) 
Boards. The GB is a formal requirement of a CCG and has defined requirements as 
to its membership (essentially the same as the membership profile described below). 
Although CCG Governing Bodies across the NHS have a varied composition, all 
include a number of GPs: in the case study there were 6 GPs (one being the Chair). 
With the Chief Nurse and a Hospital Doctor (not from a local hospital provider) this 
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made a clinical majority of voting members (8-5). The GB includes positions with 
particular responsibilities: specifically, that of the Chief Officer whose responsibilities 
include those of being the CCG’s Accountable Officer (accountable to NHS England 
and the Secretary of State for Health) and the Chief Finance Officer (executive lead 
for financial matters, including responsibility for financial audit and reporting.) In 
addition to the clinical and executive members the Governing Body included two lay 
members: one with responsibility for patient engagement, one for audit and 
governance. Although nominally the lay members provided a non-executive function, 
in practice both individuals in the case study were quite active participants in other 
CCG committees and work patterns. Thus, the distinction between executive and non-
executive was not always clear. This may be a strength of the CCG, as Beaver et al. 
(2007) cite research concluding that active board involvement in areas such as 
developing strategy tends to lead to higher corporate performance. Beaver et al. 
(2007) further suggest there are three models for corporate boards: rubber stamp 
(signing off with little challenge the strategy and actions of the executive team); 
watchdog (actively supervising the performance delivery of the organization and the 
executive team); and leadership (the whole board actively participating in developing 
and implementing strategy). The Governing Body in Ellerton and Nortondale appears 
to conform most closely with Beaver’s leadership model, possibly helped by the mature 
relationships between its membership. 
The Governing Body holds its formal meetings in public, with agenda and papers 
published on its website and made available in local libraries. The public forum and 
primacy within the governance structure may contribute towards the Governing Body 
meetings feeling relatively formal, structured, and a little rehearsed. There is typically 
little free-flowing debate and controversial issues tend to be discussed beforehand to 
avoid major public disagreements within meetings.  
The Business Committee is a formal committee of the Governing Body, which although 
subservient to it, has delegated responsibilities that allow it to act with a degree of 
autonomy. Its membership includes most of the Governing Body in addition to a 
number of senior CCG officers. The meetings are held in private, although the 
meetings minutes are potentially releasable to the public through the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOI). The private nature of the session and its less structured format 
may explain the more free-flowing nature of debate often seen in the committee. The 
Business Committee includes the members of the Governing Body minus the lay 
members who are not formally part of the committee, although they frequently have 
attended sessions for information or to participate in discussion.  
In addition to the Governing Body members the process included significant 
involvement from a number of CCG officers: 
• Project manager for the subject of the study 
• Assistant Director for Commissioning 
• Head of Service Improvement 
• Deputy Chief Finance Officer 
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Prior to the decision by the Governing Body the CCG established a project team. 
Consistent with project management methodologies, such as PRINCE 2, major 
projects or programmes often establish a separation of powers between project teams 
(entrusted with the actions to deliver a project) and project boards (given ultimate 
responsibility for major decisions and accountable for their consequences).  
3 formal committees within the CCG organizational architecture were involved in the 
decision-making process. Such committees will, however, rarely be the only forums 
for debate in strategic decisions. In addition to the formal committees, process will 
create ad-hoc meetings to discuss specific issues (sometimes titled as ‘task and finish 
groups’). Furthermore, Governing Body members and officers will meet and discuss 
issues outside of formal structures. Thus, the described meeting hierarchy seen here 
may be typical for such decisions: 
Governing	Body	
Formal organizational committee required by terms of authorisation 
Meetings held in public, meeting papers published prior to the meeting 
Significant or controversial agenda items may promote attendance at meetings and 
subsequent reporting by journalists 
Formal nature tends to produce an atmosphere of structured discussion 
Business	Committee	
Formal organizational committee, but not required by authorisation 
Decision making authority determined by the CCG scheme of delegation (very 
significant decisions may need to be referred to the Governing Body for approval) 
Meetings held in private but fully recorded and minutes releasable under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOI) 
Private meeting allowed less formal discussion and potentially more ‘open’ 
contributions by participants 
Ad-hoc	subject	specific	meeting	
Not a standing committee and not required by authorisation 
Usually not defined decision-making authority, decisions require approval by a 
formal committee 
Meeting held in private and, as typical, recorded but as ‘action points’ with less detail 
than formal minutes Meetings	more	free-flowing and had wide-ranging debate and greater use of humour  
Informal	conversation	
Not recognised as a formal meeting 
No defined decision-making authority 
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Meetings entirely private  
Debate may be very wide, possibly informal, possibly introduction of wider issues 
Lack of formal reporting or scheduling of discussion makes auditing of the influence 
of such meetings difficult.  
 
The Governing Body agenda is the responsibility of the Chair and Chief Officer, 
administered by CCG officers. In practice the full-time Chief Officer may discuss the 
agenda with the Chair, but then have ultimate practical control over the agenda (here 
control as distinct from responsibility). The formal hierarchy suggests that the 
Governing Body agree and apparently dictate the shape and agendas of the process 
and thus all lower authority bodies. In practice the Governing Body will set a general 
direction, but there is flexibility for distinct decision on agenda setting within this 
framework. Ultimately strategic decisions will need to be made (even if just ratification) 
through the formal Governing Body, thus there is little point in lower order meetings 
varying too far from the original senior brief. The interpretation and implementation of 
the original instruction does, however, become more subject to individual assessment. 
This may show that power and influence of certain subjects within the decision-making 
process does vary, in part due to their level of presence in the process. Presence here 
is both physical (were the individuals actually there in meetings and discussions) and 
how their known views and influence were felt and considered by others when they 
were not physically present.  
The CCG Governing Body membership had been very consistent throughout its short 
history. All the 13 members at the time of the study had been in place since the start 
of the CCG as a statutory body in 2013, with all but the Hospital Doctor also in post 
during the shadow year of CCG operation in 2012-13. Thus, the Governing Body was 
considered to have mature working relationships.  
Original contribution to knowledge 
The thesis provides an original contribution to knowledge in four ways: the role of the 
researcher; the place of research; the nature of study into the negotiated order; and 
the contribution to improving management practice.  
Although there are examples of participant observers within the research literature of 
ethnography, there may be few that have conducted by the lead executive in an 
organization (Ram 1994 being a possible exception). The place of an organizational 
leader as a participant observer within a form of ethnography provides a possibly 
unique insight into organizational behaviour and management decision-making.   This 
position provides a significant level of organizational access, but also provides an 
unusual insight, particularly from the perspective of reflexivity (see more below). 
Hammersley (1995) is positive about the potential benefits of the participant 
researcher within social science. This study may be the first conducted by an 
embedded participant observer working at a senior executive level in the NHS.  
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At the time of conducting the study there was no research investigating the actual 
decision-making functioning of CCGs. Checkland (2013) looks at the accountability 
systems in CCGs but not their actual functioning. McDermott (2017) studied the role 
of GPs in CCGs but did not look in detail at management practice. Even more so this 
study was a broad assessment of several CCGs and not the ‘narrow and deep’ 
research design of this thesis.  The design of the thesis, in focusing on strategic 
decision-making, is considered to be unique, with the level of access to the internal 
workings of an NHS organization as highly unusual (probably unique at this time). 
Thus, this provides an original contribution to knowledge in exploring how part of the 
reformed NHS goes about the business of making major decisions. This exploration 
includes the functioning of clinical leadership in the decision-making process, testing 
the assumptions underlying the NHS reforms that clinical decision-makers would add 
greater value to commissioning.  
The third element of the originality is what is considered to be a novel study of power 
relations and the negotiated order at board level. Many of the studies such as Strauss 
(1963) examine the order in the day to day workings of organizations. This thesis, by 
contrast, explores the concept of the negotiated order in a senior decision-making 
body, with a group of participants that do not work together in a daily, operational 
environment. Research summarised in Beaver et al. (2007) describes power relations 
and its impact on the functioning of boards, but at a more general level, without the 
specific focus of a major decision. Thus, this may be a unique contribution to 
knowledge in the researching strategic decision-making from the negotiated order 
perspective. This is a contribution to knowledge in being a twenty-first century and 
executive management level development of Strauss (1963) and an ethnographic 
introduction of negotiated order research into an organization at board level.  
The author considers the results of the research are potentially generalizable to CCGs 
throughout the NHS; probably generalizable to other top management teams in the 
public sector (NHS provider boards and Health and Wellbeing Boards, for example), 
and of relevance to the functioning and behaviour of any corporate body involved in 
strategic decision-making. Consequently, the fourth element of the contribution to 
knowledge is that of deepening the understanding management practice and how 
board level decision-making in the NHS and elsewhere may be improved.  
Tolstoy, the battlefield, and me 
In his War and Peace, set during the Napoleonic war, Tolstoy’s lead characters sit high 
above the field of conflict, “among the field guns on the brow of the hill, the general in 
command of the rearguard stood with a staff officer, scanning the country through his 
field glasses” (Tolstoy 1993, p.146). This is, of course, only one perspective of the 
action unfolding. A different scan from another hill may be subtlety different. The 
potentially dramatically different perspective, however, may be provided from that of 
the soldier at the front line4. But both perspectives are real views of the process of 
battle, both equally deserving. John Keegan, the military historian considers both 
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perspectives: The Mask of Command (Keegan 1999) on the role of the general; that 
of the soldier in The Face of Battle (Keegan 1988).  
This counter-position and duality illuminates the position of the researcher in this 
project. Thus, I am not just an NHS Chief Officer: I am the CEO of the organization 
being researched. I am therefore, part researcher, part element of the thing studied. 
This is simultaneously, novel (possibly unique in its setting), interesting, dynamic, 
problematic, and challenging. After securing the necessary consent and permissions 
to conduct the research, my position gave me an unusual position to undertake an 
ethnography of the type described below. It is extremely rare for management figures 
in a central leadership position within a project to undertake such research. Indeed, 
the researcher could find little equivalent published research (Ram 1994 in the textile 
industry perhaps the closest). The position provides a high level of insight into the 
organization and some of its history and allows a dynamic analysis of the research 
data through providing a reflexive dimension (see Winter 1989). Despite its positives, 
however, it was recognised that the very nature of the ‘view from the battlefield’ 
challenged the objectivity of the project, demanding a transparent approach to 
research methodology and acknowledgement of potential biases. Furthermore, the 
project required protection of those involved to satisfy the ethical framework, through 
the anonymization of those involved. Thus, further steps may be required to preserve 
anonymity in considering publication. Despite these challenges, the need to be explicit 
and transparent as to the role and place of the researcher may be helpful. The 
researcher is not merely an observer, but rather a part of the research that they 
themselves conduct. In this vein Finlay (2002, p.531) quotes Krieger’s comments on 
researcher reflexivity, that: “The pot carries its maker’s thoughts, feelings, and spirit. 
To overlook this fact is to miss a crucial truth, whether in clay, story, or science.” 
One important lesson from the project is the benefit of management learning through 
research, and the belief from the researcher that such exercises are actually of great 
benefit those conducting the research as well as the wider body of organizational and 
management knowledge. Moreover, as a researcher and a practicing manager I would 
wholeheartedly agree with Winter’s (1989) statement, “the process of learning must 
start from reflection upon one’s own experience”5. In this respect, as a professional 
manager, I am more comfortable in the middle of the battlefield than as a remote 
general or detached researcher; however, in choosing to take on the role of researcher 
I must do both.  
Although no Tolstoy scholar, but echoing Winter and the lifelong learning from life itself, 
I may conclude the introduction with some words from Tolstoy himself, to remind me 
to keep acting, failing, thinking, and learning: 
 No matter how old or how sick you are, how much or little you have done, your 
business in life not only hasn't finished, but hasn't yet received its final, decisive 
meaning until your very last breath (Tolstoy quoted in Kaufman 2015, p.10) 
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Structure of the document 
The thesis has the following chapters: 
• Chapter 1 presents the thesis and its research objectives.  
• Chapter 2 provides the review of the research and theoretical literature on the 
areas relating to the research subject. This is broken down into several sub-
sections: 
o An introduction to the concept of organizational strategy, as although the 
research is not into strategy per se, it was felt necessary to define 
strategy before introducing the literature on strategic decision-making. 
This will cover strategy in both private and public sector contexts.  
o A summary of texts on decision-making generally and specifically 
strategic decision-making in organizations. This includes organizational 
decision-making models as applied to strategic decision-making 
research.  
o Introducing the concept of the negotiated order in organizations and how 
this relates to group behaviour and group decision-making. This chapter 
also reviews literature on the behaviour and cultures of NHS boards 
(their upper-echelon bodies). 
o A brief description of what is commissioning in the NHS and public sector 
and how this relates to wider issues of strategy and national policy. This 
defines the specific form of the corporate environment of the case study 
organization.  
o Lastly the literature on cognitive frames, how they influence behaviour. 
The framing environment is described as at three levels and this leads 
into the categorisation of the hypothesised influences on the decision-
making process. This leads on to the development of a conceptual 
framework for the subsequent research. 
• Chapter 3 summarises the research strategy and its supporting methodology.  
It describes how the research data was generated and the tools used, such as 
qualitative data coding, to analyse the data. 
• Chapter 4 Explores the generated data and the approach to analysis, describing 
the codes emerging from the analysis. 
• Chapter 5 provides a detailed of the observed management meetings and 
themes emerging from the process, including assessment of the management 
materials seen in the case study.  
• Chapter 6 details the analysis of the research data both that from the 
management meetings and triangulated with the qualitative interview data. This 
chapter explores the influences that emerge from the data and how they appear 
within the perspective of the conceptual framework.  
• Chapter 7 interprets the analysed research data and develops theoretical 
perspectives with the aim of establishing plausible causal mechanisms to 
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explain the outcomes of the case study. The perspectives are synthesised into 
a single explanatory social power model.  
• Chapter 8 describes what are considered to be the significant implications for 
management practice in the NHS and wider management, that emerge from 
the project.  
• Chapter 9 concludes the thesis with a summation of the research findings, 
implications, and its contribution to knowledge. The researcher proposes areas 
for further research and provides a final reflexive view of the research project 
as seen by the participant researcher.  
 
 	
  27 
Chapter	2	-	Literature	Review		
2.1	Introduction	
In assessing how we improve strategic commissioning decision-making in healthcare 
it may be useful to return to first principles. Thus, in the working life of a commissioner 
one may ask: what is it we are commissioning for, towards what goals and objectives, 
with which groups of people and partners, and using what systems and processes. 
This section examines published literature in the area of strategic decision-making in 
response to addressing the research question: 
What are the factors that influence strategic decisions in healthcare 
commissioning: a negotiated order perspective? 
The literature review addresses the areas of previous research that inform the analysis 
of the research data and assist in answering the research question. Specifically, the 
review covers the major areas: healthcare commissioning; strategic decision-making; 
the concept of the negotiated order in the organizational sociology; and the concept of 
cognitive frames and how they apply in the research.  
The research occurred as a case study in an NHS commissioning organization and 
thus it is necessary to summarise the process of commissioning in the NHS and wider 
public sector. Appendix 1 provides a review of comparative commissioning of different 
healthcare systems that is not directly relevant to the research but provides wider 
context as to the role and types of commissioning and resource allocation. 
The decision subject was considered to be of strategic importance to the organization 
in question. Thus, the review needs to define strategic decision-making and describe 
the literature on models of decision-making more broadly. As a foundation to define 
and understand strategic decision-making, the review will also discuss the concept of 
strategy itself, before then focussing on strategic decision-making relevant to the 
research topic in question. The consideration of strategy includes differentiation 
between the role of strategy in the private and public sectors and how this may apply 
in the case study.  
The literature on decision-making is very large: consequently, the review will provide 
an overview into decision-making generally, but with a focus on the research relating 
to organizational and management decision-making. Although much of the literature 
on decision-making focusses on individual behaviour, this does provide a necessary 
basis for consideration of decision-making behaviour more generally. The analysis of 
group decision-making is also considered important both in terms of understanding the 
decision in the case study, but also in relation to decision-making and the group 
dynamics of organizational behaviour.  
The review will discuss the concept of negotiated order and associated concepts that 
fall within analysis of organizational sociology. This will be further refined into the 
analysis of specifically ethnographic board level studies, and any that focus particularly 
on the decision-making process. Between the analysis of groups and the analysis of 
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decision-making there is a need to explore studies that cross over both: that is the 
study of group decisions. Again, the focus will be on organizational decision-making. 
It is considered that an important element of understanding organizational social 
relations and the concept of the negotiated order is the use of cognitive frames. Thus, 
from the analysis of literature on negotiated order the review concludes with discussion 
on the use of cognitive frames and how this then shapes the conceptual framework 
used in the project. 
The themes link together to provide a framework in support of the research strategy. 
Furthermore, the themes of the review are considered to explore the main dynamics 
of the decision-making processes at work in a CCG.  
The content structure of the review is as below: 
i. What is strategy, including strategy in a real-world context? This will cover the 
overarching concepts of strategy, commonly cited models and theories, and a 
comparison of the role of strategy in the private and public sector contexts.  
ii. What is a decision and what is a strategic decision? This section summarises 
theories of decision-making, including researched challenges to decision-
making efficiency. It Includes a review of decision-making models in 
organizations and the definition of a strategic decision. 
iii. Exploring the concept of the negotiated order as an analytical tool and 
describing research into decision-making in groups. This Includes the concept 
of the organization as a coalition and the how this applies to the negotiated 
order. 
iv. What is commissioning and healthcare commissioning? Including a review of 
policy approaches to healthcare and public sector commissioning. A summary 
of different policy approaches to NHS commissioning is describes 
demonstrating its relation to political policy influence. 
v. The review concludes with analysis of cognitive frames and how they enable 
the project to stratify the differing levels of influence present upon decision-
makers. The literature review ends with the development of the research 
project’s conceptual framework. (The framework is developed further within 
the research methodology in chapter 3.) 
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2.2	What	is	strategy?	
Not just any old plan 
After yet another request for a ‘plan’ or a ‘programme document’ or more often and 
more grandly, a ‘strategy’ the researcher in his professional life often yearns for the 
approach of Karl Weick (2001). Weick is a thought-provoking writer on organizations, 
including apparently contrarian views on strategy: for example, approvingly quoting 
definitions of strategy from de Bono, “strategy is good luck rationalized in hindsight” 
(Weick 2001, p.345), and Burgelman, “strategy is a theory about the reasons for past 
and current success of the firm” (Weick 2001, p.345). Tired of churning out yet another 
strategy document there have been times when the researcher yearned for this almost 
anarchic, postmodern approach to strategy. But back in the rationalism of the real 
world, the romanticism of the wild-eyed anarchist may start to lose its shine. 
Particularly if you get lost.  
Weick (2001) recounts a tale of soldiers lost on a mission in the Alps, who find their 
way home thanks to a map found in one of the soldier’s pockets. On debriefing with 
the commanding officer, it emerges the map is not actually one of the Alps, but the 
Pyrenees. Weick’s conclusion is that when one is lost, “any old map will do” (Weick 
2001, p.346) and by extension any strategic plan may do. The legitimate points are 
thus: that in some cases action without a clear plan may be better than inaction; and 
belief in a plan can be as important as the validity of the plan itself.  
This does not, however, invalidate ‘strategic planning’: the very usefulness of the map 
is its evident accuracy. Its subsequently discovered inauthenticity has no bearing on 
the outcome. Indeed, a discovery of inauthenticity at the outset would have yielded it 
as useless, not as practice confirmed, useful. Furthermore, Gelman and Basboll 
(2014) criticize Weick’s lack of empirical evidence for the narrative, suggesting it is 
story supported by at best anecdotal evidence. They also point to the possibly obvious 
benefits of factually accurate maps, “When traveling in central London, for example, 
we can only assume he [Weick] would prefer the classic Tube map rather than, say, a 
plan of the Paris Metro” (Gelman and Basboll 2014, p.565). Thus, in its strategic 
decision-making the CCG needs to avoid getting on the wrong train.  
Introduction 
If the research is exploring the influences on strategic decision-making, then a 
precursor to the exploration is to assess the concept of strategy itself. The research is 
not into the development of strategy in the CCG and consequently this is not an 
extended discussion of corporate strategy (as for example, provided in a 
comprehensive overview such as Johnson et al. 2005). It does necessitate, however, 
a consideration to the concept of strategy in the corporate world and how this may 
apply to the public sector and a CCG. This will inform the assessment of influences on 
the CCG and of what type of strategic decision the study is researching.  The chapter 
will discuss: 
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• The definition and origins of strategy as concept and its application to 
organizations 
• Approaches to strategy as described in the literature 
• How the concept of strategy applies to public sector bodies such as CCGs 
Definitions and origins 
In the corporate environment the word strategy is often used but rarely defined. Its 
ubiquity may promote its ambiguity. But the evident ambiguity may reflect not merely 
a lack of clarity on its use, but also the complex nature of strategy as a management 
concept. Thus, we may start with the Johnson et al. (2005) description of strategy as: 
…the direction and scope of an organisation over the long term, which achieves 
advantage in a changing environment through its configuration of resources and 
competences with the aim of fulfilling stakeholder expectations. (Johnson et al. 
2005, p. 9) 
This would appear to be a mainstream definition and one that is consistent with much 
of the published thinking on planning and ‘strategy’ within the NHS. However, further 
research and analysis into strategy develops the concepts not merely as a definition 
of a term, but also a description of management practice. Before exploring the current 
definitions and approaches to strategy, it may be helpful to explore the origins of the 
term and its emergence into a management concept.  
Evered (1983) discusses the origins of the term strategy. The word originates from the 
Greek strategos, meaning a general of an army, the word itself derived from stratos, 
meaning army, and ag, meaning to lead. Evered’s (1983) investigations reveal the 
emergence of the strategos was accompanied by the roles of the strategos as 
administrative as well as military rulers.  
Much of the subsequent literature on strategy up until after World War 2 (WW2) was 
military in nature. Classic authors who shaped strategic thinking being von Clausewitz 
(1976) and Liddell-Hart (1991): their thinking reflecting not merely an interest in battle 
plans and weaponry, but a desire to establish a deep understanding of resource 
allocation, psychology, and the moral purposes of the exercises at hand. (Quoted in 
Liddell-Hart (1991, p. 4) Napoleon’s dictum, “the moral is to the physical as three to 
one”, may be an early advocate of a value-based approach to strategy?)  
The emergence of strategy as a management term may not have a clearly defined 
start, but a classic and commonly cited text, which may herald the emergence of 
strategy as a field of study as well as a practice, is from Ansoff (1965). This describes 
strategy as a form of long-term planning. Such a view may be seen as the modern 
foundation for the concept of corporate strategy. Some authors (Mintzberg 2007) may 
contend that the long-term planning approach to strategy is in part divergent from some 
of the military considerations on strategy. Thus, through the literature on strategy over 
the last 50 years there have been attempts to both develop strategy as an area of 
management practice and to define it as a concept.  
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Strategy as a management concept 
Mintzberg et al. (2009) describe strategic approaches along a deliberate (intentional) 
to emergent axis. Thus, the classical approach to strategy of an intentional plan can 
be contrasted with the more modern emergent approach of strategy as a consistently 
evident pattern. The axis is illustrated in the diagram below.   
 
Figure 2 - Mintzberg’s strategic relationship of intention and emergence (from 
Mintzberg 2009) 
However, there is separation between the dimensions of strategy type and 
organizational type: the suggestion being that the organizational type will influence the 
type of strategy. Furthermore, there is a distinction identified in Mintzberg (2007) 
between strategic thinking and strategic planning. The former being primarily 
concerned with the generation of direction, superordinate corporate objectives and 
higher-level values: the latter with the detailed planning to implement an already 
agreed (implicitly or explicitly) set of objectives and direction. Consequently, there is 
an implication that these two types of ‘strategy’ may at times be mutually exclusive: 
detailed analytical thinking crowding out the intellectual space for more expansive, less 
defined creative thinking.  Thus, ‘analysis is not synthesis’: the detailed separation of 
corporate elements (analysis) supports strategic planning, but works against the task 
of integrating, fusing, and conceptualizing corporate dimensions (synthesis). In a 
similar vein Miller (1992) describes the relationships between different types (internal 
and external) of corporate ‘fit’. Organizations most able to adapt to a changing external 
environment (good external fit) may have less internal consistency and strong 
corporate process. The different types of fit are seen as trade-offs between each other, 
not as complementary dimensions of one strategy.  
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The views of authors such as Mintzberg and Miller may in part reflect their proclivity 
towards more emergent strategic themes. Thus, in what may be seen as more 
intentional and less emergent approaches, for example, Porter (1984) or Rumelt 
(2012), there is no suggestion the strategic approaches described involve any less 
‘thinking’. Furthermore, Mintzberg et al. (2009) and Miller (1982) imply a need for multi-
dimensional approaches to strategy (in some works this may be represented as a 
configuration approach). Whilst the approach appears to have merit, it does not appear 
to avoid the need for some form of intention, and indeed some form of strategic plan.   
Porter is one of the most widely cited authors on corporate strategy (Ramos-Rodriguez 
and Ruiz-Navarro 2004). Focussed on private rather than public sector bodies Porter 
(1985) describes three approaches to strategy: cost leadership; differentiation; and 
focus. The three approaches are developed from the five forces determining 
profitability (Porter 2008): 
 
Figure 3 - Porter's (2008) forces shaping competition 
The forces are considered to vary from industry to industry and may be seen to have 
less relevance to public sector bodies, although as Porter states the forces define 
industry profitability, a similar force analysis may be applied to public bodies. Thus, the 
three approaches may be summarised as (from Porter 2005): 
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• Cost leadership is a strategy for a firm to become the lowest cost provider in an 
industry. Ways in which companies may seek to establish cost leadership may 
vary (access to raw materials, economies of scale, use of novel technology).  
• For differentiation, companies attempt to become unique in their industry, 
identifying features a market segment may value and thus may be prepared to 
pay premium prices.  
• Focus is separated into strategies of cost focus and differentiation focus. In 
focus strategies companies target a small section of a market, seeking either to 
target the population based on cost, or on product differentiation. 
Although Porter describes three generic strategies, there are the two basic dimensions 
of corporate strategy in the search of competitive advantage: cost management and 
differentiation (product or market).   
Porter’s initial works focussed on companies working in the private sector and, 
furthermore, on companies deciding which market sector to enter. Even so, in public 
sector strategies there may be relevance in the statement:  
Competitive strategy must grow out of a sophisticated understanding of the 
rules of competition that determine an industry's attractiveness. The aim of 
competitive strategy is to cope with and, ideally, to change those rules in the 
firm's favour. (Porter 1985, p.4) 
The inclusion of the analysis of Porter is justified due to its wide-ranging influence on 
strategic thinking, including on public sector strategy. The approach may be more 
applicable to private sector strategy, but to exclude Porter may be to ignore an author 
who may be one of the sector’s most influential thinkers.  
Thus, for a CCG there may be no need to understand the rules of competition; but 
rather the rules of the public sector and specifically the health sector. 
Misunderstanding the rules of the CCG environment may lead to poor strategy. 
Changing the rules may be difficult in a government led service; but interpreting the 
rules effectively may allow NHS organizations to develop strategies that support 
national and local objectives. 
Mintzberg et al. (2003) list the ‘5 Ps’ of strategy, describing strategy as: plan; ploy; 
pattern; position; and perspective. There may be beneficial perspectives from all five 
of the ‘Ps’ in this work, but the dimension of strategy as a ‘plan’ or at least some form 
of intended approach may inevitably be a fundamental element to a consideration of 
strategy.  
Whittington (2001) provides a 4-element framework of approaches to strategy (Figure 
4 below).  
• The classical approach sees strategy as planning and direction, with the belief 
the corporate world can be influenced by direction and intention of the 
organization. The classical position is considered as rational. Porter (for 
example, 1996) may be seen as a representative of the classical position.  
• The processual approach (for example, Simon 1997) provides an approach that 
describes a corporate world of limitations, where rationality is bounded. 
Although planning still has a primary place, its impact will be affected by a 
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number of influences, beyond the control of the strategist. Mintzberg (1994) is 
both a representative of the approach and a critic of more classical approaches. 
• The evolutionary approach suggests the strategic environment is so volatile as 
to infer there is little point in longer-term planning. Rather corporate strategy 
has a role in making the organization as efficient and agile as possible to adapt 
to the changing environment. An example text of the approach is Henderson 
(1989).  
• Lastly is the systemic approach. As with the evolutionary approach, for the 
systemic the main point of strategy is to align the organization to its 
environment: but here with the socio-economic and political environment. 
Examples include Granovetter (1985), and Boyacigiller and Adler (1991).   
 
Figure 4 - Adaptation of Whittington’s (2001) matrix of strategic approaches 
It may be noted that the condensation of strategic thought into these four approaches 
does require a degree of artificiality. None of the major references for each approach 
would necessarily only fit neatly into one category and there is a danger of assuming 
one must subscribe to one view of the world. Whittington (2001) asserts the 
approaches present radically different management recommendations. But the 
assertion may not be justified. The Mintzberg et al. (2009) tour through strategic 
thinking provides ten alternative views, which provides an alternative perspective to 
Whittington, whilst essentially covering the same scope of strategic thinking.   
I. The Design School regards strategy formation as a process of conception, 
matching the internal situation of the organization to the external situation of the 
environment. The strategy represents the best possible fit. 
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II. For the Planning School strategy formation is seen as a formal process, which 
follows a rigorous set of steps from analysis of the situation to the development 
and exploration of various alternative scenarios. 
III. In the Positioning School influenced by the works of Porter, strategy formation 
is an analytical process placing the business within the context of the industry 
that it is working in, looking at how the organization can improve its competitive 
positioning. 
IV. Entrepreneurial School regards strategy formation as a visionary process 
occurring in the mind of a founder or inspirational leader of an organization. 
V. The Cognitive School is based upon the science of cognitive functioning, 
seeing strategy formation as a mental process, and analysing the perception of 
patterns and process of information. 
VI. In the case of the Learning School strategy formation is an emergent process, 
where the corporate management pays attention to what works and doesn’t 
work over time, incorporating the ‘lessons learned’ into an overall plan of action. 
VII. For the Power School strategy development is seen as a process of 
negotiation between those holding power inside the organization, or between 
the company and external agencies. 
VIII. The Cultural School approach sees strategy as a collective process involving 
various groups and stakeholders within and outside the company; the strategy 
consequently developed becomes a reflection of the culture of the organization. 
IX. Strategy formation in the Environmental School is seen to be a reactive 
process: a response to the challenges imposed by an external environment. 
X. Lastly the Configuration School, which sees the purpose of strategy 
development as a process of transforming the organization from one type of 
decision-making structure into another. 
Few managers may only subscribe to one of these approaches (or descriptions). 
Mintzberg et al. (2009) suggests an appropriate view of strategy and strategic thinking 
(as distinct from strategic planning (Mintzberg 1994)) is to accept elements from 
different strategic approaches.  
The approaches described by Whittington (2001) and Mintzberg (2003) provide an 
assessment of strategy as practice, often in retrospect. Whittington (1996) is one 
author describing ‘strategy as practice’ as a defined stream of strategic thinking. 
Although developing its own body of research, ‘strategy as practice’ appears to focus 
more on the management task of conducting strategy, than the strategy itself. In some 
respects, one may associate this approach with the procedural and resource-based 
views, described below.  But in reviewing strategic decisions it may be necessary to 
describe strategic approaches as intentional and a priori. That is, what a strategy aims 
to be, as much as what it actually becomes.  
We may describe strategy in terms of both its approach (fundamentally based on 
practice and environmental context) and its intention (what it seeks to achieve and its 
plan to realize the achievement). It may be an over-simplification to describe the 
separate and possible antagonism between intention and practice as merely another 
example of Argyris’s (1976) ‘espoused theory’ against ‘theory in practice’. Instead it 
may be seen as a necessary, dialectical tension arising in the organization. Thus, the 
organization may develop plans and make statements of its intention to achieve, and 
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of its way of behaving. In one sense, such statements are useful tools of management 
practice. The utility may be described at three levels. Firstly, the level of corporate 
direction informing decision taking. Secondly, the level of communication to 
stakeholders, as to what the organization is about and intends to do. Thirdly, as a 
means of performance management for others, particularly authorizing bodies, to 
assess success in achieving corporate objectives. In the UK public sector since the 
introduction of much greater performance management and target setting, the last 
element may have particular significance.  
The three levels of direction, communication, and validation may help to explain the 
continued need and relevance for elements of hard planning. Thus, those from ‘non-
classical’ strategy schools may be critical of ‘strategic planning’ (Mintzberg 1994) but 
the evident separation of intention from practice may not necessarily remove its 
usefulness. But neither point vitiates the need for well-developed strategy. Mintzberg’s 
critique of classical strategy is subtle and in the Strategy Safari (Mintzberg et al. 2009) 
the aim appears to be to provide a more holistic view of strategy as a process.  
It may be helpful to recognise strategic approaches that fall somewhere in the middle 
of the intentional-emergent axis, specifically the processual (or cognitive) approach 
and the resource-based (alternatively cultural) approaches. They may be briefly 
summarized as: 
• Processual/Cognitive. Deriving much of its knowledge from the work of Simon 
(1997) and colleagues (for example, Cyert and March 1992), the learning here 
is primarily that of how organizations work, and the restrictions imposed upon 
behaviour by the nature and functioning of those organizations. Thus, the main 
features of this as an approach are to understand how ‘administrative 
behaviour’ (Simon 1997) limits both the development and implementation of 
strategy.  
• Resource-based/Cultural. In this approach the strategic direction is less on how 
to achieve specific goals or establish direction, but more of how to develop and 
enhance organizational resources (Wernefelt 1984). As such this accepts the 
need for the organization to be flexible and aware of its environment, with the 
resources making it able to respond to that environment. Such responding 
becomes arguably more important than direction setting, as the environment 
will influence to such a degree as to make directional, intentional strategy 
difficult or impossible. 
Both approaches have been criticized due to a view that although they provide learning 
and insight that is useful to the strategy process, they are not really strategies at all 
(for example Johnson et al. 2002). Thus, for the processual approach the learning is 
fundamentally about how organizations function: for the resource-based approach, 
how to enhance its ability to function. However, in both cases the analysis is more 
helpful as explanatory rather than normative assessment. Thus, this section may be 
concluded by asserting that ‘harder’ strategic planning of the type described by Porter 
is beneficial and necessary for public and private sector organizations. Limitations on 
the effectiveness of intentional planning should be seen as assisting in organizations 
in being more effective at strategic implementation, developing organizational flexibility 
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and improving organizational culture. The limitations and boundedness of strategic 
planning do not, however, invalidate its use.  
The case study of the ‘Honda Effect’ may be instructive. According to different authors 
from different perspectives (summarised in the California Management Review 1996) 
the great success of Honda’s motorcycle business entry into the USA had different 
explanations. One, from a BCG review of the decline of the UK motorcycle industry 
suggesting Honda had a clear strategy to develop and expand in the US market, 
contrary to the UK where companies had no effective strategy and were very 
traditional. This allowed Honda to dominate the small bike market before then 
expanding into the larger vehicles. Pascale’s (1984) later study interviewing the Honda 
managers involved, suggested the development in small bikes was partly accidental, 
as initially these were only used by managers to ride themselves and were thought to 
be too small for the US market. As interest in small bikes increased Honda shifted 
focus to this area, then started to dominate, followed by moving latterly into the larger 
bike market sector. Thus, the BCG analysis is of a ‘design’ intentional strategy 
approach; Pascale’s of an ‘emergent’ or ‘process’ school. Rumelt (1996) reviewing the 
various documents written on the case suggests there is truth in both accounts and 
that despite the apparent difference both accounts agree on that Honda had: superior 
technical excellence in product design; previous success with small bikes in Japan; 
and the move into larger bikes happened after the early success. Thus, Rumelt 
suggests both accounts have some value, but that success was helped by technical 
competence and an efficient ability to manage costs in production. Interestingly Rumelt 
(1996, p.110) states he believes, “strategic thinking is a necessary but greatly 
overrated element of business success”6 
Thus, it may be concluded by asserting that ‘harder’ strategic planning of the type 
described by Porter is beneficial and necessary for public and private sector 
organizations. Limitations on the effectiveness of intentional planning should be seen 
as assisting in organizations in being more effective at strategic implementation, 
developing organizational flexibility and an improved organizational culture. The 
limitations and boundedness of strategic planning do not, however, invalidate its use.  
Approaches to strategy 
Miles et al. (1978) approach strategy from the perspective of organizational adaption 
and assess how strategies develop in the corporate environment. This may assist in 
looking at strategy as a real-world discipline and also one that does not require aligning 
with one discreet type (as in one of Whittington’s ‘approaches’ or Mintzberg’s 
‘schools’). Miles et al. (1978) describe organizations needing to address three 
‘strategic problems’: entrepreneurial (what products are developed and brought to the 
market); engineering (how products get to the market); and administrative (how the 
organization manages itself to address the two other problems). In addressing the 
three problems Miles et al. (1978) provide a strategic adaptation typology of four types: 
defenders; prospectors; analyzers; and reactors.  The defender strategy focusses on 
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market protection, including targeting cost efficiency and customer satisfaction. 
Prospectors are highly innovative and seek to find new products or new markets. 
Analyzers take elements from both defender and prospector strategies. Reactors work 
primarily to adjust to their environment and are seen as perpetually unstable.  
Just as Porter (1985) describes three approaches that can be condensed down to two 
(essentially cost or differentiation) so for Miles et al., the three problems are 
fundamentally only two. The entrepreneurial problem is what to do; the engineering 
problem how to do it. The administrative problem is an ever-present part of any 
strategic issue (that of the implementation and management of actions to achieve 
strategic ends) and as such should not, arguably, be considered a separate strategic 
problem. Similarly, rather than treating the Miles et al. (1978) approach as an 
alternative to Porter (1985) it may be seen as complementary. Boyne and Walker 
(2004) confirm this assessment of a complementary approach by referring to the Miles 
et al. (1978) typology as ‘strategic stance’ (the broad approach) and Porter (1985) as 
‘strategic actions’ (specific steps to take). Thus, competitive advantage strategies 
require consideration of which industries or markets to work in; the two generic 
strategies propose choice between cost focus and differentiation focus. From this 
basis organizations will tend to balance between defender and prospector strategies 
within their market: thus, all organizations will be ‘analyzers’ in this respect, just 
differing apportionment between the two types. (Boyne and Walker (2004) merge the 
Miles and Porter typologies into a single matrix.) Consequently, schools such as the 
cognitive and resource-based, rather than strategies in themselves may be best seen 
as ways of enabling corporate capacity and capability in the delivery of strategic 
objectives.  
The degree to which the ‘reactor’ type is seen may be largely dependent on the wider 
corporate context, including the industry or market segment. (Although Miles et al. 
(1978) suggest the reactor type may be the least successful approach in the private 
sector.) As in this project the reactor model may be seen as a common strategic 
behaviour type seen in the public sector, with Boyne and Walker (2004) commenting 
that political centralization and the role of regulation will increase the likelihood of 
organizations being reactors. In the current NHS the strong hand of regulation is 
evident, as in the regulatory role of NHS England on the CCG in the project case study. 
Regardless of how emphasis has been provided on more emergent approaches to 
strategy and of more holistic and less planning styled theories, there appears to remain 
a need for strategy to always involve an element of planning. Thus, the approaches 
beyond the classical can be best seen as providing a level of richness and depth to 
the concept of strategy beyond mere simple planning: but again, they do not invalidate 
planning as a necessary element. The LTP and SMJ reviews fundamentally validate 
strategy as a modern management discipline. Within this strategic decision-making 
should be seen as a strand of this discipline.  
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The assessment of ‘what is strategy’ is a necessary step before seeking to understand 
how strategic decision-making occurs in this study. The analysis above allows further 
assessment of the role of strategy in policy and practice in the public sector.  
Strategy in a real-world public sector context 
CCG strategic decision-making will not happen in isolation and its context will shape 
the influences on how decisions are made. As with all strategy, there will be significant 
environmental influences and public sector organizations may demonstrate different 
features and experience different pressures to the private sector (Johnson and 
Scholes 2001, Moore 2000, Nutt and Backoff 1993):  
• The corporate goals of public sector bodies may be multiple, vague, and 
possibly conflicting (Nutt and Backoff 1993). Decision-making may thus become 
more complex in the absence of a clear overriding corporate objective, such as 
a financial bottom-line.  
• Strategy will need to fit within the authorizing environment, created by political 
processes (Moore 2000). Long-term direction is less concerned with the 
longevity and sustainability of the organization as an independent body and 
more with its relation to the current (and possibly future) political priorities.  
• Value may be identified as more important than profit. Moore (2000) describes 
value as the achievement of social purposes, rather than creating financial 
revenues. Even against this definition, value may also be more difficult to 
determine and be subject to political influence. Porter (2010) has defined value 
as the improvement in health outcomes for every ‘dollar spent’: but this does 
not necessarily address who agrees the assessment of improvement; which 
health outcomes matter most; and whose ‘dollars’ are used to fund the care.  
• Whereas private sector bodies may receive most or all their income from 
customer purchases, public and non-for-profit organizations will receive most of 
their revenue from sources such as taxation funded allocations, or charitable 
donations (Moore 2000). (Care may be taken not to over-emphasize this 
distinction as public sector bodies may generate revenue at point of service 
delivery, for example through individuals paying for pharmaceutical 
prescriptions in the UK. Furthermore, private sector bodies will often benefit 
from state funding either directly through subsides or indirectly through changes 
to taxation and rent regimes.) 
• Linked to the point above, “there is no automatic relationship between 
increments of achievement in the organization’s mission and increments of 
revenues earned” (Moore 2000). Thus, the challenge for public strategists and 
decision-makers is the achievement of certain critical objectives may have a 
limited, or negative impact on the organization’s financial health. Arguably, 
there is closer alignment of value maximisation, financial health, and corporate 
survival in the private sector (Moore 2000).  
• Although often financially constrained public sector bodies may have a much 
greater focus on performance and service improvement than a financial bottom 
line (Boyne and Walker 2010). The increasing focus on performance targets 
was demonstrated in the target setting emerging from the 2002 NHS Plan. The 
  40 
relative importance of performance targets may be further complicated by the 
presence of “scheduled interruptions” (Nutt and Backoff 1993): periodic 
elections and political appointments that may adjust performance priorities or 
abandon some altogether.   
• The authority to change and re-shape services and systems may be more 
limited (Nutt and Backoff 1993) and managers may need to take greater 
account of a wider range of stakeholders. For example, healthcare units that 
may be seen as ‘underperforming’ may not easily be radically changed or 
closed, where there is significant public opposition to such a change. Whilst 
discussing value, however, Moore (1995) does infer that an important role for 
public services may be its entrepreneurial one: that is not merely implementing 
policy but realising opportunities to provide value for the public they are there 
to serve.  
• Competing influences may distort strategy: balancing the need to achieve 
consistency with political leaders, members of the public, and achieve financial 
balance. The 2012 Health and Social Care Act may itself be seen as a 
pragmatic compromise that was as much to do with accommodating competing 
voices and pressures as with implanting an overall strategy (see Timmins 2012) 
All of these pressures are likely to be evident with NHS commissioners, and they 
consequently helped to shape the hypothesized influences described in the conceptual 
framework. Although arguably the strategic approaches and intentions described 
above remain just as relevant to the public sector as the private. If Mintzberg (2007) is 
correct that the nature of the organization influences the strategy type, and the nature 
of the organization is heavily influenced by the corporate environment, then the 
influences apparent on a public sector organization will be significant. In the case of 
Air Canada (Mintzberg 2007) there is an organization described as very effective at 
strategic planning: at the expense of strategic thinking. This may be seen as a critique 
from a sharp critic of strategy as planning (that is Mintzberg). But if there is some truth 
in the assertion that planning and thinking can work against each other in the sphere 
of strategy, the influences upon CCGs may restrict opportunities for strategy 
development.  
Joyce (2015) concludes that strategy in the public and private sector is concerned with 
similar things: defining goals; analyzing situations; planning resource use; finding 
courses of action; and planning for longer-term outcomes. Whilst Joyce does identify 
that the role of strategy is broadly similar, the differing pressures and environmental 
context as described by Johnson and Scoles (2001) appear to suggest that public 
sector organizations need to accept modified approaches to developing effective 
strategies. Nutt and Backoff (1993) question whether the assumptions of private sector 
strategy will necessarily apply in public sector and not-for-profit bodies. They develop 
a detailed matrix describing the different factors that make private and public sector 
bodies distinct from each other in terms of strategy development. Many of the factors 
cited by Nutt and Backoff (1993, p.211), such as relationship to markets, political 
influences, statutory constraints, and performance expectations, appear relevant to 
and consistent with the macro level influences on decision-making as described below 
  41 
in the development of the conceptual framework in the current project. Nutt and 
Backoff (1993) conclude that public organizations need to incorporate ways to deal 
with the factors of their ‘publicness’ (those that are distinct from private sector bodies) 
and managing the factors will then influence the production of public sector strategy.  
Not only may there be different private-public factors for strategizing: the industry itself 
may provide particular challenges, healthcare being one of the most complex. Thus, 
Porter (2010) has written 
In any field, improving performance and accountability depends on having a 
shared goal that unites the interests and activities of all stakeholders. In health 
care, however, stakeholders have myriad, often conflicting goals, including 
access to services, profitability, high quality, cost containment, safety, 
convenience, patient-centeredness, and satisfaction. Lack of clarity about goals 
has led to divergent approaches, gaming of the system, and slow progress in 
performance improvement. (Porter 2010, p.2477). 
Whilst Porter (2010) eloquently discussed the concept of value in healthcare, he 
appears less clear as to how to unify the myriad of conflicting goals within a single 
strategic framework7. CCGs may need to continue to use strategy as both a tool to 
achieve organizational objectives and to unify (if only partly) the interests of its 
stakeholder base.  
Moore (2000) describes a public/non-for-profit ‘strategic triangle’ based on three points 
considered as critical for the development of effective strategy: value; legitimacy and 
support; and operational capacity. Value being the purposes the organization has for 
existing and its objectives in satisfying the expectations of its stakeholders. The 
direction as to where support for achieving value comes from is determined by 
legitimacy and support. Operational capacity determines whether the organization has 
the expertise and capability to achieve results and satisfy it value proposition. Although 
the specific description of the three in the public sector context is illuminating, it is not 
immediately apparent whether this is qualitatively different to some descriptions of 
wider strategic approaches. For example, Thompson (1993) describes a three-
dimension model of environment, values, and resources (‘EVR Congruence’) that 
appears to closely match the model of Moore (2000). Nevertheless, Moore’s (2000, 
p.199) comment “political management as important to public managers as 
organizational management” remains valid and important for public sector bodies in 
developing and implementing strategy. 
Joyce (2015) comments that most of the research into corporate strategy has been in 
the private sector, with much less conducted in public sector bodies. Exceptions to this 
include Boyne and Walker (2010) who summarize evidence from a number of mainly 
UK based local government studies, and the Johnsen (2015) study of the public sector 
in Norway.  Johnsen (2015) uses the Mintzberg et al. 10 schools as framework to 
explore how different approaches are used in the Norwegian public sector. The 
conclusions are that the most evident schools in practice are the design, power, 
environment, and learning schools: but with the most evident being the planning 
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school. Linking to the earlier statement of the multi-dimensional role of strategy 
(possibly more so in the public sector) Johnsen (2015) discusses the factor 
accountability being an important reason why strategy as planning may be important 
for public sector bodies. Thus “All organisations have stakeholders, but to the degree 
that public sector organisations are more prone to political processes than other 
organisations using tools such as stakeholder analysis… as well as using missions for 
motivating employees… and collaborators may also be relatively important. Thus, 
strategic management in the public sector is important.” (Johnsen 2015, p.246). 
Boyne and Walker (2010) test the link between public sector performance and the 
assessed categorisation of organizations within the Miles et al. (1978) typology. Their 
conclusion being that overall a prospector (innovator) strategy is linked to better 
performance (although the authors recognise the number of studies is limited and the 
prospector role appears more suited to Local Authorities than the NHS, where new 
markets are less easy source 8 ). Furthermore, they recognise that public sector 
managers will often exchange one performance variable for another depending on the 
context (for example, sacrificing service performance for financial improvement). In a 
similar vein Andrews et al. (2009) research public sector organizations against the 
Miles et al. (1978) typology, with reference to whether there is an observed fit between 
strategic type and organizational structure. Miles et al. (1978) infer that corporate 
success may be linked to an alignment of strategic with structure: for example, 
prospector strategies align most effectively with decentralised management 
structures. Andrews et al. (2009) confirm that public sector bodies demonstrate 
consistency with the Miles typology. They did not find, however, the corresponding 
alignment of strategies with management structures. For NHS bodies in this case, 
such as conclusion may not be entirely surprising. Structures of corporate governance, 
particular upper-echelon (board level) bodies, will often have certain prescriptions as 
to membership. In the CCG case this required certain statutory officers (CEO, CFO), 
specific clinical posts (executive nurse and hospital doctor), a minimum number of lay 
members, and a significant number of representative GPs. Other functions required 
by legislation (data protection, freedom of information) or regulation (various 
performance reporting processes) will further determine elements of a CCG 
management structure. As such it is unlikely a CCG management structure will ever 
be wholly dependent on its strategy. Thus, it may be hypothesised that if the Andrews 
et al. research was repeated in CCGs, and possibly a range of other NHS bodies, it 
would produce similar conclusions to their original research.  
Concluding discussion on strategy 
The review above has covered strategic literature covering both the private and public 
sector. This is considered necessary as there is a significant cross-over between the 
private, for-profit sector and the public, non-for-profit sector. Some authors, such as 
Mintzberg (2007) frequently do not differentiate between sectors when analysing 
strategic management. Others (such as Joyce 2015) identify similarities between 
strategic management in both sectors. Furthermore, the development of a greater 
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focus on business-like thinking in the public sector, including the use of techniques 
such as service outsourcing and open market tendering, suggests public sector 
management should seek to learn lessons from private sector organizations.  
The assessment of ‘what is strategy’ is a necessary step before seeking to understand 
how strategic decision-making occurs in this study. The analysis above allows further 
assessment of the role of strategy in policy and practice in the public sector. Returning 
to the three dimensions of strategy discussed above (intentional planning to support 
decision-making, communication to stakeholders, and validation through performance 
management) CCGs as public sector bodies may demonstrate a greater emphasis on 
the second and third of these dimensions than a private company. Although privately 
listed companies will need to manage the expectations of their shareholders, the 
stakeholder base may be less complex than an NHS body or Local Authority, as indeed 
may be the requirements for formal consultation on major changes. The age of 
austerity appears to be seeing a greater focus on central government top down 
performance management and regulatory control, which may further emphasize public 
bodies need to ‘deliver what they promise’. Such central control may, therefore, be a 
major influence on CCG commissioning decision-making.  
From the published literature on strategy we may conclude that as a concept it is multi-
dimensional and multi-factorial. Thus, strategy is: 
• Contextually dependent: from the influences of the external environment 
(including the operating corporate context but also the national culture) and the 
internal environment (culture and structure) of the organization. Due to its tax-
based funding source NHS bodies may be acutely influenced by the wider 
context.  
• Best described not merely as a plan or a pattern or a culture, but a corporate 
discipline that requires different elements. The apparent conflicts between 
different approaches and factors may be seen as a necessary dynamic feature 
of what is strategy. (Thus, attempts to eliminate tensions may be misplaced: 
even reconciliation between plan and pattern may be difficult.) 
• Despite the emergent nature and cultural factors relating to the concept, still an 
organizational tool that requires a degree of intentional direction and hard 
planning. Although for a CCG the role of strategy as a communication and 
performance management tool should not be underestimated.  
• Particularly in the public sector the three-dimensional nature of strategy (plan, 
communication tool, performance assurance tool) suggests strategy as object 
and practice is multifactorial.  
This introduces an area of exploration in this research project: that of how much actual 
strategic thinking can be undertaken by a public sector health commissioning 
organization? How will the evident influences shape strategic decision-making? 
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2.3	What	is	a	decision?	What	is	a	strategic	decision?	
Sociology and strategy 
Sorensen (1963, p.68) describes the cultural complexity of White House decision-
making and those involved: 
…each department has its own clientele and point of view, its own experts and 
bureaucratic interests, its own relations… its own statutory authority, objectives, 
and standards of success. 
Thus, for Sorensen (1963) however large (or strategic) the decision, multiple social 
factors come into play. This may be obviously true in ‘big P’ Politics, but probably also 
true in the more mundane politics of organizational life. 
The genesis of the project was the desire to explore and understand what goes in the 
process of decision-making in a CCG. The use of the negotiated order as a conceptual 
lens may question whether this really is a study of strategic management, or of 
strategic decision-making, or is it actually a study of organizational sociology (not 
unlike Watson 2003)? Well, perhaps it is, and must be, a study of all these elements. 
Understanding the sociology9 of the CCG may first require an understanding of what 
it is they are doing when they are at work. If the case study is of a large scale, 
significant and thus, strategic, decision, the observed behaviours will occur whilst this 
work is underway. Just as we may want to try and avoid barking up the wrong tree, or 
boarding the wrong train, so it may be best to avoid assuming that decisions are 
something they aren’t. Or that what is presented as a strategic decision actually is the 
thing the organization says it is.  
Introduction 
In the last chapter we define strategy, in the research context, as the means by which 
the CCG would state its scope of operation, its corporate direction and how it seeks to 
allocate and use its resources to address the needs of its population and manage the 
expectations of stakeholders. Thus, if strategy relates to large scale scope, longer-
term direction, and significant use of resources, what then conforms to the definition 
of a strategic decision and does the decision-making observed in the CCG fit such a 
definition. This chapter covers: 
• The definitions of a decision, a strategic decision, and decision-making 
• Described models of organizational decision-making in the literature 
• The concept of prospect theory and bounded rationality as a major decision-
making model as central to the analysis in the project 
• A short summary of strategic decision-making tools and approaches that have 
been used in private and public sector organizations.  
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Definition 
Having defined strategy and its application to the CCG in the current NHS, the subject 
of strategy then informs how strategic decisions are defined and described. Eilon 
(1969) comments that while there is large literature discussing definition of decision-
making, there is comparatively little defining what is a decision. Defining the concept 
of decision, we will maintain consistency with the previous research (Cox 2012, p.12):  
From Eilon (1969), Baron (2000), and Levin (1972) we may assert a definition 
that a decision is: a judgement to take action made from a range of alternatives, 
to achieve an objective, or bring resolution to an indeterminate issue. Decision, 
therefore, requires choice, a goal towards which the process strives and an 
action resulting from the judgement. 
This definition recognises, particularly so for decision-making in an organizational 
context, a decision will have three dimensions: an event; a process; and a narrative 
explanation10. Thus: 
• Event – what happened when (this may involve multiple dates and times) 
• Process – when was the start of the decision-making (initial genesis may often 
be long before something described by decision actors as a decision) and when 
was the implementation of the perceived intention to act? 
• Narrative explanation – why was the ‘decision’ made, under what 
circumstances and for what reasons? 
But many decisions are operational or tactical in nature: that is, they are made in a 
short-term timescale, on a small scale, and may not change significantly resource 
allocations. Thus, Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992, p.17) define strategic decisions as 
“those infrequent decisions made by top leaders of an organization that critically affect 
organizational health and survival.” In some respects, definition may be easier by 
describing what strategic decisions are not. Thus, they are not operational decisions: 
such decisions being smaller scale, of immediate or short-term timescale, being 
concerned more with implementing an agreed plan or established course of action. 
Mintzberg (1976) thus discuss strategic decisions as being particularly important to the 
organization in terms of actions, resources, and precedents set. (This suggests 
strategic decisions will have significance beyond the decision actions in the moment.) 
Whittington (2001, p. 58) states that, “Almost all strategic decisions involve an 
investment of some sort”. Although plausible, little evidence is provided to support this 
assertion. However, in the arena of NHS commissioning, essentially a function of 
resource distribution, the assertion would appear to hold true. That is not to say that 
all NHS commissioning decisions are strategic. Nevertheless, major decisions 
regarding direction of healthcare policy implementation will invariably tend to involve 
at least some element of resource allocation. A further sensitivity to the statement may 
be required, in that almost all strategic commissioning decisions involve investment or 
disinvestment, of some sort.  
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Johnson (2005) summarising strategic decisions states they are concerned with: 
• The long-term organizational direction 
• The scope of the organization’s work 
• How to gain advantage over competitors (but only in situations of competition) 
• Addressing the changing corporate environment 
• Building resources and organizational capacity 
• Responding to the values and expectations of stakeholders 
Consequently, they will be: 
• Complex 
• Made in situations of uncertainty 
• Impact on operations decisions 
• Involve the internal facets of the organization and its external relationships 
• Involve significant degrees of change 
Along more animated lines, Pidd (1996) describes strategic decisions as ‘messes’. 
Other management challenges such as ‘puzzles’ (agreed formulation of a challenge 
and agreed solution once found) and ‘problems’ (agreed formulation but no agreed 
solution) are seen as relatively straightforward. Messes, however, are complex and 
have (at least at the outset) no agreed formulation of the management challenge and 
no agreed solution (even at a late stage of a process). For Pidd (1996, p.69): 
Strategic decision-making is often characterised by ambiguity about objectives 
(other than survival), uncertainty about outcomes (they may be several years 
ahead) and great risk if things turn out badly.  
March (1988) identifies a number of ambiguities in organizational decision-making: 
ambiguity about preferences; ambiguity about relevance; ambiguity about history; and 
ambiguity about interpretation. Thus, for strategic decisions participants may face an 
environment where there is uncertainty over available preferences, the relevance of 
options, a differing narrative on the preceding corporate history, and competing 
interpretations of objectives and solutions.  
In a similar vein, Grint (2010b) provides a typology of management challenges of: tame 
problems (solvable by rational management thinking); command problems (dealt with 
by command and control); and wicked problems. Wicked problems for Grint (2010b) 
are similar to messes of Pidd (1996): 
A Wicked Problem is more complex, rather than just complicated – that is, it 
cannot be removed from its environment, solved, and returned without affecting 
the environment. Moreover, there is no clear relationship between cause and 
effect. (Grint 2010b, p.12) 
Strategic decision-making process and structure 
As strategic decisions are not merely events, being large scale and not merely 
operational, there are processes and structures that may be described in decision-
making. Mintzberg et al (1976, p.133) define a decision process as, “set of actions and 
dynamic factors that begins with the identification of a stimulus for action and ends 
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with the specific commitment to action”. (Mintzberg et al (1976) discuss strategic 
decisions as ‘unstructured’, that is being untypical and with no obviously 
predetermined order. This is considered consistent with the definition of strategic 
decision above and thus the additional descriptive ‘unstructured’ is deemed 
unnecessary as being a typical part of strategic ‘messy’ decisions.) Mintzberg et al 
(1976) further define strategic decisions according to their stimulus: opportunity 
decisions being purely voluntary to improve a stable or adequate situation; crisis 
decisions in response to a critical pressure; and problem decisions, that whilst not as 
urgent as crisis do present the organization with a significant challenge. The decision 
in the case study is considered to be consistent with that of problem: it was not a crisis 
and although sought to improve a service it was from a baseline position assessed as 
sub-optimal by decision-makers.  
The ‘simple’ decision process emerging from their research (Mintzberg 1976, p.158) 
lists the stages of: 
• Recognition of the decision problem 
• Diagnosis of what exactly the problem is and entails 
• Search for options to address the issue 
• Design of options either modification of pre-existing options or creation of new 
options 
• Evaluation and choice of alternatives 
• Authorisation of the choice recommended 
Mintzberg et al (1976) despite producing a simple model, do recognise the complexity 
of strategic decision-making and also include in their model the likely input of 
‘interruptions’: whether through political or external factors, or the emergence of new 
options and alternatives within the process.  
Witte et al (1972) summarises a body of management research that describes a similar 
decision process: a) identification of problem or issue to be addressed; b) gaining 
necessary information on the issue; c) find possible solutions; d) evaluate proposed 
solutions; e) selection of preferred option; and f) actual action taken. Witte et al’s 
(1972) research concludes that the orderly process of decision phases may not be 
seen in management practice. Rather the different elements of a decision process will 
tend to overlap and intermingle. Thus,  
We believe that human beings cannot gather information without in some way 
simultaneously developing alternatives. They cannot avoid evaluating these 
alternatives immediately, and in doing this they are forced to a decision. This is 
a package of operations, and the succession of these packages over time 
constitutes the total decision-making process. (Witte et al 1972, p.180) 
Therefore, if this research is valid, the elements in the decision process may be present 
but not happening in a logical order. Furthermore, the conclusions of Witte (1972) align 
with the Garbage Can model (Cohen 1972) suggesting a complex decision 
environment with contains pre-existing solutions looking for decision problems.  
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Decision-making models 
Following the definition of decision and decision process, the project uses the decision-
making form described by March (1991). Thus, decision-making is seen as an 
intentional process that includes four elements: 
• A set of alternatives for action (there is no decision to make without choice). 
• Some knowledge, however limited, of the potential consequences of the 
alternatives. 
• A preference ordering with which to compare and evaluate alternatives. 
• Decision rules with which to select the preferred alternative, whether formal and 
explicit or informal and implicit.   
It may be observed that for decisions generally, and particularly for strategic decisions 
the knowledge for all four elements may be imperfect. March (1991) describes the 
challenges to decision-making in situations of uncertainty (picked up in more detail on 
the discussion of bounded rationality below). 
The decision-making literature includes the development of a number of conceptual 
models of decision theory. The ‘base’ decision model may be seen as the rational 
model: originating in the literature of economics (Smith 1950, Muth 1962) it assumes 
decision-makers make decisions that are in their rational best interests. Many 
economists, particularly those supporters of free-market economics, continue to 
support the general notion of rational decision-making as the default model (Blume 
and Easley 2007)11.  
Stanovich (2011) has an extended discussion of the concept of rationality. This 
separates the definitions into: the “weak” definition as commonly used of rationality as 
‘based on reason’; and that used in cognitive science as “the actions of an entity in its 
environment that serve its goals” (Stanovich 2011, p.5). Stanovich (2011) also infers 
that for cognitive science rationality must assume the possibility of irrationality: that is, 
for behaviour to be rational there must be the possibility of irrationality. Furthermore, 
Stanovich (2011) see a rational model as fundamentally normative, not descriptive. 
Thus, in describing actual real-world decision-making, a truly rational model is a 
hypothetical concept against which actual practice may be compared, but it may not 
represent how practice is actually conducted.  
Other decision research has questioned the degree of rationality evident in decision-
making. Simon (1997) defines rationality as to do with the evaluation and selection of 
alternatives as part of a value system where knowledge of the consequences of the 
alternatives can be assessed. This is further separated into ‘objectively rational’ where 
a decision would be seen as rational if it maximized the outcomes in a situation; and 
‘subjectively rational’ where it is seen to maximize the outcomes given the known 
information at the time of the decision, although subsequent knowledge may show this 
information to be inadequate. The still further separation relevant to this context is that 
between ‘organizationally rational’, directed to supporting the goals of the organization, 
and ‘personally rational’ directed towards the interests of the individual. Thus, a 
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summarized rational decision-making model would be one where the decision-makers 
acted in the best interests of themselves (individual or organization), using the best 
available knowledge, following a logical decision process of: recognition, diagnosis, 
search, design, evaluation, and action.  
From the earlier assessment of rationality as a general concept, Simon (1997) 
introduced the concept of bounded rationality. Although decision-makers may try to 
act rationality, organizational man (as opposed to the economic man of the rational 
model) is constrained by boundaries imposed by the modern organization. Decision-
making in the modern organization is complicated by factors that limit rationality 
(Simon 1972): the cognitive limits of individuals; the complexity of the decision 
environment; decisions are often taken under conditions of risk and uncertainty; and 
the information of decision choices and options may be incomplete. Thus, limiting 
boundaries of information show that it is almost always sub-optimal (too much, or too 
little, at the wrong time, or in the wrong form); and secondly, administrative targets that 
influence performance towards maximizing target achievement more than overall 
corporate gain (the concept of satisficing). Schutz (1943, p.142) in an extended essay 
on rationality in the social world, states, “that rational choice would be present only if 
the actor had sufficient knowledge of the end to be realised as well as of the different 
means apt to succeed”12. Bounded rationality infers that such knowledge may always 
be imperfect. Although not specifically within the context of organizational decision-
making, the review of rationality conducted by Mercier and Sperber (2011) infers that 
overall human decision-making is rational, despite its flaws.  
Mintzberg et al (1976) suggest, consistent with the bounded rationality concept, that 
rational model literature on strategic decision-making should be seen as normative 
rather than descriptive of actual practice. Thus, Mintzberg et al (1976) and Nutt (1984) 
infer that the analytic phase of a decision process, critical to the rational model and 
where facts are established and value assessed, is actually little used in practice.   
From the 1950s onwards, research into management decision-making has produced 
a number of competing models to explain decision behaviour. All of them conclude a 
truly rationalist model is not descriptive of actual decision-making. (The rationalist 
model may, therefore, have value as normative more than descriptive.)  
Following the emergence of alternatives, typologies of such models provide an attempt 
to understand management decision-making beyond the purely rational (Eisenhardt 
and Zbaracki 1992, Das and Teng 1999).  Described decision models are: 
• Rational/Boundedly Rational (Simon 1997, Allison 1999) 
• Political (Pfeffer and Salancik 1974) 
• Organizational Behaviour (Allison 1999) 
• Garbage Can (Cohen et al. 1972) 
• Logical Incrementalism (Lindblom 1959, Quinn 1980) 
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The selection above is in part derived from the Das and Teng (1999) overview of 
management decision models, and those that appear in a number of decision 
typologies. The list is not exhaustive but is considered to involve the main decision-
making themes produced in the literature. The models above assume that bounded 
rationality is but one of several models. However, the assessment of a multiplicity of 
models may underestimate the complexity of the concept of bounded rationality and 
indeed mistakes elements of the model, particularly those that represent boundaries, 
as suggesting a different paradigm. Thus, we may contend that a fuller assessment of 
the dimensions of the other models shows them not as separate concepts, but rather 
displaying boundary like behaviour which belongs within a more complexly developed 
description of bounded rationality.  
Thus, the political model describes a pattern of competing interest groups (originally 
for Pfeffer and Salancik (1974) within academic institutions) where power and 
influence are the main drivers. Although this seems less than rational, that is the 
decisions are not made to support core corporate objectives, we may assert: the core 
corporate objectives may not be completely ignored; the structure of large academic 
institutions may promote a multiplicity of objectives for different departments; for each 
individual department, the decision motives may indeed be rational (at least in part). 
Decisions with political type features are likely to be more complex: the level of difficulty 
rising where there is more conflict among key players, greater capacity for stakeholder 
objection, and more relations to historical debates on similar ground (Nutt 1998).  
The Organizational Behaviour model (Allison and Zelikow 1999) describes a routine 
following of organizational procedure, using tools such as standard operating 
procedures. The routine use of such procedures regardless of circumstance, with no 
direct attention to corporate objectives or rational benefit, may produce sub-optimal 
and non-rational decisions. However, the development of standard procedures may 
be considered to provide consistency of corporate delivery, organizational efficiency 
and thus to be largely rational in creation. In this respect the model describes, in a 
detailed manner, the satisficing behaviour depicted by Simon (1997). Furthermore, the 
decision-making behaviours described originally by Stanovich and West (2000) and 
latterly by Kahneman (2012) separate the psychological processes of organizational 
decision-making into two types: ‘System 1’ is quick and intuitive, efficient, and requiring 
little consideration; ‘System 2’ is longer and more contemplative, considering 
information and evidence. For Kahneman problems occur when decision-making 
would benefit from the resources of System 2, but the decision-makers use System 1, 
sometimes out of habit. This may explain certain types of sub-rational decision-
making, driven by human tendencies to be influenced by biases and heuristics (mental 
short-cuts or ‘rule of thumb’). But it does not suggest System 1 type thinking is in itself 
not rational. Thus, for standard operating procedures, their use, in effect, provides an 
organizational form of systematised System 1 thinking. An approach that is often very 
efficient and effective. At times, a blind adherence to such procedures will be 
problematic and their very presence may discourage more consideration in the 
decision-making process.  
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The Garbage Can model (Cohen et al. 1972) collects in its wheelie bin the disparate 
parts of the decision process within organizations described as “organized anarchies” 
(Cohen et al. 1972, p.1). The main factors in decision-making for the Garbage Can 
model are three elements all with their own diversity at the point of decision (a ‘choice 
opportunity’): participants; problems; and solutions (Cohen et al. 1972).  The 
motivation for the process, however, may still be rational: and the elements described 
suggesting the garbage-like processes are further examples of decision boundaries.  
For example, the variable attention level of participants is consistent with Simon’s 
assertion of information limitations as a rational boundary. A significant finding in the 
Garbage Can model is that solutions in a decision process are rarely novel (Watson 
2002) and produced through the decision process (that is they are ‘solutions waiting 
for a decision’). Nutt (1984, p.443) quotes Wildavsky, as suggesting “managers don't 
know what they want until they see what they can get”. This may not be adequately 
covered in the original bounded rationality model: but this may reflect two elements. 
Firstly, the complexity of information management includes that of developing and 
assessing solutions. Secondly, the classical rational model is inconsistent with the 
demands of modern organizational decision-making. Thus, the occasions where a 
decision process will have the time, management, and financial resources to develop 
novel solutions will be rare (but possibly not non-existent). Nutt (1984), however, states 
that empirical research shows the solution-to-problem approach of the Garbage Can 
theory is only demonstrated in a minority of cases where decision-making is stimulated 
by problems. The original Garbage Can research (Cohen et al 1972) was conducted 
in academic institutions and thus may be seen to be more strongly reflect decision-
making in this particular environment, than more generally. Not surprisingly where 
decision processes are opportunistic they may be more obviously solution driven (Nutt 
1984), in part, presumably due to the solution often containing the opportunity. Nutt 
(1984, p.443) also concludes that although decision-making may have similarities with 
the Garbage Can, decision processes “were neither capricious nor whimsical, and 
each had a clear purpose”.   
Lindblom (1959) describes a corporate world of public administration similar to the type 
of Simon (1997) and Cyert and March (1992). A rigorous study of values and 
alternatives is not observed in the decision-making process.  Rather, a limited set of 
alternatives is available, due to the pressures of the political and administrative 
environment. Quinn (Mintzberg et al. 2003) describes not only cognitive limits (what 
can be known) but also ‘process limits’, what can be done at what time with what 
resources. Consequently, although progress is observed, it is often due to a series of 
small-scale ‘incremental’ changes, working within the confined choices of any given 
situation. The available choices may in part be the product of ‘framing’ effects (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1981). Critically for Incrementalism, decision-making (even at a 
strategic level) may not involve many (if any) large one-off events. Instead, “Policy is 
not made once and for all; it is made and re-made endlessly” (Lindblom 1959, p. 86). 
Importantly for Quinn (1980) logical incrementalism is not ‘muddling through’ but rather 
an example of pragmatic but essentially effective management.  
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The five models described above may be more constructively seen as elements within 
one model. For convenience we may describe the one model as bounded rationality 
and consider each of the descriptions above as sophistications and elaborations of 
that model.  
It may be necessary to reflect at this point that the concept of bounded rationality and 
the research into decision-making bias and imperfection does not necessarily infer that 
organizational decision-making is irrational. The ongoing development of technological 
progress, economic growth, and (more controversially) moral advancement suggests 
society does make decisions that are generally, and over the longer-term, in the 
interests of those who make them. This assessment may well apply equally to modern 
healthcare. Thus, Le Fanu (2000) may describe an end to the rapid progress of earlier 
phases in healthcare development: but its development to this point is not in question. 
Later progress may be slower but genuine progress in improving health outcomes is 
still observed. For Simon (1978) bounded rationality may suggest a distinction 
between substantive rationality, where the objectively most appropriate course of 
actions is taken, and procedural rationality, where the appropriateness has to be 
balanced against the limitations of bounded rationality. Within this definition it is 
suggested that a procedurally rational decision-making process is defined by “the 
extent to which the decision process involves the collection of information relevant to 
the decision, and the reliance upon analysis of this information in making the choice” 
(Dean and Sharfman 1993).  
Prospect Theory 
If Bounded Rationality is defined as the mainstream decision model, the self-
proclaimed authors of its road map are Kahneman, Tversky, and colleagues (see 
Kahneman 2003). The bedrock of the road map is the concept of Prospect Theory. 
This appears to be one of the most significant developments in recent decision theory, 
spawning a large volume of research and discussion (Barberis 2013). At its core it 
presents a theory of decision linking it to decision makers’ assessment of risk and 
reward (in a literal sense the ‘prospects’ of a decision process). The theory suggests 
decision-makers are risk averse for gains (that is will conservatively protect gains 
rather than seeking greater rewards for greater gain); and risk seeking for losses (that 
is where loss is perceived, greater losses will be risked to recover a loss).  
The theory also breaks down the decision process into editing (framing) and 
evaluating. The framing element shapes the decision process: Kahneman (2003) 
describes prospect theory as a ‘map of bounded rationality’ and as such Prospect 
Theory may be seen as a development in the concept of the rational boundaries. 
Framing in this sense is the process of constructing the boundaries: arguably, different 
boundaries in every case (Cox 2012). Importantly, the aversion to risk seeking 
relationship is, in part, influenced by how the decision frame is constructed. Thus, the 
framing process influences how decisions are taken: presenting a decision process as 
a choice of managing either gains or losses will affect how the decision is made. (There 
  53 
will be a return to framing in more detail in the development of the conceptual 
framework).  
Prospect theory also describes and develops the concept of decision heuristics. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) described the impact on decision-making of bias and 
heuristics (mental short-cuts or ‘rules of thumb’ that support rapid decisions). This has 
spawned a large volume of research into their effects on decision-making. The overall 
conclusion is seemingly that they do affect judgement. However, the research does 
appear to be largely experimental in design: thus, several celebrated decision study 
types, such as the ‘Asian Disease problem’13 (Tversky and Kahneman 1981) may have 
only limited applicability to real-world strategic decisions, such as the current research. 
But there is evidence that heuristics should be considered in decision-making, and that 
certain strategies appear to reduce the negative impact of bias, particularly that of the 
‘framing effect’. These may include: promoting diversity of opinion within the decision 
process; more thorough consideration of options and problems; and framing problems 
from different perspectives.  
Biases identified in the literature include: 
• Availability heuristic: ‘if you can think of it, it must be important’. The easier it is 
to remember something the more its consequences are considered important. 
“Tornadoes were seen as more frequent killers than asthma, although the latter 
cause 20 times more deaths” (Kahneman 2012, p.138).   
• Representational heuristic: where features commonly found in a population are 
considered as overly present. In one sense this is judgement by stereotype and 
can mean decision-making is influenced by provided information, regardless of 
its accuracy or relevance (Tversky 1974).  
• Affect heuristic: in simple terms the emotional impact of certain terms. ‘Do I like 
it? Do I not like it?’, emotion often being more important than evidence. “If their 
feelings toward an activity are favourable, they are moved toward judging the 
risks as low and the benefits as high; if their feelings toward it are un- 
favourable, they tend to judge the opposite—high risk and low benefit” (Slovic 
et al. 2004).  
• Anchoring heuristic: judgement based on the impact of an initial value, even a 
completely random value. Thus, in many cases the first number presented 
influences the effect of any subsequent number (Tversky 1974).  
• Hindsight bias (Stanovich and West 1998) is seen where individuals 
overestimate what they would have known due to knowledge of an outcome. 
This ‘rewriting of history’ is also described as the ‘narrative fallacy’ (Taleb 2007) 
where history is written backwards from the known outcome.  
• Confirmation bias (Nickerson 1998, Mahoney 1977) involves searching for data 
that supports an existing opinion or position, at the expense of information that 
may contradict these existing opinions. Nickerson (1998) describes different 
forms of confirmation bias and related biasing tendencies such as 
overconfidence.   
• The Endowment effects: there is a discrepancy between ‘willingness to buy’ and 
‘willingness to sell’ (Kahneman et al. 1990). People appear to assign much 
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greater value to something when they own it; conversely by comparison non-
owners do not endow properties with additional value.  This discrepancy may 
negatively affect the ability for individuals to make effective trades.  
• The Peak and End effect shows that when experiencing uncomfortable 
experiences, such as colonoscopy, (Redelmeier and Kahneman 1996) people 
will remember the most intense pain and the pain felt at the end of the event 
more than the length. Long and uncomfortable events may be seen in a more 
positive light if there is no extreme pain and the last few minutes feel more 
comfortable.  
• Framing effects (Kahneman 2003) most obviously described through the 
conclusions of prospect theory and the Asian Disease Problem (see section 
2.6). Nickerson (1998) infers that biases that have been attributed to 
motivational factors may be due as much to cognitive factors such as framing.  
 
West et al (2012) indicates that cognitive ability may not reduce the likelihood of 
decision bias.  
Whilst biases may be evident in any decision process, it may be helpful to explore how 
the influences discovered in the case study create, amplify, or mitigate heuristics and 
biases.   
System 1 thinking as Fast and Frugal Heuristics 
The dual-process decision system of Stanovich and West (2000) and Kahneman 
(2012) has been summarised as ‘System 1 and System 2’. This identified problems 
when the intuitive, shorthand decision process of System 1 was used where the more 
deliberative, considered approach of System 2 might be more appropriate (see Evans 
and Stanovich 2013, for a summary of recent debates on dual-process theories). 
However, there was no suggestion that System 1 was redundant, rather that its reflex 
use may produce sub-optimal decisions. The confirmation of the benefits of heuristic 
(essentially System 1 type) decision-making is emphasised by Gigerenzer (1996): 
summarised as ‘Fast and Frugal Heuristics’. Simplistically this celebrates the approach 
of System 1 and suggests the critiques of human decision-making as by Kahneman 
and others minimises the benefits of heuristics. Furthermore, Gigerenzer and Todd 
(2001) approvingly quote Herbert Simon as not seeking to optimise the decision-
making process. Evidently for Gigerenzer, and at least the interpretation of Simon he 
favours, decision-making research should focus on understanding and exploring, more 
than in trying to establish normative models. Although Gigerenzer is critical of the 
Kahneman approach, he still seeks to work within a framework of bounded rationality. 
Thus, where Kahneman claims to draw the bounded rationality road-map, Gigerenzer 
(2001) proclaims to develop its ‘toolbox’. It may be inferred that rather than producing 
alternatives to bounded rationality or indeed different variants within it, there may be 
an overall systematic approach to decision-making that may be labelled bounded 
rationality. To some degree the Kahneman-Gigerenzer opposition (explicitly 
recognised by both sides of the debate) reflects the different starting points. One 
seeking to explain inefficiencies in a decision-making process and finding reasoning 
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in bias and framing effects: the other seeing the same processes (shortcut rules of 
thumb and intuitions) which produce consistently effective decision-making over the 
longer-term. This may be a false opposition with a possible need to synthesise the 
‘road-map’ with the ‘toolbox’. Vranas (1999) suggests there may be more consistency 
between the two approaches than accepted by either side. In part Gigerenzer’s wish 
to not see decision-making behaviour in terms of ‘errors’ perhaps strays too far to imply 
that few errors are present. One element of Gigerenzer’s critique is the potentially 
empirical weakness of the Kahneman school approach. Some authors (Vranas 1999) 
suggest this assessment may be over-stated. However, although there is a consistent 
body of research on the accuracy of actuarial decision models (Meehl 1954, Dawes 
1999), Dana and Davis-Stober (2016) infer that overall a heuristic or fast and frugal 
approach may approximate closely to the effectiveness of actuarial models. In the 
context of this project it may be stated that not only may a good deal of the research 
utilising experimental methodologies have weak ecological validity; but this weak 
ecological validity may be amplified when attempted to generalise to strategic 
decisions.  
Klein (2008) has developed a naturalistic decision-making model. This has some 
similarities to fast and frugal, in that it seeks to describe how effective and positive is 
much of actual real-world decision-making. A major element in Klein’s (2008) thinking 
and the naturalistic model is the importance of context. Thus, the potential weak 
ecological validity of Prospect Theory type research is considered a fundamental flaw 
in assessment of decisions in practice. Although Klein is critical of what is considered 
a tendency to over-estimate the weaknesses of System 1 type decision thinking, the 
overall project of naturalistic decision-making theory may be seen to be to 
complement, rather than replace, the analysis of Kahneman and colleagues (for 
example see Klein 2013). There may be similarities between Klein and Weick (2001), 
both of whom have studied the decision-making behaviour of fire-fighters. Thus, both 
conclude real-world decision-making may be messy and complex, but is generally 
effective, if not necessarily compliant with a linear rationalist model. Similarly, 
Nickerson (1998) describes a number of factors which mitigate against decision-
making short-cuts and heuristics (such as the confirmation bias) being considered as 
‘errors’. Thus, real-world decision behaviour may not always comply with an abstract 
normative model: but it may still be effective.   
Overall, therefore, the definitions of rationality as consistent with that of Simon (1997), 
as described above, may infer that intuitive decision-making models (whether 
described as System 1, fast and frugal, or naturalistic) may still be broadly rational. 
They do appear to use knowledge to evaluate options to maximise outcomes: even 
more so they may be subjectively rational (Simon 1997) in that they aim to maximise 
outcomes with the known information at the time of decision. This may not necessarily 
be objectively rational; but this may only be known either by the use of other knowledge 
(potentially outside of the knowledge base of the decision-makers at the point of 
decision) or at some future point after the decision is made. In some cases, it may be 
argued that decisions judged as non-rational, due to outcomes that do not maximise 
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for individuals, can only be judged as such by the use of hindsight or outcome bias. 
Furthermore, following Stanovich (2011), if the objectively rational model is seen a 
primarily normative, then one may argue that a rational approach and rational steps 
may be taken in a decision-making process, even if the behaviour may vary from a 
fully rational normative behaviour. The rationality then being procedural, rather than 
objectively or substantively rational (Simon 1978, Dean and Sharfman 1996).  
Similarly, it may be incorrect to describe behaviour which varies from the normative 
model as ‘irrational’.  
The ‘rational’ role of System 1 type thinking is given further support by the somatic 
marker hypothesis (SMH) (Damasio 1996, Dunn 2006). SMH suggests that: there is a 
neurobiological explanation for differing approaches to decision-making; and that the 
different parts of the pre-frontal cortex involved in decision-making do, nevertheless, 
work in concert. The ‘somatic markers’ are intuitive cognitive markers derived from 
previous experience which guide later cognitive consideration. An absence of somatic 
markers may produce sub-optimal decision-making (Bechara et al 1999). If the SMH 
is correct then the dual-process, System 1-System 2, approach cannot be seen as 
being entirely separated into two parts. Furthermore, System 2 may be both enhanced 
(or at least directed) by System 1 and subject to its own bias and mis-directions, 
without intuition. Despite its enthusiasts, and a plausible neuro-biological explanation, 
doubts exist as to whether the limited experimental empirical evidence is sufficient to 
move the SMH from hypothesis to theory (Colombetti 2008). Further research may be 
required to take a hypothesis, grounded in some evidence and a biological description, 
to a more consistent casual explanation for decision-making and a possible clear link 
between System 1 and System 2.  
Consequently, it may be concluded that the System 1/fast and frugal approach can 
still be considered broadly rational and may conform to the steps of rational decision-
making described above (recognition, diagnosis, search, design, evaluation, and 
action). The sub-rational elements of a decision-making process, and where System 
2 thinking may be beneficial is less in following of a rational process (such as the six 
steps) and more in the level of analytical scrutiny, use of evidence, and balanced 
evaluation used at each of the six levels. System 1 then may be efficient and still 
rational for most decisions. In strategic decision-making an over-reliance on System 1 
may provide decision errors, and despite the claims of Gigerenzer (1996) and the 
claims of cognitive benefits of the SMH, the role of a System 2 approach may be 
necessary to support the most effective and, arguably, most rational decision-making.  
Decision-making behaviours: heuristics and biases; and habits and 
backgrounds 
In this research explanations may be forthcoming in how CCG decision-makers use 
heuristics (in both positive and negative modes) and how the external influences shape 
the decision-making process, and thus produce framing effects. Such effects may 
produce distortions to decision-making behaviour or may provide reaction from 
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decision actors that may mitigate framing effects. From either perspective, we may 
see the impacts on the decision-making process that promote and allow heuristics and 
the potential effects where decision-making behaviours work away from achieving 
corporate objectives.  
The fast and frugal concept may have relevance for this study due to the presence 
within the decision-making body of a large proportion of GPs. GPs in their clinical life 
will typically have a large number of clinical contacts, often of short duration (in many 
cases 10 minutes). Such a clinical decision-making environment will promote the use 
of shortcuts and intuition (“intuition is nothing more and nothing less than 
remembering” Kahneman 2012, p.237). This approach will often be generally effective 
(that is achieving a clinically desirable outcome) and invariably efficient (that is 
producing the outcome at a cost-effective value). Thus, the question is raised as to 
what happens when such an approach is translated into strategic commissioning 
decision-making. Will the instinct to be fast and frugal (and efficient) overcome any 
desire for consideration or search for evidence? Or will the lack of anything to 
remember (for ‘intuition is remembering’) provide an unwillingness to make snap 
decisions in areas where decision actors are unfamiliar?  
A further factor worthy of exploration is not merely the role of heuristics and biases 
(good or bad) from the individual decision-maker, but also how they are displayed and 
managed within the group. Besharov (2004) suggests attempts to reduce the impact 
of biases in decision-making may be self-defeating and produce more negative results 
than the biases themselves would promote in the first instance.  
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Strategic decision-making tools 
Flowing from earlier consideration of strategy reference may be made to strategic tools 
to support organizational decision-making. Johnson (2005) summarises one of the 
commonest tools supporting decision-making on corporate portfolio management, the 
Boston Consultancy Group (BCG) growth-share matrix. This is aimed not merely as 
assessing the status of a company portfolio but to assist in decision-making as to future 
investment decisions. Thus, Cash Cows represent established services in mature 
sectors with low possibility of growth but a steady stream of profit. Dogs have low 
chance of growth, make little money and may be seen as a drain on corporate 
resources. Stars may be new services in sectors with high growth prospects. Question 
marks are possibly stars and their answering will move them into one of the other 
boxes. Thus, for investment decisions this may suggest: cash cows need support but 
limited investment and a focus on cost management; stars need investment while in a 
growth phase, before they mature into cash cows; question marks need to be 
answered as soon as possible; and dogs need to be transformed or jettisoned. 
Criticisms of the matrix have labelled it simplistic, reductionist, and mechanistic 
amongst other descriptions (Madsen 2017). Although described as being “largely 
discredited in academic circles” (Madsen 2017, p.19) it, nevertheless, appears to 
persist as a planning tool.  
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Figure 5 - BCG Growth-Share Matrix (from Johnson 2005) 
Montanari and Bracker (1986) provide an attempt to use a variant of the matrix in a 
public sector setting. Here growth and market share have been replaced by ‘public 
need and support’ and ‘organizational capability’. Thus, the dimensions represent what 
an organization’s public may need or desire and what an organization is capable of 
doing in response. Although possibly useful as a tool to assist in decisions, there would 
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appear to be a need for more obviously strategic thinking in terms of longer-term 
objectives and corporate direction to inform the production of strategic options in the 
first place. Even then it is not clear that choosing between options based primarily on 
public popularity and capability is necessarily strategic behaviour: rather this may be 
seen as opportunistic. Such opportunism may be warranted but possibly only if 
informed by a wider strategic view. 
Figure 6 - Public sector portfolio matrix (from Montanari and Bracker 1986) 
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Johnson (2005) lists a number of other matrices like tools that are developed to assist 
in decision-making. (Madsen 2017 lists seven variants of the BCG matrix alone.) 
Although all of interest as potential use, none may be a substitute for a clear 
articulation of strategic direction and may be criticized as a slightly artificial attempt to 
present management templates as scientific decision-making.  
Concluding remarks on strategic decision-making  
The literature on decision-making in its more general sense is illuminating and helpful 
to frame the discussion on strategic organizational decision-making. However, much 
of this literature on wider decision-making, for example, much of that produced by 
Kahneman (2012), is experimental in design and may be seen as having limited 
ecological validity when applied to organizational decisions. Despite its possible 
limitations, it appears difficult to effectively discuss decision-making without reference 
to Kahneman and colleagues and their subsequent critics. Recent developments 
linked to neuroscience (for example, Damasio 1996) may also inform decision-making 
assessment but may need to be tested in practice for consideration in terms of 
organizational decision-making.  
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The project uses a definition of strategic decision-making combining Eisenhardt and 
Zbaracki (1992), Johnson (2005), and Whittington (2001), a strategic decision is thus 
defined as:  
An infrequent decision made by leaders of an organization that critically affects 
long-term organizational health, survival, and involve significant changes to 
resource allocation that impact on the organization’s stakeholders.  
The five decision models identified above may appear unrelated at first glance but can 
be described as appearing along a typological axis. As suggested, it may be 
considered as part of a bounded rationality continuum, with different models or 
elements of models evident in particular types of decision. (This is more 
straightforward to assume, if for the purposes of this project the truly ‘rational’ model 
of free market economics (for example Muth 1961) is considered to be rarely 
demonstrated in organizational, and possibly all strategic, decision-making.) Thus, in 
addition to a definition the project uses a working model of organizational decision-
making based on bounded rationality (Simon 1997) incorporating prospect theory 
(Kahneman 2003). The exploration with CCG decision-making is how the influencing 
factors and the organization of the negotiated order may create or change the 
boundaries of bounded rationality.  
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2.4	Negotiated	order	and	group	decision-making	
No such thing as… 
Kenneth Clarke’s Prime Minister whilst Health Secretary was the formidable Margaret 
Thatcher, who famously stated “there is no such thing as society” (Thatcher 1987). 
Arguably the famous Woman’s Own interview is often taken out of context and a later 
part of the interview elaborates further: “There is no such thing as society. There is 
living tapestry of men and women and people…” (Thatcher 1987). The anthropologists 
such as Geertz (1973) may conclude that the living tapestry is just another way of 
describing society14. Either way, society or living tapestry, there seems a consensus 
that the individual cannot exist for too long on their own…particularly in the modern 
form of organizations. Human beings live in groups: the human an essentially social 
animal. The corporate world has a wealth of literature on ‘leadership’ (Grint 2010a) 
implying in some cases the benefits of the individual over the group. Nevertheless, 
organizations still entrust much of their major decision-making to some form of group: 
be it called a Board, or a committee system with another nomenclature. In the case of 
the CCG its leading decision-making body is a Governing Body. Beyond the leading 
decision-making bodies, organizations themselves are collections of groups, with their 
own sociologies (Watson 2003). But the collections produced may not be free of 
tension. Watson (2002) identifies the inherent, necessary, and arguably irreconcilable 
conflict between: the organization’s need to control its resources to maximise 
efficiency; and the requirement to allow (often promote) autonomy for those within the 
organization. How the groups develop, interact, and reconcile their contradictions may 
be through the process of negotiation: such processes within the field of decision-
making shaping the decisions that are eventually made.  
Introduction 
This chapter reviews literature on group decision-making in organizations, leading on 
to an introduction and exploration of the concept of negotiated order. Negotiated order 
considered the practical process through which a manageable order of organizational 
life and decision-making is possible: and the frame through which the research 
question was explored. The chapter discussed: 
• The dynamics of group behaviours in decision-making and the influences of 
group behaviours on decision outcomes 
• The concept of organizations as coalitions and the emergence of the concept 
of the negotiated order 
• Reviews of NHS senior decision-making bodies and how they behave, including 
how they are seen to make decisions 
• The role of power in organizations as a tool of negotiation 
• The interplay between different roles in organization as covered in the agent-
steward problems 
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• A return to the question of ‘what is commissioning for’ through the lens of the 
negotiated order 
Group behaviours in decision-making 
Studies of group decision-making suggest there may be differing dynamics at play 
than those seen with individuals? (Baron 2003). We may categorize conclusions from 
previous studies into those identifying positive and negative impact of group dynamics. 
Negative decision behaviour identified in the literature includes the concepts of 
groupthink (Janis, 1982) and group polarisation (Isenberg 1986). Janis (1982) 
originally coined the term groupthink defined as “when the members’ striving for 
unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of 
action” (Janis 1982, p.9). It appears it may be related to the type of group members 
(as with the ‘Jupiter Effect’ (Belbin 2010). Although, however, the experimental 
research into groupthink is somewhat equivocal, there is descriptive evidence that 
conclusively supports the assertions of this view (Baron 2005). Group polarisation 
(Isenberg 1986) suggests that group decisions in certain situations may be riskier than 
the individual decisions of group members. In some respects, this is similar to 
groupthink, but rather than suggesting a general tendency to conformity, it proffers a 
group decision model where strong views become ever stronger through the decision 
process. Factors moderating against group polarisation (Isenberg 1986) are 
suggested as processes that become more factual and a greater focus on decision-
maker values.  
Evidence supporting the positive effects from group decision-making includes two 
related but independently conducted studies from central banks (Blinder and Morgan 
2000, Lombardelli et al. 2002). The studies, experimental in design and relating to 
economic decision-making, conclude that groups not only make more accurate 
decision and predictions, they also tend to do this more quickly than when the same 
tasks are conducted by individuals. The two studies would appear to support CCGs in 
using an established board to make its major decisions. Ferguson (2006) infers that a 
factor in the outcome of the World War II was the competing decision processes: 
decision by committee (on the Allied side) being slow, bureaucratic, requiring huge 
efforts to achieve consensus, but ultimately being more effective than decision by an 
individual. The suggestion here being that decision by committee is more precise and 
removes bad ideas (or at least weaker ones) than a fast, individual decision-making 
process. (This suggestion may need to be tempered by recognising the quality of group 
versus decision-making will depend on the quality and state of mind of both the 
relevant groups and individuals.)  The benefits of groups in a decision-making process 
appear in part to be generated by the presence of challenge within the decision-making 
body. Thus, the ‘weeding out’ of weaker ideas described by Ferguson (2006) requires 
a suitably diverse group, with members willing to adopt different positions.  
The related concept of Devil’s Advocacy15 (DA), is summarised in the meta-analysis 
of Schwenk (1990) as superior overall to expert decision-making. Furthermore, the 
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more complex Dialectical Inquiry approach, which goes further in structured debate 
and evaluation than DA, was not seen to be superior to DA. Evidently a simple level 
of challenge and debate may be sufficient. Although the absence of a formal or 
informal DA role may not necessarily promote groupthink, its presence may well work 
against both groupthink and group polarisation. However, Schwenk (1990) also 
concludes that expert decision-making is superior to DA when “when the state of the 
world conforms to the expert’s assumptions” (Schwenk 1990, p. 172). Therefore, to 
promote most effective decision-making it may be necessary for a CCG to understand 
those cases which are more certain and fit within an established body of knowledge. 
But as one of the elements within a definition of strategic decisions is that of 
uncertainty, it appears decision by an expert alone may not be optimal in strategic 
contexts. This may also be influenced by the role of information in the decision-making 
process. Hall et al. (2007) infer that additional information may reduce the quality of 
decision-making. This is a laboratory study of participants judging future outcomes of 
baseball games where the group given the additional information of the names of the 
teams under scrutiny performed worse than those with less information. The 
conclusion here though may be not so much that ‘less is more’, as the authors state 
(in support of the Gigerenzer fast and frugal hypothesis), but rather that some 
information which appears useful (the names of teams in this case) may actually be 
extraneous and unhelpful. The Hall (2007) study is not of group behaviour and thus 
one conclusion may be that the influence of superficially useful, but misleading, 
information may be mitigated by the use of group decision-making.16 
A review of ‘work group diversity’ (van Knippenberg 2007) summarized research into 
group dynamics in two broad types: social categorization (simplistically the level of 
team cohesion and consensus within the group) and decision-making. The summary 
suggested that greater intra-group diversity (for example, group demographics) 
reduced group cohesion and contentment; but may increase the effectiveness of 
decision-making. But the review also concluded research was often conflicting and 
that further research into the field would be beneficial. Furthermore, the studies 
summarized were not limited to senior (board) level groups or decision-making 
processes.  
George and Chattopandhyay (2008) reviewed group decision-making and discussed 
three aspects: access to information; information processing; and commitment to the 
decisions made. They conclude group decision-making may be a strength and the 
facility to access and process information may be improved, possibly more so in 
diverse groups (with possibly wider access to information sources and more diverse 
processing skills). However, diversity may work against group commitment to decision 
implementation. Thus, the quality of the initial decision-making process may be 
improved: but in a very diverse group, commitment of members to implement the 
decision effectively may be weaker. Furthermore, the tensions within diverse groups 
may be initially productive but act to destabilize groups in the longer-term.  
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The hypothesis tested by Simons et al. (1999) was that for group diversity to be 
constructive there needed to be the opportunity for debate. This seeks to use ‘debate’ 
as proxy for the factors of information access and processing discussed by George 
and Chattopandhyay (2008). Thus, “Without a debate, a team’s diversity may remain 
an untapped resource” (Simons et al. 1999, p. 664). The Simons et al. (1999) research 
concludes that while diversity is beneficial it needs to be matched by an appropriate 
‘process’. Thus, the conclusions of this and other group decision-making research may 
be seen as displaying the benefits of group diversity (whether organic through group 
member characteristics, or artificial through intentional disharmony, as in DA) but only 
conditionally. Conditionality may involve the nature of the decision to be made and the 
resources available for the decision.  
The organization: as a coalition 
Cyert and March (1992) describe the organization as a coalition of different elements. 
This description of the ‘firm’ (organization) shows not a uniform set of actors working 
for a unified set of objectives. It describes a diverse series of interest groups and 
influences, with all different groups shaping different goals. Moreover, the different 
goals may not necessarily be complementary. This whole approach, if accepted, 
provides a significant sophistication to the issue of group dynamics. Thus, in this 
analysis it is not sufficient to only analyse group behaviour within the group 
environment, or indeed to assess the composition of the group. It is necessary to also 
assess the interests and groups of each inner faction within a group. In this analysis 
the group dynamics reflect the pre-existing positions of the different groups, with goal 
directed decision-making less in terms of one overall objective and more in terms of a 
patchwork of competing interests.  
Bloom (2013), summarising research into early child development with a perspective 
on moral behaviour, concludes one of the strongest human drives from the earliest 
observable ages is the one towards coalition. Thus, it may be that the appearance of 
coalitions within organizations is not merely observed behaviour: it is necessary 
behaviour of the human beings involved in that organization. It may, therefore, be 
expected that in an organizational form such as a CCG, there will be an inevitable 
impetus towards establishing group identities and formal or informal coalitions.  
Cyert and March (1992) have a model of the ‘firm’ that appears to provide a description 
of extreme consistency with the compositional dynamic of a CCG, and its Governing 
Body (GB). The CCG Governing Body has the following composition at the time of the 
research (consistent with most other CCGs to varying degrees): 
• Full-time executive management officers (Chief Officer and Chief Finance 
Officer) 
• Full-time clinical management officers (Chief Nurse) 
• Part-time primary care leads (6 GPs including the Chair and 1 GP practice 
manager) 
  65 
• Lay member as secondary care (hospital) clinical lead 
• Lay member with responsibility for patient and public involvement 
• Lay member with responsibility for audit and governance 
• Other co-opted, non-voting, members from partner organizations (Local 
Authority, Public Health, and Local Medical Committee) 
Therefore, although all members of the GB are formally committed to the corporate 
objectives of the CCG, the variety of backgrounds and associated interests of the 
individual GB members is likely to manifest itself as the group appearing a coalition. 
Cyert and March (1992) discuss the effects of the organization as coalition on 
corporate goal setting. Thus, the different elements of the coalition promote different 
goals. Not only different goals but also differing goal priorities at different times 
(referred to as variable ‘attention focus’17. Therefore, we may attempt to describe the 
different priorities that may be present within a CCG, priorities that we may seek to 
explore and test within the research.  
Governing Body Role Primary Goals and Priorities 
Chief Officer Overall corporate success, trying to balance the 
competing priorities and interest groups in the 
organization. Also mindful of maintaining external 
relationship (a goal in itself) and may sacrifice 
organizational priorities to maintain them. As 
accountable officer will ultimately tend heavily towards 
the ultimate ‘must-dos’ of securing safe services and 
achieving financial balance. 
Chief Finance Officer Financial health (not just balance but whatever the 
current determined target may be) and value for 
money. Although will have the goal of financial probity 
will be prepared to be ‘flexible’ in finances to achieve 
goals. Will see that ultimately finances support delivery 
of care but will seek to make the money fit.  
Chief Nurse Major focus on patient safety both through 
commissioned services (such as safe hospitals) and 
provision of appropriate safeguarding mechanisms (for 
example, in support of vulnerable adults with learning 
difficulties). Although focussed on clinical outcomes, 
will have less attention to whether a service is at the 
very edge of best clinical practice and more on whether 
the basics of care are secure. 
GPs Major focus on improving clinical care and clinical 
outcomes. May take some elements of safety for 
granted (in some cases wrongly) and may only see 
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Governing Body Role Primary Goals and Priorities 
money as an enabler to achieving clinical outcomes, 
not financial targets as an end in themselves. 
Hospital Doctor Primary role as a check and balance against the 
enthusiastic GPs who may seek to change services 
without appropriate regard to the impact on hospitals. 
Limited exposure to the CCG business means access 
to information is limited. Main goal to avoid chaotic 
disruption being produced by CCG decisions.  
GP Practice Manager Provides focus on development of primary care, 
primarily from an organizational perspective. Although 
has the goal of developing clinical services, principally 
in primary care, also provides a check and balance 
against GPs attempting to achieve the impossible in 
primary care. 
Lay member – public 
involvement 
Goal of engaging public, patients, and partners. Will 
seek to maximise attention given to engagement 
through any CCG process. Attempts to bring public and 
patient interests into the decision-making process, 
even though these may work against the stated 
objectives of the CCG.  
Lay member – audit and 
governance 
Prime focus on probity and good governance. Less 
worried about hitting the financial targets than how they 
are hit. One eye often directed towards the opinions of 
external bodies, such as auditors and statutory 
regulatory organizations. May well like process and 
transparent audits trails for decision-making. 
Co-opted members Priorities and goals will be in large part determined by 
their parent organization. Thus, although in theory their 
role is a GB member, will take their own goals into any 
decision-making process.  
In one sense the range of goal priorities, described above, provides balance within the 
senior decision-making team; therefore, the range works against subjective and overly 
prejudicial decisions. This may help to reduce the likelihood of behaviours such as 
groupthink (Janis 1982), evidenced, for example, through the research of Hong and 
Page (2004) into the benefits of decision-maker diversity. However, it may dictate an 
approach in the decision-making process of negotiation between actors to achieve a 
consensus: this consensus being not just to achieve an agreed organizational 
objective, but to establish what is the goal. There can be no necessary assumption 
that the goals in a decision-making process, even where relating to an explicit stated 
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organizational objective, are jointly owned, and clearly understood as the same goal 
by all decision makers.  
Negotiated order and negotiated environment 
The dynamics observed in the coalition of the organization are considered to produce 
a “negotiated environment” (Cyert and March 1992, p. 168) that appears consistent, if 
subtly different, with the concept of the negotiated order (Strauss 1963, Watson 2002). 
Negotiated order is defined as, “the pattern of organizational activities that has arisen 
or emerged over time as an outcome of the interplay of the variety of interests, 
understandings, reactions and initiatives of the individuals and groups involved in the 
organization” (Watson 2002, p. 76). Negotiated environment is the product of a desire 
to “devise and negotiate an environment so as to eliminate uncertainty” (Cyert and 
March 1992, p. 168). Furthermore, the corporate world produces a planning process 
that “provides a negotiated internal environment. A plan within the firm is a series of 
contracts among the subunits in the firm” (Cyert and March 1992, p. 169).  
One of the first approaches exploring the concept of the order within the decision 
making process, implying order is a negotiation of the various parties, was proposed 
by Strauss et al. (1963). Highly influenced by the work of Goffman (1961), Strauss et 
al. (1963) examined relations within the setting of a psychiatric hospital, exploring the 
creation of contracts, pacts or agreements between individuals and different groups 
within the organisation. These agreements were the subject of the negotiation process, 
which would draw upon hospital rules, policies, procedures, and the relative position 
of persons in the organization's structure. This approach is anchored in the symbolic 
interactionist tradition of social psychology, which explores the reality and identity 
construction of the individual through the process of interaction with others. The 
interaction in this context can occur via a multitude of mediums such as sight, 
language, or a compendium of cultural images. The study explored the process with 
different disciplines within the institution and the patients. It concluded that the 
agreements emerged from the negotiation process and that such agreements were 
always in the process of forming and changing. The term 'negotiated order' as a 
general application to the exploration of organizational life was not identified by his 
initial study but in his later work (Strauss 1982).  
Ram (1994) in a detailed study of working practices in clothing firms, describes a 
continual process of workplace negotiation and ‘muddling through’. Thus, “neither 
harmony or autocracy was an adequate categorisation with which to grasp the 
informal, complex and conflictual make-up of the workplace” (Ram 1994, p.150). Ram 
(1994) suggests that a great deal of time in the working environment relates to ‘effort 
bargaining’ in the negotiation of workplace order.  
Fine (1984) summarises four main elements of the theory of negotiated order.  
• All social order requires some form of negotiation; 
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• The negotiations conducted are contingent on the structural conditions of the 
organization concerned and follow patterned lines; 
• Negotiations are time-limited and require an iterative process of review, 
renewal, or revision; 
• Major structural change in an organization involves a change of the negotiated 
order. 
Nadai (2008) provides a summary of a number of criticisms of the theory of negotiated 
order. Firstly, that everything is negotiable, although the quotation of Strauss himself 
that “important things are always non-negotiable” (Nadai 2008, p. 5) suggests this 
observation may be a simplistic assessment. Secondly, those practising negotiated 
order give too much weight to the personal views of research subjects. This suggestion 
of subjects having perceived greater power than actually present in practice has been 
countered by suggesting that the concept involves assessment not merely of 
negotiation between individuals, but also of the impact of processes. Consequently, 
the research process identifies and explores the processes and structures at work 
within the social environment, not merely the negotiations of the individuals in practice. 
A third and more basic charge against negotiated order is the lack of rigorous 
definitions.  Thus, although widely used as a core concept, major theorists appear not 
to explicitly define ‘negotiation’. In Strauss’s work on negotiated order there is 
reference to negotiation at times as distinct from other relational terms such as 
‘coercion’, ‘manipulation’, and ‘persuasion’ (Nadai 2008). Depending on one’s 
definitions, such concepts may be opposed to negotiation or included within it as a 
concept of organizational interaction. Nadai (2008) describes necessary conditions for 
negotiated order to happen: tension between subjects’ interests (without which there 
would be no need for negotiation); and some capacity for exchange between the 
subjects providing some degree of opportunity for consensus. From the range of texts 
on negotiated order, such as Watson (2002) and Nadai (2008) we may propose a 
working definition of negotiation as:  observable attempts by decision actors to 
influence the organizational structures, power relations, and decision outcomes in the 
observed situation in accordance with the decision actors’ interests and objectives.  
It appears likely the dynamics of the negotiations arising through the establishment 
and maintenance of the ordered environment may influence the decision-making 
behaviour. Baron (2003) remarks that individuals may play different roles at different 
times, both formal and informal roles: for example, chairperson as a formal role, ‘clown’ 
as an informal role. From the table above, we may identify that individuals will not have 
only one goal. Furthermore, GB members may occupy a ‘corporate’ goal position: that 
is addressing the overall organizational objectives, rather than a sectional ‘interest 
group’ goal position at different times. This suggests a highly dynamic cultural 
environment. We may hypothesise the fluctuating relationships and balances of power 
and influence may be constantly recreating both a negotiated environment, who plays 
what roles at what times in what positions, and a negotiated order: which goals are 
consensually agreed are paramount, what secondary, and what discarded. The 
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organizational cultural environment may demonstrate morphogenesis: that is how 
much flux is present within the decision-making body, how roles evolve and the degree 
of goal shifting and prioritisation. This morphogenesis (shape creation in the decision-
making process) of the group may show fluctuating roles of both the formal and 
informal types. Thus, a table describing GB roles may be complemented: by one 
showing informal roles taken my individuals whilst acting as members of the group. 
Boards may take such analysis into the field of organizational development by 
commissioning personality trait studies of group members that identify personality 
types, for example Myers-Briggs Type Indicator analysis (Gardner 1996). 
We may describe the internal dynamics of the organizational coalition as stratified in 
three levels. One level is the formal structures and roles in place: job descriptions, 
committee terms of reference, schemes of delegation, budgetary responsibilities, etc. 
The ‘lowest’ level may be considered as the corporate culture (the informal shared 
meanings, values, and behavioural norms existing in the organization). In between 
these two then exists the level of the negotiated order. Therefore, the negotiation 
establishes the framework of informal personal, departmental, and corporate 
relationships. This framework allows distribution of organizational powers and 
influence and thus drives the prioritisation and goal setting.  
In decision-making terms, the negotiated order is reminiscent of the Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1974) description of the decision process as a political struggle. Fine (1984) 
uses the term micropolitics in discussing negotiated order and the elements are 
consistent with the models of: bounded rationality (not only limited information, but an 
organizational struggle for who owns information and whose information evidence is 
primary); and the garbage can (variable attentional levels leading to variable attention 
on prioritising goals). Furthermore, Quinn (1980) describes the role of the manager in 
decision-making as working with different organizational ‘sub-systems’ involving 
different groups at different times. Thus, applying an incrementalism approach to 
negotiated order supports the assertion of negotiation being a dynamic and on-going 
phenomenon across a decision-making process.  
With a theoretical foundation that has been traced back to Cyert and March (1962), 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) developed a framework for studying so-called ‘Top 
Management Teams’ (TMT) within an overall description of the upper echelon (UE) of 
organizations. This paper appears to have stimulated a whole sub-genre of group 
dynamic research, under the heading of UE (summarised in Carpenter 2004). The 
focus of UE research is into the group behaviour of those at the top of organizations, 
who we may assume are those most likely to be involved in strategic decision-making. 
Furthermore, although most of this is outside the NHS or similar organizations, it may 
have some comparisons with a CCG Governing Body. (Carpenter (2004, p.754) 
provides a typology of definitions of who is considered to comprise the upper 
echelons.) The UE research appears to support some conclusions from the 
organization as coalition concept. Manager demography (experience and background) 
appears as factors in UE behaviour, as do values held by TMT members. However, 
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research appears to highlight possible mediating factors, such as intra-group 
communication and the level of debate (Carpenter 2004), evidently supporting some 
of the broader group decision-making conclusions on information processing and 
avoidance of a strong desire for consensus. An interesting development is the shift for 
some authors from TMT to TMG (that is Top Management Group). This emphasises 
the dynamics of the senior body as often lacking harmony: the use of the term ‘team’ 
cannot be assumed to mean teamwork is happening in practice. Furthermore, 
Carpenter (2004) suggests that although much UE style research focussed on senior 
groups, it may be unwise to discount the impact of individuals within the group. Whilst 
the studies through the UE genre are helpful to inform the dynamics within a decision-
making group, it may be appropriate to place the demography and values of individuals 
and groups within context: broader environmental influences will remain very strong 
and may not be overridden by a senior team.  
A further dynamic within group decision-making is how the group members use 
evidence to support their decisions. Kovner et al. (2009) conclude evidence-based 
decision-making is more effective and should be promoted. However, they also 
conclude its use is not systematically applied across healthcare decision-making. This 
research is confirmed locally in the NHS by Cox (2012), who suggested one factor in 
the degree of evidence-based approaches used is the composition of the decision-
making body and whether clinicians (doctors and nurses) were part of the process. 
Thus, not only will different personalities, backgrounds, and roles shape how 
individuals behave in the decision-making process, but also their approach to using 
available evidence and information will vary. Clarke et al. (2013) surveyed NHS 
commissioners and found that the use of evidence in decision-making was variable, 
and that “Only 50% of respondents stated that clinical guidelines and cost-
effectiveness evidence were important for healthcare decisions”. Furthermore, those 
who most used empirical evidence came from Public Health backgrounds. The greater 
the seniority of the manager the less empirical evidence was used, with practical 
(‘local’ or ‘soft’ intelligence) used more frequently. For CCGs the presence of medically 
trained individuals per se may not necessarily improve evidence-based approaches 
(although this may be likely overall). Consideration will be needed to the involvement 
of different clinical disciplines (such as Public Health professionals) to improve the 
balance in the decision ‘team’ and the benefits of evidential techniques.  
NHS Boards 
There are a small number of published papers on the NHS and negotiated order:  but 
few looking specifically at board level behaviour (Exworthy 2001). This suggests there 
may be paucity of ethnographic research into NHS Board behaviour, and an even 
further lack of such studies into board or board level decision-making. Exworthy’s 
(2001) study explored negotiated order and role theory relationships between Chair 
and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) across 17 NHS organizations. The study used 
qualitative interviews within an analytical framework derived from the realist approach 
of Pawson and Tilley (see Pawson 2009). Exworthy (2001) found distinctions between 
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Chairs and CEOs. CEOs tended to have a large amount of NHS experience, Chairs 
typically much less so: over 20 years for a typical NHS CEO; less than 10 years for an 
archetypal Chair. In terms of roles, there appeared to be a more clearly external role 
for Chairs (referred by some respondents as ‘public relations’) and internal for CEOs. 
The relationships were labeled according to quality, from ‘strong’, through 
‘comfortable’, to ‘satisfactory’, inferring there is a likely span reflecting both the 
relationships between individuals, and the context within which such relationships 
occur. Where differences were identified between the roles, these appeared most 
frequent in the early stages of relationships, suggesting the process of negotiation 
required time to reconcile disagreements. Critical incidents (Exworthy 2001) were seen 
as an important factor, which may cement or weaken relationships, depending on their 
outcome and how the incident affects the relationship. Although the research highlights 
the benefits of role definition and, probably more importantly, role demarcation it also 
concludes on the importance of how the relationships develop. Thus, Exworthy (2001, 
p.90) states: “The evolution of the relationship over time was especially significant, as 
this was mostly conducted informally by reaching a set of tacit understandings and 
agreements”. The tacit agreements appear to reaffirm the role of the negotiated order 
concept in board dynamics, at least between the two lead participants.  
Published papers on NHS Board performance included a mix of guidance and 
research. The tendency was towards guidance rather than primary research. Where 
research was published its methodology was in most cases that of qualitative 
interviews. Seven recent papers receive more detailed examination below.  
Davies (2007) does not provide any primary research but is rather a review of 
commissioning in the ‘New’ NHS (no longer new following the latest reforms) from a 
legal perspective. The paper includes concerns regarding both the dual provider-
commissioner role of PCTs and issues in relation to its disappearance. Although this 
is primarily an issue of the past (CCGs having no defined provider functions) it may re-
appear should CCGs gain a greater responsibility for the commissioning of primary 
care. Further concerns were raised regarding conflicts of interest, particularly through 
the potential use of private companies to provide commissioning support functions. 
However, this appeared to be identified as a potential risk rather than an observed 
behaviour. Overall, the paper is written primarily as a critique of the then initiative of 
Practice Base Commissioning (PBC) rather than a critique of Boards per se.  
Veronesi et al. (2012) seeks to test the impact on corporate NHS performance of 
clinicians being a formal part of the board directors’ team. The research sought to 
examine Trust performance over a three year-period against two main measures 
(Healthcare Commission rating and patient morbidity data collected by the Doctor 
Foster research institute). The study was of provider organizations only and did not 
explore any similar theme with commissioning organizations.  
The research concludes that the inclusion of clinicians (essentially medical doctors) 
on NHS Trust Boards was beneficial in terms of the measures identified in the study. 
However, the paper also colludes the causal factors as to why the greater presence of 
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clinicians on boards would have a beneficial effect was unclear. Although no causality 
was established, if there is the possibility of some form of causal link between 
performance and clinician involvement, the development of clinically led 
commissioning organizations seems to be worthwhile.  
The Chambers (2012) paper is placed within the context emerging after the enquiry 
into Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust (MSFT), with its associated concerns for 
patient safety and compromised governance. The paper provides no primary research 
but ‘draws’ from social science literature on board working. Chambers identified three 
issues: 
• There is no consensus or consistent evidence as to an ideal Board form. 
(The basis for the original model of NHS Trust boards in 1991 is considered 
inadequately explained.) 
• Local circumstances are as important as any overarching principles for 
board working. 
• There is said to be an, ‘emerging proposition’ of effective boards needing to 
have: trust between the directors; robust challenge; a grip on the delivery of 
quality patient care; and delivered in a financial sustainable way.  
The first two points have some evidence and may be helpful in producing a better 
understanding of board functioning. The third point, whilst not necessarily incorrect, 
appears to, in large part, merely state significant elements of what a successful board 
would achieve. As such it may be as much an aspiration to a performance level, rather 
than tools to achieve an end. (How many boards wouldn’t want to be challenging and 
trustful, delivering high-quality patient care within financial resources?)  
Chambers (2012) does make the point that the close adoption of the private sector 
board model in the NHS from the 1990s was never reviewed in terms of its utility in the 
public sector. Chambers (2013) later produced a second review built on the summary 
of Chambers et al. (2012). As with the earlier paper, there was no primary research, 
but rather an extended review of associated evidence (reviewing 670 articles). The 
paper provides a very comprehensive summary of theories of board behavior across 
both private and public sector organizations. The conclusion from the research was 
the authors found no simple formula for successful boards. However, they suggest 
elements required for a successful board include "high challenge, high trust and high 
engagement” (Chambers et al. 2013, p.8).  Chambers et al. (2013) recommend further 
research into NHS boards into their composition, ability to influence on clinical quality, 
and the impact of organizational development activities with boards.  Governance 
failings are associated with (if not causally linked) to a lack of focus on clinical 
performance. Financial matters are sited as both preoccupying some boards away 
from clinical quality or being largely ignored by others. Some of the literature reviewed 
here critiques board performance as often lacking a focus on strategy: generally 
accepted as a major role for a board. However, arguably little of such critiques define 
what they mean by the term strategy. As our review of strategy infers, strategy itself is 
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a complex concept and thus we may question whether judgements as to how ‘strategic’ 
boards behave may be in part dependent on one’s definition of the term itself.  
Bevington et al. (2005) summarizes work related to “250 NHS Boards” over a four-
year period. The paper does not describe a methodology for the research with the 
NHS Boards, and therefore it is difficult to critique the paper as primary research. It 
was also written before the establishment of the current system of Foundation Trusts 
and as this is produced in part as a guide for good practice it may be considered a 
piece of its time, with more limited relevance to current practice. The article states, 
from the boards sampled, they tended to be either good at challenge or good at trust: 
but rarely good at both simultaneously. Some interviewed board members described 
the risks of groupthink in the higher trusting environments. There seemed numerous 
examples of this type of low challenge behaviour (references include terms such as 
‘club culture’ and senior cliques). The main conclusion and recommendation of the 
paper was that effective NHS boards needed to balance trust and challenge, with the 
key role in the body being that of the chair.  
The Ramsay et al. (2010) review has a broader scope than just board functioning and 
includes descriptions and assessment of corporate governance. As with Chambers 
(2013) there is an assessment of different models of board behaviour and 
governance. The review includes statements (common to a number of papers) 
regarding the importance of strategy within the role of the board. However, it also 
describes the importance of quality and safety and how high-performing organizations 
have this as a central and standing item on board agendas. Whilst the review covers 
many topics in other papers on NHS boards it also describes innovation as a 
foundation of good board practice. It does, however, recognise that the evidence for 
boards influencing innovation is limited. This may in part link to a deep concern in 
much of the literature with board accountability and responsibility, with governance at 
times being a synonym for organizational control. The Ramsay et al. (2010) review 
provides another useful summary of literature and views on board behaviour 
and performance; however, it also has no original primary research on NHS boards.  
The ICSA (2011) report collected data from NHS Board level Directors (through online 
surveys) and studied papers and agendas from NHS Board level meetings. There was 
some limited observation of actual board meetings (20 in number). From all data 
sources Board meetings tended to have a minority of issues that were considered 
as strategic, despite all respondents suggesting the main purpose of the Board being 
strategic issues. Examples were cited of board non-executives not challenging 
executive directors, even in the face of severe performance challenges. The research 
infers that from the Board papers scrutinized included only a minority (2%-18% 
depending on definition) of items explicitly presented as for a decision. This may be 
interpreted either as: an inappropriate form of agenda drafting with an excess of 
papers ‘to note’ with less focus than optimal on decision-making; or alternatively that 
as strategic decisions are large and infrequent, the ongoing work of a Board 
will include monitoring and assessment of services that are the product (or the 
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prequel) to a strategic decision. The research identified the major board priorities 
including “safe, high quality care” and “accessible responsive services” (ICSA 2011, 
p.16) as two of the top five. More so than the two most obviously ‘strategic’ 
themes: “shaping future healthcare” and “Resources used effectively, efficiently” 
(ICSA 2011, p.16). This may imply that although the Boards consider their major roles 
to be driving strategy and direction, their practice implies that oversight of operational 
delivery and performance is actually a greater concern. (For all types of NHS Trusts 
studied the overwhelmingly largest agenda theme for every type was 
operational performance (ICSA 2011, p.17-22).  
Despite all the NHS bodies researched being public bodies, holding some of their 
Board meetings in public and employed as being servants acting on the public interest, 
only 1% of respondents stated involving the public in shaping healthcare was a Board 
priority. The ICSA (2011) paper suggests an inadequate focus on strategic issues and 
too great a focus on operational issues. Decision-making was considered to involve 
too little challenge with a variable quality of supporting information for 
papers presented as for decision.  
The ‘strategic’ role of boards has been discussed, but not always defined. If this is one 
of, if not the most important, roles of a board, it may require further consideration, 
particularly where research seeks to describe just how strategic boards are behaving. 
Furthermore, patient quality and safety are also identified as high priorities in high-
performing boards. This may be seen as potentially contradictory, as much of 
the focus on quality and safety will be inevitably operational in nature. This is not to 
suggest it is inappropriate, but rather we may question whether the assumption of 
boards being largely ‘strategic’ is actually the case in practice. Some authors may 
suggest a board is strategic by its nature. Alternatively, it may be that boards are not 
necessarily strategic in nature at all and that the governance requirements involved in 
providing oversight and assurance into patient safety and quality are so important as 
to be a necessary function of NHS boards, whether they qualify as strategic or not.  
Similarly, the conflict between governance as a system of control overseen by the 
board; and innovation as a practice promoted by the same board may not be easily 
reconciled in practice. It may be that organizations accept different methods to 
promote innovation and accept that the requirement for the board to deliver 
organizational control and accountability as a body will not allow it to be 
particularly ‘innovative’. This may still allow the promotion of innovation within an NHS 
organization but not specifically by the board as a formal body.  
The scope of this research study does not allow consideration as to the ‘optimal’ 
configuration of a CCG Governing Body: the main constituents of the body 
are mandated in the 2012 Health and Social Care Act. Although there is the capacity 
for local implementation, there is relatively little discretion as to its composition.
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NHS Boards as negotiated orders 
The research and papers summarised above can be considered through the 
perspective of the negotiated order. Thus, Exworthy (2001) identifies role definition 
and professional background as influencing factors and the negotiated order process 
may be seen as the mechanism through which the alignment of roles and individual 
expertise profiles are managed. The perceived benefits of group diversity in decision-
making committees suggest a need to promote a level of role, and possibly individual, 
divergence; however, for the group to allow effective decision-making, diversity 
requires reconciliation. The desire to promote a sense of ‘checks and balances’ 
between power groups (as in the Chair-CEO relationship described by Exworthy 
(2001)) may necessitate such reconciliation. Consequently, the charge that boards 
may not always behave ‘strategically’, in that their agenda setting may include only a 
minority of strategic issues (and therefore, strategic decisions), may be misplaced. 
Consideration of operational issues, wider organizational development discussion, 
and a range of agenda items that may fall outside of a definition of ‘strategy’ may all 
facilitate group working. Such time may allow the process of negotiated order to 
resolve disagreements and allow definition of power relations.  
Bevington’s (2005) described polarity of ‘good at challenge’ or ‘good at trust’ may 
illustrate how negotiated orders evolve in practice. This evolution will be influenced by 
the composition of the groups, this determining the potential balance between 
challenge and trust. The wider environmental context may allow an assessment of 
whether the balance produced is considered ‘best fit’ with its own environment? As 
described in the example of a CCG Governing Body composition detailed above, the 
evident range of individuals in board level committees suggest ongoing negotiation in 
the group may be a continual feature of strategic decision-making.  
Agency and Stewardship Theories  
Discussion on the dynamics of board decision-making and the negotiated order may 
be further informed by an assessment of the role and nature of the board in the 
corporate environment. Consideration may be given to the concepts of agency and 
stewardship theory. Both attempt to analyse the relationship between the senior 
executive functions in an organization (primarily senior managers or boards) and those 
whom the executive represents (shareholder and owners in the original models). 
Public sector organizations have not been central to the early developments of the 
theories but have emerged as legitimate areas for consideration in contemporary 
research.  
As a brief summary, agency theory describes the Principal-Agent problem (PAP) (see 
Eisenhardt 1989 for a review of agency theory):  
• Organizations will have principals (owners, shareholders) with specific 
interests in corporate performance. The principal will appoint someone (usually 
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a senior manager or managers) to carry out work on their behalf, defined as 
the agent.  
• The interests of the principal and agent have the potential to diverge. For 
example, in managing risk, a shareholder would mitigate risk through a 
balanced share portfolio and may be best served accepting high levels of risk 
within an organization if it is accompanied by the potential for high rewards. A 
manager (agent) may seek to mitigate the risk through diversification into other 
economic areas that balance the risk: but this may be accommodated by lower 
overall returns. Thus, addressing the interests of the agent (lowering corporate 
risk to make sure the company stays in business) conflicts with that of the 
principal (who may accept the risk of corporate failure if it maintains higher 
short-term gains).  
• The principal and agent will experience information asymmetry. The agent 
(likely to be closer to the day to day business of the organization) may have 
greater access to information and may be able to use this to further his 
interests, at the expense of the principal. (For all three points see Jensen and 
Meckling 1976.) 
Agency theory appears to have emerged from the economic environment of the early 
1970s and in part reflects concerns regarding the attitude towards risk in major 
corporations. The theory has been subsequently finessed and critiqued (Eisenhardt 
1989) and may be seen, at least in its initial incarnation, as simplistic and reflecting a 
base in a rational economic decision-making model. Donaldson (1989, 1990) has 
produced an alternative model to agency theory, explicitly accepting that the 
motivations for actors are more complex than the classic decision model (and 
consequently agency theory) assumes. Donaldson’s model (1989) is consistent with a 
bounded rationality model and describes agents acting as stewards: working in 
consistency with principals for a common corporate goal. This suggests interests are 
more complex than merely simple economic self-interest and that principals may need 
to invest less heavily in performance management and control measures.  
The dynamics of agency and stewardship theories (sometimes included within a 
discipline description of organizational economics) may have relevance to one of the 
earlier questions raised and which may appear repeatedly through the review and 
possibly through the subsequent research itself: that of “what is commissioning for?” 
Thus, with the concept of strategy we identified tensions between strategy as long-
term planning and strategy as strategic thinking. This can be seen to lead to different 
approaches and influence how decisions are made. The nature of the organizational 
coalition within the negotiated order will influence both the approach and nature of 
corporate strategy (potentially in different ways at different times). Similarly, the 
dynamics within the coalition may influence the practical application and answer to the 
question of “what is commissioning for?”  
The challenge for describing agency theories for a CCG is in the first instance to define 
whom is the principal. This may be one of a number of possible stakeholders or, 
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probably more likely in practice, a network of stakeholders and interest groups. This 
provides a starkly different comparison with that of early agency theorists (for example 
Jensen and Meckling 1976). For Jensen (1976) the interests of the principal (primarily 
shareholders) are defined narrowly in terms of share price and profit. This provides a 
clear definition of interest and therefore allows straightforward assessment of the 
corresponding interests (divergent or otherwise) of agents. However, such a simple 
definition of interests has been criticised even in terms of its applicability to companies 
limited by shares (Donaldson 1989): such a simple definition may be even more 
problematic for a public sector organization. Thus, it may be concluded there is 
identification of the ‘principal’ role as being provided through a network of 
stakeholders, producing a complex web of associated (but potentially conflicting) 
interests.  
If the task of identifying the agent (in this case the CCG Governing Body) is 
straightforward, describing simple agency interests may be as complicated as with 
attempts at doing so for the principals. The attempt at such an exercise and the 
consideration of “what is commissioning for?” confirm the assessment of Cyert and 
March (1992) as to the complexity and dynamic environment of the coalition.  
Tools of negotiation: exploring the role of power 
The concept of negotiation demands an assessment not merely of those negotiating 
or the outcome of that negotiation: be it ordered or otherwise. It also recognises that 
the process that creates negotiated order involves the members of the negotiating 
environment requiring tools with which to negotiate. Possibly the most important 
aspect in the negotiation and the one that may be the largest dependent factor 
influencing the outcome of the order creation is: power. 
Lukes (2005) discusses definitions relating to the term power, suggesting difficulty in 
clearly defining power as one term. Dahl (1957) in an early essay on the subject 
provides a basic definition of power: “A has power of B to the extent that he can get B 
to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957, p. 202-203). Dahl’s 
approach focuses primarily on the element of power as a relational concept and Lukes 
(2005) develops the concept to a more sophisticated level but maintaining the possibly 
of one comprehensive definition of power. Thus, power is described as having two 
variants: ‘power to’ and ‘power over’, the latter being a subset of the former (Lukes 
2005, p.69). Thus, power to may not necessarily have a relational element, whereas 
power over will be primarily relational. This also allows power to be conceived as more 
than merely a feature of domination. Similarly, Giddens (quoted in Gaventa (2003)) 
describes power as, “both as transformative capacity (the characteristic view held by 
those treating power in terms of the conduct of agents), and as domination (the main 
focus of those concentrating upon power as a structural quality)” (Gaventa 2003, p.7).   
Lukes (2005) describes three ‘views’ of power, documented as three dimensions. The 
one-dimensional view of power (often seen as referenced to Dahl (1957)), also titled a 
pluralist approach, describes power in the field of decision-making and explores how 
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the various parties involved in a decision-making process exercise their powers. This 
view assumes power is primarily overt and visible to the parties and observers. In the 
two-dimensional (reformist) view (attributed to Bachrachand and Baratz, see Clegg 
1989), also focussed on decision-making, there is an acceptance of not only overt 
power, but also covert power and the ability of those in power to remove certain issues 
from the decision-making forum. In the three-dimensional (radical) view there is an 
identification of power, in addition to its overt and covert elements, as that of power 
over latent conflict. Thus, in the three-dimensional view those with power may not only 
remove items from decision-making, but to avoid their very appearance as issues in 
the first place. (Lukes’ three-dimensional model has been empirically tested in a real-
world setting by the case study of Gaventa (1982).) Clegg (1989) summarises the 
Lukes model in tabular form  
 
Table 1 - Summary of the Lukes 3-Dimensional Power Model (from Clegg 1989) 
 Three-dimensional view including one and two-dimensional 
views 
 Two-dimensional view including 
elements of one-dimensional view 
 
 One dimensional 
view 
 
Element 1st Dimension 2nd Dimension 3rd Dimension 
Objects of analysis Behaviour Interpretive 
understanding of 
actions 
Evaluative 
theorization of 
interests 
 Concrete decisions Non-decisions Political agenda 
 Issues Potential issues Issues and 
potential issues 
Indicators  Overt conflict Covert conflict Latent conflict 
Field of analysis Preferences 
revealed in 
participation 
Preferences 
embodied in sub-
political grievances 
Relation between 
revealed 
preferences and 
‘real interests’ 
 
Lukes’ (2005) three models may be theoretically applied to the CCG as a negotiated 
order in its decision-making. 
• One-dimensional. Through this view the negotiated order is played out in plain 
sight. The information and evidence used in the decision-making process are 
made visible to all decision-makers. Their interests are explicit as are their 
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points of view and background. The decision debates play out openly. The 
outcomes of the decision-making process are clearly defined, even if a 
consensus cannot be achieved.  
• Two-dimensional. Although the elements described in the one-dimensional 
view appear present, there are also identified elements in the decision-making 
process that are hidden. Access to information is unequal across the members 
of the decision process. Certain parties may promote selective evidence and 
information in support of interests that may be both overt and covert. Some 
elements of the decision process may be presented as fait accompli: assuming 
some decisions need not or cannot be made. 
• Three-dimensional. The overt and covert elements of the two-dimensional 
process are present, but some important factors may not even be considered. 
This may be through deliberate exclusion from the decision debate (‘they do not 
need to know this’) or through cultural influences that establish a ‘common 
sense’ acceptance that assumes some factors do not even deserve 
consideration.  
Lukes (2005) references Gramsci’s concept of hegemony in developing his three-
dimensional view in support of its dimension of ensuring consent. Thus, from this 
perspective consent and an acceptance of power relations is not necessarily a 
resignation to others power, but possibly a willing acceptance.  In a similar vein Harvey 
(2005) describes Gramsci’s definition of common sense as not being good sense, but 
rather “profoundly misleading, obfuscating or disguising real problems under cultural 
prejudice” (Harvey 2005, p.39). Hegemony here, therefore, is defined as the cultural 
predominance of a set of ideas and beliefs that is accepted by a social group.   
In its original form, Lukes (2005) three-dimensional view has the role of domination as 
significant. Domination being a constituent of the power of the powerful and by 
definition is a relational element of power as ‘power over’. Lukes self-critique appears 
to possibly soften the ‘power over’ aspect of power to fit the ‘power over’ as a sub-set 
of ‘power to’. This is consistent (and possibly prompted by earlier considerations) with 
the Morriss (2006) definition: power being the ‘ability to effect outcomes’. Thus, 
although the original three-dimensional view may emphasise the factor of domination, 
we consider the ‘one-two-three dimensional’ power framework is applicable to the 
analysis of the negotiated order of CCG decision-making. Without research we could 
not assume that domination was present or absent. The possibility of latent power 
within individuals or groups during the process bears consideration: through research 
it may be possible to explore the levels of overt, covert, and latent power. As such the 
Lukes power framework, possibly with necessary adjustment, supports analysing the 
systems of negotiation within the organizational coalition. It should be added that the 
use of the three-dimensional approach in the research is within an organizational 
context and elements of Lukes’ model are more obviously applicable to a wider socio-
political context. For example, the third dimension borrowing from Gramsci’s concept 
of hegemony and the wider Marxist conception of false consciousness. This may not 
apply directly in an organizational context in quite the same ways as the Marxists may 
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see false consciousness from a class perspective. Benton (1981) is critical of the role 
of false consciousness in the Lukes model and describes Marxism’s ‘paradox of 
emancipation’. In this project the third dimension is less related to false consciousness 
and more to how organizational decision-making works within unspoken and 
unchallenged cognitive frames. Frames that may provide power to certain groups that 
are then exercised, consciously or unconsciously.  
Morriss (2002) discusses at some length a definition of power and suggests a lack of 
definition is present in a number of works on power (Lukes possibly being one). For 
Morriss (2002) power is seen primarily as a capacity. He is at pains to separate a 
definition of power as a capacity and a potential: from its use as a thing (a resource or 
vehicle to demonstrate power) and as an event (the exercise of power). The perceived 
mistakes are labelled as respectively the vehicle fallacy and the exercise fallacy.  
Although the focus on potential and capacity may provide some degree of clarity, it 
may be a step too far to assume there is no vehicle or exercise element to power. For 
without a vehicle to exercise power or some evidence that power can indeed be 
exercised, how powerful would a potential be? Morriss may be correct to question a 
direct convergence of the three elements of capacity, vehicle, and exercise into one 
definition of power. Without the evidence of all three it may be considered that power, 
as a social phenomenon, may not really exist. Continual action (exercise) would 
presuppose no unrealised potential and thus there would no facility for capacity. A 
vehicle to exercise action but no capacity to actually act would be, almost by definition, 
absent from potential and thus powerless. The presence of capacity to use a vehicle 
to exercise action does presuppose in addition to the presence of capacity, the 
presence of some vehicle (resource), which produces the potential to exercise the 
potential (power) through action. Consequently, we may infer that the three elements 
should not be conflated into one: but also, that they are necessarily inter-dependent.  
Morriss (2002) describes concepts that are either related to power or often conflated 
with it: influence; control; and coercion. Along with power itself this can form a basis 
for a typology of negotiation tools within the negotiated order. Although Morriss (2002) 
describes power as different from the elements often confused or conflated with it, 
there is little attention given to defining these other elements. Mintzberg (1983) infers 
that the seemingly interchangeable terms of power and influence should actually be 
the same thing. Thus, influence is merely a description of power itself. Mintzberg 
(1983) discussed definitions of power but doesn’t explore in detail whether influence 
is the same concept or an alternative. Rather the evident ambiguity of the term 
influence and its exchange with the term power in everyday use is seen as sufficient 
cause to abandon a distinction between the two. The consideration of the literature 
and practical experience of management may side with Morris (2002) in seeking to 
avoid conflations that blur the definition of power. In this case it seems necessary to 
maintain a distinction between the terms of power and influence. Power for this project 
is seen as a capability (for Morris (2002) an ‘ableness’): an ability to affect outcomes. 
Whereas influence is seen as a potential ableness: an ability to possibly affect 
outcomes. Although clearly related, from this assessment influence may be seen as 
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more wholly dependent on contextual, cultural, and environmental variables, than 
power. As a real-world example, it may see that the CCG Chair has the power of a 
vote in the Governing Body. This is unconditional and exists by the very fact of being 
in the post. (How the power is exercised, voting positively, negatively, or through 
abstention, does not affect the presence of the power to vote.) The Chair may also 
possess influence over how others may vote: but this is conditional upon the decision 
in question and relation of the chair to other voters. It may be seen that influence can 
be either used as a basis for power or in some senses be translated into power. The 
Chair working with other Governing Body members may establish an organized group 
voting in concert in such a way as to effectively move beyond merely ‘influencing’. This 
is not sufficient, however, to conflate influence with power as one term. They remain 
related, overlapping, but essentially distinct.  
Morris (2002) further discusses the measurement of power, with particular 
consideration as to voting, ability, and ableness. Despite the development of 
mathematical models to assist in such measurement, it is unclear whether they can be 
applied in a useful fashion in the current research. It is helpful, however, to recognise 
the assessment of Morris (2002) that power is not necessarily a fixed quantity. Thus, 
Morris (2002) suggests some authors have considered power a ‘zero-sum’ concept: 
for some to gain power others have to lose it; however, this negates the possibility of 
power being created. In the current project the influence of the external environment 
on the decision-making group may result in power shifts that may involve some 
members or sub-groups gaining power (through, for example, a change in government 
policy) that may not directly reduce the absolute power of another group, but rather 
their relative power within the decision-making body.  
Whilst not discussed in terms of measurement, in a similar vein Mintzberg (1983) 
describes a view of the bases of power. The five are listed as: control over a resource; 
control of technical skills; control of a body of knowledge; rights to impose choices; 
and lastly the access to those who possess the other four. We may consider that 
although Mintzberg’s bases elaborate a view of power in the organization they are not 
necessarily exhaustive or may not significantly extend the concept of power beyond 
that described alternatively through authors such as Lukes (2005) and Morriss (2002). 
Thus, whether ‘power to’ use resources, skills, or knowledge, the typology of the 1-2-
3-dimensional models appear valid as a model for the project and helps understanding 
the role of power in the negotiated order. Mintzberg (1983) explores further how power 
is used within the organizational coalition. This approach identifies 4 ‘systems’ of 
power: authority; ideology; expertise; and politics. This confirms the assessment above 
of the different groups within the organizational coalition (see the Governing Body table 
above) and not only their relevant interests, but also the way in which different 
members within the negotiated order may seek to gain and use power. Thus, we may 
explore the power ‘systems’ in the context of the research: 
• Authority – Who has authority (formal and informal) and how does this affect 
the potential and exercise of power. 
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• Ideology – What ideologies are in play and how do they affect the power 
relations. 
• Expertise – What technical knowledge systems are in use and how is the 
expertise used to gain power. 
• Politics – What internal and external political factors shape how power is used. 
Whilst on the subject of power, the project reaffirms the benefits of analysing decision 
processes as an effective means of examining the presence and exercise of power. 
This is in contradiction to Morriss (2002), who is critical of work by Dahl (1961) 
exploring decision-making in USA local government. Morriss asserts it is incorrect to 
explore power through decisions (‘issues’) and that researching power requires a more 
holistic approach (as was approvingly, for Morriss, provided by Gaventa (1982)). This 
seems possibly contradictory in terms of methodology, for elements of Gaventa’s 
research do focus on decision-making. Furthermore, Morriss (2002) does not dispute 
that decision-making is an element of the exercise of power; rather he sees the focus 
should adjust to that of outcomes for participants. Although a focus on outcomes may 
be beneficial, it may downplay an important part of decision-making itself: that it is 
indeed an exercise of power (using capacity as a vehicle) and thus is appropriate and 
arguably essential as a subject of study in researching power. In the case study 
strategic decisions would appear to be one of the main ways in which the balance of 
power between decision-makers, and how power is actually exercised, can be 
effectively explored. Furthermore, in organizations decision-making may be one of the 
most obvious areas where the practice of power in use can be observed: thus, 
providing empirical evidence for the analysis of power. Clegg (2009, p.5) describes 
two main differences in classical approaches to power: 
Hobbes and his successors may be said to have endlessly legislated on what 
power is, Machiavelli and his successors may be said to have interpreted what 
power does. 
In this case we may add that it may be only through the analysis of what power does, 
that we can fundamentally understand what power is. Thus, the empirical assessment 
of power use is not merely an observation of the practise of power, but also reveals 
more completely what power is (or may be). Conducting the research into CCG 
decision-making may allow exploration into how and why power is used in the creation 
of negotiated order, and how in practice it relates to the other tools of negotiation. 
Concluding remarks on group decision-making 
The concepts of negotiated order and the organization as a coalition provide a 
potentially rich basis of knowledge and evidence upon which to build a conceptual 
framework for the research. Watson (2003) discusses organizational study, including 
negotiated order, as in part a sociological examination. Thus, this current project would 
appear to be a sociological study of decision-making practice within a CCG. The 
concept of a sociological study is helpful to frame the research within a wider 
environmental context. The early studies developing the concept of negotiated order 
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may imply its use is primarily focussed into the internal dynamics of an organization. 
Such an inference may be an over-simplification. In later work Strauss (1982) 
describes the place of order negotiation as having both internal and external 
dimensions.  Thus, “when a single organization is being studied, it should be viewed 
as embedded in a matrix of other organizations” (Strauss 1982, p. 350). Furthermore, 
Strauss (1982) discusses organizations as engaging in “arenas of participation”, 
arenas that involved negotiation between the various participants in any given arena.  
Although the negotiated order concept is described in various studies, it may be difficult 
to determine it as a precise social form based on empirical studies. The research is a 
novel study of the concept as how it may apply at upper-echelon management in the 
NHS. This picture of negotiation and ordering at different levels fits within an 
assessment and analysis of organizational behaviour beyond the internal dynamics of 
a CCG. Of necessity it warrants consideration as to the corporate environment within 
which the CCG operates. Such a multi-layered approach suggests analysis and 
understanding of the agents of commissioning decision-making (be they individual or 
organizational) and the structures where such agents practice. This may demand a 
more developed discussion on the concepts of structure and agency.   
The consideration of negotiated environment and negotiated order may help illuminate 
the question asked earlier of ‘what is commissioning for?’ Traditional approaches to 
public sector commissioning consider assessment of the need to be addressed as the 
origin of a commissioning process. This needs assessment, however, may not 
necessarily be straightforward or value free. In a consideration of NHS commissioning 
in the 1990s North (1997, p.382) concludes:  "Even when reduced to the more 
manageable proportions of a single health problem, such as mental health, stroke or 
head and brain injury, the process of determining those needs is a complex and 
uncertain one”. Furthermore, where complexity of subject matter and diversity of 
interest groups collide, the establishment of something close to an objective 
assessment of need may be difficult or impossible. Consensus may be established but 
facilitated only by the arrival of simplicity and repetition. 
As the question of assessing need (the supposed foundation for commissioning) is 
considered to be complex and multi-factorial, the potential complexity may increase 
further by grounding the needs assessment within the organizational coalition. 
Although the grounding may increase initial complexity, the ensuing richness may 
enhance the understanding of how the commissioning process functions.  Thus, we 
may describe differences of ‘what for?’: 
• Differences of outcome: improvement in service delivery through change; 
improvements in safety through focus on maintaining consistency; 
improvements in access to promote patient experience.   
• Differences in target groups: focusing on the elderly as the major users of 
services; focus on the young as the ones where the gain in life years may be 
greatest; focus on the deprived as the ones with the worst health outcomes; 
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focus on prevention and early intervention; focus on evidence-based 
interventions (regardless of where they are).   
All of which will be influenced by the position of individual members of the coalition. 
What may be tested through the research is the respective positions adopted in terms 
of ‘what is commissioning for?’ related to the individuals as agents within the coalition 
and the group behaviour as a coalition.  In some respects, commissioning becomes 
as much as question of not only ‘what for?’ but ‘who for?’  
 
  
  85 
2.5	What	is	commissioning	and	healthcare	commissioning?	
Still barking up the tree 
Kenneth Clarke is considered a major political figure in the history of the NHS as the 
Secretary of State for Health from 1988-90 (Webster 2002 and see Appendix 2). Two 
decades after being a major architect in the emergence of the modern form of health 
commissioning in the NHS, he commented, that if commissioning was seen as a failure 
then “that would be the biggest blunder of them all. If one day subsequent generations 
find you cannot make commissioning work, then we have been barking up the wrong 
tree for the last 20 years” (Timmins 2008, p.28). At the time of the case study, as the 
NHS moved towards its 70th birthday, the definitive judgement as to commissioning in 
the NHS was still unclear. However, success or blunder, at the time of the research, 
commissioning was alive and well. Well… it was certainly alive, having just created 
over 200 commissioning bodies in the form of CCGs. The research thus observed the 
commissioning CCG dog barking: up a tree of possibly uncertain status.  
Introduction 
The NHS reforms introduced by the UK coalition government (2010-15) included 
changes to the commissioning system and the creation of a national body with 
responsibility for healthcare commissioning: NHS England (established following the 
Health and Social Care Act 2012 (Great Britain 2012)). The 2012 Act (Great Britain 
2012) defined commissioning as: 
Commissioning is the process by which future health and social care will be 
developed and, as such, has a significant role to play in service transformation. 
It involves much more than procuring services and managing transactional 
issues as they arise. It is the process commissioners use to plan, deliver and 
monitor services for their local population, based on strong leadership and 
effective relationships, great outcomes and best value (NHS England 2014). 
The origins of current NHS commissioning may be traced to the development of a 
policy initiative in the late 1980s of the internal market (Webster 2002), partly 
introduced during the stewardship of Kenneth Clarke. The internal market was aimed 
at introducing elements of market competition into public services. Specifically, for the 
NHS it involved the emergence of the ‘purchaser-provider split’: the separation 
between the functions of, on the one hand, planning and buying healthcare 
(commissioning) and on the other the delivery of care services (provision). Thus, the 
need to design future service provision against identified need; to target resources to 
achieve specific ends (sometimes politically motivated); and achieve value from 
taxpayer generated funding streams, results in commissioning being seen as much 
more than simply purchasing.  
The process of commissioning may be understood through the commissioning cycle: 
a circular, dynamic, and continuous process of needs-based planning, procurement, 
and performance management. 
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Figure 7 - The Commissioning Cycle (from Department of Health 2007) 
 
Similarly, the Local Government Association (LGA) describes commissioning as 
“activities that combine to achieve efficiency and maximize value” (LGA 2012, p. 3). 
The activities include:  
• Understanding need and desired outcomes 
• Optimizing resources 
• Targeting 
• Choosing the right mechanisms 
This is also summarized graphically as (from LGA 2012): 
Figure 8 - The Local Government approach to commissioning 
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Murray (2008) provides a summary of definitions and descriptions of commissioning 
in the UK public sector. This concludes the common features of a commissioning cycle 
being: strategic needs assessment; deciding priorities and outcomes; planning and 
designing services; options appraisal; sourcing; delivery; and monitoring and review 
(Murray 2008, p. 91).   
Therefore, for both the NHS and the wider public sector the concept of commissioning 
is: needs based (what is the need to be addressed); outcomes focused (how will the 
need be addressed with what intended results); and resource driven (what resources 
will be used to achieve the intended outcomes). Increasingly commissioning may be 
seen to have a strong focus on performance management (how do commissioners 
know when they have achieved their outcomes and satisfied needs?).   
Murray (2008) identifies that although widely used the term of commissioning is not 
regularly defined and may be used interchangeably with similar but distinct terms such 
as procurement and contracting. The formal descriptions of commissioning include the 
elements of procurement and contracting (both being narrower terms relating to 
purchase and the establishment of contractual relationships) but are considerably 
broader, with particular reference to the elements of planning to address need, 
prioritization of resource allocation, and monitoring of delivery to achieve outcomes. 
Murray (2008) summarizes in graphical form the relationship between procurement 
and commissioning: 
Figure 9 - The relationship of the commissioning and procurement cycles 
Having established a definition of commissioning it may be beneficial to explore how 
different healthcare systems use resources.  
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Comparative commissioning 
Differences exist between countries in their approaches to providing healthcare for 
their populations. Analysis of different systems and the evident differences in 
outcomes assured for the system’s populations is explored in more detail in Appendix 
1. Although it may be possible to identify forms of planning and funding healthcare that 
are analogous to that of the UK NHS system of commissioning, there appear to be no 
direct comparisons. Furthermore, although evidence supports the assertion of the 
relatively poor cost to health outcome results delivered in the USA (see Appendix 1); 
the rapidly changing political landscape may make such comparisons redundant. In 
the USA case, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (in early implementation 
stage at the start of this project) may significantly change how the USA supports its 
population accessing healthcare. Consequently, international comparisons are of 
interest, but possible more in terms of the potential lessons NHS commissioners may 
learn from other areas, than in finding a replacement model for NHS commissioning 
as a whole.  
We may infer that analysis of current comparative international health systems 
presents the following, tentative, conclusions: 
• Increased healthcare funding may often be associated with improvements in 
life expectancy, but continued improvement will not be linear.18 
• The overall shape of healthcare systems, particularly its degree of population 
coverage and degree of focus on health improvement, will have a significant 
influence on health outcomes.19 
• Publicly funded healthcare can achieve good health outcomes and higher value 
for money by restricting access to marginal benefit health interventions.20 
• High-cost specialist hospital care may improve individual health outcomes, but 
the benefits at a population level are less certain.21  
Despite the difficulties of comparing different health systems, the international 
evidence does appear to confirm there are benefits to some form of healthcare strategy 
within a form of healthcare resourcing consistent with the NHS definition of 
commissioning. Furthermore, comprehensive access to care requires fitting 
healthcare usage within a limited, indeed increasingly limited, resource envelope. 
Consequently, achieving value for money from healthcare is a strategic issue: arguably 
for NHS commissioning the major strategic objective.  
Policy approaches to healthcare commissioning 
Some of the examples below demonstrate healthcare commissioning at a national, 
largely policy, level. They may not describe the process of strategic thinking within 
individual commissioning bodies: but they do describe approaches as they emerge 
from national policy, which may well be mirrored within organizations tasked with 
implementing NHS policy. This may prompt the question whether genuine, 
autonomous strategic thinking is possible at lower level commissioning, for example, 
in CCGs and formerly Primary Care Trusts (PCTs).  
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a) Introducing the internal market in the UK NHS. A series of reforms, introduced from 
the late 1980s through until the mid 1990s, saw a government committed to a 
general approach of free-market economic liberalization seek to develop a form of 
free-market style competition and market mechanisms within the NHS (Webster 
2002). The strategy appeared as straightforward: find ways of replicating the 
market (through initiatives such as GP fundholding); and through the use of 
competition and market mechanisms drive cost-savings (for example, through 
service out-sourcing to cheaper private providers). The strategy may be seen as 
having few output objectives, other than saving money, and was directed towards 
operational functioning rather than outcomes.  
b) The NHS plan, initiated in 2000 lasting until the end of the Labour government in 
2010 (Webster 2010, NHS 2000). The NHS plan was part of a sustained effort by 
the government to invest in public services and bring the NHS spend to the level 
of comparative European health services. This represented a large attempt at 
strategic planning on a national scale, and whilst suggesting there was scope for 
‘local determination’ its large number of targets and nationally developed service 
frameworks, directed the majority of service development as consistent with the 
government intentions. This had a national development vision and involved the 
NHS moving towards service delivery around performance management of 
mandated targets. Rather than promoting autonomy at the periphery, the strategy 
assumed top-down direction would deliver the improvement in outcomes and 
outputs,  
c) The NHS reforms of 2010, with major implementation at organizational level in 
2013 (NHS 2010), following the introduction of the 2012 Health and Social Care 
Act (Great Britain 2012). The overall approach was initially a small move away from 
performance targets, and instead an emphasis on developing local clinical 
leadership. The original spirit of the reforms appeared to suggest targets and 
priorities would be primarily the responsibility of local clinicians. But the early 
evidence implies that any government of the day may find it difficult to let go of 
responsibility for target setting, suggesting there may be a dissonance between 
word and deed.  
d) The Wanless report, “Securing Good Health for the Population” (Wanless 2002) 
was commissioned by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer to provide an 
assessment of how health improvement and healthcare could be delivered within 
affordable public sector resources. The report described three levels of scenario 
built around how well the NHS and the population engaged with public health 
initiatives, thus shifting resources from expensive down-stream hospital care into 
more upstream preventative services. By implication the report suggested a 
‘strategy’ (of sorts) for the NHS of focusing heavily on public health. But an interim 
assessment of implementation (Wanless et al. 2007) concludes the ‘full engaged’ 
scenario of a population seeking to maximize its health was far from in place.  
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All of the examples described above emerged in their own political climate and 
consequent motivations. Thus, for a) the motivation was to make the NHS behave 
more like a market with the belief that market mechanisms and competition would 
improve care and efficiency. For b) there was a belief in a return to more directive 
national planning and a more whole-scale adoption of performance targets. The 
reforms in c) were conceived in large part as a way of shifting decision-making 
authority to clinicians, whilst d) represented its original political sponsor (The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer) in seeking to achieve greatest value for money for NHS 
resources. All four in part reflected the policies of their respective governments and to 
some degree political party ideology.  
What is also evident when working through the examples is the degree of political 
compromise and pragmatism present in the policies at the point of implementation. 
Thus, the most obvious solution to developing a market environment in healthcare 
would be to privatize a nationalized system and introduce fully fledged private capital 
markets. In the late 1980s, however, privatizing the NHS was considered politically 
impossible (Timmins 1996) and thus a ‘virtual’ market system was developed. 
Although market-like this inevitably produced compromises that diluted some of the 
potential benefits of free-trade exchange in a fully market-based economy. The 
introduction of the NHS plan focused on performance targets, but also recognized the 
difficulty (often impossibility) of removing poorly performing health providers, and 
where clinical guidelines suggested greater service centralization there appears little 
appetite to be seen to promote unit closures or to tackle local political influences. The 
2010 White Paper originally described commissioning as led by GPs. The controversy 
surrounding the reforms led to a ‘pause’ (Timmins 2012) in the reform programme with 
a number of resulting changes to the initial programme. It may be too early to tell 
whether such changes have improved or deteriorated the programme (it is likely such 
an assessment may be impossible in any remotely objective sense). What the changes 
did appear to do was increase the number of organizations created and to probably 
complicate the whole commissioning process (Timmins 2012). In the Wanless case, 
the ‘fully engaged’ scenario, whilst evidence-based and possibly deliverable, required 
initiatives and actions which political parties may have felt unachievable (at least in 
terms of them staying in power through re-election). Thus, it took several years to gain 
the political consensus to introduce plain packaging for cigarettes, even though there 
was evidence to suggest it deters cigarette smoking, the reduction of which was a 
prime action within Wanless (2002). This practice of policy implementation only within 
the scope of what is considered as electorally acceptable is consistent with the concept 
of the Overton Window (Russell 2006). This also implies that the guidance and policies 
that emerge from central government departments, such as the Department of Health, 
will already be heavily influenced by external and internal factors before they are 
communicated to front-line commissioning bodies such as CCGs. These influences 
are likely to continue to be present when CCGs themselves are involved in strategy 
development and implementation.  
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Concluding remarks on commissioning 
The literature on commissioning appears relatively limited in terms of high-quality 
research. Definition documents and ‘how-to’ guides, relating to either the NHS 
(Department of Health 2007) or local authorities (Murray 2008) are descriptive of the 
commissioning process, rather than explorations of commissioning practice. The 
approaches to commissioning discussed above are also records of policy driven 
directions to the task of commissioning. They are not research based evaluations of 
which approach may be better. Indeed, the very political nature of approaches to the 
NHS, and consequently commissioning within it, make such evaluations problematic.  
The cases identified above, in addition to the earlier narrative on defining 
commissioning, beg a possibly fundamental question: what end is commissioning 
seeking to achieve? The grounding of commissioning for public services is that of 
assessed need. This in itself poses further questions. How is the need defined? Who 
defines it? Furthermore, there may be an assumption that ‘need’ can be defined 
objectively. The research tests whether the various influences do allow such 
objectivity, as the complexities of defining need will occur in context. The complexities 
in defining need include: 
• Timing. Although commissioning organizations such as the CCG will have 
access to a Joint Strategic Needs Assessment (JSNA) for its area (produced in 
collaboration with the relevant Local Authority) the time required to produce 
such analysis may result in the assessment being considered no longer current. 
Although evidence it only becomes useful evidence if actually used by decision-
makers. 
• Subjectivity. Any needs assessment will involve a degree of subjectivity. Thus, 
a list of health needs will require prioritization and a degree of discretion. In 
some cases, such as assessment of mental health needs, the very assessment 
of a need itself may be seen as subjective. 
• Context. Needs assessment will occur in a real-world context of competing 
priorities and attempts at objective assessment will necessitate recognition of 
wider influences. The influences on the decision-making process will shape 
what is considered by be the population needs. 
• National versus local. With a corporate context of nationally directed policy, 
commissioning often needs to balance requirements to deliver initiatives to 
address perceived national need against a possibly divergent aspiration to 
address more locally focused needs. With a decision-making body, such as a 
CCG Governing Body, with a predominance of local clinicians make test the 
national to local balance.  
Not only are there potential issues in needs assessment, but also the process of 
assessment, prioritization, and decision on what is to be done will not necessarily be 
straightforward.  
Overall the process of commissioning at least by intention is relatively straightforward: 
attempting to satisfy identified needs through the allocation of available resources. 
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What is important for this study is to recognise that this process is not value or 
politically neutral. It occurs within a politically driven policy environment and issues 
such as how to use competition will influence local decision-making. Furthermore, just 
as the variability of evidence to support decision-making may vary so the subjective 
interpretation of those charged with commissioning will influence how it is 
implemented.  
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2.6	Frames	and	influences	in	the	decision-making	
environment	–	Developing	the	conceptual	framework	
The moralization gap 
What may make the ‘living tapestry’ of the people in organizations so rich and 
interesting is its diversity and complexity. Thus, this rich tapestry is not of individuals 
and groups who think the same: rather views of the same phenomena may elicit 
different opinions. Pinker (2011) describes the concept of the moralization gap: the 
difference in interpretation of events depending on the individual’s role in an event, 
particularly where one was a perpetrator and one a victim. Thus, the difference in 
perspective provides a potentially major difference in narrative22 (Pinker 2011).  
The perpetrator sees an event as self-contained, relatively minor, an act that was 
largely necessary and determined, with few after effects and one that should be 
forgotten, with those involved moving on. So, ‘it was really nothing, an accident I 
regretted but it was over soon, and I have already forgotten it’. 
For the victim the event had a long pre-history, had a devastating impact, with effects 
lasting long into the future, being wilfully malignant by the perpetrator, and one that will 
never be forgotten by the victim. So, ‘they have always hated me, this was the last in 
a long line of deliberate actions to harm me, it will haunt me forever’.  
Based on psychological research Pinker (2011) suggests that these alternative views 
are sincerely held, and different groups will collect their own sources of facts and 
supporting information. This apparent discrepancy, as both cannot be objectively 
correct, may be in part due to position, experience, and thus how an individual or a 
group looks at an issue. They will see phenomena through ways of looking at the world: 
cognitive frames.  
Introduction 
Earlier in this review we encountered the concept of framing, which has been a central 
part of much of the analysis related to behavioural decision-making (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1981) and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Furthermore, 
the previously discussed concept of bounded rationality may see the organizational 
boundaries identified as types of frame. The further use of framing may assist in 
describing not merely the ‘who?’ of decision-making (that is the constituencies of 
decision-makers) and the ‘what?’ of decision (what actions are taken with what effects) 
but also the ‘how?’ of decision. Thus, research complementary to that of negotiated 
order - into organizational framing - supports the project in defining how the different 
constituencies, decision-makers, and power groups communicate through the 
decision process. Frames and framing thus form part of the analysis of understanding 
how different influencing factors emerge and combine or compete in the process of 
strategic decision-making.  
This chapter discusses: 
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• What is framing and different framing concepts and models 
• The framing environment as evident to a CCG. The framing environment 
discussion summarises the major strategic influences from the literature that 
may affect decision-making in the CCG. The influences are described at three 
levels: the macro (high level, national, very large scale); the meso (middle level, 
at organizational scale); and micro level (individual and small group scale). 
• The conceptual framework that emerges from the study of the literature and the 
framing influences in particular.  
Framing 
Frames have been defined as “schemata of interpretation” (Goffman 1974), which give 
meaning to events and information. The frames allow users to “organize experience 
and guide action” (Benford and Snow 2000). Benford and Snow (2000) further infer 
that frames are ‘action oriented’ sets of meaning and belief, which help to shape 
opinions and organize organizational support. For this definition, organizational 
framing is not merely a system of cognition (developing meaning) but also a system of 
organizational politics (developing power and influence). The framing concept used in 
this research is from Benford and Snow (2000): the collective action frame.  In this 
form framing does involve helping to construct meaning but also aims to generate 
support for action and to engage with constituents and constituencies (Benford and 
Snow 2000, p. 614).  
Cornelissen and Werner (2014) summarise framing concepts across a range of social 
science disciplines. This includes describing framing across three levels: 
• Micro – the level of the individual or group, often as referred to in behavioural 
decision-making research (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  
• Meso – the level of the organization, as referred to in consideration of strategy 
making (for example, Kaplan 2008, and Kennedy and Fiss 2009).  
• Macro – the level of broader corporate and cultural environments.  
The separation across levels appears to align with the current research project’s 
consideration of external and internal influences and its relationships with structure 
and agency. The consideration of the level at which the frame emerges and impact on 
the decision may be important when researching strategic organizational decisions. 
This may be distinct from the decisions researched through behavioural decision-
making, which have primarily studied the decisions of the individual, often outside of 
an organizational setting (for example Kahneman 2012). Thus, the varying influences 
of external and internal environments and the shifting and competing frames in the 
negotiated order may result in less predictability in the patterns of decision behaviour. 
Kaplan (2008) discusses ‘framing contests’ where differing frames compete for 
supremacy within a communication technology company.  
A further dynamic is that between primary framing (priming) and secondary framing 
(Goffman 1974, Cornelissen and Werner 2014). Here priming is a form of framing but 
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represents the framing effect of pre-existing paradigms that create a frame (or frames) 
from cues in the operational setting. This is a form of primary frame: the social situation 
(in this case the negotiated order) has no impact on the frame. Thus, Goffman’s 
statement, “It seems we can hardly glance at anything without applying a primary 
framework, thereby forming conjectures as to what occurred before and expectations 
of what is likely to happen now” (Goffman 1974, p.38) brings to mind Kahneman’s 
(2012) regarding “intuition is remembering”. However, although there may be 
similarities between the primary frame and the System1 – System 2 separation of 
behavioural decision-making (Stanovich and West 2000), the framing concept is 
developed at a deeper organizational level. This is not merely the individual’s prior 
knowledge: the primary frame appears to provide an individual and group scene 
setting at the outset of a decision process.  
In framing (as distinct from priming) the frames emerge through social interaction. The 
social interaction, therefore, creates a new frame, which may relate to pre-existing 
concepts (and thus, possible pre-existing frames), but which is not identifiable as a 
decision frame at the outset of the period.   
Inter-subjectivity – framing as imagined order and the role of 
emotion 
Harari (2014) considers the creation of order in human history, going well beyond the 
organizational concept of negotiated order, but with nevertheless some similarities. 
Harari’s (2014) hypothesis is that human society has been possible in part due to its 
ability to cement cooperative relationships through ‘imagined order’: cultural 
phenomena such as religion and politics and belief systems more generally. This is 
consistent with the concept of negotiated order in organizations and, furthermore, 
provides a useful subtlety in its treatment of types of knowledge phenomena. Thus, 
Harari (2014) discusses three phenomena: the objective (that which is physically 
there); the subjective (that which is created in the mind of the individual); and thirdly 
the inter-subjective. The inter-subjective thus is created from individuals but exists as 
shared assumptions with its consequent power coming from its very mutual form. Inter-
subjectivity may be seen as a form of framing process, where group frames are 
constructed. Potentially, at least following Harari (2014), this construction process 
works across micro, meso, and macro levels. Furthermore, the construction of any 
cultural order is not seen as being ‘imagined’: rather it “disavows its fictional origins 
and claims to be natural and inevitable” (Harari 2014, p.150). Therefore, the strength 
of the strongest frames and of the negotiated order itself lies not necessarily in its 
objective relation to empirical evidence but in its ability to develop and reinforce beliefs 
that are seen as inevitably correct. (In this case we may say ‘correct’ rather than ‘true’.) 
Despite the probable benefits of evidential decision-making, frames in use may have 
uneven levels of empirical support. In some respects, this may be beneficial but not 
always necessary. Rationality in the case of the negotiated order: being the tail to the 
emotional dog (see Haidt 2001).  The social intuitionist model (Haidt 2001) infers that 
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rational arguments used in support of decisions are primarily post hoc justifications, 
rather than pre-decisions considerations. This may suggest that in relation to framing 
the most important frames in a decision-making process are the priming frames: those 
that decision-makers have when they enter the process. This may result in a lesser 
importance for the social interaction frames. If this is the case, the negotiated order 
assumes greater importance for the use of power than lesser for the creation of 
interpretive frames. Pizarro and Bloom (2003) critique the social intuitionist model, 
referencing research inferring where “fast” positions are formed this is generally done 
based on previous reasoning. Furthermore, they assert that individuals do engage in 
active reasoning: the ‘dog’ thus not being entirely ‘emotional’. Pizarro and Bloom’s 
(2003) critique echoes Kahneman’s ‘intuition is remembering’: decisions evidently 
driven by ‘emotion’ or at least lacking obvious rational consideration may actually be 
using reason and learning from previous experience.  
Haidt (2001) is concerned primarily with decision-making in the context of morality, 
and thus it may be debateable as to its strict application to organizational decision-
making. More fundamentally, and in relation to the concept of emotion in decision-
making more broadly, there are researchers who question a strict definition between 
reason and emotion in decision-making. This is demonstrated in the aforementioned 
concept of the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio et al 1996, Bechara 1997), where 
neuroscientific studies suggest the more ‘emotional’ parts (and functions) of the brain 
complement, rather than undermine the rational elements. More fundamentally still, 
the recent development of the concept of the ‘theory of constructed emotion’ (Barrett 
2017) infers a complex pattern of physiological, psychological, and cultural processes 
at work in the production of emotion. Thus, for Barrett (2017, p.31), “With concepts, 
your brain makes meaning of sensation, and sometimes that meaning is an emotion”. 
But the concepts in use will shape, frame, whether the response is emotional and what 
emotions will occur. This may be of great importance in exploring the role of individual 
behaviour within groups within a complex decision-making environment. This also 
recognises the multiple levels at which concepts and frames are applied.  
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The framing environment 
From the assessment of frame levels, it may be necessary to redraw the constituency 
maps according to not the two dimensions of external and internal, but of the three 
dimensions of Cornelissen and Werner (2014). Thus, the previously described 
influences are aligned to the three levels, where the influences drive the frame 
production and use. The synthesis of influences and frames, producing the 
environment within which the negotiated order develops is represented as: 
 
Figure 10 - 3 Tier Frame Model of negotiated order construction
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The Macro frame 
Figure 11 - Tier 1 the Macro Frame 
 
 
Public and stakeholder expectations 
Gomes (2010) studying the influences on Local Government decision-making 
develops a ‘five-sided’ model of stakeholder influence. This provides a broad range of 
influences through the concept of the stakeholder. Gomes defines stakeholders as 
“people, categories of people – such as employees, managers, suppliers, owners and 
customers (service users for public organizations) – and organizations, which have a 
stake in the organization’s objectives” (Gomes 2010, p.707). We may consider this 
description as to be so comprehensive as to ultimately lack definition and thus in the 
context of our research to be possibly too broad. Nevertheless, research on decision-
making influences may help to identify which stakeholders do influence NHS 
decisions, including whether a model as developed by Gomes (2010) in relation to 
Local Government can be generalized to the NHS. The level of stakeholder influence 
described is considered so significant that, “satisfying the stakeholders’ expectations 
is the main goal of public sector managers” (Gomes 2010, p. 707). It may be expected 
that the NHS may behave in a similar manner to Local Government, both in terms of 
the influences its experiences and how it conducts goal setting. However, it may be 
necessary to define the groups of stakeholders with greater specificity.  
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One of the almost inevitable consequences of the NHS being funded through general 
taxation is the view within the tax-paying community (in effect the whole adult 
population) that it has a sense (usually a strong sense) of ownership over the service. 
For Nutt (2005, p.294) “Everyone has an ownership stake in a public organization”. 
This includes views as to how services are delivered and prioritisation of how and 
where resources are used. The pressures this exerts of the commissioning process 
may be many and diverse, but we may identify three potential public expectation 
pressures. Firstly, ‘localist’ aspirations of improving patient experience. Secondly, 
perceived threats to service provision, which encourage opposition to service 
reconfigurations. Thirdly, populist views on publicly funded healthcare services that 
may be at odds with either needs assessments or published evidence.  
Local politics 
Whilst NHS strategy is in part driven by national politics and may thus reflect an 
element of political ideology, there is no necessary continuity of political views across 
the whole political spectrum. One area where this discontinuity may manifest itself is 
in the behaviour of local elected politicians. In extreme cases this has shown elected 
members of the political party of the sitting government vigorously opposing health 
policy that is considered to be locally unpopular.  
Local political systems (primarily those part of the Local Government framework) 
provide processes for authorisation and scrutiny, which may often be a necessary part 
of the decision-making pathway for strategic decisions. For example, the upper-tier 
Local Authorities are statutorily obliged to provide Overview and Scrutiny of Health 
Committees (OSC).  For a CCG seeking to implement a major strategic change it is 
quite likely there will need to be at least a discussion and consideration with the OSC 
(and by definition associated partners) if not indeed a process of formal public 
consultation. Although it may be argued that NHS commissioners should seek wide 
engagement and consultation before implementing major changes, the need to 
proceed through formal channels and to manage change processes within the gaze of 
public attention may influence the commissioning process. Thus, “The external 
environment of a public organization is littered with political considerations” (Nutt 2005, 
p.293).  
Resource constraints 
A national body, NHS England, determines CCG financial resources. NHS England 
itself is funded through the Department of Health, following inter-departmental 
negotiates within the financial management of the UK Treasury. In simple terms the 
resource allocations given to CCGs (as with previous NHS commissioning bodies) are 
centrally determined and there is very little flexibility for local variation. Funding 
formulas have been developed to allocate resources to different areas, and a new, 
ostensibly more age related, funding formula was introduced by NHS England in 2014-
15. (As with previous examples, the introduction is implemented in a phased manner, 
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with movement towards target funding occurring through differential application of 
funding growth rather than absolute reductions to CCG allocations. In the case under 
scrutiny the CCG is within a group designated as furthest away from target allocation 
and thus received the lowest level of funding growth nationally.)  
At one level the resource allocation is less an influence on commissioning than part of 
commissioning itself: it being a form of resource allocation to satisfy need. In this 
respect it is not so much an influence than a factor shaping the boundaries and 
framework of the commissioning process. On the other hand, however, the overall 
direction of funding and perceptions as to its likely development over time may 
influence decision-making. Thus, if we refer to the financial history of the NHS, we see 
periods of high and low growth. The level of current growth and expectations as to 
future growth may influence the approach to service development (do commissioners 
focus on getting best value from core services in times of austerity, or are they allowed 
to expand access and service provision in times of growth?). Certain services become 
centrally placed within this discussion one possible example being access to NHS 
funded In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF). IVF is considered a triumph of modern medical 
science and is thought ‘evidence-based’, with NICE supporting its use and considering 
it a cost-effective medical intervention. From an alternative standpoint, IVF does not 
directly address a primary health need (that is, it does not save lives, or improve the 
wellbeing of those with ongoing disease). Consequently, there may be differing 
schools of thought as to whether it should be funded through the NHS. On the one 
hand it is a proven medical technology that may enhance the lives of those who receive 
it; on the other, it may not be the most pressing demand on the scarce resources 
available. Here is the point where scarcity becomes a critical and context dependent 
commissioning variable. In ‘times of plenty’ there may still be a strand of opinion that 
does not support NHS funding of IVF, but with expanding resources many will see a 
logical sense of expanding access to services (such as IVF). In times of austerity, calls 
for expansion of service will be less readily heard and thus it may prove more difficult 
to develop novel services, particularly those that do not directly address a core health 
need. Paradoxically this may lead to commissioners funding relatively unproven 
services that may target a health need, whilst refusing to fund evidence-based 
interventions which are, nevertheless, considered marginal in terms of their overall 
health impact. (In 2014 some CCGs were commissioning IVF access well below that 
recommended by NICE, and in one case a CCG did not commission it at all (McVeigh 
2014). At the same time CCGs were developing multi-million pound investment 
programmes under the title of the ‘Better Care Fund’ (LGA 2014), targeted at 
supporting elderly patients being managed more in their own homes. The evidence 
base for this programme was relatively uneven and at times appeared as an article of 
faith, compared to the ‘hard’ evidence of an intervention such as IVF.) 
All of the above is not merely important in terms of relationships to specific issues. 
Rather it is also important in terms of creating an environment of perception as to 
resource availability and how planning should be focused in the medium and longer 
terms.  
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Clinical Evidence 
Research and the evidence-based approach to medicine is often considered as both 
one of the major achievements of the discipline and a bedrock of a scientific approach 
to further development of healthcare (Gray 2009, Greenhalgh 2010). Despite this, 
there can be no automatic assumption that the clinical evidence base is either value 
free or objectively non-controversial. Reviews of the veracity of medical research have 
judged: “studies that report positive or significant results are more likely to be 
published” (Dwan et al. 2008, p.1); and “evidence for the existence of study publication 
bias and outcome reporting bias” (Dwan et al. 2008, p.1). Consequently, some authors 
conclude, “the medical literature therefore represents a selective and biased subset of 
study outcomes” (Chan and Altman 2005, p.1). It is important, therefore, as; it shapes 
the development of healthcare science; and it is a fundamental element in the 
decision-making resources of the commissioning process. It is not, however, 
something called ‘the truth’. Thus, in a similar vein we may quote Gould (1992), "Facts 
do not 'speak for themselves', they are read in the light of theory”. For theory, one may 
also substitute ‘ideology’ or any number of other relevant biases.  
A further complexity in the analysis of evidence is not merely what is the evidence but 
who is using it. (Again, we do not consider it as inappropriate to see evidence in these 
terms. There is possibly no more than relative objectivity, if at all. Consequently, it does 
appear as if the evidence is being ‘used’, for good or ill.) The negotiated order 
describes a theatre of battle in the decision-making process within which participants 
will use evidence as one of a number of tools facilitating forms of negotiation and 
influence. Thus, we may re-phrase Gould’s statement in terms of evidence as an 
influence: ‘Evidence does not speak for itself: interest groups, within the organizational 
environment, present on its behalf’. The study from Lord et al. (1979) reinforces the 
possibility of evidence being used to support pre-existing positions. Although an 
experimental study that may have limited ecological validity, the research 
demonstrated participants using evidence to support pre-existing prejudices on the 
issue of the death penalty. Lord et al. (1979, p.2108) concluding “social scientists can 
not expect rationality, enlightenment, and consensus about policy to emerge from their 
attempts to furnish "objective" data about burning social issues”. Opinions on sensitive 
issues such as the death penalty may not necessarily reflect biases that appear in a 
complex decision-making environment such as the NHS. It may, however, question 
whether the emergence of evidence, of whatever quality, will necessarily provide 
balance into polarised debates23.  
National Policy 
As with resource allocation there may be consideration of whether national policy is 
necessarily an influence on commissioning or just part of the commissioning process. 
Nevertheless, at the level of the decision-making body (of organizations that are 
created as statutorily independent) national policy may not be seen as something only 
to be followed, but rather as one of a number of competing influences and pressures 
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to be managed. This may be seen as another example of the Principal-Agent problem 
(Jensen 1976 and see earlier in the review) in that the central ‘parents’ of health policy 
produce directions and guidance to ‘child’ organizations, such as CCGs, with the 
intention of such bodies implementing the guidance. The organizations themselves 
may see things a little differently. Watson (2002) remarks that all organizations contain 
an (ultimately) irreconcilable tension: that between the need for control (one of the very 
points of having an organization in the first place) and the need to allow (and in some 
instances promote) autonomy for individuals and individual departments. Thus, 
successive NHS commissioning systems have sought to promote a sense of local 
ownership and autonomy. (Examples include GP fundholding, Practice Based 
Commissioning, and the very emergence of CCGs themselves, see Appendix 2.) This 
may, however, work against centrally determined planning guidance. Furthermore, 
there may be no automatic assumption that a local commissioner (such as a CCG 
Governing Body GP) will prioritize national priorities over local ones.  
Further influencing factors of national policy are that directives may manifest 
themselves as capricious and impatient. The politically charged nature of tax-funded 
healthcare may encourage governments to change policy directions quickly, both in 
response to public pressure (and more probably) in relation to pressure for other 
political agencies (opposition parties or a variety of pressure groups and lobbyists). 
Nutt (2005) comments that the scrutiny placed on public bodies, compared to private 
companies, is ‘intense’ and the nature of the scrutiny often ‘fickle’.  
On its election the coalition government of David Cameron stated it was moving away 
from nationally driven targets and non-clinically driven performance measures, such 
as hospital patient waiting lists. By the mid-term of the administration there was 
evidence of extended waiting times compared to the previous government and the 
coalition’s response was to instigate a new focus on reducing waiting times (backed 
by additional funding). The contradictory and possibly resource consuming messages 
may not be well received at a local organizational level. And such changes in policy 
often appear to emerge with an associated sense of haste (labeled ‘urgency’).  
The Meso and Micro frames 
The influencing factors on the meso and micro frames intertwine and present 
themselves at both levels.  
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Figure 12 - Tier 2 the Meso Frame 
 
 
Figure 13 - Tier 3 the Micro Frame 
 
Environmental 
Parsons (2014) provides research showing the apparent local influences on corporate 
behaviour that are seen to explain differences between variations in corporate financial 
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misconduct. In simple terms, it appears firms (and those working in them) are more 
likely to exhibit financial misconduct if their neighbours behave in the same manner. 
This is provided as the most plausible explanation for the observed three-fold 
differences between misconduct across different areas of the USA (Parsons 2014). An 
earlier paper (Dougal et al. 2013) appears to provide a similar pattern but when applied 
to corporate investment. Thus, companies are more likely to provide investment if their 
neighbouring firms are doing the same. For both studies there is a perceived 
relationship not only at a corporate level of organizational influence, but also of 
influence at an individual level. Corporate Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) were more 
likely to be influenced by neighbouring CEOs of similar age.  
It may be beyond the scope of the current research to explore the nationally driven 
cultural influences on decision-making (for example, using work from Trompenars 
(1993)). (Trompenars (1993) discusses the cultural differences between countries in 
their approach to decision-making; that between individualistic and collectivist 
approaches. It is unlikely such cultural differences will be apparent within this study.) 
It would be, however, within the scope of the current project to explore and assess 
potential influence from other local NHS bodies, particularly other CCGs, and the 
possible influence on decision-making of local peer groups. For the organization as a 
coalition the interest groups within the coalition may have similarly aligned peer 
networks that align to their own backgrounds. For example, across a region there may 
be a Chief Finance Officers group that meets and liaises both formally and informally. 
This may or may not provide significant influence on a decision-making process: but 
the research may seek to explore whether there are identified linkages between 
behaviours within the subject organization (and hence by its constituent decision-
makers) and neighbouring comparative institutions. Comparisons may be made of 
similar decision types; their outcomes in the subject case study; and of equivalent 
decisions taken by organizations in other NHS regions.  
This influence may have links to that of decision-maker demographics. One may 
speculate that where locally adjacent decision-makers of different NHS bodies are of 
similar age and socio-economic backgrounds they may be more likely to communicate 
(possibly through socialising) and may have similar points of reference (read the same 
journals or access the same mass media). Conversely where such senior figures 
(perhaps two locally adjacent CEOs) are demographically diverse (wide disparity in 
age, socio-economic class, etc.) their communication may be lower, with consequently 
reduced influence on decision-making.   
Health Needs 
There may be no other factor as commonly considered to be the foundation of 
commissioning as that of health needs. This may, therefore, be seen as another 
example of something that should not be treated as an influence but more as ‘part of 
the day job’. If commissioning is not seeking to address need, what is it doing? But the 
assumed consensus as to the place of ‘need’ may be misplaced. Competing different 
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needs will be presented and their prioritisation will vary. Outcome of corporate 
prioritisation may also be ultimately dependent on the dynamics of the negotiated 
order.  
Briefly we may categorize types of need and their potential relation to parts of the 
organizational coalition.  
• Clinical health outcomes. For some this may be considered the traditional 
approach to health need: a relatively empirical study of trends in disease, 
mortality, and morbidity. An example of such analysis is contained within a Joint 
Strategic Needs Assessment (JSNA), produced by all upper-tier Local 
Authorities, in collaboration with NHS partners.   
• Demonstrated demand usage. This may be summarised as ‘If we build it, they 
will come. If they keep coming, build it bigger’. The definition is less an 
assessment of an objective need and more a response to demonstrated 
behaviour (Wennberg 2010). Certain NHS interventions to ‘improve access’ 
may provide examples of addressing this need, by increasing capacity for 
patients to receive rapid assessment in primary care, even though such faster 
access has no evidence to support better health overall. It may, however, 
improve patient satisfaction. 
• Opportunity for marginal health improvement. This may be summarised as 
‘Collecting lots of 1% improvements is the key to success’. In a number of 
clinical specialities research will discover opportunities for improved patient 
management. Individually such interventions are likely to provide marginal 
health improvement and consequently there may not always be a willing 
audience to consider such opportunities. The combined impact of a whole 
series of such initiatives may, on the other hand, provide the scale of 
improvement NHS commissioners may desire.  
The concept of health need, therefore, is another area of struggle within the negotiated 
order. Negotiated goals may thus be a product of synthesizing the three elements of: 
objective health needs; subjective aspiration for services; and the improvements 
discovered through empirical research.  
Team composition 
In the early 1970s there was a debate between two influential political theorists Ralph 
Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas (Blackburn 1973). Miliband produced a volume 
(Miliband 1969) detailing the educational and socio-economic background of those in 
the UK establishment who were considered to hold most political and economic power. 
His conclusion was that political and economic power was concentrated within the 
hands of a small number of people most of whom shared a common background of 
class and education. Miliband suggested this, in part, explained the continued position 
of the ruling elites in UK society as those in power sought to extend the power and 
influence of their own ‘class’. Nicos Poulantzas, from a different Marxist theoretical 
position, whilst congratulatory of Miliband’s work was, nevertheless, critical of his 
analysis. For Poulantzas the origins of the individuals in power and whether they did 
or did not represent some form of class elite was less important than the function of 
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the state they were working in. Thus, for Miliband the proportion of the senior civil 
service that were educated in private schools and a narrow band of higher academic 
institutions (‘Oxbridge’) confirmed the state acting in the interests of those already in 
power. A narrow socio-economic elite was seen to maintain and reproduce socio-
economic systems that maintained and reproduced power relations beneficial to itself. 
For Poulantzas, the origins and class of those running the state was of secondary 
importance: the state developed from an economic base of capitalism and its forms 
represented an effective way of delivering the functions required to maintain and 
reproduce the power relations of capitalism, including maintaining the position of its 
ruling elites.  
Both of the authors described above are politically and theoretically Marxist. 
Consequently, their analysis reflects a theoretical position of class conflict within 
capitalism as an economic system. Nevertheless, the approach to understanding the 
relative influence between individual and structure further supports the approach of 
analytical dualism (see Research Methodology). We may contend that it is not 
necessary to subscribe to a Marxist position to learn lessons from the Miliband-
Poulantzas debate. Foucault (discussed in Craib 1992) positions a debate less in 
terms of class and economic power and more that of power in general. Thus, the 
analysis may be seen not only as one of exploring the role of class relations, but of the 
impact of factors that may be grouped within a description of profile of the decision-
makers. The exploration may support understanding the dynamics and mechanisms 
between structural factors (external influences) and agency factors (the negotiated 
order). The profile of the individual decision-maker in the process should not be 
ignored.  
Corporate capacity and organizational process 
All organizations require capacity (resources of people, building, and materials) to 
achieve its ends. Although CCGs are relatively small organizations in terms of people 
employed, they still require capacity to achieve their objectives. The number of staff in 
particular may present itself as a limiting factor in the decision-making process. 
Returning to Simon (1997) we may suspect that the bounded rationality features of 
satisficing and imperfect information may be linked to the availability of management 
capacity.  Where capacity is greater a decision process may allow more time to 
consider options (rather than opting for the first plausible solution) and to generate 
information in support of a decision. When capacity is limited the converse may apply.  
The constraints of organizational process and capacity are demonstrated at a number 
of levels: the simple number of staff available to support a decision-making process; 
the quality and performance of individuals; the processes and procedures in place in 
the organization.  
Raw human capacity (physical human capital) is to some extent the easiest to assess, 
although recognising the volume available to support a particular decision may be 
complicated.  
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Individuals may have “a significant impact on the performance of large organizations, 
and even entire industries” (Mollick 2012, p. 1003). The Mollick (2012) paper suggests 
individual differences may have a more pronounced impact in ‘creative’ industries: but 
the research also examined the impact of ‘innovators’ (staff paid to be creative and 
entrepreneurial) and ‘managers’ (bureaucratic senior implementers). The “surprising” 
finding of Mollick (2012) was the importance of the manager role and the impact on 
firm organizational achievement from individual performance. Thus, “managers have 
significantly more impact on firm performance than individual innovators” (Mollick 
2012, p. 1012). This is in part explained by the role of management in selection. Thus, 
the ‘innovators’ may produce a number of ideas: however, the idea that progresses to 
development will be ‘selected’ by a manager. This research may be comparable to a 
CCG decision-making process. Options may be developed. The quality of the options 
produced, and the supporting information will influence the decision-making process; 
but so will the ability of those making the decision to understand, analyse, and 
synthesise the options and information provided.  
The feature of organizational process, if the process is well designed, should have a 
limited direct influence on a strategic decision. The need to progress through an 
organizational process, such as business case development, may inhibit the 
production of processes and obstruct issues moving towards a decision; however, 
once a CCG has begun a progress on a decision area, the organization process itself 
may not be a direct influence; however, the need to follow process and standard 
procedures may exacerbate capacity limitations and exhibit what may be termed 
‘organizational inertia’.  
For this study the role of both the senior managers in the CCG Governing Body and 
also the support management team that provide analysis and information to the 
decision-making process are examined to assess their influence.  
Corporate history and memory 
A challenging element of the research is that of establishing the influences on the 
decision-making process that are apparent but not actually evident in real-time. This 
is ontologically supported through Archer’s (1992) concept of morphogenesis that 
includes analysis identifying the need to include the impact of history and emergence. 
However, although theoretically supported, the attempt to establish the degree of 
historical influence remains problematic. The influence of history is contained within 
the analysis of decision-making biases (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) such as the 
availability heuristic (if it is remembered it has greater prominence). In the context of 
the current research the historical impact may be at both corporate and individual 
levels. The rapidly changing NHS environment may produce a lack of what is 
sometimes referred to as ‘corporate memory’: the ability of organizations to use their 
histories as evidence in support of future actions. The pace of NHS change at times 
seems so rapid (in organizational terms at least) that corporate memory seems an 
almost inevitable casualty.  
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Building on Archer’s morphogenesis it may be possible to describe the dynamic 
relation between the agent and the environment across the three levels of framing. 
Firstly, at the individual/micro level that the compatibilist dynamic between the free-will 
of the individual at the point of action, within a largely determined environment 
(Dennett 2003). Secondly, at the internal organizational/meso level: between the 
individual decision-maker and the negotiated order of the decision-making 
environment. Thirdly, at the macro level of the organization’s external environment: 
between the decision-making body and its corporate external world. Thus, within the 
individual the decision will be made in part from a pre-existing set of beliefs and 
knowledge, on the one hand, and aspirations and expectations on the other. The 
choice will be made, but from a series of largely pre-determined choices.  
Within the group the decision may be made through the construction of a group 
consensus (a product of the negotiated order) influenced by the individual 
determinants, and the determining outcomes form the ordering negotiation. But the 
external focus of the project inevitably recognizes the impact of the commissioning 
environment. Consequently, we may describe the third level of determination as that 
of the external influencing factors. This may be seen as influences on the process or 
on individuals. In some cases, the combining factors may provide a set of pre-existing 
influencing factors that pre-determine the realistic options available. For example, the 
concept of the Overton Window (Russell 2006) suggests only certain political options 
will be achievable at any one time. Anything outside the window may not realisable, 
despite the relative quality or benefits of options laying outside the window. As a 
defined hypothesis the Overton Window appears to have limited empirical bases, but 
the concept may help to illuminate the external influencing factors. Thus, may there 
may be significance in the role of history. This may be a historical need to re-play 
events to secure an outcome not secured in the past; or it may be a reiteration of 
subjects within a frame of availability or realisability (within an Overton Window). A 
related factor is the concept of ‘nothing new in the decision process’ as highlighted by 
(Cohen et la 1972), linking the Overton Window hypothesis and that of the Garbage 
Can (Cohen et al. 1972) provides a plausible hypothesis that decision-makers will be 
presented not primarily with novel solutions but those that have been brought ‘off the 
shelf’ in some case after a lengthy gestation period or when considered long forgotten.  
Arthur (1989) describes the impact of path dependence on the outcomes of certain 
technologies. Thus, the emergence of one technological solution over a competitor 
(Arthur’s (1989) examples include the predominance of petrol over steam) may be as 
much decided by the influence of previous decisions taken and the present vested 
interests than the technical superiority of the technology itself. A form of path 
dependence may be seen in NHS decision-making, where previous decision may 
shape how decision-makers take similar decisions in future.  
Despite the somewhat diverse evidences described above there may exist sufficient 
examples to conclude there are likely to be significant historical influences on strategic 
decisions. Thus, we may describe the historical deterministic influencing factors as: 
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• The overall determined environment in which commissioning occurs 
• Historical obligations that shape the current strategic thinking of the CCG 
• Known historical episodes that are present in the minds of decision-makers 
(including the availability heuristic) 
• Perceived frames of opportunity that are considered to be what decisions may 
be ‘allowable’ at the point of decision 
• Pre-developed policy options that emerge and re-emerge in response to 
defined commissioning needs. 
Financial constraints 
The role of finance in commissioning is considered as fundamental, resource 
allocation being a major component of its role in the healthcare system. It is, therefore, 
not surprising that we may consider it as both an external and internal influence. The 
postulated internal influences are: available resources, value for money analysis, and 
the competing investment priorities. The three influences work together in terms of not 
merely the effect of an overall resource envelope, but of how the envelope is allocated 
between different projects. In many respects this reflects many of the other decision 
influences but may provide an even starker demonstration of the work of negotiation 
within the organizational coalition. Coalition members will manoeuvre for position to 
access as much financial resource as they need (or as much as they can). The 
discussion thus may shift from whether a project in isolation is beneficial (‘this mental 
health initiative delivers health improvement’) to whether the clinical area under 
scrutiny has received sufficient resources (‘mental health only receives X% of funding, 
it should have more’). In such debates the individual proposal in question may become 
a secondary issue and the decision is thus less as to the specific scheme and more 
as to the place of the scheme within a wider apportionment process.    
Linked to the scramble to assert supremacy for competing interests is the struggle 
between different commissioning opportunities. They may seek to use the same 
resource, but relate to different clinical areas, and consequently comparisons may be 
difficult. The role of NICE in support of this process provides a form of the ‘double-
edged sword’. Defining interventions as ‘cost-effective’ against the available evidence 
base provides a clear statement for commissioners of what is seen to work and 
enables an objective reference point to support decision-making. The other edge of 
the sword, however, is that such assessments are made in isolation. For healthcare 
commissioning using resources across a wide spectrum of care, NICE assessments 
provide little support to help decide on how two ‘cost effective’ interventions compare 
against each other.  
Synthesised Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for the project combines the previously analysed 
information and concepts. Thus, the analysis of the literature review provides a 
summary of the organizational concepts at play in the case study. The strategic 
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decision-making environment places the organization in an environmental context. 
The three level macro-meso-micro framing environment is the product of the literature 
review in that it: describes the strategic environment and in particular the role of 
strategy in the public sector; constructs a model of the decision-making context within 
which the case study occurs, recognising the influences on individual and group 
decision-making; and provides the conceptual framework within which the negotiated 
order dynamic is hypothesised to develop. All of this is seen to happen in the actual 
practical context of the case study: NHS commissioning.  
Bordage (2009) in discussing conceptual frameworks suggests they have the purpose 
of both illumination and magnification: shining light on a problem and allowing the 
researcher to examine the problem in more detail. For Bordage (2009) frameworks are 
also a mechanism for the researcher to be explicit regarding their assumptions. In this 
project it is an opportunity to synthesise the conclusions emerging from the literature 
review and also to clearly identify the negotiated order concept as its analytical lens.  
The use of the negotiated order as the analytical lens emerged from the literature 
review and particularly from studies of organizational behaviour, most importantly 
Cyert and March (1992) and the concept of the negotiated organization (for the 
researcher a precursor to the negotiated order). The review of group decision-making 
and board type (upper-echelon) behaviours confirmed the benefit to the researcher of 
conceptual approach that would allow such behaviours to be examined, but within a 
framework that supported exploring the research question and addressing the 
research objectives.  
Although other approaches to group behaviour may have been used, it is considered 
that the negotiated order is the most appropriate for this case study, for the following: 
• The literature on negotiated order (for example Strauss 1963, 1982) includes 
studies in healthcare settings. 
• Other factors possibly at play in group dynamics, such as the use of power, are 
treated as falling within and the negotiated order concept and as constructing 
the order process. 
• More recently developed organizational analytical concepts, such as 
institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio 2008), may have been used as 
alternatives to the negotiated order, but are likely to cover very similar ground. 
Further research may test the validity of the lens in this study against 
alternatives.  
 
The framework supports the research strategy of creating and producing research 
data. As described above the application of the literature review analysis and its 
methodological application is summarised in the Context-Mechanism-Outcome (CMO) 
approach (Pawson and Tilley 2004). 
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Figure 14 - Context-Mechanism-Outcome (CMO) Framework 
 
 
Analytical framework of Critical Discourse Analysis 
The analytical framework provides the means of analysing the produced research data 
consistent within the research methodology, in pursuit of answering the research 
objectives. The necessary task from the produced data was to establish a means of 
analysis that allowed scrutiny, analysis and synthesis of the produced data that 
delivered the research objectives yet was consistent with the requirements of research 
validity and reliability. As the primary produced data was that of text, the analysis 
required a means of textual analysis: but one directed by the research ontology. This 
was undertaken by the application of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Jorgensen 
2002). The term discourse has been widely used and is subject to varied interpretation 
and definition, prompting some authors to suggest it has become ‘vague’ (Jorgensen 
2002). As a general term, discourse has been defined as “a particular way of talking 
about and understanding the world” (Jorgensen 2002, p. 1). The project uses the 
definition of discourse provided by Jaynes (2015). This is more than discourse as a 
language event but as “language use, the communication of beliefs, and interaction in 
social situations” (Jaynes 2015, p. 98). Similarly, Clegg (1989, p.178) quotes Laclau 
as defining discourse as the phenomena through which the “social production of 
meaning takes place”.  For Jaynes (2015), quoting Van Dijk, an important element of 
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discourse studies is to describe how the three dimensions integrate. CDA provides an 
analytical framework that allows interrogation of the data produced (primarily textual) 
within the ontological and epistemological approach of critical realism. CDA is only one 
form of discourse analysis (Gee 2010). Gee (2010) suggests all discourse analysis 
should be critical, but for this project CDA is used as the main analytical typology 
adopted is the trinity of Fairclough as described below. Wodak (2001) understands the 
use of ‘critical’ as having “distance to the data, embedding the data in the social, taking 
a political stance explicitly, and a focus on self-reflection” (Wodak 2001, p.9). 
Elsewhere this is re-framed as CDA focusing on concepts of power, history and 
ideology (Wodak 2001, p.3). This project is considered to have maintained a distance 
to the data consistent with its realist methodology; focused on self-reflection of 
decision actors; assessed the use and presence of power; and analyzed texts within 
their corporate context and social history. There was, however, no explicit focus on 
political ideology and no political stance taken.  
The use of CDA supported achieving the research objectives of the project and 
aligning closely to its realist methodology, as CDA includes the requirement to analyse 
language within its empirical context (Jorgensen 2002). This is facilitated by 
Fairclough’s (2003) CDA approach, which avoids drawing a distinction between 
detailed textual analysis and social theoretical approaches. Rather there should not 
be an either/or distinction (Fairclough 2003). In this project the core data is primarily 
textual and there is a beneficial necessity to conduct detailed textual analysis: but such 
conducted with consideration of the wider social context. It may be considered that 
Fairclough’s (2003) description of the ‘order of discourse’ is consistent with the concept 
of the negotiated order.  
Fairclough’s (2003) approach to CDA (Jorgensen 2002) describes a three-dimensional 
model: social practice; discursive practice; and text. Thus, 
• Social practice – the case study occurs within its wider social context and the 
analysis of findings references this context and the role of social structure within 
management practice. This dimension places discourse within the creation and 
use of the macro frame level. 
• Discursive practice. The practical observed levels of management activity are 
at the discursive level and use the meso (organizational) frame and the micro 
(individual) frame. This level recognises the wider social practice, structural 
influences, and analyses the production and use of language as a tool in 
decision-making and the development of the negotiated order. 
• The text is the visible level of actual data collected in the study. Analysis of the 
data allows consideration of discursive practice: but without the actual data, 
consideration of discursive practice would be no more than speculation. Thus, 
the role of data in discourse analysis is reminiscent of Orna’s (2005) description 
of information products as ‘making knowledge visible’. In this case what is 
visible is the text. The analysis attempted to explore and discover the 
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mechanisms used in discursive practice. The study of actual data in practice 
provides the opportunity for social scientific study.  
Figure 15 - Diagrammatic representation of Fairclough's CDA model (from 
Jorgensen 2002) 
 
The relationship between the three levels is part of the analytical project. Furthermore, 
all texts are considered to overlap, described by Fairclough (2003) as intertextuality: 
We can begin by noting that for any particular text or type of text, there is a set 
of other texts and a set of voices which are potentially relevant, and potentially 
incorporated into the text. (Fairclough 2003, p.47) 
As with the interplay between frames, it is evident of the interplay between texts used 
in the decision-making process. Yet again there is seen interaction across domains: 
intertextuality describing the interaction of language; interdiscursivity the interaction of 
language use; and multi-level frames the interaction of cognitive frames used and 
produced in the case study.  
Thus, the conceptual framework of the research project synthesises the three 
elements of:  
Ø Analysis of texts created and used through discursive practice (CDA), which 
then reveal; 
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Ø The cognitive frames used in the environment of the created negotiated order, 
which then allows; 
Ø Development of mechanisms at work in in the negotiated order creation and the 
behavioural relations implicit in the analysed text. 
The discursive practices analysed in the case study occur within the broader corporate 
social context (for CDA its social discourse) and constitute the macro frames. Leitch 
and Palmer (2010) discuss the possible inadequate assessment of ‘context’ within 
discourse analysis. This may be addressed by applying the three-dimensional 
framework of Fairclough (Jorgensen 2002); furthermore, the explicit analysis and 
combination of discourse analysis with contextual framing may address the perceived 
inadequate treatment of context as considered by Leitch and Palmer (2010).  
Discursive practice occurs primarily at the meso and micro levels and the theme of 
negotiation remained central to the analysis. Thus, “texts discursive differences are 
negotiated; they are governed by differences in power” (Wodak (2001, p. 11).  The 
visible reported feature of the negotiated order is the spoken and written text. 
Furthermore, the analysis of text explores the mechanisms that identify the spoken, 
written and unspoken and unwritten dimensions of power (Lukes 2005). For Foucault 
there is an inseparable link between knowledge and communication and discourse 
then becomes in itself an exercise of power: “No body of knowledge can be formed 
without a system of communications, records, accumulation and displacement which 
is in itself a form of power” (quoted in Gaventa 2003, p.4). Thus, CDA analyses the 
use of discourse in the power dimensions of the creation of the negotiated order.  
The use of CDA in this project was aligned to the methodology of ethnography: the 
study of the decision case as a process not an event allowed longitudinal analysis of 
texts generated, used and reconstituted throughout the process. The diagram below 
summarises the conceptual framework and secondly with its relationship to the 
literature review with its relationship to the content of the literature review: 
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Figure 16 - Conceptual Framework of Discourse Framing 
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Figure 17 - Conceptual Framework of Discursive Framing  
Mapped to Literature Review 
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Chapter	3	–	Research	Strategy	and	Methodology	
Shining a strange light 
Returning to Kennedy’s description of decision-making as “dark and tangled stretches” 
(Sorensen 1963, p.xiii) one of the purposes of the research is to illuminate the decision-
making environment. Van Maanen (2011b, p.229) comments that, “Ethnography 
shines a light, sometimes a very strange one, on what people are up to and such 
doings are rarely if ever predictable or in line with what either ‘current theory’ or ‘the 
experts’ might say”.  
The task of the researcher in exploring the influences on commissioning is in part to 
explore the observed situation and the social factors at play, even if strange and 
unpredictable. This may not always be easy when confronted with competing cognitive 
frames and the risk of falling down the moralization gap (even if the wrong trees and 
wrong trains have been avoided thus far). The added complication for the researcher 
in this project was to deal with the evident complexities of the ontology facing the 
participant observer. The research strategy and methodology employed describes how 
the researcher addressed the challenge of achieving the research objectives and to 
bring the research subject into the light.  
Introduction 
This section describes the strategy employed in conducting the research and the 
method employed. The chapter details the different research methods employed and 
the timescales used in conducting the research. The chapter explains the supporting 
research methodology, critical realism, used in the project, and the approach of 
ethnographic case study as the preferred approach. This is then followed with specific 
description of the research undertaken and the analytical tools employed in processing 
the collected data. Finally, the chapter summarises the methodological framework 
developed to undertake analysis of the research data.  
The chapter summarises the research method and methodology through discussion 
of: 
• The underpinning methodology that supports the research and provided the 
theoretical basis to produce the research design 
• The overall research strategy and methods used in collecting data 
• The approach of ethnographic case study as the method employed 
• How the project addressed issues of research validity and management of 
ethical considerations 
• The approach to analysis of the research data through its various forms and 
stages 
• The reflexive critique of the role and influence of the researcher in the project 
• The resulting methodological framework arising from the literature review and 
the research methodology. 
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Research methodology 
The approach of the social scientific research in the project has four dimensions:  
• Ontology is the theory or study of being: what is existence and what it is to exist.  
• Epistemology is the theory or study of knowledge: it produces theories of how 
we understand the world of existence.  
• Methodology is the principles and systems for the methods used to explore, 
generate, and test knowledge 
• Aetiology is the system of causes that explain the working of the world explored. 
Thus, if ontology attempts to define and describe the world we experience; 
epistemology attempts to define and describe how we can establish such knowledge 
about the world. Consequently, ontology and epistemology are related, if separate, 
concepts. Furthermore, ontological positions often correspond to similar 
epistemological positions and arguably any theory of knowledge must correspond to a 
theory of being (even if implicitly so). The ontological positions will inform the 
methodology used in the research, and the applied methodology will provide the 
analytical tools to establish aetiology, the explanation of causality. The research 
methodology employed was that of critical realism.  
Critical realism may be seen as an ontological position attempting to incorporate 
elements from the apparently oppositional theories of ‘pure’ realism and interpretive 
approaches such as phenomenology (Sayer 1992). A simplified continuum of objective 
realism and positivism (in various forms) to subjective interpretivism in research 
ontology is arguably an artificial polarity of positions on a continuum for research 
epistemology. The critical realist project is an attempt to reconcile elements of realist 
and subjective interpretivist approaches, with the emergence of an ontology that 
recognises necessary elements of multiple approaches (see Sayer 1992, Edwards et 
al. 2014, Fisher 2010). Critical realism, thus, includes an explicit recognition of 
pluralism and holds that an objective world exists independently of an individual’s 
ability to interpret and understand it. Further, it recognises that how we do understand 
this objective reality is dependent on a subjective interpretation of this world as it is 
experienced. The real external world of ‘intransitive objects’ exists: but our means of 
understanding this world will always be in part socially constructed (as ‘transitive 
objects’) (Johnson and Duberley 2000). This duality is seen as making critical realism 
‘unique’ within social science (Edwards et el 2014). The recognition of the duality is 
not primarily as an attempt to reconcile the objectivism of realism and the subjectivism 
of interpretive positions. More than this, it establishes a need to analyse both strands 
as equally important and at times dynamically conflicting, within its overall ontology24. 
The reconciliation of realist and idealist (anti-realist) ontologies and epistemologies 
into the critical realist synthesis is described in the diagram from Johnson and Duberley 
(2000)25: 
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	 Thesis	 	 Synthesis	 	 Antithesis	 	
Epistemological	realism	 	
Metaphysical	realism	 	
Epistemological	relativism	 	
Metaphysical	relativism	
	 Empirical	realism	 	 Critical	realism	 	 Superidealism	 	
Figure 18 - Bhaskar's Critical Realist Synthesis (Johnson and Duberley 2000) 
Sousa (2010) summarises the differing positions of positivism, postmodernism, and 
critical realism across the four dimensions of ontology, epistemology, methodology, 
and aetiology. This has been modified as a summary table below: 
 
Table 2 - Summary of different metatheoretical approaches (via Sousa 2010) 
Theoretical	
Position	
Ontology	 Epistemology	 Methodology	 Aetiology	
Positivism	 A	world	existing	independent	 of	the	mind	 Knowledge	 gained	through	experimentation,	the	 development	of	 laws,	 allowing	scientific	prediction	
Primarily	quantitative	methods,	 using	deduction	(falsifiability)	 and	induction.		
Deterministic	cause	 and	 effect	relationships	 in	closed	systems	
Postmodernism	 The	view	of	 the	world	is	created	through	 human	experience	 and	discourse	
The	 world	 is	known	 through	discourse	 and	 the	exploration	 of	human	interpretation	
Qualitative	research	methods	such	 as	phenomenology	and	 textual	interpretation	
Unclear	 if	causation	 is	 a	stable	concept26	
Critical	Realism	 Accepts	 the	existence	 of	 a	mind-independent	world	 but	observed	 and	understood	through	 human	interpretation	
Multiple	approaches,	including	experimentation,	social	construction,	description,	 and	pragmatic	explanation.		
Mixed	 methods,	using	 different	qualitative	 and	quantitative	approaches	 to	triangulate	research;	 use	 of	abduction	 and	retroduction.		
Causation	 as	underlying	complex	mechanisms	within	interdependent	open	systems		
The method applied to understanding the real world is to establish reality as stratified 
(Edwards et al. 2014, Fisher 2010). The stratification is at three levels, the empirical, 
the actual, and the real (Bhaskar 1978): 
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• Experiences. The ‘empirical’ level is that experienced by agents in practice. This 
level is subjective: including what individuals ‘see’; or indeed do not see.  
• Events. The ‘actual’ level is that of events that happen in the world, which may 
be inconsistent with the subjective experience.  
• Mechanisms. The ‘real’ level of mechanisms and structures that generate the 
actual world.  
The strata interact not in a singular direction, but rather dynamically in directions top 
down (hierarchically) and bottom-up (emergently). Fleetwood (2005) further stratifies 
the ‘real’ into four modes of reality. Thus, things are considered real if they have ‘causal 
efficacy’: that is, they have a tangible effect or outcome, even if they are not materially 
existing. (Fleetwood (2005) uses the example of God, where the idea of God as a 
concept is real, even if God may or may not be actually existing.) Thus, the four strata 
are:  
• Materially real – things that physically exist that exist independently of human  
• Ideally real – concepts, ideas, and opinion, etc that form part of discourse. They 
are not material but have actual effects. 
• Socially real – these are entities that are real by being depended on the social 
interaction of individuals and groups (for example markets and organizations) 
• Artefactually real – things are a fusion of the materially real, the ideally real, and 
the socially real. Fleetwood’s (2005) example here include computers and 
violins, where their being is socially mediated beyond the mere physical.  
The scientific methods employed are primarily abduction and retroduction. Abduction 
is an extension of the concept of inference to the best explanation (IBE Okasha 2002). 
This eschews the difficult debates regarding induction (see Okasha 2002) and rejects 
the evident simplicity of a reliance on deduction through falsification27 (Sayer 1992). 
Instead it employs a pragmatic approach of abduction (literally ‘taking out’ the best 
explanation). Sayer (1992) discusses falsificationism and the deductive method 
suggesting that one of the problems with the approach is that it is rarely actually used 
in scientific research. Despite this rarity, many positivist authors reference Popper and 
the deductive method as ‘the’ scientific method, possibly misinterpreting the concept 
of induction (Greenland 1998). Hansson (2006) appears to justify Sayer’s assertion in 
a study of research published in the journal Nature. Of the 70 high-quality papers 
published in the year studied, only 2 employed a deductive approach consistent with 
falsificationism. 
Abduction is a pragmatic approach, but with some similarity to induction, and is 
concerned with using IBE as a means of assessing the best and most useful 
explanation. For Sayer (1992, p.69) this involves replacing a search for ‘truth’ with a 
striving for “practical adequacy”. (Sayer’s version of critical realism is consistent with 
the position of philosophical pragmatism (Johnson and Duberley 2000).) Abduction is 
a method of combining observations and theories to provide the most plausible 
explanation establishing some form of causal relationship. The analysis of causality is 
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less a search for connections between discreet events (such as cause and effect) and 
more a striving to establish the aforementioned mechanisms (Sayer 1992, O’Mahoney 
and Vincent 2014).  
Retroduction is similar in approach to abduction (for some authors (O’Mahoney and 
Vincent 2014) the two are conflated into one approach). The major difference in 
approach is that where abduction seeks to establish mechanisms, retroduction starts 
with identified mechanisms and then explores what causal forces would produce such 
mechanisms (and by extension which phenomena would not produce such 
mechanisms) (O’Mahoney and Vincent 2014). Thus, abduction may be seen as the 
more appropriate approach in the analysis of collected real-time and observational 
data, where mechanisms and outcomes may be uncertain. Retroduction is used where 
the outcomes are known but how the processes emerged leading to that point is less 
clear. Both abduction and retroduction appear consistent with the concept of IBE.  The 
ultimate test for the validity of a text may be its practical adequacy. The strength of 
critical realism in organizational research may be its ability to incorporate elements of 
interpretivism, and thus interpretive research methods, within an overall realist 
framework. Placing of research within a realist framework provided a grounding that 
allowed interpretive exploration without moving into extreme relativism. Thus, the use 
and content of narrative discourse and the language games evident within interview 
data (and indeed observed conversation) provided rich research data exploring the 
decision-making process. Yet the framework avoided any over-emphasis on language.  
Further exploration of the stratified approach can be considered with reference to the 
development of concepts of the different strata. Of particular relevance appears to be 
consideration into the roles and relationships of structure and agency. Central to this 
consideration in the methodology is the morphogenetic realist approach as described 
by Archer (1995). Archer (1995) develops the critical realist approach in an extensive 
exploration of structure and agency. In part the exploration is a reaction against, and 
a critique of, conflation theories (Archer, 1995). Conflation is seen as taking one of 
three forms: downwards conflation (structure and agency merging into one form 
dominated by the impact of social structure and the external world); upwards conflation 
(merging dominated by the perspective of the individual with social structure as 
secondary); and central conflation (structure and agency become merged into one with 
a perceived inability to separate the two). Against conflation, Archer infers an 
ontological perspective should maintain the ability and necessity to analyse structure 
and agency as separate (despite their obvious ultimate linkage).  
The morphogenetic approach describes the relationship between structure and 
agency in terms of a dynamic process of change over time. Morphogenesis in biology 
is the biological process by which organisms change shape. In organizational theory 
the concept similarly explains how bodies or social systems evolve and change form. 
One of the major differences between morphogenesis and other theories critiqued by 
Archer is the acceptance of time as a factor that distinguishes structure and agency. 
Relating this to the research project provides an interesting dimension in the treatment 
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of decision. Much of the laboratory style experimental research provides no 
acceptance of a historical influence on the decision process. Although the history of 
the individual may influence decision-making, for example, through the effects of 
heuristics, there is no capacity for an assessment of a decision process before the 
decision-making under scrutiny. Much of the wider research does not attempt to frame 
decisions within an organizational historical context. So, in the case of Kovner (2009) 
decisions are studied within their decision-making timeframe, but do not provide 
detailed assessment of the historical decision-making context.  Thus, the history is 
treated as important to understand why a decision is occurring (“why did we need to 
make that judgement at that time?”); but there may be an absence of the history of 
how decisions are made (“what did we do last time we made decisions that influences 
this decision?”). Therefore, the focus on the decision need may distract from a focus 
on the decision practice. If we accept Archer’s concept of temporality, there may be a 
need to analyse not merely the current decision practice, but the historical 
development of the decision makers, decision-making bodies, and the associated 
organizational histories and organizational learning that shape the decision frame.  
The morphogenetic approach may be associated with symbolic interactionism (Craib 
1992) through its focus on temporality. As G.H. Mead is identified as an early influence 
of symbolic interactionism it may be no accident that he developed a novel assessment 
of time and thus its potential influence on social research. Maines (1983) discusses 
Mead’s theory of time and infers a radical departure from traditional conceptions of the 
past and the future. Although the present implies the past and a future, “reality is 
always that of the present” (Maines 1983). The past arises through memory and exists 
in images contained within the present. Similarly, the future is always hypothetical: 
existing as a form of anticipation. For Mead, “We speak of the past as final and 
irrevocable. There is nothing that is less so . . .” (Mead, 1932, p. 95). Thus, the 
boundaries between past, present, and future are always uncertain. “There is a 
continuity of experience, which is a continuity of presents” (Mead 1929, p. 235). Thus, 
for Mead, the past has no status other than in its relation to the present.   
The four dimensions of Mead’s formulation of the past are:   
§ The symbolically reconstructed past: this is time as an ongoing process not 
measurement confined. “The present makes the past possible” (Maines, p.163). 
Also, "The symbolic reconstruction of the past thus involves redefining the 
meaning of past events in such a way that they have meaning in and utility for 
the present” (Maines 1983, p.163). "Each present, therefore, must reconstruct 
its past” (Maines 1983, p.163). The dimension sees the past as something that 
primarily supports sense-making of the present.   
§ The social structural past is not dealt with directly but is considered implied. The 
past structures and conditions, the experiences found in the present. The 
process is not entirely deterministic (according to Maines 1983) as 
unanticipated events require adjustment: the structural past thus provides 
probabilities for what will take place in the future. 
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§ The implied objective past. Not explicitly described in Mead. The ‘what must 
have been’ dimensions. This relates to a situational ontology about events that 
have occurred in the past of which there is an established consensus. Thus, 
some events ‘must’ have to have occurred for certain things to be existent in 
the present.  For the present to be like it is, the past must have been of a certain 
type. 
§ The mythical past. The dimension relates solely to symbolic creations used to 
manipulate social relations. These ‘pasts’ are creations and are not empirically 
grounded. But they have material effects and are thus may be empirically 
consequential. Such mythical creations are purposive and exist to provide 
advantages in social relations.  
Thus, in using Mead’s formulation of temporality it may be seen that morphogenesis 
is a continuous, dynamic series of processes that not only link dialectically between 
structure and agency, but also across dimensions of time. Furthermore, da Silva 
(2007) draws an explicit link between the dialectical nature of temporality and 
structure-agency, and Strauss’s (1978) concept of the negotiated order.  
The three steps in the morphogenetic cycle are identified as: structural conditioning; 
social interaction; and structural elaboration (Archer 1995).  
§ In structural conditioning properties are seen as being consequent on past 
actions and outcomes. Thus, these past events “have effects in their own rights 
later on, as constraining or facilitating influences upon actors, which are not 
attributable or reducible to the practices of other agents” (Archer 1995, p.90). 
§ Social interaction is considered to be structurally conditioned (influenced) but 
not structurally determined. The different relationships and interplay between 
actors will be influenced by structure but will produce effects from the interaction 
itself, partially independent from the influence of structure. The reconciliation of 
self-interest, itself promoted through structural conditioning, will occur through 
interaction and management of competing vested interests within a group, 
managed through negotiation and accommodation (Archer 1995, p. 90-91). 
§ The resultant interactions occurring within the conditioned structure then 
produce the process of structural elaboration. The elaboration is a process of 
change that affects the structure itself and those working within it. This product 
of group conflict, cooperation, and general interaction is seen by Archer (1995) 
as largely unintentional, although there seems no reason to assume some 
intentional outcomes may not be a product of structural elaboration.  
This morphogenetic cycle avoids the conflations of moving straight from conditioning 
to elaboration (in effect a form of determinism); and from social interaction to 
elaboration (assuming no structural role). Archer’s (1995) approach to understanding 
the dynamic relationship between structure and agency as necessarily inter-linked, but 
analytically separate, concepts is labelled analytical dualism.  
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Archer (1995, 1996) identifies distinctions within the concept of agency. Thus, agency 
is not seen as equivalent to the individual. Rather agency may be of a collective or 
corporate body, corporate agency, or an individual, primary agency. The distinction is 
helpful within this project as the study is fundamentally associated with decision 
bodies. Thus, the research is both a study of the decision-making bodies in action and 
the decision-makers within these bodies in the decision process. The dynamic of 
creating the negotiated environment suggests a mutually influencing relationship 
between the primary and corporate agencies. The configuration of primary agents will 
in part shape the nature and behaviour of the corporate agency (primary to corporate 
morphogenesis). Conversely, the constructed corporate bodies will influence the 
decision-making behaviour of the primary agents themselves (corporate to primary 
morphogenesis).  
Developing this distinction to support the research strategy and analytical framework 
it may be helpful to describe different temporal zones within the decision process. The 
area within the decision process, that is the time spent in and immediately before and 
after a major decision-making committee, may be described as intra-decisional. The 
period before the actual start of a decision process and the period after a nominal 
decision but before actual implementation, may be described a peri-decisional. The 
research may seek to explore whether the behaviour of agents is obviously different 
between the two zones, and how corporate and primary agents relate to each other, 
both within the socio-cultural structures.  
Research design 
Decision-making research is often described in three forms: experimental research, 
often within the field of behavioural psychology (for example studies included within 
Kahneman (2012)); analysis of political decisions utilising historical sources (such as 
Janis (1982)); and critical event case studies (for example as contained within Weick 
(2001)). The author’s previous dissertation used case study and narrative research 
techniques. However, the approach was that of retrospective analysis: this was 
consistent with some of the three research designs described above. But previous 
retrospective research had often started from the outcomes of decision, reviewed the 
process, and constructed explanations. The analysis thus included an assessment of 
decision-maker behaviour: but not in real-time. Experimental studies were done in real-
time, but not in a practical decision-making environment, questioning their ecological 
validity.  Following Geertz (1973), to understand why people act requires studying what 
they do: the research studied in detail what decision-makers did and how they behave. 
Studies of management behaviour (for example, Mintzberg 1973, Tengblad 2006) that 
focus on the practice (or ‘doing’) of management provide a useful reference point.  
Karlsson and Ackroyd (2014) discuss the options of intensive versus extensive 
research. It may be argued the critical realist approach is more consistent with the 
intensive approach and was used in this study. Furthermore, CR advocates suggest 
the use of a wide range of research collection methods (in this case, observation, 
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interviews, and historical documents) allowing the intensive approach, consistent with 
the CR ontology (see various chapters of Edwards et al. 2014). The intensity of the 
analysis is seen as helping to ‘get under the skin’ of the decision-making process.  
To explore decision practice the research used three main methods: 
• Ethnography (participant observation) of decision practice in decision-making 
committees. 
• Narrative analysis of decision-makers recollections and retrospective 
assessment of the decision process. 
• Analytical review of evidence used and developed in the decision process.  
The conceptual framework required a method that allowed the generation of detailed 
textual research data of the decision-making process in action. Thus, the CDA 
approach to textual analysis requires text. The research textual data came from the 
observed meetings analysed within the ethnography. The triangulation of the meeting 
data with the approach of qualitative interview provided assessment of the levels of 
framing influences across the three levels of the framework. The deep study of 
behaviour was considered to be appropriate to the case study as the most appropriate 
method consistent with the conceptual framework.  
Research strategy 
The overall research strategy was one of case-study analysis (Yin 2009) during the 
decision-making processes occurring during one financial year. As the objective was 
research into strategic decisions, at the early part of the project appropriate decisions 
with a significant potential impact on corporate success were sought. The focus was 
on one major strategic decision process.   
The research strategy had three arms: ethnographic study of real-time decision-
making of the executive decision-making body; retrospective assessment of decisions 
through qualitative research interviews; and collection of the texts and resources used 
to support the decision processes. Yin (2009) discussed various approaches to the 
case study approach. The case study method was a single case design (Yin 2009, p. 
46). Yin (2009, p.46-49) describes five rationales for using single case design. Of the 
five, the project is justified strongly by three of the rationales. The strong rationales for 
single case design are: that it was an extreme or unique case (such decisions are 
unusual and the combination of specific factors in the organization were unlikely to be 
repeated in the same combination in other areas); secondly, that it was representative 
of a type of complex strategic decision facing a CCG. (This combination of unique 
versus representative is paradoxical but enlightening: the decision is complex, multi-
factorial, and at the time of decision-making provided a particular blend of internal and 
external influences; but such combinations, unique in their particular presentation, will, 
nevertheless, be typical of strategic decisions in this type of organization.) The third 
rationale was its revelatory nature, as the access of the researcher is considered 
unusual in terms of current NHS research, and untypical across corporate bodies more 
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generally. The rationale of critical test was not considered to apply in this case, due to 
its exploratory nature. A longitudinal rationale was also considered not to apply, as the 
research data was collected over a continuous, relatively short period. The case study 
design was considered to be holistic rather than embedded (Yin 2009, p.50). The three 
arms of data production could be considered as separate sub-units consistent with the 
embedded description: but the three arms were just that of data production and not 
separately identifiable semi-autonomous case study units. Consequently, the aim of 
the study was to produce a holistic case study.  
Case Study 
The case study approach is an appropriate strategy when research aims to ask ‘why?’ 
and ‘how?’ questions (Yin 2009, p. 4). A case study is defined as, “an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident” (Yin 2009, p. 18). Yin (2009) discusses perceived weaknesses to the case 
study approach: lack of research rigour; limited basis for generalisation; length of time; 
and weak ability to establish causality. The project addressed the perceived 
weaknesses through: 
• An extended period of research data collection and reporting within a developed 
framework; 
• Generalisation to theoretical proposition (Yin 2009); 
• The ethnography was deliberately lengthy and detailed; 
• The objective was to explore the mechanisms at work, more than assert 
causality. 
The critical realist ontology and epistemology support the use of ‘intensive’ research 
methods (Edwards et al. 2014) such as case studies: an intensive dissection of a 
decision, using multiple research methods. The intensive research strategy supported 
the approach of seeking differing levels of research evidence. Thus, Yin (2009) 
suggests case study research may have three purposes: exploratory; explanatory; and 
descriptive. In this project the case study research aimed to: describe the detailed 
process of behaviour in the decision-making process; explore the relationship arising 
from the negotiated order; and attempt to explain the mechanisms at work in producing 
the outcomes from the decision process.  
Ethnography  
Ethnography may be defined as a form of social science research with the direct 
observation of subjects in their usual social environment (Watson 2003), over an 
extended period of time with the researcher actively participating with the subjects in 
the normal cultural setting (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). Although participant 
observation may be conflated with ethnography, Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) 
suggest the ethnographer should use whatever data is available to inform cultural 
analysis. That said, it seems likely that much of what will be described as ethnography 
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is likely to include an element of participant observation. This may be an effective 
means of achieving “close observation of and involvement with people in a particular 
social setting” (Watson 2011, p.205).  
Advocates of ethnography (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995) describe its relative 
merits compared to other research methods and in this case the specific reasons to 
use the technique being: 
• Exploring actual behaviour of decision-makers in the process in real-time 
• Exploring the decision process before the outcome of the decision and 
subsequent sequelae, thus reducing outcome bias 
• Assessing how evidence is sourced and used through the process, rather than 
just assessing the quality of the evidence.   
Hammersley (1992) discusses the relationship between ethnography and realism. This 
study used the methodology of critical realism and Hammersley’s assessment of 
ethnography as supporting a realist position helps define the research framework for 
this project. Thus, the focus on decision-making in practice provides a perceived 
‘naturalistic’ assessment of decision practice. The use of ethnographic techniques by 
an actor within the decision-making theatre is consistent with the role of complete 
participant within defined ethnographic typologies (Bryman and Bell 2003). But it may 
be necessary to go further in defining the approach as beyond general ethnography 
and closer to a definition of auto-ethnography (Bryman and Bell 2003) or participant 
ethnography (Hammersley 1992). The intention in this research was not only to look 
at the practice of individual managers, but that of the decision-making bodies. 
One difficulty facing researchers using participant observational techniques in practice 
may be the complexity of placing such practical research into theoretical frameworks. 
As discussed above some definitions of ethnography (possibly Hammersley 1992) 
focuses on the approach as being its research method. Others (for example Watson 
2011) instead emphasise the approach as being one fundamentally of sociological 
understanding rather than a research methodology per se.  
Bryman and Bell (2003) discusses different typologies for participant observation. 
Typologies range from the most distanced observation (‘complete’ or ‘total’ researcher) 
to the most actively engaged in the community being studied (‘complete’ or ‘total’ 
participant). In this project the researcher played a maximally participating role 
consistent with that of complete or total participant except that the research was not 
covert (Bryman and Bell 2003) and the researcher would remain in the studied 
workplace after completion of the research. Bryman and Bell (2003) further discusses 
the level of involvement of the researcher in the process being studied: either active 
or passive. Clearly in this case study the researcher, as a senior figure in the 
organization under scrutiny and a major decision-maker in the decision-making 
process was heavily active. Bryman and Bell (2003) recognises that practitioners 
engaged in participant observation will need to demonstrate self-awareness of their 
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place and role in the organization. The use of the reflexive critique provided the explicit 
self-awareness and reflection of the individual researcher’s position in the project.  
The consistency of using a participant observer approach with a realist ontology is 
supported by using an approach described by Anderson (2006) as analytic 
autoethnography28. Anderson (2006) describes five features of this approach, all which 
were applied in the project: the researcher having the status of a full member of the 
social group; analytic reflexivity; the researcher being visible to the other participants; 
an open dialogue with the participants as part of the research; and a commitment to 
the development of theory. The last point being that the exercise is not merely to 
document an insider view of events, or a managerial autobiography: rather it is to 
explore organizational behaviour and generate theoretical understanding.  
Although the use of retrospective qualitative interviews is obviously not participant 
observation, in this research it is considered to be an important part of the whole 
ethnography. Within the research strategy the interviews provided triangulation: the 
use of multiple methods of investigation to enrichen data generation and analysis 
(Bryman 2003, p.291). Thus, “ethnographers often check out their observations with 
interview questions to determine whether they might have misunderstood what they 
have seen” (Bryman 2003, p.291). In this project there was the use of interview data 
as cross-checking but also to “allow access to different levels of reality” (Bryman 2003, 
p.291). This was important to get access to individual decision-makers views of the 
process: not something that may be necessarily evident in the meeting data alone. 
This was considered to be possible due to two main reasons: firstly, certain more 
candid views of decision-makers may only be forthcoming in a confidential interview 
situation; and secondly, the wide variation in participant contributions (as 
demonstrated in table 20 and the graph in figure 28) demonstrates that assessing 
individual views from meeting data alone may be difficult. Thus, interviews provided 
not only triangulation but also allowed greater depth of research data and more 
comprehensive collection of decision-maker perspectives. Scandura (2000) suggests 
that triangulation by using multiple data sources may allow each data source to provide 
a unique perspective. Furthermore, Scandura (2000) infers research validity may be 
improved by the use of triangulation, and thus stronger conclusions may be drawn 
from analysis of data from multiple research methods.  
 
Ethical considerations 
The research methods employed provide a number of ethical challenges (Bryman and 
Bell 2003, Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). The ethical issues arising in the project 
were: 
• Consent. The research confirmed individual consent from decision makers for 
both the scrutiny of documented decision-making meetings and semi-structured 
interviews. All consent was confirmed through signed consent forms in a format 
consistent with the requirements of the sponsoring academic body. 
  129 
• Privacy and confidentiality. The potential professional conflicts were those 
relating to seeking honesty and openness from individual contributors without 
overdue concern for such honesty undermining working relationships. The 
project, through the consent process, confirmed the confidentiality of any 
interview comments. Observational data in the four management meetings 
were collected in formally recorded (‘minuted’) meetings where all contributions 
were documented for posterity. Although the meetings were recorded there 
remained a need for strict confidentiality as the subject matter included 
discussions as to whether to resolve commissioning issues through the use of 
open market tender. Consequently, some of the information may have been 
considered commercially confidential. Again, all documented information or 
data collected not already in the public domain was treated confidentiality. 
• Consequences for future organizational decision-making. Beyond the need to 
protect individuals the project also considered the impact on future strategic 
decisions for the organization. The close attention to confidentiality provided 
protection from exposure of commercially confidential data that may 
compromise future decisions. The intention of the project was to improve 
learning about how decisions are made and thus help to improve future 
decisions. This was the positive side of the learning process. A potential 
negative was exposing any inappropriate behaviour by individuals or groups. In 
actuality no professionally inappropriate behaviour was observed.  
• Data protection. The project did not include patient identifiable data. 
Furthermore, all participants were employed by the NHS; and thus, subject to 
data protection regulations and legislation. Nevertheless, all collected data 
required assessment for any mention of individual cases relating to patients or 
professionals.  
Research validity and reliability 
The adopted strategy sought to produce research that was both valid and reliable. 
Silverman (2011) describes the challenges to qualitative research of demonstrating 
both validity and reliability. Reliability, defined in terms of the consistency of results 
across different observers and differing occasions (Hammersley 1992), is inevitably 
difficult for case study research, as very often the type of case may be unique. 
Consequently, reliability requires techniques other than that of being merely easily 
replicable.  Silverman (2011) discusses the feature of transparency as important for 
qualitative research. In this project transparency has been demonstrated through: a 
rigorous and explicit detailing of the research methods undertaken; verbatim 
transcriptions of interview data; and collection of verbatim-recorded meeting notes. 
Thus, all data sources were collected as verbatim information in the first instance and 
not just as researcher interpretation. Furthermore, the coding of qualitative data was 
conducted through a systematic process using qualitative analysis software (see 
below). Reliability of analytical concepts required linkage of developed codes and 
themes to the verbatim transcripts and organizational texts. Whilst an element of 
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subjective interpretation is a feature of all research analysis, qualitative and 
quantitative (Silverman 2010), transparency aimed to promote objectivity wherever 
possible.  
Bryman and Bell (2003) describes validity as whether the researcher is observing, 
identifying, or measuring what they say they are. Three typical tests for research 
validity are:  construct; internal; and external (Yin 2009). The validity of the project is 
maintained by: 
• For construct validity using more than one data source providing triangulation. 
Triangulation is considered an effective approach in support of achieving 
validity in qualitative research (Silverman 2011). The use of multiple data 
sources was complemented by the use of consistent coding schemas across 
sources. 
• The project was primarily exploratory there was not anticipated to be an 
identification of strict causal relationships, as indeed the project did not use a 
deductive methodology of hypothesis falsification. The Context-Mechanism-
Outcome (CMO) framework sought to explore and construct mechanisms 
linking outcomes to context: causality more aligned to processes than to a 
series of events. Consequently, the project methodology provided no 
requirement to demonstrate the type of internal validity as described in purely 
quantitative research. The test of consistency was achieved by using a common 
coding scheme across all data sources and coding according to verbatim 
textual data for all sources.  
• External validity, in terms of generalizability of findings and application to wider 
decision-making environments, provided the most significant challenge for the 
methodology. Yin (2009) however, states that case study research is 
generalizable to ‘theoretical propositions’ and ‘analytical generalizations’ (Yin 
2009, p.43). This infers the research findings can be generalized not through a 
statistical frequency application to given populations (as in conventional 
quantitative research) but through the application of analytically developed 
theoretical propositions to equivalent management environments. The research 
findings and conclusions can be generalized to similar cases and apply more 
broadly through testing the theoretical positions in further research.  
• A further test, that of ecological validity (Bryman and Bell 2003) is sometimes 
described as a sub-set of external validity, but distinct from population validity.  
Ecological validity tests how the research environment reflects a comparable 
real-world setting. It is confirmed by the nature of the real-world research of the 
project itself. Indeed, a major motivation for the project was to explore decision-
making in its actual real-world environment, through an ethnographic approach.  
Johnson (1997) discusses three types of validity pertinent to qualitative research, in 
addition to internal and external validity.  Thus, the current project maintains validity 
via following approaches: 
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Table 3 - Johnson's (1997) research validities 
Validity Type Approach to ensure validity  
Descriptive validity – the factual 
accuracy of accounted relayed by 
researchers 
Data was verbatim transcripted and 
available wherever possible data used to 
highlight an observation in the analysis was 
illuminated by verbatim quotes. 
Interpretive validity – the accuracy of 
portraying the views and meanings of 
participants 
Observational data was triangulated with 
interview data to provide a check of 
authenticity in interpretation. 
Theoretical validity – is the theoretical 
explanation provided credible from the 
data 
The transparent data and coding schemes 
are provided and explained as base data for 
the claimed theoretical interpretation. Rival 
explanations are first developed and then a 
synthesised theory produced at the end.  
 
Seale (1999) discussed various approaches to quality in qualitative research, including 
voices suggesting traditional approaches to validity and reliability, based on 
quantitative and natural science research may no longer be applicable. Such views 
appear to generate from non-realist conceptual standpoints, for example post-
modernism. Such alternative approaches to research quality are not considered 
consistent with the generally realist ontology of this project. Seale’s (1999) analysis of 
alternative positions may also be seen as suggesting postmodernist attempts to 
abandon traditional classifications of validity achieve limited success. Alternative 
classifications (“truth value, applicability, consistency, and neutrality” (Seale 1999, p. 
467)) play roles in replacing their traditional antecedents: but may not undermine the 
need for classification itself.  (Seale and Hammersley’s ‘subtle realism’ (Seale 1999) 
appears consistent with the critical realist approach in the current project.) Thus, the 
approach to validity was taken consistent with the realist ontology. Wynn and Williams 
(2012) discuss the methodological approach used in critical realist research. The 
project is considered to have followed these principles as: 
• Explication of events through ‘thick description’ – a detailed analysis of 
ethnographic data. 
• Explication of structure and content – through elaboration of the different 
organizational and framing levels at work in the case study. 
• Retroduction, explaining mechanisms and powers at work– by producing a 
theoretical model that aligned with the discovered data and research findings. 
• Empirical corroboration that mechanisms described have greater causal 
credibility than alternatives – through the use of rival explanations and then a 
synthesized overall model.  
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• Triangulation of sources and methods – different data was collected from 
observation, interview, and documents.  
The choice of decision 
The CCG was necessarily selected as the subject of study as it was the organization 
of the researcher. The choice of decision was determined by the definitions relating to 
what is a strategic decision, as discussed in the earlier literature review. Thus, the 
chosen case-study decision was considered to: 
• Support the achievement of a major corporate objective (in this case the 
development of stronger out of hospital community healthcare services). 
• Involve or influence significant levels of healthcare commissioning (the case 
involved a range of community services providing healthcare across the whole 
CCG area). 
• Be of a financial value above the delegated limits of any individual or committee 
of the organization under scrutiny, other than its main Governing Body/Board 
(in this case a value of approximately £12 million).  
The subject for the case study also needed to reflect the practicalities of the research 
project and thus, in addition to the criteria relating to the strategic nature, it also 
complied with the following requirements: 
• Being time limited within a defined period, in this case within one whole financial 
year of 2015-16; 
• Involving a discreet collection of individuals to whom the researcher would have 
access (the CCG Governing Body and supporting officers); 
• Having an ultimate decision-making committee to which the researcher would 
have access as a participant researcher (the CCG Governing Body). 
The case study focussed on the path of the decision to the specific strategic decision 
during the financial year of 2015-16. The decision-making meetings occurred between 
the June and July of the year: preparation and early drafts of documents occurring 
slightly before this period. The project negotiated access by achieving agreement from 
the CCG leadership to the research.  
Research methods employed 
The research data generation was through the three routes of: participant observation 
of decision-making bodies; qualitative interviews with decision-making committee 
members; and collection of documents produced and referenced in the decision-
making process.  
Participant observation 
The observational data collection was of four CCG meetings that were central to the 
decision-making process. The management meetings were the main decision-making 
  133 
forums in the study and provided the observational data regarding the decision 
process.   
The meetings were: 
• Preparatory planning meeting.  
• First CCG business committee. 
• Second business committee. 
• Governing Body in public where final decision was taken.  
All of the meetings were audio recorded to support accurate minute taking by the 
CCG’s note takers. The meetings lasted for 1-2 hours, with the time taken on the 
specific decision subject taking approximately an hour in each case. The researcher 
gained access to the meeting transcripts as part of the project, with explicit support 
from the organization and the meeting participants. Consent was gained from 
participants for transcript data to be used in the project.  
Qualitative interviews and Interview sample 
The aim was to interview the majority of the individuals directly involved in the decision-
making process. This included the members of the Governing Body and a small 
number of senior CCG officers who led the work on the business case and 
presentations involved in the process. The qualitative interviews provided triangulation 
evidence in support of discovering the mechanisms at work in the decision process. 
The 18 decision-making participants involved in the process were split between 
Governing Body members, those with a vote at the eventual decision-making 
Governing Body meeting, and the professional employed officers of the CCG that were 
not voting decision-makers. The individual participant breakdown was as follows: 
Table 4 - List of decision-making participants 
Participant 
Title 
Role Pen picture 
Clinical Chair GP CCG Town 
Practice (Clinical 
Chair) 
Very experienced male GP who has worked in 
the Ellerton area for nearly 40 years. Held 
similar lead commissioning roles for over 10 
years. 
GP Vice Chair GP CCG Town 
Practice (Vice 
Chair) 
Very experienced female GP worked in 
Ellerton for over 25 years as a GP. Long 
experience in commissioning type roles. 
Ellerton GP GP CCG Ellerton 
Practice  
Young female GP, originally from the middle-
east, who had been working in Ellerton for 
about 3 years.  
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Peripatetic GP GP CCG 
Peripatetic  
Male Ellerton GP, not a GP practice partner, 
but works with a number of different GP 
practices. 
Notlam GP GP CCG Notlam 
Practice 
Very experienced male GP who had worked in 
the Nortondale area for over 30 years. Had a 
close affiliation with Notlam Hospital and 
senior GP partner at the large Notlam practice. 
Nortondale GP GP CCG Rural 
Nortondale 
Practice 
Younger male GP from a very rural practice in 
the middle of Nortondale. Long experience in 
commissioning type roles with CCG and 
previous PCT. 
Hospital 
Consultant 
Hospital Doctor A very experienced male former hospital 
consultant who had retired from working at 
Ellerton District Hospital several years 
beforehand.  
Chief Nurse Chief Nurse Female Chief Nurse who had been in post 
since the creation of the CCG and had held 
various previous senior positions.  
Practice 
Manager 
GP Practice 
Manager 
Experienced female GP practice manager 
from an Ellerton GP practice, the same 
practice as the CCG Chair. 
Lay Patient 
Rep 
Lay Member 
(Patient 
Engagement) 
Recently retired male ex-Local Authority senior 
manager. At the time of the study part time 
CEO of a local charity. 
Audit Chair Lay Member 
(Audit and 
Governance) 
Recently retired male ex NHS Finance Director 
who worked part time as a management 
consultant 
CFO Chief Finance 
Officer 
Experienced male finance professional who 
had been working in Ellerton for only a few 
years. 
CEO Chief Executive 
Officer 
Experienced male NHS CEO previously held 
board level posts in the former PCT. 
Project Director Project Director 
for the Project 
Experienced female senior manager from a 
nursing background.  
Project 
Manager 
Project Manager 
reporting to the 
Project Director 
Male manager recently appointed to the 
project role and had little experience of NHS 
commissioning  
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Deputy CFO Deputy Chief 
Finance Officer 
Experienced female finance professional with 
most of her experience in hospital trusts. 
AD 
Commissioning 
Assistant 
Director of 
Commissioning 
Very experienced female manager with a long 
history of working in NHS commissioning 
AD Primary 
care 
Assistant 
Director of 
Primary Care 
Experienced female manager but had most of 
her career in the private healthcare sector. 
Started in the NHS when the CCG was 
established.  
 
Of the 18 individuals identified as centrally involved in the process, 16 were interviewed 
between January 2016 and July 2016. All interviewees were informed of the content 
of the research and completed a consent form prior to data collection. The initial timing 
of the interviews reflected both the practical issues of conducting the interviews after 
completion of the research proposal and ethical approval from the college 
authorisation processes. The period of data collection was a product of gaining access 
to the 16 individuals, bearing in mind also that the interviewer was working in the 
organization during this period. Although the timing of the interviews was relatively 
recent after the event, there was a risk that subsequent events may have distorted 
views of the decision. The actions resulting from the decision were only just coming 
into force when the interviews were conducted, and as such there may be a limited 
impact from outcome bias on decision-makers’ views. It should, however, be noted 
that the ongoing presence of influences as described in the research data may also 
be felt after the event and needs to be recognised as an ongoing risk for research of 
this type. This could be further enrichened by a subsequent interview series at a later 
stage after the initial case study, possibly when some of the actions arising from the 
decision-making process have been implemented.  
The format of the interviews was semi-structured with all interviews referencing the 
model interview questions as a base structure, with other themes or questions 
emerging from this base. The model questions are provided as Appendix 4. The aim 
of the interview questions was to encourage participants to explore items consistent 
with the research objectives within the conceptual framework. The questions were 
constructed to engage the interviewees (for example in questions 1 and 2) and to 
probe the interviewees within the frame of the conceptual framework. Thus: 
• the role of empirical evidence as an influencer (Q3), as against the personal 
reflections on the decision-making subject (Q4); 
• the impact of the decision-making process on the individual (Q5) and the 
expectations of the process against the eventual outcome (Q6); 
• the range of influences felt by decision-makers in the process (Q7) 
• the role of coalitions (Q8) and the importance of certain individuals within the 
process (Q9) 
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• the role of responsibility and governance in the eventual decision taken (Q10) 
Lastly participants were asked about how decision-making could be improved within 
the CCG, as the project remained a practical study with the expectation of helping to 
shape future decision-making.  
The questions were prompts in semi-structured interviews, and not merely questions 
requiring responses in a questionnaire. Consequently, the generated data from the 
interviews went beyond simply replying to the questions. The semi-formal and free-
flowing nature of the interview discussion may be seen to be reflected in the volume 
of data created from the conversations. The interviews lasted between 35 minutes and 
90 minutes. The duration dependent on the level of contributions of the interviewees.  
Participant Recorded words in interview 
Clinical Chair 5,516 
GP Vice Chair 2,471 
Ellerton GP 5,549 
Peripatetic GP 9,715 
Notlam GP 6,597 
Nortondale GP Not interviewed 
Hospital Consultant 2,739 
Chief Nurse 11,627 
Practice Manager Not interviewed 
Lay Patient Rep 3,972 
Audit Chair 5,121 
CFO 5,135 
CEO 2,276 
Project Director 6,792 
Project Manager 10,415 
Deputy CFO 5,479 
AD Commissioning 5,262 
AD Primary care 4,193 
 
By the completion of interview 16, the two remaining interviewees were not available 
for interview until much later. Following transcription and analysis of the interview data, 
using coding triangulation with the observational data, the data appeared to support 
an assessment of theoretical saturation (Bryman and Bell 2003) in that: no significantly 
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new information appeared to emerge from the later data; the coding concepts 
appeared well developed and the interview data enhanced the understanding gained 
from the observational data; and the relationships across the data  were considered to 
be well established (Bryman and Bell 2003, p.330). Interviewing of 88% of the 
decision-maker population was considered sufficient with the evidence of saturation. 
The two decision makers not interviewed (Nortondale GP and Practice Manager) were 
unavailable during the period of data collection and the researcher considered that 
theoretical saturation had been achieved and thus the absence of them from the data 
may not significantly change findings or conclusions. Their two spoken contributions 
to the meeting data (2,187 and 257 respectively) were included in the meeting data 
analysis and thus their participation was active if partial.  
Documentary evidence 
The documents used in the case study by the CCG itself were limited to: 
• The draft business case (as presented to meeting 3) 
• The final business case (as presented to meeting 4) 
• PowerPoint presentations introducing the subject and partial content from the 
business case (as presented at meeting 2) 
• Meeting minutes and agendas for the four observed meetings 
Data analysis did not include specific analysis of the documents themselves, as they 
were referenced and discussed in the and interview data. It was considered more 
appropriate to consider the documents within their usage, that is how they were 
consumed and used as decision-making tools, rather than to evaluate them in their 
own right.  
Research milestones and timeline 
The research project progressed according to the following detail: 
Milestone Date 
Preparatory Planning Meeting 17th June 2015 
First Business Committee formal discussion 24th June 2015 
Second Business Committee formal discussion 1st July 2015 
Governing Body meeting with final decision 22nd July 2015 
Semi-structured interviews with participants January to May 2016 
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The methodological research framework and the development of 
the conceptual framework 
This section explores the ontological and epistemological foundations for the research 
method. These critical realist foundations support the use of a realist analytical 
framework that also flows logically from the literature study. Pawson and Tilley (2004) 
describe a realist evaluation method with a Context-Mechanism-Outcome (CMO) 
framework. The morphogenetic approach aligns structural and cultural conditioning 
with Context; social interaction with mechanisms; and social elaboration with both 
outcomes and mechanisms. As described above in Archer’s (1996) distinction 
between agency and structure the CMO framework applies across both dimensions 
consistent with analytical dualism. The CMO framework was usefully applied to the 
project as it aligned with the main literature review themes.  
Context  
The context of includes: 
• Commissioning - the business of the organisation. This element of context is 
not merely the business itself but also the business environment, including 
policy directive and the external influences described above.  
• Strategy - how the organisation delivers its business objectives. This also 
reflects elements of the business environment, but more specifically how the 
organization responds to that environment. Thus, this brings in both external 
and internal influences.   
• Strategic decisions - how critical points are managed in assessing how to 
implement the organisational strategy. The decisions themselves appear in all 
three levels of the CMO framework. In the contextual level this is how the points 
arise and their importance to the achievement of corporate objectives.    
Outcomes  
The outcomes that emerge from the process included: 
• Decisions made   
• Actions taken  
• Implications of the decisions and actions  
• Intended and unintended consequences   
Mechanisms  
Finally, the framework sought to link the context of the process and its outcomes 
through the detected mechanisms. The research project sought to explore the 
phenomenon of the negotiated order and explored the: 
• formation of coalitions & interest groups  
• power struggles   
• exchange and consumption of information   
• creation and use of analytical frames   
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Figure 19 - Context-Mechanism-Outcome (CMO) Matrix 
The framework supporting the analysis of the research findings aligns with the 
connected framework summarising the literature review themes and the hypothetical 
grounding of the research. Thus, the CMO framework above is considered to be within 
the conceptual framework identified in chapter 2.6 and shown in figures 16 and 17 and 
represents the method that underpins the research strategy of the conceptual 
framework. 
From the research question to the research data analysis there may be described a 
consistent path of the research process in the project. Thus: 
• The motivation for the research was that of understanding and then improving 
on the process of decision-making that occurs in NHS commissioning. This was 
the researcher’s professional background and the case study occurred in 
changing environment of the NHS following the 2012 Health and Social Care 
Act, which introduced a greater involvement of clinicians (for the most part 
medical doctors) to decision-making bodies. 
• The research question was “What are the factors that influence strategic 
decisions in healthcare commissioning: a negotiated order perspective?” 
Therefore, the research was just a general exploration of decision-making, but 
a more focussed study of the influences present in decision processes. The 
theoretical perspective used to frame the research was that of the negotiated 
order.  
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• The literature review provided the basis for the project by critically evaluating 
research into decision-making context and the subject area: 
o The management concept of strategy, as the decision subject is 
considered as strategic. Thus, the conceptual framework contains the 
macro level of organizational strategy. The literature reviewed was that 
which defined strategy and described its conceptual development and 
practice within both private and public sector organizations. The latter 
particularly informs the strategic context of the organization under study 
as a public sector healthcare body. 
o The subject under study is that of decision-making as seen through the 
case study of a strategic decision: thus, the review discussed general 
concepts of decision-making with a more specific focus on strategic and 
organizational decision-making models. The social practice researched 
was that of strategic decision-making practice and this appeared to fit 
within the meso framing level, the level of organizational praxis 
influenced by the macro environmental context.  
o The professional field of the case study was that of NHS commissioning 
and the review summarised the concepts of commissioning. The 
discipline of commissioning, however, is not represented in the 
conceptual framework, as this is the field of practice where the study 
occurs, rather than a conceptual element. 
• Thus, the case study was of a commissioning organization, conducting a 
strategic decision. The decision-making practice was that of group behaviour 
which was also reviewed with the aim of assessing features of group decision-
making behaviour. The recognised phenomena of the organizational coalition 
(Cyert and March 1992) and the negotiated order (Fine 1984) emerged from 
the survey of group behaviours within organizations and was selected as the 
most appropriate frame through which to conduct the study. The negotiated 
order is the level that social practice occurs and is the mechanism that may be 
revealed through the research (a testable hypothesis that the negotiated order 
may be demonstrated within NHS commissioning).  
• The negotiated order is shaped by the framing environment at the macro level, 
which it itself then also shapes and frames at the meso (middle) and micro 
(lower) levels. Thus, the frames evident in the case study may be identified 
through the discourse shown in the textual data of the management meetings 
and the qualitative interviews.  
• As the causal mechanisms may only be discovered through the analysis of texts 
the core of the conceptual framework is the method of analysing textual data: 
critical discourse analysis. Within the framework CDA provides the means to 
assess whether the three framing levels demonstrate the influences as descried 
in the literature review and, furthermore, what mechanisms drive the outcomes 
seen in the study.  
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Thus, the conceptual framework sits within it research context, that of strategic 
decision-making in NHS commissioning. The analytical lens is that of negotiated order 
as a description of group behaviour in the decision-making environment. The 
exploration of the negotiated order is assessed within the three framing levels that 
reference the range of influences that may be present in the decision-making process. 
Therefore, the research question was be addressed through the framework exploring 
the decision-making influences across the different levels, identified through the 
analysis of the decision discourse. From the generated data through to context we 
may describe:  
• Data – what is visible, the textual narratives provided by group discussion and 
individual interview 
• Group dynamics – the exploration of group behaviour and the hypothesised 
negotiated order as the pattern of how decision-makers behave in the decision 
environment 
• Strategic context – the wider organizational context of the decision-making body 
reflecting the influences from the corporate environment.  
The framework supported the generation and subsequent analysis of research in the 
case study.   
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Chapter	4	-	Generation	of	data	and	coding	
development	
Introduction 
This section details the generation and collection of research data and its subsequent 
analytical coding within the conceptual framework as described in section 2.6 above. 
The audio meeting and interview data was analysed through qualitative methods. 
Analysis was conducted on the contributions from the observed meetings that provided 
numerical data on meeting contributions from participants. Qualitative analysis was 
performed on the verbal contributions in the meetings, of the interview data, and of the 
content of documentary evidence. Qualitative analysis whilst performed separately in 
each of the data areas, aimed to conduct consistent analysis, using common coding 
approaches, and seeking to identify themes across all of the collected data. The 
detailed discourse analysis of the codes against the data, particularly against 
discourse ‘building tasks’ (Gee 2010) is provided in Appendix 5.  
Data analysis of meeting contributions 
The transcripted meeting data was analysed to count the number of individual 
contributions and the word count for each contribution. From this data it was possible 
to calculate the number of contributions per participant and the total word counts for 
each participant, in each of the meetings. Together this then allowed assessment of 
the proportionate contributions of each participant within each meeting and within the 
four-meeting group as a whole. The method of analysis had similarities to that used by 
Bezemer (2014). The detailed analysis of meeting contributions and ranges of 
contributions made by each participant is provided in Chapter 5 and is summarised in 
table 20 and the graph summary below (repeated as figure 28 in Chapter 5).  
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Figure 20 - Graph of words spoken by participants in management meetings 
The graph demonstrates the range of word contributions from participants was very 
wide. The heavy word count seen by the CCG Chief Officer (GB13) and the project’s 
Project Director (OCR1) may not be surprising, but the very low interventions by some 
participants may be more surprising. Although the number of words spoken may not 
reflect the relative influence individuals may have had in the process. For the actual 
formal decision-makers themselves, that is the voting Governing Body members, it is 
notable that each of them had the equivalent vote in the eventual decision meeting. 
But for some voting members, their explicit positions can be discerned (at least 
partially) through their verbal statements: for the less vocal, their reasons for their 
decision choice may be less obvious to external observers. This may be seen as 
problematic, both in terms of the quality of debate supporting effective decision-
making, and in terms of the governance in a decision process, where an explicit record 
of individual positions may be seen as helpful.  
Data analysis 1 – qualitative observational data  
The transcripted data underwent analysis through a multi-layered coding approach. 
Coding of qualitative data is considered a standard approach to qualitative analysis 
(Saldana 2013). 
The practical implementation of coding schema on the data used a modified and 
iterated version of the Silver and Woolf (2015) ‘Five Level QDA’ (Qualitative Data 
Analysis) approach. The original 5 level QDA as used in the project is represented as: 
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Table 5 - The use of Five-Level QDA (From Silver and Woolf 2015) 
Five-Level	Qualitative	Data	Analysis	2	levels	of	strategy	>>	translates	to	>>	2	levels	of	tactics	Level	1	 Level	2	 Level	3	 Level	4	 Level	5	
Objectives	 Analytical	
plan	
Translation	 Tool	selection	 Constructed	tools	
The	purpose	of	the	project	expressed	as	the	research	question	
The	conceptual	framework	and	analytical	tasks	 Translating	the	tasks	to	software	tools	and	translating	back	
Specific	software	operations	 Different	software	and	analytical	operations	used	for	the	project	
 
Thus, in this project the five levels occurred as: 
Table 6 - QDA coding level 
Level Research actions 
1: Objective Research objectives 
2: Analytic plan Conceptual framework emerging the literature review  
3: Translation The analytical framework of coding developed using the 
QDA tool (Nvivo) 
4: Selected tools Nvivo used to further analyse and facilitate second order 
coding and the discourse analytical framework analysing 
coding themes 
5: Constructed tools Synthesis of analysis emerging from software tools and 
wider analysis of data flowing into concluding research 
themes identifying mechanisms at work in the case study.  
Data Analysis 2 - Initial coding development 
The meetings sessions were digitally recorded; and after granting the project access 
to the recordings, all meeting contributions were verbatim transcripted. First cycle 
coding (Saldana 2013) followed an iterative process, following the steps of: simple 
word count analysis; initial verbatim coding; conceptual coding following re-analysis of 
meeting transcripts; synthesis of conceptual and verbatim coding.  
The initial verbatim coding of observational data showed the top-ten word counts: 
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Table 7 - Simple word count coding of observational research data 
Coded	Word	 Count	of	Use	 Weighted	
	%	
Similar	words	included	in	code	
Service	 380	 2.13%	 Service,	services,		Risk	 327	 1.83%	 Risk,	risks	Option	 324	 1.81%	 Option,	options	Tender	 190	 1.06%	 Tender,	tendered,	tendering,		Need	 181	 1.01%	 Need,	needs,	needed	May	 181	 1.01%	 may	Model	 166	 0.93%	 Model,	modelled,	models	Think	 162	 0.91%	 Think,	thinking,	thinks	Change	 156	 0.87%	 Change,	changed,	changes,	changing	Want	 148	 0.83%	 Want,	wanted,	wanting,	wants	
 
The simple word analysis provided limited insight into emerging themes but was a 
basis to develop first cycle codes for more developed coding concepts. The verbatim 
codes may be separated into simple descriptive codes, that document superficial 
processes occurring in the case study; and conceptual codes that hint at potential 
causal mechanisms. Thus, the frequent use of terms such as ‘service’ is reference to 
an oft-used professional term, but this may provide little information about the deeper 
dynamics of decision-making. Verbatim analysis did, however, allow the generation of 
conceptual codes. 
The main emerging codes from the observational data, following second cycle coding 
(Saldana 2013), fell into a number of broad categories: 
• Improvement codes relate to themes strong need to improve service 
beyond their current standards, often shown as emotions and feelings 
expressed in the process. Codes within this groups included: 
o Confusion 
o Frustration – “things have to get better” 
o Tension 
o Self-interest  
• Risk codes relating to the potential downsides of particular choices.  
o Financial risk 
o Political risk 
o Clinical risk 
o Legal risk 
o Capacity risk 
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• Corporate process codes relating to the management of the decision-
making process itself.  
o Governance – “how do we decide?” 
o Evaluation – “how do we choose?” 
o Procurement – “are we following a valid and legal process?” 
• Behaviour codes describe how decision-makers and the wider 
communities act in the process. Specific codes included: 
o Openness 
o Closed and opaque. 
o Pragmatism 
o Nortondale (this became significant enough to become a higher level 
code) 
• Stakeholder codes relating to how the decision options may be seen by 
wider partner agencies – “what do our communities expect”. This tended to 
focus more on assumed expectations from partner agencies (GPs and NHS 
Trusts) than on patient groups.  
• Service design codes cover discussion on how the services need to 
improve or be reconfigured.  
o The clinical model 
o Service information 
o Services at scale 
o Specification 
o Evidence 
The initial coding analysis of meeting data was cross-referenced against the emerging 
themes from the interview data. This allowed the fuller exploration of themes.  
Data Analysis 3 - Coding profile of the four meetings 
The developed codes are summarised as: 
• Improvement 
• Risk 
• Corporate process 
• Behaviour (including the Nortondale sub-code) 
• Stakeholder 
• Service design  
Each of the four meetings tended to show certain codes as dominant, reflecting the 
progress of the debate within the process, and possibly also the shifts in the 
dynamically generating negotiated order.  
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Table 8 - Summary of coding references in management meetings 
Code	 Meeting	1	 Meeting	2	 Meeting	3	 Meeting	4	 TOTAL	Improvement	 36	 35	 31	 13	 115	Risk	 62	 187	 290	 56	 595	Corporate		 92	 230	 218	 73	 613	Behaviour	 1	 3	 6	 7	 17	Stakeholder	 0	 20	 32	 14	 66	Service	design	 51	 57	 88	 41	 237	TOTAL	 242	 532	 665	 204	 1643	
 
The range of coding references largely results from the relative length of the meetings 
(two long and intense, two much shorter). The final decision-making forum (meeting 
4, the Governing Body) showed a relative balance across the codes, possibly reflecting 
its final decision-making status (that is as the ultimate decision-making meeting). The 
others tended to demonstrate an imbalance across the codes, reflecting the 
preoccupations in the meetings at the particular times.  
 
Table 9 - Percentage allocation of codes across meetings 
Code	 Meeting	1	 Meeting	2	 Meeting	3	 Meeting	4	 TOTAL	Improvement	 15%	 6%	 5%	 7%	 7%	Risk	 25%	 35%	 43%	 27%	 36%	Corporate		 38%	 43%	 33%	 36%	 37%	Behaviour	 1%	 1%	 1%	 3%	 1%	Stakeholder	 0%	 4%	 5%	 7%	 4%	Service	design	 21%	 11%	 13%	 20%	 15%	TOTAL	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	
This may be summarised in terms of meeting priority and as the place of each session 
in the overall process. Meeting 1 focussing mostly on: the improvement theme 
(justifying why there needed to be a change); the service design theme (what the 
changed service would need to look like); and the corporate process theme (how the 
CCG delivers its desired outcomes). Meeting 2 explored more heavily the corporate 
process theme, discussing issues such as legal process and procurement, possibly in 
part due to a need for the decision-makers to understand procurement routes and 
options to secure a new service. This session also included an increasing focus on 
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risks, spread across all of the risk categories. Risk was the largest single coding theme 
proportionately allocated for meeting 3. Meeting 4 spread attention across of the major 
groups (the stakeholder theme being small in coding references in al sessions), with 
the largest proportionate focus on the behaviour code (including the focus on 
Nortondale).  
Each of the meetings tended to show a concept (or coding) rhythm: that is, certain 
subjects tended to dominate certain parts of each meeting. This may be considered 
as less so in the more structured (and public) Governing Body session (meeting 4). 
Thus, participants tended to engage in a back-and-forth discussion on the advantages 
and disadvantages of an issue and then move on the next one. Some concepts 
recurred through the meeting, and some had a discreet place in one part only. This 
raises questions as to meeting behaviours and etiquette (in the sense of individual and 
group cultural conduct). Discussion and the overall discourse may be influenced by 
how the group facilitates or obstructs consideration of differing subjects. For each 
session it was possible to identify structural and behavioural elements that shaped the 
discourses. The elements demonstrated in the meetings were: 
• Agenda setting (2nd dimension power) 
• Slide-deck/business case presentation (2nd dimension power) 
• Chairing style (influencing 1st and 2nd dimension power) 
• Participant opinion clustering on subjects (linking to coalition forming and 
polarisation) 
• Group behaviour that allows considered attention to some subjects and quickly 
skims over others (2nd dimension power) 
• Group consensus as to further exploratory work on information sourcing and 
document production informing future sessions and decision 
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Data Analysis 4 - Developed coding analysis of meeting data with 
interview data 
The decision-makers were interviewed, and the verbatim transcribed interview data 
coded against the second cycle coding schemes developed from the coding of the 
observational meeting data. The coding references in the interview data against the 
same coding schema as the meeting data is shown below: 
Table 10 - Summary of coded interview data 
Code	 Total	References	 %	of	References	Improvement	 111	 13.8%	Risk	 82	 10.2%	Corporate	Process	 221	 27.6%	Behaviour	 183	 22.8%	Stakeholder	 54	 6.7%	Service	design	 151	 18.8%	TOTAL	 802	 100.0%	
 
Table 11 - Comparison of data codes between meetings and interviews 
Code	 Meeting	Reference	%	 Interview	Reference	%	Improvement	 7%	 13.8%	Risk	 36%	 10.2%	Corporate	Process	 37%	 27.6%	Behaviour	 1%	 22.8%	Stakeholder	 4%	 6.7%	Service	design	 15%	 18.8%	TOTAL	 100%	 100.0%	
 
From table 11 above it appears both the subject for discussion and the content of 
interviews included a stable level focussed on the improvement themes, but the 
proportion of coded data may not necessarily reflect the importance of the issue to all 
decision-makers. Furthermore, some of the ‘frustration’ elements of the improvement 
code may have been voiced more explicitly in interviews than the meetings. The 
degree of attention on corporate process codes in both data groups may be seen to 
reflect the need to discuss technical issues such as governance, procurement, and 
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option evaluation. Service design was an expected issue during a case study of a 
service redesign/service recommissioning subject, and the content proportion as 
relatively stable across both data groups. The stakeholder codes appeared limited 
within both data groups, but there may be seen to be some degree of cross-over 
between the stakeholder codes and the political risk code, which was primarily a 
political risk relating to the engagement of local, primarily NHS stakeholders.  The 
preponderance of the behaviour codes in the interview data may be a reflection of two 
factors: firstly, that the questioning itself did address issues of participant behaviour; 
and secondly that in the meetings it would be unlikely that individuals would discuss in 
detail the behaviour of each other, or indeed the group as a whole. Conversely, in an 
interview setting such discussion would be much more likely.  
The clinician Governing Body members (primarily GPs) from the textual analysis of the 
observed meetings and early interviews showed the greatest tendency towards the 
improvement code and the frustration theme, in large part driven by local experience 
of poor service delivery. Comments included: “I think the biggest influence was the 
exasperation with the Trust” (Peripatetic GP Interview); “I think the frustration of not 
making any improvements or not making any progress was felt by everybody” (GP 
Vice Chair Interview); and “I knew people were frustrated with current services and 
therefore they wanted to do something different” (Project Director).  
The sense of experiential evidence of poor-quality services was possibly enhanced by 
the lack of objective empirical data produced by the service under scrutiny in the case 
study. Thus, one commented “it was hard to make an evidenced based assessment 
because of lack of data and comparisons with other areas were not that easy” (CEO). 
Similarly, another stated, “people’s memory of events and very subjective perspectives 
on part of the service, really, that was over-riding, I think for me, as a memory of those 
processes” (Clinical Chair). This may be seen as decision-making driven by emotion 
(Haidt 2001) or intuition appearing as emotion (Pizarro and Bloom 2003). Such 
personal clinical evidence does remain as evidence: “It’s not strictly evidence-based 
in what you term the scientific nature but it is evidence-based because it’s based on 
your own experience” (Clinical Chair); and ““you think it’s a gut instinct, but it’s based 
on 20 years of doing this day in and day out so it’s not really a gut instinct” (GP Vice 
Chair). The view of the Governing Body GPs, therefore, aligned with intuition being 
based on expert experience rather than emotion (thus Pizarro and Bloom 2003, rather 
than Haidt 2001).  
Conversely, the CCG full-time non-clinical executive officers showed the greatest 
proclivity towards the risk and governance themes. The risk themes of: 
• financial risk (an open tender option may produce a more expensive service) 
and  
• political risk (relations with other stakeholders, particularly existing NHS 
organizations may deteriorate).  
Financial risk was an obvious concern of the financial professionals: “my nervousness 
and I think a lot of other peoples was around the fact that we might not know enough 
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about the baseline position” (Deputy CFO); and “the lack of data that we are getting 
about the service as provided means that the potential for missing things I think is quite 
high” (CFO). The CO also recognised, “my pre-conceptions were that putting it out to 
the market would involve financial risks” (CEO).  
The political risks were recognised by a broader range of decision-makers. One GP 
stating, ““the spectre of destabilising the Trust is always a thing that is in the 
background and that then came to play in the meeting [Meeting 2]” (Peripatetic GP). 
The CO’s opinion was “my pre-conceptions were that putting it out to the market would 
involve financial risks, but also big risks in terms of our relations with the main 
stakeholders” (CEO).  
Interestingly legal and procedural risks were identified in the meeting discussion: 11 
references to legal risks or legal requirements. There was, however, less clarity 
whether procurement was or wasn’t legally required: thus, “there is still a legal 
obligation to tender services” (Chief Nurse) and “We should do things because it is the 
right thing for patients not because we worry the lawyers might take us to court” (CEO). 
This equivocality on legal requirement appeared to result in the issue dissipating later 
as a decision factor and it featured less in interviewee responses, although one 
respondent suggesting the “NHS with this procurement is much more cautious than in 
local government” (Lay Patient Rep).  
It appears that those charged with financial accountability may be more risk averse, in 
part due to their responsibilities in achieving financial targets (more pressing to 
accountable executive officers than part-time Governing Body members). One 
interviewee observing different approaches to risk: ““it comes down to appetite for 
risk…  at the meeting I attended there was a fair bit of division around what people 
were looking to get out of it” (Deputy CFO).  
In considering stakeholders, the groups of clinicians tended to prioritise the wider GP 
community as the most important stakeholders, possibly reflecting the nature of the 
CCG as a membership body. (The forum where the CCG engages with the 
membership practices was the Council of Members.)  For example, “If we continue 
with the current service it is a big reputational risk with our current practices” 
(Nortondale GP, Meeting 3) and “the Council of Members… are very keen on a 
tendering option for that element of services that are in Lot 2” (Clinical Chair, Meeting 
4).  Executive officers appear to focus more on the relationships with other public 
sector agencies. This tended to overlap with the code of political risk. For example, 
see the comment regarding “the Trust” (above), and the statement by CEO “the biggest 
strategic risk is the first one in terms of the overall strategic programme with the health 
economy. There is a risk of bringing in another provider to that programme” (CEO 
Meeting 3). This referenced the concern that wider stakeholder engagement maybe 
threatened by the impact of a change on the discreet services in the case study. But 
as with the overall discussion of tender or not the impact on stakeholders was debated. 
Thus, a contrary view expressed by Nortondale GP was, “on the one hand they may 
be a bit upset. On the other hand, you may say what has our relationship with [the 
  152 
Trust] given us so far?” (Nortondale GP, Meeting 3). Reference was made to patients 
and patients experience (Meeting 4), but this appeared to support multiple arguments.  
The service design codes focussed on the development of clinical models and what 
the process may achieve in terms of services delivered to patients. Such discussion 
would be anticipated in a strategic decision of this type, but the overall decision 
concerning the route to delivery appeared to focus more on the way to achieve the 
right provider model rather than the specification for delivery. The relative lack of 
discussion may also reflect the volume of consideration on service design included in 
the circulated business case and associated management presentations. Summaries 
of the intended design included: “Deliver a more streamlined and integrated 
community service that patients receive the right care at the right time in the right 
setting” (business case content quoted in Meeting 3). Although a clinical model was 
described in the business case, various details of the potential services were 
discussed in all of the meetings, suggesting that there was a parallel process of 
decision-makers establishing what they wanted to commission.  
The behaviour codes described decision-makers experience of how the other 
members acted. These included assessments that the process was relatively open, 
and in other’s views that it was opaque and confusing. Thus, for Lay Patient Rep, “you 
can sometimes recognise when deals have been done over the table and around the 
committee room, you vote for me and I will vote for you.  There was none of that and 
has never been a hint of that”. Contrary to this, one described a sense or pre-
determination: “what [Project Director] did was she did the risk analysis, one of those 
template things, and that was just a complete set up” (Peripatetic GP). Similarly, 
another commenting “to some degree yes I think there is a pre-constructive plan to do 
this, this and this” (Notlam GP). Other perspectives, from two officers outside the 
decision-making body reflected less on the closed-opaque debate and more on the 
wider engagement of individuals and perspectives throughout the process. Thus, “I 
don’t think we crystallise people’s views” (AD Primary Care) and “The initial 
involvement from my perspective, [of] finance and contracting, was really minimal” 
(Deputy CFO). This tended to suggest power and influence as applied at the second 
and third dimensions of power (Lukes 2005).  Perhaps most significantly in terms of 
the eventual outcome this thematic group of behaviour codes also included the 
Nortondale code. This shaped the outcome sufficiently to be treated almost as a 
concept in itself, although its importance lays in the wider examination of the 
negotiated order. This will be explored further in the consideration of negotiated order.  
Evidence emerged supporting the hypothesis of the negotiated order concept. Some 
interviewees did recognise the presence of internal coalitions consistent with the idea 
of negotiated organization (Cyert and March 1962). What was evident was the different 
roles and backgrounds of decision-makers appears to influence their behaviour. The 
structure of corporate boards (the CCG Governing Body in this case) often reflects a 
desire to establish diversity amongst the senior group to provide balance and an 
appropriate level of challenge. (One author suggesting elements required for a 
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successful board include "high challenge, high trust and high engagement” (Chambers 
et al. 2013, p.8).)  Although this diversity appears to be demonstrated in the case 
study, the need to arrive at some form of decision-making consensus suggests some 
form of negotiated settlement may be necessarily required. Thus, the group diversity 
involves not merely trust and challenge but continual negotiation between competing 
priorities and positions.  
The CCG Governing Body had the following composition at the time of the study: 
• Full-time executive management officers (Chief Officer and Chief Finance 
Officer) 
• Full-time clinical management officers (Chief Nurse) 
• Part-time primary care leads (6 GPs including the Chair and 1 GP practice 
manager) 
• Lay member as secondary care (hospital) clinical lead 
• Lay member with responsibility for patient and public involvement 
• Lay member with responsibility for audit and governance 
• Other co-opted, non-voting, members from partner organizations (Local 
Authority, Public Health, and Local Medical Committee) 
The sense of ‘deal-making’ and compromise within the process was referenced by all 
interviewees in differing ways. This will be explored in the later sections considering 
influences, frames, and the negotiated order. From the analysis above we may align 
the coding groups to an evident framing level. Thus:  
Table 12 - Data codes aligned to framing levels 
Framing	Level	 Research	Codes	Micro	 Improvement	Service	redesign	Behaviour	Meso	 Stakeholder	Corporate	process	Risk	Macro	 Risk	Corporate	process	Stakeholder	
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Reflexive critique 
Reflexivity has been described as the viewpoint of the researcher being ‘bent back’ 
towards the researcher themselves (Winter 1989). For Finlay (2002, p.532) reflexivity 
is “thoughtful, conscious self-awareness” and the reflexive research analysis involves, 
“evaluation of subjective responses, intersubjective dynamics, and the research 
process itself”. Similarly, interview data has been described as “co-authored by the 
interviewer” (Kvale and Brinkman 1992, p. 192). For this project the role of the 
researcher within the organization placed significance on the concept of reflexivity.  
The project uses as its reference point the theoretical framework of Archer (2003). This 
confirms that reflexive analysis and the acceptance of the valid role of the individual 
voice within research and social exploration is consistent with a realist ontology and 
epistemology (Finlay 2002).  
The nature of the research and its potential implications may have importance for 
organizations of the type under scrutiny. In which case the senior members of such 
organization may interrogate the research conclusions from a similar position to the 
main researcher. As such the reflexive position is not merely an acknowledgement of 
a research position, or indeed an interesting academic curio, but actually a potentially 
fundamental requirement to assess the potential impact of the research to wider 
management praxis. In some respects, we may talk about a reflexive imperative. The 
imperative to acknowledge the reflexive element of the study is necessary due to the 
perceived originality of the project. Thus, the place of the researcher as in the centre 
of the organization under scrutiny is unusual: but this places further challenges to the 
research, in particular maintain a sense of objectivity to the analysis.  
The reflexive critique may assume greater importance when placed in the context of 
practical research with the aim, not merely of exploring organizations, but of 
developing practice within them. Thus, Winter (1989, p.11) states, “The agenda is not 
determined by an outside agency (an ‘academic’ researcher or an institutional 
superior) but by those whose practices are to change as a result”. The reflexive 
element of the analysis in the study, thus references learning from action research 
(Winter 1989).  
The presence of the researcher as a leading member of the organization under study 
demanded a need to consider how the reflexive approach would be used and as to 
how the objectivity of the research process could be maintained. It was considered 
that the challenges to research validity remain the same but that the researcher 
position needed to be clearly identified from the outset. Furthermore, the concept of 
discourse as ‘language events that provide the social construction of meaning’ implies 
that the researcher themselves are a necessary part of that construction. The use of 
reflexive analysis, moreover, provides one of the methodological ‘layers’ within a multi-
layered critical realist approach, recognising the dynamic interplay between agents to 
agents, and agents to structure. This concept of layering may indeed apply to the 
perspectives of the researcher themselves. In her discussion on the ‘internal 
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conversation’ Archer (2003) proposes three elements that are part of the human inner 
mental state: 
• That a domain of internal mental privacy exists in any conscious individual; 
• The private mental states are inaccessible to external inspection; and 
• Accessing the internal state is not a passive process of observing the internal 
mental world, rather it is an active conversation of the self with the self.  
For Archer (2003, p.34) this active process helps us to, “define what we do believe, do 
desire and do intend to do”. Thus, for the reflexive researcher it is the conversation of 
the researcher with themselves that ultimately produces the research product. Not a 
two-way interaction between the researcher and data: but a multi-layered interaction 
of researcher with data, and researcher with researcher.  
Reflexivity is considered to be a useful tool in social science research (Winter 1989). 
Furthermore, Archer (2003, p.19) describes the fundamental role of reflexivity and the 
‘internal conversation’ in human society: 
Were we humans not reflexive beings there could be no such thing as society. 
This is because any form of social interaction, from the dyad to the global 
system, requires that subjects know themselves to be themselves.  
The reflexive critique is taken from the perspective of the research as an individual 
actor within the process and consequently the first person will be used throughout 
these sections. The sections review the reflexive view of the research objectives, the 
impact of the self-reflection on researcher themselves, and the conclusions from the 
research project on future management research. 
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Chapter	5	–	Management	meeting	observation	findings		
Introduction 
This chapter describes detailed the findings from the collected research data of the 
four observed decision-making meetings in the case study, collected through 
participant observation. The management meetings were the main decision-making 
forums in the study and provided the observational data regarding the decision 
process.  The qualitative interviews provided triangulation evidence in support of 
discovering the mechanisms at work. The core data of the ethnography was this 
observation data and a significant level of extracts from the data are provided which 
demonstrate the behaviours and the dynamics of the decision-making process.  
The 18 decision-making participants involved in the process were split between 
Governing Body members, those with a vote at the eventual decision-making 
Governing Body meeting, (with a ‘GB’ prefix) and the professional employed officers 
of the CCG that were not voting decision-makers (with a ‘OCR’ prefix). The individual 
participant breakdown was as follows: 
Table 13 - List of decision-making participants 
Participant	
Index	
Title	
Role	GB1	 Clinical	Chair	 GP	CCG	Town	Practice	(Clinical	Chair)	GB2	 GP	Vice	Chair	 GP	CCG	Town	Practice	(Vice	Chair)	GB3	 Ellerton	GP	 GP	CCG	Ellerton	Practice		GB4	 Peripatetic	GP	 GP	CCG	Peripatetic		GB5	 Notlam	GP	 GP	CCG	Notlam	Practice	GB6	 Nortondale	GP	 GP	CCG	Rural	Nortondale	Practice	GB7	 Hospital	Consultant	 Hospital	Doctor	GB8	 Chief	Nurse	 Chief	Nurse	GB9	 Practice	Manager	 GP	Practice	Manager	GB10	 Lay	Patient	Rep	 Lay	Member	(Patient	Engagement)	GB11	 Audit	Chair	 Lay	Member	(Audit	and	Governance)	GB12	 CFO	 Chief	Finance	Officer	GB13	 CEO	 Chief	Executive	Officer	OCR1	 Project	Director	 Project	Director	for	the	Project	OCR2	 Project	Manager	 Project	Manager		OCR3	 Deputy	CFO	 Deputy	Chief	Finance	Officer	
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OCR4	 AD	Commissioning	 Assistant	Director	of	Commissioning	OCR5	 AD	Primary	care	 Assistant	Director	of	Primary	Care	
Meeting 1 
Attendees: ELLERTON GP, PERIPATETIC GP, CHIEF NURSE, CEO, PROJECT 
DIRECTOR, AD COMMISSIONING (6 people). 
The meeting was held mid-June 2015. It was a preparatory planning meeting to 
prepare production of the business case and agree the timescales for the decision 
process. The meeting involved seven participants making 243 separate verbal 
contributions totalling 5,125 spoken words. The contributions ranged from the highest 
contribution level of 41% to 2.6%.  
This felt to be the start of a decision-making process that had a long gestation in the 
CCG and indeed before that in the local health community: ELLERTON GP stating, “I 
have had my fingers burnt too many times”. This planning meeting was relatively 
informal and was a pre-meeting to the more formal discussions that would eventually 
end in a decision taken at the Governing Body. This was also somewhat smaller than 
the formal committees. It had a relaxed atmosphere with light-hearted comments (“As 
a Scorpio my memory is long”, CHIEF NURSE) and there was much jocularity and 
amusement throughout. The meeting had no formal chair and did not produce formal 
written minutes to record the session. The attendees at the session had been agreed 
by a previous CCG business committee and reflected a smaller sub-set of 4 of the 
CCG Governing Body and 2 senior officers. PROJECT DIRECTOR had already been 
identified as the lead for the programme of work involved in the case study. They had 
played in a similar role in a recently managed procurement for an integrated urgent 
care service, a service that had started in the April of the same year.  
At the time of the meeting there was not a fully developed business case outlining the 
options under consideration, as this meeting was largely concerned with sketching out 
the process for how this case would be subsequently developed. It did reflect on the 
wider patient and stakeholder engagement that had occurred in support of establishing 
the best care models for community care. The PROJECT DIRECTOR has a significant 
input into this meeting, as indeed they would throughout the other meetings and the 
process in general. This would include PROJECT DIRECTOR being the main author 
and editor of the business case that was eventually presented to the CCG Governing 
Body later that July. The meeting began with an assessment that the clinical model for 
a new service had already been largely agreed: 
We had discussion last week about the model of delivery: the model has been 
agreed around the four clusters of community teams and this is within the CCG 
strategic plan (PROJECT DIRECTOR).  
The discussion moved on to whether there was agreement to the composition of the 
clusters, a factor that did not seem to be clear from the CCG strategy. This debate 
represented a significant part of the meeting discussion and in retrospect may be seen 
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as the part of the meetings that discussed the clinical model the most. This debate 
tended towards the forensic in its level of detail, but possibly reflected the sense of 
overall agreement to the model and thus a desire to get to implement the theoretical 
model. The model was considered as largely agreed and consistent with the CCG 
strategy but, interestingly, “We never really got the configuration signed off” (CEO). 
The ensuing discussion included GP practice level debate as to the composition of the 
‘clusters’. This became quite detailed: 
PROJECT MANAGER - I can draw the geography and look at different options. 
CEO and PROJECT DIRECTOR – Yes that would be a good idea. 
PERIPATETIC GP – The problem I can seeing that is worth flagging now is that 
if the LMC wants to build a super-practice it would have Provenance Terrace 
joining Enderby Gardens. 
PROJECT MANAGER – But this reinforces the point that we don’t base it 
around specific practices. 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – We may have to move the shape of the clusters with 
different scenarios. 
From the discussion as to the specific configuration of the model and its geographical 
alignment the meeting then moved on to consider the content of a business case, and 
the likely option appraisal. PROJECT DIRECTOR then provided the first site of a range 
of options in the process: 
The 5 options are: 
I. Don’t do anything stay with the current service specification with the current 
provider 
II. Stay with the current provider and try to achieve the model specification 
through a managed change 
III. Procure through the open market through a single open tender 
IV. Procure through the open market with a staged approach following a pre-
qualification stage. 
V. Procure through the open market with a process of competitive dialogue 
(PROJECT DIRECTOR Meeting1) 
From this introduction of options, the meeting did not then discuss the benefits of each 
option but deliberated the evaluation criteria in assessing the options. Although this 
discussion was relatively brief, there was no explicit reference to the wider CCG 
strategy or 5YFV in developing assessment criteria. It may have been helpful to 
consider how the process related to wider corporate objectives, as the discussion at 
this point seemed to lack focus, and the group was struggling to decide how it should 
arrive at evaluation criteria. For example: 
CEO – Is integration important as a criterion for deciding which procurement 
route we choose? 
ELLERTON GP/CHIEF NURSE – No 
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ELLERTON GP – The question is probably are we going to buy this suit off the 
rack or are we going to get someone to design it bespoke?  
CEO – In which case integration isn’t a criteria (sic) for deciding the 
procurement route. 
ELLERTON GP – It is a criteria (sic) in the model but not for choosing the 
procurement route. 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – Whether it aligns with other services is not a criterion. 
Is the criteria about going out to market to secure the outcomes we want? 
There was a recurrent theme of discontent with the current service and service 
provider, although differing levels of strength of feeling. This may be seen as where 
there was a conflict between the need to objectively develop a proposal against the 
feelings of frustration from personal experience.  
CHIEF NURSE - But how will you decide what is the best way to achieve the 
model. That is what we should be asking. 
CEO – How are we going to judge it? 
AD COMMISSIONING – Past performance? 
PERIPATETIC GP – Below the belt! 
CHIEF NURSE – Why is that below the belt? 
PERIPATETIC GP – Because that would mean we have to get rid of our 
incumbent. 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – That is one of the things we should look at. 
ELLERTON GP – What is the big deal if you do? 
CEO – It probably needs to be more objective than that. 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – Remember we have to score it. 
CEO – What the Trust will say is the service that they deliver is largely the same 
one as they inherited. 
CHIEF NURSE – 3 years down the line!? 
CEO – It takes at least 6 months to consult with staff. 
CHIEF NURSE – What about the other 2 and a half years then! 
ELLERTON GP – Surely that is not acceptable. 
CHIEF NURSE – Our response may be that we want them to focus on acute 
care and not bother with community services. 
CEO – Not having the Trust as a provider is not a reason to choose a 
procurement route.  
PROJECT DIRECTOR – We have to be able to score that against each route. 
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CHIEF NURSE – But if you have a current failing provider who are failing at 
many levels. 
CEO – There are other services such as A&E that are failing to deliver and we 
aren’t planning to put all of them out to tender. 
There appeared, therefore, a strong voice, of a group of attendees, supporting the 
move to open market tender, including discussion as to the legal requirements: “I don’t 
know why we don’t just say we are tendering because of the legal obligations?” (CHIEF 
NURSE). This appeared to be borne out of the frustration experienced from the current 
community services, the ELLERTON GP, commenting, “The only way to hold them to 
account is to scrap everything and start from scratch”. This had two main elements. 
Firstly, the GP experience of poor integration between primary care and community 
services, combined with an increasing feeling of dislocation. Secondly, the experience 
of CCG officers trying to redesign services: where engagement from the community 
services provider had been perceived as very difficult (“We have an improvement 
trajectory for A&E and it is going backwards”, AD COMMISSIONING).  In this meeting 
the views of the ELLERTON GP, the CHIEF NURSE and the AD COMMISSIONING 
(officers previously involved in difficult redesign) were very strongly in favour of 
creating a new, different service, possibly through the tender route. The PROJECT 
DIRECTOR and PROJECT MANAGER as the project leads were trying to keep a 
balanced position, but the PROJECT DIRECTOR in particular had run successful 
procurements in the past and was not averse to using market mechanisms. The 
PROJECT MANAGER was less senior and relatively new to the CCG, and 
consequently had a less strident voice. For the PERIPATETIC GP and CEO there 
were possibly different reasons for being more critical of tendering. The PERIPATETIC 
GP was the GB member most supportive of maintaining local services and saw the 
fact of the community and hospital services being provided by the same Trust as 
significant: he may have been concerned that affecting one may undermine the other. 
Thus, the PERIPATETIC GP stated a preference for continued working, “I think we 
need to go back to saying where we all are in terms of do we think we should give the 
Trust another chance or are we floating voters? Do the Trust get another go?”.   For 
the CEO, there was one big concern, that like PERIPATETIC GP, the introduction of 
new providers into the community may further disintegrate services and weaken the 
overall healthcare system. This also recognised the political impact on relations with 
the main acute provider, “it is a difficult position to hold to say, ‘we want to get a new 
provider because we don’t like the current one’” (CEO). A smaller concern was that of 
the risks of tendering itself and the uncertainty of outcome from an open market 
process (“if you bring in new providers, they may be able to make more radical 
changes, but it will bring risks on instability” (CEO). The latter felt to be a bigger risk to 
CEO in their role as the Accountable Officer (AO) position in the CCG where they are 
accountable to NHS England (NHSE) and the Department of Health (DoH) for 
decisions taken by the CCG. Thus, if the tender process collapsed or a successful 
bidder subsequently withdrew from provision, the responsibility for problem solving 
would rest with CEO. Although the whole officer team would be involved in problem 
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solving, it may have been a bigger risk for the CO (CEO), and possibly also for CFO 
(although not present in this meeting) due to the financial risks contained in tendering. 
The strategic risk of disintegration and negative relationships with the current 
community providers (one also the locality’s main acute hospital provider) were 
significant, but more manageable. CEO later reflected that in this session he and 
PERIPATETIC GP had a more positive view of the incumbent provider as a healthcare 
partner than the others in the meeting.  
The latter part of the meeting saw the emergence of the differing treatments of risk 
through the process. The risk averse approach (representative of the latterly coded 
risk theme) is shown as, “In terms of the 2 options we need to be clear that they bring 
with them a set of opportunities and a set of risks. Broadly the areas of opportunities 
are also the areas of risk. So, in terms of workforce the least risk approach is to do as 
little as possible” (CEO, Meeting 1). Exemplification of the alternative treatment of risk 
was, “The biggest risk is to do nothing” (CHIEF NURSE, Meeting 1). The risk 
assessments also demonstrated a different interpretation of the workforce risks 
associated with change29.  
CHIEF NURSE – The biggest risk is to do nothing. 
CEO –That seems like it now, but after a major change it may look different. 
CHIEF NURSE – Yes but we are already seeing lots of staff leaving community 
services and going to work for GP practices. 
PERIPATETIC GP – We are not losing staff from the heath community. 
PROJECT MANAGER – I am less concerned people don’t want to change. The 
staff engagement exercise showed the staff did want things to change. 
The degree of polarisation across the meeting may be seen to present a challenge to 
the concept of clinically led commissioning. Facilitating clinical commissioning involves 
creating an environment where clinical leaders can shape healthcare policy: but ideally 
a safe environment. Making space for clinicians requires providing opportunities and 
capacity to make the necessary decisions: ultimately allowing clinicians to decide on 
policy according to their objectives for improving healthcare delivery. The safety 
requires ensuring that this space excludes opportunities that take the CCG and its 
leaders into dangerous places: potentially steering a decision-making process away 
from areas that may breach statutory guidance, allow bodies to mount a legal 
challenge the CCG, or take financial decisions that will undermine the corporate 
sustainability. This decision involved forces driving simultaneously in opposite 
directions. Thus, the frustration with both current service delivery and the sense of 
inertia when attempting to improve it, suggested a drive towards tender and more 
radical changes. But the more radical the changes, the greater the risks; and, thus, the 
more the safety of the organization could be threatened. The discussion appeared 
balanced and may have avoided groupthink (Janis 1982). Others in the meeting 
appeared to consider CEO as generally more supportive of the current provider. There 
was an obvious struggle between CEO and PERIPATETIC GP wanting to achieve 
balance across options and the desire, particularly from the CHIEF NURSE-AD 
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COMMISSIONING-ELLERTON GP group, to move more quickly to affect service 
change. The following dialogue is an example of the struggle is shown in the meeting: 
CEO – It would be wrong to make the decision based… on ‘Well last year we 
tried to redesign the services and it was a real pain in the arse and we don’t 
want to do that again’. 
CHIEF NURSE – But every pathway we have tried to redesign 
PERIPATETIC GP – This is a lot bigger than the pathways we have done 
before. I am glad I had my 1:1 with the Trust Director Finance last week… We 
both know what we want to deliver, but we need to see how we get there from 
where we are now. When we realise we may not be getting where we want to 
be, then we tender. We have not tried this with this service. 
ELLERTON GP – Not with this service but with many others. We have tried 
that, and it didn’t work. 
AD COMMISSIONING – We have an improvement trajectory for A&E, and it is 
going backwards. 
CEO – But we need to measure the options against the criteria. It may be some 
of us have complete faith in the YFT management. 
PERIPATETIC GP – Now I didn’t say that!  
The last statement produced laughter throughout the room, implying that although the 
PERIPATETIC GP and the CEO had some confidence in the FT, the confidence had 
limits! 
Meeting 2 
Attendees: CLINICAL CHAIR, ELLERTON GP, PERIPATETIC GP, NORTONDALE 
GP (meeting Chair), CHIEF NURSE, AUDIT CHAIR, CFO, CEO, PROJECT 
DIRECTOR, PROJECT MANAGER, DEPUTY CFO, AD COMMISSIONING (12 
people) 
This discussion was held as part of a formal CCG committee meeting, its Business 
Committee, in late June 2015. There were 12 participants involved making 474 
contributions with 10,725 words. The biggest contributor making 26.8% of intervention; 
one participant making no verbal contribution. The meeting was introduced by a 
management presentation summarising a circulated supporting paper.  The 
presentation and paper were developed after Meeting 1 and reflected some of the 
debate that occurred in the first session.  
The general ‘feel’ of this meeting to the observer was different to that of the first one. 
It was a much bigger group; was outside of the CCG headquarters in a large 
community hall in the CCG’s main population centre; it had followed a prior meeting 
with a full agenda; and it was more obviously structured and run according to a project 
plan. Consequently, a level of intimacy and therefore, humour were less evident. The 
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room size and layout made it difficult, at times, for members of the meeting to hear all 
that was said. (Furthermore, such meetings can encourage smaller sub-conversations 
and whispered comments.) The NORTONDALE GP chaired the meeting as the regular 
chair of this committee.  
The use of business cases and presentation software in such situations may be worth 
reflection. On screen slide-share presentations, particularly using software such as 
Microsoft PowerPoint (PwP), have become increasingly common through in modern 
management. Despite comments regarding ‘death by PowerPoint’ it is still a very 
commonly used tool. The differences between Meeting 1 and Meeting 2 show possible 
reasons for its increasing use. On this occasion (Meeting 2) the initial period of the 
session was shaped and dominated by the PROJECT DIRECTOR (supported by 
PROJECT MANAGER). There was no explicit requirement for others not to comment 
or for clarifying questions to be avoided. However, the ability to hold the meeting’s 
attention for the first 10-15 minutes, without alternate contributions of any length, 
created an environment where the subject matter for the subsequent discussion was 
largely formed. At one level this is merely developing the theme of the meeting and 
providing the requested information for participants to discuss. At another, however, 
this may be in accordance with Lukes’ (2005) 3 dimensions of power: creating and 
managing agendas for decision. Furthermore, if participants are only able to hold a 
limited amount of information at any one time, then an early play to fill the information 
capacity may restrict certain other information or issues being discussed, at least as a 
priority.30 Therefore, devices such as slide-share presentations and business cases 
may allow enforcement of particular frames: possibly at the expense of other, 
competing frames. In this case, there were elements of the presentation and 
supporting papers that were close to the ‘go to tender’ position; more so than the 
contrary view. One example was the risk associated with legal challenge if the services 
were not put to the market, expressed during the presentation as “If there are other 
suppliers how aggressive will they be and how likely will they challenge and what is 
the level of risk from challenge” (PROJECT DIRECTOR Meeting 2). This was a risk 
that the CEO suggested was relatively small (“I think it is a risk to challenge. But the 
regulations on integration are sufficiently ambiguous that you may interpret it as not a 
breach” (CEO)): but the presented material indicated this could be a major corporate 
risk. This may be less important if the meeting participants considered all information 
equal. If, however, the information produced in meeting papers and presentations has 
higher status, this may enforce certain viewpoints, and strengthen the coalitions linked 
to such views. The assertions regarding the risk of challenge due to anti-competitive 
behaviour were challenged in the meeting, but the anchoring of the discussion (as for 
Tversky 1974) was with the stated position regarding legal challenge. 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – if you don’t put it out to the market and a provider 
thinks that we have acted in an anti-competitive way they can challenge that 
they have not had the opportunity to bid for a contract… Now what we are doing 
is commissioning a different model and awarding a new contract. A provider 
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may see it as a Contract opportunity… You may decide you want to take the 
Risk.  
PERIPATETIC GP – Hang-on! That is huge! If we were in Nottingham 3 years 
ago and we involved in the Dermatology tender, that decision would have a 
bigger impact on us than any of the things you have spent 10 minutes scaring 
us about.  
PROJECT DIRECTOR – No I am not trying to scare you and it is not down to 
me to decide. 
A further complexity, as demonstrated here, may be that information was presented 
but in a form that was difficult to understand. On this occasion some of the presentation 
slides were difficult to see (“I knew I should have used different colours” PROJECT 
MANAGER, Meeting 2). This may have been inconsequential: or have hidden 
potentially important information that was alluded to but not in a form where it could be 
appropriately critiqued.  
The discussion on the presentation content was intended to inform the production of 
the business case that would be provided to a CCG business committee. The 
discussion then shaped the options that constituted the emerging option appraisal. 
The scope of services in the developing case was outlined and their relationship to 
current healthcare providers. The presentation covered the genesis of the programme 
of work and the development of the conceptual model in the wider CCG strategy. The 
main principles of the desired model for community services were described by the 
PROJECT DIRECTOR as: 
• Providing easy access to primary care; 
• GPs at the centre of coordinating out of Hospital care;  
• Greater focus on prevention of ill-health;  
• An understanding of planned care pathways to ensure out of hospital care is 
delivered effectively;  
• Alternative out of hospital care settings will be developed with services outside 
of hospital developed to provide Patients with the right care;  
• Rapid access to Urgent Care;  
• Health and Social Care providers working together with active management of 
Long-Term Conditions and the care of the Frail Elderly; 
• Patients having a named coordinator; and  
• GPs rapidly accessing specialist skills for patients closer to home. 
The points included referenced both the CCG strategy and engagement with patients 
and stakeholders (“these were some of things that came out of the engagement 
process as being important to people about the service should look like” PROJECT 
DIRECTOR). The model was summarised in an overview graphic displayed in the on-
screen slide-pack. The presentation stressed that the clinical model underpinning the 
proposal was part of the established CCG strategy and was, to some degree, 
promulgated as an agreed ‘given’: “The model is built on the vision of community 
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services that is within the CCG strategic plan. It is vision that is already supported by 
the CCG” (PROJECT DIRECTOR, Meeting 2). Although this was described as an 
already established model, discussion did, nevertheless, ensue as to the content of 
the model and some of its assumptions. However, this was moved on by a clear view 
from PROJECT DIRECTOR as to the need for the decision: “The key thing today is 
the options appraisal to decide how we procure the service going forward. So, we need 
to focus on the procurement options.” (PROJECT DIRECTOR, Meeting 2).  
The presentation then proposed three options for how to achieve the model service: 
Ø Option 1 – Work with the current range of providers to change services to reflect 
the aspirations of the model. 
Ø Option 2 – Re-procure all the services within scope through an open market 
competitive tender process 
Ø Option 3 – Re-procure some service elements through competitive tendering 
and work with existing providers for those not tendered. 
After the description of options, debate ensued as whether the main issue at that stage 
of the process was that of a discussion of which option, or rather whether to continue 
with the current service or not: “I think there is some confusion here. The fundamental 
question here is do we want to continue with the current service or change it.” 
(CLINICAL CHAIR). This point was debated, and the consensus seemed to be that as 
the model had been previously developed and agreed the question was how to secure 
delivery of the model. The CEO suggested the options needed an “option 0”: that of 
the status quo with minimal change.  
The discussion on dissatisfaction with the current service quickly shifted to whether or 
not the service change would be delivered by the competitive tender route: 
CLINICAL CHAIR - Because the decision about whether we continue with the 
current provider determines whether you go out to tender. 
AD COMMISSIONING – We have already… 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – The decision has been made that the design of 
community services needs to change and that is contained within the CCG 
strategic plan. 
CLINICAL CHAIR – In which case option 1 of working with the current provider 
is to deliver the new model. 
CEO – I think that is right but personally, particularly when the business case 
goes into the public domain, I think it probably should have an Option 0 that 
documents the continuation of the status quo. 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – Yes for the business case but for the exercise today 
we are discussing do we tender or not tender. These are the 3 things we need 
to consider.   
  166 
Such exchanges suggested some participants (here AD COMMISSIONING) had, 
perhaps, already assumed the likely outcome would be to tender and probably to find 
a new provider (or at least significantly change the nature of the relationship with the 
existing provider). Late in the meeting a seemingly resigned comment on a similar 
theme, “that is the worry for me is that most people are fed up with the Trust and that 
will influence the decision” (PERIPATETIC GP). 
The meeting then moved on to consider how options would be evaluated against which 
criteria, and wider contextual issues such as legal issues and NHS regulatory 
frameworks. There were four criteria identified in the presentation: 
• Value for money  
• Patient satisfaction 
• Service delivery (model of care/integration) 
• Demonstrable outcomes 
Interestingly this discussion of evaluation criteria quickly shifted to one of considering 
legal challenge on the grounds of non-competition. In this meeting explicit reference 
was made to legal advice, “This is the advice we have received from the legal team” 
(PROJECT DIRECTOR, Meeting 2) but no actual evidence of this advice was ever 
presented at any of the meetings (or, as far as can be ascertained, circulated to 
Governing Body members). Reference was also made to the then provider regulatory 
body, Monitor, who were seen as a potential arbitrator in a dispute, but the role and 
authority of Monitor in the process was not clarified. This may be seen as a means of 
asserting one of Mintzberg’s (1983) power systems: that of expertise. In this case 
expertise was referenced but not demonstrated. Whether the lack of evidence 
undermined the statement or left an extant oblique reference to legal expertise is 
questionable.  
The debate returned to how to evaluate an option appraisal, peppered with comments 
regarding the dissatisfaction with the current services, and how a tender process may 
be managed. Thus, with limited discussion as to the clinical model (a general sense 
that there was agreement to the need for change and some agreement to the clinical 
mode) the debate shifted to how to secure the model and the advantages and 
disadvantages of the procurement option. The meeting on several occasions agreed 
it needed to confirm the evaluation criteria but seem to struggle to actually focus on 
this task: 
NORTONDALE GP – We are still at the stage of sorting out the criteria. 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – We have to sort the criteria and then go through each 
option. 
CEO – Can I just be clear in terms of what we are proposing in terms of 
Evaluation. There are 4 criteria, they are there and what are to some degree 
risks on the following slide. 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – We need to ask the questions as we go through it. 
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CEO – Are you suggesting we evaluate against the 4 criteria and those on the 
Following slide? So, is it 8 criteria or the four plus the following slide points as 
a criteria of risk? 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – It is however you want to do it? 
NORTONDALE GP – Do we need to put something down about quality? 
PERIPATETIC GP – I will use a new word: Value. Quality is last year’s word. 
AUDIT CHAIR – These 4 seem very important the later ones seem part of how 
you achieve them 
AD COMMISSIONING – Can we not look at each option against those as 
criteria and then assess the risk? 
Discussion went on to the potential impact of staff currently involved in the service 
(who may transfer to other providers under the TUPE conventions). This varied from 
a sense that staff were as dissatisfied as local GPs (“staff and leaving with the current 
provider and it is already falling apart” AD COMMISSIONING) to a view that despite 
the service model staff wanted stability (“They want to be paid by the same people and 
receive the same pension” PERIPATETIC GP). The impact on staff was disputed with 
no obvious consensus in the meeting, including whether it was necessarily even a 
significant issue, “The average man in the street won’t know or care who employs 
District Nurses” (CLINICAL CHAIR). As in Meeting 1 there was some time spent on 
the opinions of the current service provider. 
Risk also emerged as a concept in the discussion, although this was mainly around 
the risk of service “destabilisation” and “disintegration”, with consideration as to the 
impact on current NHS relationships:  
CLINICAL CHAIR – One of the main risks for me is the relationship with our 
current provider. 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – It may affect the levels of negotiation. 
CHIEF NURSE – You could argue it will strengthen our relationship with our 
current provider. Because at least they will know we are prepared to go to the 
market, whilst at the moment they don’t. 
CEO – I do think it will negatively affect our relationship. I do think it potentially 
undermines the wider strategic programme. 
The financial risk, when mentioned, was mentioned in terms of resources lost to 
community services than any potential increase to CCG financial pressures, “Or there 
is a £1m coming out of community services and filling the black hole from secondary 
care” (PERIPATETIC GP, M2). Risk was also identified in terms of the impact on 
Notlam Community Hospital if the services were tendered and the Trust, who ran the 
Hospital, lost the contract, potentially providing a financial deficit to one or other part 
of the local NHS.  
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The financial discussion moved on to the subject of Value for Money (VFM), previously 
identified as one of the evaluation criteria. This involved a debate on how VFM was 
assessed by the value of services delivered, or by a market mechanism that showed 
the respective value and efficiency provided by different providers in the market. The 
CLINICAL CHAIR commenting, “Are you likely to get VFM by working with the current 
provider to develop the service or are you going to get VFM through going to the 
market”. This financial discussion raised the lack of information available on the current 
services, including both activity data and more detailed financial information. The CFO 
commenting, “We have a model of care at the moment that we don’t want but if we 
move to a new model of care with the same provider Even if we say it is the same 
amount of money, how will we know we are getting value. If we can’t value it at the 
moment, how will we know the amount we have picked to pay if we haven’t assessed 
against some other test” (CFO, Meeting 2).  
Throughout the meeting the issue of how to procure the service, with frequent 
references to “tender” or “tendering”. According to the coding scheme, there were 89 
references to the procurement code (a sub-code of the corporate behaviour code), 
greater than any of the other meetings and 40% of references across the four 
meetings. This focus on whether to use the tender route or not was a large part of the 
session and much of the discussion appeared to present a binary choice between all 
tender and not, with organizational coalitions emerging in the meeting.  
The meeting ended with an agreement to produce a business case for the forthcoming 
CCG business committee.  
Meeting 3 
Attendees: CLINICAL CHAIR, GP VICE CHAIR, ELLERTON GP, PERIPATETIC GP, 
NORTONDALE GP (meeting Chair), HOSPITAL DCOTOR, CHIEF NURSE, 
PRACICE MANAGER, AUDIT CHAIR, CFO, CEO, PROJECT DIRECTOR, PROJECT 
MANAGER, DEPUTY CFO, AD COMMISSIONING (14 people plus one other officer 
not centrally involved in the process). 
The meeting was the Business Committee occurring before the subject’s appearance 
at the decision-making Governing Body. The session was held in early July in advance 
of the subsequent Governing Body in late July 2015. This session had 16 participants 
with a range of contributions of 91 to 1, spanning a word contribution range of 23.3% 
to 0.3%. Again, there was a presentation and supporting paper. 
This meeting was the final significant decision-making meeting of the process before 
the finally planned formal decision at the Governing Body and various times people 
seemed to discuss whether this was the time to make the decision. The chair 
(NORTONDALE GP) had to remind participants that the eventual ‘final’ decision would 
be taken by the Governing Body later in July. That said, it was clear this discussion 
would be important in shaping the eventual outcome and by this stage positions would 
be taken that may not change too much before the Governing Body meeting itself.  
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The meeting discussed the circulated business case (titled ‘Business Case for Out of 
Hospital Care’ dated June 30, 2015), presented to the forum by the PROJECT 
DIRECTOR. The document had evidently appeared as a late paper and 
NORTONDALE GP commented, “I’m afraid we haven’t seen this document 
beforehand”, suggesting at least some members would have benefited from more time 
to consider the content. The information was presented, however, as largely known to 
the audience: “Some of you may have seen a lot of the information before” (PROJECT 
DIRECTOR). The PROJECT DIRECTOR’s introduction referenced engagement with 
groups of stakeholders, including the CCG’s wider GP community and some of the 
community staff themselves. The PROJECT DIRECTOR also confirmed the likely 
value of the services under consideration as “more than £9.8 million”, which was then 
clarified as £9.8 million plus a further £1.7 million from a smaller provider, giving a total 
value approaching £12 million. The combination of different contract values appeared 
to provide a level of complexity: the discussion as to the financial values showing that 
at this stage of the process some of the underpinning information relating to the project 
was still uncertain to the decision-makers.  
As in the previous meetings there was a discussion as to the status of the clinical 
model. This was accepted as ‘agreed’ to a point: 
NORTONDALE GP – In terms of this afternoon we are not thrashing out the 
model. 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – No we are not. 
NORTONDALE GP – We have got a high-level agreement of what the model 
is. 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – The detail will come in the next phase of developing 
the specification. 
NORTONDALE GP – You make me nervous every time you say the model is 
agreed. 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – The model that is in here is the same as that in the 
CCG strategy. It depends on the future progress as to how we shape the model. 
The presented document summarised: 
• The background to the case and its context for the CCG 
• The services under consideration and the financial values 
• The developed clinical model for how community would work 
• The case for change to the new model 
• Information on stakeholder engagement and stakeholder feedback 
• The options presented for how to get to the new model 
• The option appraisal 
• Recommendations and next steps 
• Equality impact assessment of the changes 
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Although the document covered all of the above the main point of discussion in the 
meeting was on the option appraisal to achieve the model service. The services 
included in the scope of the business case were: community District Nursing and 
Therapy services; community equipment and wheelchair services; intermediate care; 
and Podiatry. Community paediatrics included in the overall services listed at Meeting 
2 had now been excluded from the scope.  
The options presented were: 
a) Recommission the current service/leave as the status quo; 
b) Managed change31 process with the current NHS provider without tender for all 
services; 
c) Competitive open market procurement for all services; 
d) Combination of b) and c) where some services would be tendered, and others 
taken through a non-competitive managed change. 
The business case provided an initial assessment of the options and evaluated them 
against four criteria: 
• Value for money – how options would achieve the best price for service; 
• Patient experience – how patient experience would be improved; 
• Service delivery – how the service improvements could actually be delivered; 
• Demonstrable outcomes – how options would ensure delivery of improved 
patient clinical outcomes. 
The options were then further assessed against the risks they presented to the CCG. 
These were the three risks of: 
• Strategic risk – how the delivery option may impact on the wider healthcare 
commissioning and work of the CCG; 
• Reputational risk – how a decision may affect the status of the CCG in its health 
community 
• Financial risk – what level of financial uncertainty an option provided to the 
CCG. 
The intention being firstly, to evaluate options against their ability to deliver desired 
care model against the identified criteria. Secondly, to assess the options against their 
assessed risk.  
The option scoring and scoring methodology was recorded as follows: 
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Table 14 - First business case scoring methodology 
Score Rating Description 
0 Not 
adequate  
Does not meet requirement  
 
1 Adequate Would meet minimum requirements 
 
2 Good Meets most of CCG strategic vision to enable 
transform of health care provision 
 3 Excellent Meets all strategic vision to enable transform of 
health care provision 
 
Table 15 - First business case option scoring 
O
ption  
Value for 
Money 
Patient 
Experience  
Service 
Delivery  
Demonstrable 
Outcomes  Total  
a) 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 
b) 0.5 2.0 1.5 2.0 7 
c) 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 9.5 
d) 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 7.5 
 
This made option c), for all services to be tendered, as the preferred option. The case 
stated that there wasn’t a differential assessment of the financial impact of each option 
as, “care will be based on redirecting resources that are currently committed to the 
existing community services contract to provide funding for the provision of the new 
model” (1st Business Case, p.13). Thus, the financial assessment was not of the ability 
of an option to provide a direct financial benefit (that is lower cost) but rather 
assessment of the financial risks of each option: that is an option’s assessed likelihood 
of providing financial uncertainty and potential financial deterioration.  
In the document presented to the committee the scoring table of options was included 
in the main body of the business case: however, the risk assessments were only 
documented in the supporting appendices (although all appendices were circulated as 
attached to the document that went to the committee). The risk assessment approach 
followed that consistently used in the NHS at the time with a combined assessment of 
likelihood (scored 1-5 with 1 unlikely to 5 almost certain) and impact (scored 1-5 with 
1 minimal impact to 5 very significant), with both scores multiplied together to provide 
a final risk score in each risk domain. The scores are summarised below.  
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Table 16 - First business case options scoring 
O
ption  
Strategic risk Reputational Risk Financial risk Total  
a) 16 15 12 43 
b) 12 12 12 36 
c) 14 12 12 38 
d) 9 12 14 35 
 
The risk scoring was queried in the meeting as different approaches were used for 
different options and there may have been inconsistency in the risk assessments: “the 
approach of the team… is that you identify the risks that apply to each option. 
Personally, I would apply the same risks to all options” (CEO, Meeting 3). The meeting 
did not describe a need to produce alternative options and the assumption appeared 
to be some variant of the options provided would be presented to the eventual 
decision-making Governing Body meeting.  
The meeting did identify problems with finding supporting information to analyse the 
services under consideration, as stated by the Project Director, “We don’t have a great 
deal of information on the services and these are essentially contract value lines” 
(PROJECT DIRECTOR, Meeting 3). The following exchange was illustrative of the 
issue: 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – It is probably worth saying we are working to get some 
more activity information and some more detail, so we can do a proper analysis. 
NORTONDALE GP – Is there not a duty for them to provide the information?  
DEPUTY CFO – We are not sure what information is supposed to be provided 
within the community MDS [Minimum Data Set].  
CHIEF NURSE – It has been delayed. 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – There was some national work on community services 
benchmarking. At the moment we haven’t seen anything from that. 
 
In this meeting and the previous two, the decision actors appeared to accept the quality 
of information available and did not articulate a desire to gain more information in 
support of a decision. This may reflect a belief that further information was either 
unavailable or wouldn’t add clarity.  
The discussion on options quickly resulted in the meeting discounting option a), as this 
was not even seen as a ‘serious’ option: 
NORTONDALE GP (Meeting chair) – You [to PERIPATETIC GP] are not 
seriously saying that we should keep the same service are you. 
PERIPATETIC GP – No. 
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NORTONDALE GP – So we can discount that option. 
There followed a detailed discussion of how the other options were assessed and 
scored. NORTONDALE GP, the chair of the meeting, after discussion of the case and 
at the point the meeting assessed the outcome of the initial score stated “Surprise, 
surprise the outcome is…”, which may be seen as a slightly ironic comment as to the 
strong likelihood that the highest scoring option may have been a strong favourite to 
be the highest score from the outset. This was supported by another comment, “It is 
obvious that the tender option will score higher” (PERIPATETIC GP). At this point in 
the meeting there is recorded general chatter on whether the scoring calculations had 
been produced and whether they were correct. This highlights what may be a common 
feature of such scores in business cases: that they are taken quite seriously and as 
semi-scientific means of evaluating options. This approach occurs within a scoring 
system that is to some degree artificial, internally generated by the process itself, and 
subjectively scored by the authors of the paper. The presentation of a score for options 
may have a significant influence on the eventual decision outcome through the 
anchoring heuristic (Tversky 1974). Thus, subsequent scores and numerical 
assessment may be influenced by the size of the initial score.  Alternatively, the score 
may be seen as a means to rationalise a decision in hindsight and thus is not a true 
appraisal tool, but a means of justification. Thus, the NORTONDALE GP commented, 
“Have we got, or not got, to the answer we wanted so we are trying to change the 
score?”. Although this comment as challenged, it may represent that some decision-
makers interpret the process to be primarily one of justification for a preference.  
If meeting 2 had the largest focus of the four sessions on corporate process 
(particularly the procurement code and the focus on tendering), this meeting was the 
dominant session discussing subjects of risk. Across the coding categories of capacity, 
clinical, financial, and political risk the coding analysis recorded 290 references. 
Certain attendees appeared more concerned with risk and this tended to be a small 
group (see the coalition descriptions below). The meeting may have been the most 
obvious point of the juxtaposition of the improvement and risk themes, summed up in 
a comment from the CCG Clinical Chair:  
The bottom line for me, is there a benefit from tendering the whole lot worth the 
higher risk, and if not, it isn’t worth tendering it all. You take the more moderate 
option of the hybrid option, which is potentially lower risk. That is the 
fundamental question for me. It is basically how pissed off you are with the 
current service. (CLINICAL CHAIR, Meeting 3) 
The document described three risk assessment criteria (strategic, reputational, and 
financial) but in the meeting the issue of risk was presented with a slightly different 
emphasis, thus: 
The key considerations when completing the risk assessments were as follows: 
• Is the commissioner breaching any regulations? 
• Are there other providers who can deliver the service? 
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• How likely is it there will be a procurement challenge? 
• What is the likely outcome of any challenge? 
• What is the impact on the current healthcare system? (PROJECT 
DIRECTOR) 
Thus, in the meeting the documented strategic and financial risks were possibly 
reduced in scale in favour of the reputational and wider legal-regulatory risks. But 
again, there was disagreement as to how to evaluate certain risks, such as the 
strategic risk of destabilising partners and any consequent financial risk to the CCG: 
PERIPATETIC GP - The strategic risk for me has to be higher. 
CLINICAL CHAIR – Higher than what? 
PERIPATETIC GP – Than working with the current provider if it destabilizes 
them. 
DEPUTY CFO – If you think it is a £10 million contract it…[interrupted] 
NORTONDALE GP – We had a discussion last week and didn’t it come out that 
they are providing it at a loss. 
PROJECT MANAGER – The soft intelligence says they are. 
CHIEF NURSE –They say they are so presumably this would strengthen their 
financial position if they lost the service. 
PERIPATETIC GP – I doubt they would look at the £10 million in that way. 
DEPUTY CFO – That does make the risk higher. 
CHIEF NURSE – To the Trust? 
DEPUTY CFO – No to us. 
CHIEF NURSE – How does that make it higher to us. 
DEPUTY CFO – Because if it isn’t an affordable service it will cost us more if 
we tender it. 
CHIEF NURSE – But do you believe that? 
DEPUTY CFO – I have not seen any evidence. 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – That is the problem. 
This again showed that a lack of data in in relation to the services in question made 
finding a common objective assessment of risks difficult. It appeared that those who 
were least supportive of the current provider (the Trust) and most enthusiastic 
regarding tender (CHIEF NURSE, PROJECT DIRECTOR, PROJECT MANAGER) 
tended to downplay the risks. Conversely, those who appeared more concerned 
regarding the risks (here the PERIPATETIC GP and DEPUTY CFO) may have been 
more sympathetic to the current provider both in terms of their current performance 
and the destabilising effect of a tender. (DEPUTY CFO did not demonstrate any 
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particular support for the Trust but was mainly ill at ease with creating any further 
financial risk through the uncertainty of a tender process.) 
The issue of reputational risk was mainly framed in terms of the CCG and its wider GP 
community, who had consistently voiced their dissatisfaction with community services. 
Thus, “If we continue with the current service it is a big reputational risk with our current 
practices” (NORTONDALE GP, Meeting 3). There thus appeared a counter-position 
between the ‘strategic risk’ of destabilizing the wider health economy and main 
provider and the ‘reputational risk’ of possible alienation of the CCG’s local constituent 
GPs.  
After the lengthy discussion the meeting recorded the voting status of all participants 
who would have a vote in the eventual Governing Body meeting (as opposed to a vote 
of the total participants in the meeting). The vote was recorded as: 
Table 17 - Voting summary on option appraisal at meeting 3 
Governing	Body	(voting)	member	 Option	NORTONDALE	GP		 C	ELLERTON	GP	 C	AUDIT	CHAIR	 C	GP	VICE	CHAIR	 C	PRACICE	MANAGER	 C	HOSPITAL	DCOTOR	 C	CHIEF	NURSE	 C	PERIPATETIC	GP	 D	CFO	 D	CEO	 D	CLINICAL	CHAIR	 D	
LAY	PATIENT	REP	 Not	present	
NOTLAM	GP	 Not	Present	
Voting summary – Option C - 7 votes; Option D - 4 votes 
The business case and supporting presentation were more developed by the time of 
this meeting and thus the discussion may be seen as reflecting a more mature stage 
in the process. It was by now reasonably clear where some of the Governing Body 
members were positioning themselves. The risks attendant in the options were now 
being more clearly articulated and there was a sense of the process moving forward 
to completion. It was not evident any significantly new information appeared prior to 
this meeting or indeed subsequent to it as part of preparation for the actual Governing 
Body. Consequently, this meeting may be seen as the main opportunity for formal 
discussion of options in detail between the main decision-makers.  
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The meeting was generally good-humoured but did feel more intense and the 
approaching point of actual decision was more evident, the vote at the end of the 
meeting demonstrating the need for the group to assess the likely decision outcome.  
Meeting 4 
Attendees: CLINICAL CHAIR (meeting Chair), GP VICE CHAIR, NOTLAM GP, 
NORTONDALE GP, CHIEF NURSE, PRACICE MANAGER, LAY PATIENT REP, 
AUDIT CHAIR, CFO, CEO, PROJECT DIRECTOR (11 people). 
The session was the formal CCG Governing Body, held in public and had 11 
participants (10 of the Governing Body members plus the Project Director). 
Participants made 92 verbal contributions totalling 6,720 words. The meeting had a 
business case as a formal document to approve or reject as part of the decision-
making process.  
This meeting was the Governing Body meeting of the CCG where the subject for 
decision would be discussed and an initial decision made. As this meeting was a 
statutory governing body meeting (at corporate board level) it followed a much more 
formal approach than any of the previous meetings. The meeting was held in the 
council chamber at the Nortondale Council Offices. Although meetings 2 and 3 had 
structured agenda, papers, and were carefully planned, their happening away from 
public gaze allowed a free exchange of opinions and ideas that was lacking in this 
forum. Similarly, humour that was heavily evident in the discourse of meeting 1, and 
subtly present in meetings 2 and 3, was largely absent in this case. The PROJECT 
DIRECTOR, as the lead for the discussion, spoke for a significant proportion of the 
meeting, with CHIEF NURSE and CEO making major contributions. Other Governing 
Body members made contributions, but more as points requiring clarification than main 
statements in themselves. The CLINICAL CHAIR was very clearly the chair of this 
forum, the chair-person role possibly occupying a more formal position due to the very 
formality of the meeting.  
The Governing Body considered the paper presented by the PROJECT DIRECTOR, 
the final business case for commissioning of community services for the CCG (‘Out of 
Hospital Care Final Business Case’). This case reflected some of the discussions 
occurring in meeting 3 and may have been influenced by wider discussions with 
decision-makers in the intervening three weeks. As with the business case at meeting 
3, the one to this forum included the same content structure (see above) and provided 
a list of options for consideration and decision. The revised options presented were 
(verbatim reproduction from ‘Out of Hospital case Final Business Case’): 
a) Do Nothing: This option is non-competitive. The service would remain with 
the current provider and the specification would be unchanged.   
b) Managed Change Programme: This option is non-competitive. Each LOT 
would be re- specified in line with the agreed model and delivered through 
a managed change programme.  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c) Competitive Tender: Each LOT would be re-specified and delivered via a 
formal competitive process   
d) Combination of Options B and C. LOTS 1, 3 and 6 would be re-specified 
and delivered through a managed change programme. LOTS 2, 4, and 5 
would be re-specified and delivered   
Reference to the option list as described in meeting 3 above shows that the significant 
change for options b) to d) is the introduction of specific ‘Lots’ to the options. Thus, the 
six different parts of the community services that had been identified were then 
constructed into biddable groups (‘Lots’) that could be commissioned individually or 
collectively. This appeared to be an admission from the previous discussion that an all 
or nothing approach to a procurement option may not achieve group consensus, or a 
required majority: whereas breaking the sections of the services into definable groups 
allowed some specific issues, such as Nortondale locality concerns, to be addressed. 
The option considered in meeting 3, of competitive tender for all the services as one 
whole was no longer presented as an option. Thus, the case detailed: “Following 
consultation with the CCG clinical and managerial team, the out of hospital care 
programme has been divided into six separate LOTs” (Out of Hospital business case). 
There was no further explanation given for removing the ‘option c’ as presented in the 
business case to the previous business committee (Meeting 3). This may demonstrate 
the influence of the discussions at Meeting 3, the presumed assumptions and 
subsequent conversations regarding Nortondale, and the 2nd dimension power of the 
officer group to form agendas with specific options presented, and others excluded. 
Thus, the business case presented at Meeting 4 documented types of service included 
and excluded within the project scope: 
Inclusions 
1. Community Services  
2. Intermediate Care  
3. Community Equipment and Wheelchair Services 
4. Podiatry  
Exclusions  
5. Paediatric community services/child development centre  
(Out of Hospital Final Business Case Draft June 30, 2015) 
“Community Services” here related to a range of service including District Nursing and 
Community Therapies. Intermediate Care was primarily facility (bed-based) based 
rehabilitation in some form of unit. By the Governing Body meeting the business case 
had been amended from the 5 service areas to six: 
• Lot 1 is the community model for Nortondale. What this model includes is 
District Nursing, Fast Response, Community Therapies, and intermediate 
care, including any facility-based service.  
• Lot 2 is the community services for Ellerton. That includes the same elements 
of the service as Lot 1 [but for Ellerton]. 
• Lot 3 is specialist children’s services 
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• Lot 4 - Podiatry. 
• Lot 5 – equipment and wheelchair services; and  
• Lot 6 - Is defined as the specialist community services which is defined as 
predominantly community-based specialist nursing, specialist therapies and 
community geriatricians. (PROJECT DIRECTOR presenting from the ‘Out of 
Hospital business case July 22, 2015’). 
Most obviously the groupings had been changed by splitting the ‘community services’ 
element into its two geographical parts: one the urban centre of Ellerton; the other the 
rural area of Nortondale. Although this appeared to emerge as a compromise and to 
placate the Nortondale GPs who were un-enthusiastic about tendering, this split was 
less than clear to all participants:  
NORTONDALE GP - Can I ask you about Lot 1? Are the Stillington practice in 
Lot 1. Historically they have received community nursing services form 3 
different sources. Is that Lot defined by the practice area, or where the patients 
are registered, or by geographical area? 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – Again this is one of the things that will be defined by 
the ongoing work. We have had some initial discussions about the Lots and this 
is the interim proposal. But again, the work needs to be done on the specific 
populations within the Lots. 
NORTONDALE GP – This has been a problem for this practice, and it would be 
nice to get that sorted at this stage. 
PROJECT DIRECTOR – But you can’t tie District Nurses to specific practices, 
as you can’t really do that. It is nice and fine in somewhere like Notlam but in 
other areas it is more complicated. 
Although this may reflect the inevitable problem of trying to draw specific boundaries 
around geographically diverse rural areas, it may also reflect a desire to achieve 
political compromise between decision-makers in the CCG, above a need to make 
coherent service configurations. One element that may have influenced the split 
between Nortondale and Ellerton may have been the intermediate care bed base at 
Notlam Hospital (in Nortondale), the inclusion of which within an open market tender 
may have been controversial. Thus, one point of clarification being, “So anything that 
is currently defined as Notlam Hospital within the current community services contract 
would be within that Lot [1]” (CEO).  (As a small community hospital, it was considered 
vulnerable to closure in the recent past, the local community had a high level of anxiety 
regarding any service changes. The one of the Nortondale GP practices (that of 
NOTLAM GP) also received payment for providing medical support to the intermediate 
care unit.)  
The evaluation criteria used in the option appraisal remained the same (VFM, patient 
experience, service delivery, and demonstrable outcomes). The risk assessment 
methodology, however, was modified following feedback at the previous meeting and 
now assessed risk in terms of: 
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• Does the option undermine the cohesive working and agreement within the 
local health and social care community to work in partnership?   
• Does the option deliver the CCG strategic plan?   
• Is the option affordable?   
• Will there be a perception that the CCG is not fulfilling its commissioning 
responsibilities by Council?  of GP Members; NHS England; Public; Partners? 
The scoring method was a simple 0-3 for each criterion, with no weighting for individual 
criteria. Risk scoring was averaged across the risk dimensions with an assessment of 
whether the risk options were low, medium, or high.  
Table 18 - Final business case option scoring 
O
ption 
Value for 
Money 
Patient 
Experience  
Service 
Delivery  
Demonstrable 
Outcomes  Total  
a) 0 1.5 0 0 1.5 
b) 0.5 2.0 1.5 2.0 6 
c) 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 9.5 
d) 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 7.5 
 
With the following risk assessment score for each option 
Table 19 - Final business case option risk scoring 
O
ption 
Risk Score (Average) Risk Description 
a) 12 High 
b) 11 Medium 
c) 13 High 
d) 11 Medium 
 
There was no explanation in the case or in the meeting presentation from the 
PROJECT DIRECTOR as to the reasoning for the distinction between the ‘high’ and 
‘medium’ risk scores, although the numerical differences as shown above, were small.  
The business case recommended the Governing Body support Option d). This having 
a lower option score than Option c) but balanced by a considered lower risk profile: 
“The associated risk is lower than Option C and in addition the key benefits from the 
initial assessment still apply” (Out of Hospital Care Final Business Case, p.13). The 
perceived benefits of the preferred option were described as: 
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• Can test value for money for key elements of the service   
• Provides opportunity for innovation/service developments   
• Provides opportunities to bring new ideas to local health community   
• Supports strategic drive for sustainable services in Ellerton by increasing 
capacity and range of  providers.   
• Provides a higher certainty that the Provider will deliver the specification   
• Ensures the CCG is meeting requirements and offering contract opportunities, 
therefore reduces the  risk of legal challenge   
• Supports partnership working by including a managed changed element to the 
programme (Out of Hospital Care Final Business Case, p.13)  
Following the PROJECT DIRECTOR’s presentation of the business case the 
Governing Body examined the case and asked a number of questions. This started 
with a conversation between the PROJECT DIRECTOR and the CHIEF NURSE (as 
questioner). This explored element of the service specification and then the discussion 
moved quickly onto the subject of risk. The LAY PATIENT REP, member with 
responsibility for patient engagement stressed the need for whatever the outcome 
was, that engagement with the CCG’s stakeholders and wider community was one of 
the necessary next steps. The CFO added comments regarding risk, that one of the 
risks not scored in the case was that of the resource cost of pursuing a procurement. 
This was not mentioned and thus not quantified in the case and to the CFO appeared 
potentially significant: “even if we are using existing staff and existing resources does 
that need another, say £150,000 of resources, they can’t be doing anything else when 
they are doing it” (CFO, Meeting 4). This was dismissed relatively quickly by the GP 
VICE CHAIR, and the AUDIT CHAIR with little consideration to actual cost: “To be 
honest if you followed the logic of that argument you wouldn’t do any of it at all” (AUDIT 
CHAIR Meeting 4).  
The next part of the discussion focussed on the decision to procure or not the specific 
items of Lots 1 and 2. Consensus seemed to have been reached relatively quickly on 
the benefit of procurement for Lots 4 and 5 (Podiatry, and Wheelchair and Equipment 
services respectively) and managed change (not procurement for Lot 3, specialist 
children’s community services). There was little debate about the management of Lot 
6 (specialist community nursing services) and this appeared to be accepted as being 
managed according to the proposal of Option D (that is, managed change). Following 
debate regarding whether to adopt the business case recommendation, to support 
Option D as the preferred option, the meeting considered the recommendation and 
final decision. CEO suggested a modification to Option D, with a period of managed 
change to try and develop services without procurement for the Ellerton area for a 
period of 12 months, which if unsuccessful would then trigger a formal open 
procurement. The lack of consensus from the Governing Body members on the 
decision resulted in the need for a recorded vote. The CCG Governing Body did not 
routinely take votes on all matters: the meeting chair (CLINICAL CHAIR) stating, “I 
usually try to achieve consensus if possible”. CEO commented later that he may have 
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not suggested the vote if he had realised the likely balance of votes (that is 9 to 1). 
The CLINICAL CHAIR closed the meeting with, “I think that is very fair and it is useful 
to have that debate in public and it makes it very clear we have made an active 
decision, and this is not something that has got in under the radar”. Retrospectively at 
interview the chair commented:  
Perhaps I could have Chaired it a bit better but you know I think that we work in 
such a way and we make decisions in such a way that I am very comfortable 
with those decisions because I think people are given the chance to give their 
opinion and we give enough time and space to allow everybody’s opinion to be 
heard and to influence the decision that is made. (CLINICAL CHAIR interview)) 
The vote was recorded as: 
Table 20 - Final business case voting Meeting 4 
Governing Body (voting) member 
 
Option D in business case 
CLINICAL CHAIR Yes 
GP VICE CHAIR Yes 
NOTLAM GP Yes 
NORTONDALE GP Yes 
CHIEF NURSE Yes 
PRACICE MANAGER Yes 
LAY PATIENT REP Yes 
AUDIT CHAIR Yes 
CFO Yes 
CEO No (proposed modified Option D) 
ELLERTON GP Not present 
PERIPATETIC GP Not Present 
HOSPITAL DCOTOR Not present 
  
9 voted in favour of the proposal, one voted against, there were no abstentions and 3 
Governing Body members were not present. (The PROJECT DIRECTOR was present 
in the meeting and presented the business case but was not a voting member of the 
Governing Body.) 
Comparison of the four management meetings 
The analysis of the participant contributions demonstrated the variable engagement of 
the participants across the meetings in the case study. This tests the inference of 
“Substantial variation in participation” (Cohen 1972, p.3) amongst those involved in 
organizational decision-making. Thus, the 18 participants in the process had a range 
of presence in the meetings: 3 participants (CHIEF NURSE, CEO, PROJECT 
DIRECTOR) attended all 4 meetings; 9 attended 3 sessions (CLINICAL CHAIR, 
ELLERTON GP, PERIPATETIC GP, NORTONDALE GP, AUDIT CHAIR, CFO, 
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PROJECT MANAGER, DEPUTY CFO, AD COMMISSIONING); 2 attended 2 
meetings (GP VICE CHAIR, PRACICE MANAGER); and 3 only attended 1 session 
(NOTLAM GP, HOSPITAL DCOTOR, LAY PATIENT REP). One participant (AD 
PRIMARY CARE) although playing an important role in the decision-making process 
and had a senior role in supporting the Governing Body, didn’t participate in any of the 
sessions. More than merely the presence in meetings, analysis of the verbal 
contributions in the sessions showed a wide variation of input. Analysis of the 
contributions was influenced by the earlier work of Bezemer (2014). Furthermore, the 
findings explore not merely the presence participation (that is whether decision-makers 
were actually in the meetings) but their active participation: whether they were actively 
contributing to the decision-making debate. Thus, some individuals had much greater 
oral interventions. A summary of verbal interventions by total words is provided below: 
Table 21 - Summary of verbal contributions of meeting participants 
Participant	 Words	 Contributions	
%	
Words	
%	
Contributions	
Meetings	
attended	PROJECT	DIRECTOR	 8,479	 235	 24.6%	 17.6%	 4	CEO	 7,868	 230	 22.9%	 17.2%	 4	PERIPATETIC	GP	 3,453	 154	 10.0%	 11.5%	 3	CHIEF	NURSE	 2,693	 146	 7.8%	 10.9%	 4	CLINICAL	CHAIR		 2,576	 112	 7.5%	 8.4%	 3	CFO	 2,476	 67	 7.2%	 5.0%	 3	NORTONDALE	GP	 2,187	 134	 6.4%	 10.0%	 3	AD	COMMISSIONING	 992	 68	 2.9%	 5.1%	 3	ELLERTON	GP	 874	 52	 2.5%	 3.9%	 3	PROJECT	MANAGER	 820	 58	 2.4%	 4.3%	 3	GP	VICE	CHAIR	 647	 23	 1.9%	 1.7%	 2	AUDIT	CHAIR	 394	 11	 1.1%	 0.8%	 3	DEPUTY	CFO	 346	 19	 1.0%	 1.4%	 3	PRACICE	MANAGER	 257	 11	 0.7%	 0.8%	 2	GP	VICE	CHAIR	 194	 13	 0.6%	 1.0%	 1	LAY	PATIENT	REP	 119	 2	 0.3%	 0.1%	 1	HOSPITAL	DCOTOR	 36	 1	 0.1%	 0.1%	 1	NOTLAM	GP32	 0	 0	 0.0%	 0.0%	 1	
Total	 34,411	 1,336	 100.0%	 100.0%	 	
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This demonstrates the range of interventions across the group and the preponderance 
of certain individuals in the process. What could not be determined merely by the 
numerical word contribution was whether the most vocal participants were 
proportionately the most influential on the eventual outcome. What may be inferred is 
that: 
• The role of the chair in meetings may be important (shown by Bezemer 2014) 
in managing the meeting dynamics but it may be less important in influencing 
the decision outcome.  
• A project director or manager (PROJECT DIRECTOR in this case) may assume 
a very prominent position in a process and shape how decision meetings unfold.  
• A senior executive (in this case the CEO) may provide an apparently 
disproportionate input compared to peers; although less disproportionately 
related to the level of accountability and responsibility.  
• Senior executives and officers may hold significant influence on shaping 
meeting agendas and deciding what is discussed, and thus what is decided. 
This corresponds to Lukes (2005) three dimensions of power. This may be seen 
as sitting more heavily with the PROJECT DIRECTOR and the CEO than others 
in the process.  
• Cohen’s (1972) “substantial variation” is seen in the extremes of meeting 
participation where two Governing Body members (NOTLAM GP and LAY 
8,4797,868
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 Figure 21 - Graph of words spoken by participants in management meetings 
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PATIENT REP) were present and voted in the eventual decision-making 
meeting but were not present at any of the preceding discussions.  
Within the concept of negotiated order, the findings allow consideration of whether 
certain participants have greater influence on the creation of organizational coalitions 
or on the establishment of certain cognitive frames. 
Development of the option appraisal 
A thread running through the meetings was the option appraisal to establish the 
preferred solution to achieve the service improvement. This evolved over the course 
of the case and can be seen as part of the way in which a consensus was achieved. 
Thus, options evolved as: 
• Meeting 1 – Verbally described options but not detailed in a management paper. 
Following discussion on whether the options were on the types of clinical 
service model; or the options to achieve the implementation of a service model. 
The initial options considered included differing types of procurement.  
• Meeting 2 – Emergence of three options: work with the existing providers; 
tender all services; tender some services (specifically podiatry and community 
equipment). No preferred option was stated in the presentation to the meeting.  
• Meeting 3 – The addition of a ‘do nothing’ option making a distinction between 
the managed change option of working with existing providers and just keeping 
the same service as currently. The other options remained the same. (Although 
Option D described a combination of tendering and managed change, it did not 
specify which services would fall into each category.) Option C, all services to 
open tender, was recommended as the preferred option.  
• Meeting 4 – The explicit emergence of ‘Lots’ to separate out the service 
elements into six groups. The four options were largely the same as in Meeting 
3, other than Option D (the combined approach) now had clarity as to which 
services would be tendered and which not. In the final case Option D, had now 
become the preferred option, being both recommended in the business case 
and approved by the meeting.  
Although Meeting 1 listed five options the later debate in the session distilled this down 
to a seemingly binary choice between open market tender’ and ‘work with the current 
provider’ (“So at this stage we are just looking at 2 options?”, PROJECT DIRECTOR 
Meeting1).  This binary choice changed in the appraisal journey, with a move away 
from tendering all services into a combined approach and within that the separation of 
the Nortondale services as a separate Lot. At the end of Meeting 3, the CHIEF NURSE 
referred to the potential voting choice of NOTLAM GP, in that they “would almost 
certainly vote for D”. Thus, by Meeting 3, the decision split across the Governing Body 
was 7-4 in favour of Option C as against Option D (Options A and B were discounted 
from the appraisal by the voting stage). The latter comments in Meeting 3 focussed on 
defining more clearly Option D. Thus, meeting chair NORTONDALE GP asked, “Do 
we need to define what [Option] D is? I think we do need for a group of us to meet and 
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define what D is, as we can’t really score D until we know what is in it”. This implied 
that with definition either D may become the preferred option or that the group may 
establish a clearer consensus on Option C (recognising that 2 of the Governing Body 
members were not present for the meeting). Even before the end of the meeting 
members were suggesting how the eventual Lot approach may be shaped: “The lots 
last year defined Notlam and Nortondale as a separate package, and that may make 
a lot of sense” (CHIEF NURSE, Meeting 3). This may have been in response to the 
overall higher risk assessment of Option C in the business case, and a last-minute 
further risk element described relating to the community hospital: “there is a huge 
reputational risk in putting out a tender that includes Notlam Hospital. I am not trying 
to scare people but there is a big risk” (CEO, Meeting 3).  
By the stage of Meeting 4, Option D included much greater clarity as to the service 
split and became the overwhelming choice of the meeting. (CEO opposing with a 
suggested amendment to Option D, rather than the choice of a different option.) The 
option appraisals had their genesis in the previous work in the CCG on its general and 
community strategy, and in the case itself in the discussion at Meeting 1. At none of 
meetings 2,3, or 4 did any participants propose alternative options. It is unclear from 
the meeting and interview transcripts whether this reflected the fact of the options 
being considered as the only viable ones, or whether the meetings assumed there 
were no other options if a business case included a range of options.  
By the point of the decision to use partial market procurement the CCG appeared to 
have delayed a decision on to the form of the procurement. In the Meeting 1 discussion 
the options discussed included choices between ‘single open tender’ and ‘a process 
of competitive dialogue’. At the consideration of the final business case, types of tender 
were not specified and the vehicle to achieve tendering appeared to be left to a later 
decision point by the project board to be created as from one of the business case 
recommendations.  
The ultimate business case appeared to represent not merely a rational iterative 
analysis and evaluation of the options and the supporting evidence: but as much a 
pragmatic need to accommodate internal and external stakeholders, so that the 
preferred option was one that allowed the establishment of a negotiated order in the 
CCG. The progress of the option appraisal and the pragmatic changes made by the 
participants were consistent with the concept and assumptions of the negotiated order.  
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Chapter	6	–	Analysis	and	discussion	of	triangulated	
research	findings	
Introduction 
This section analyses the findings from the collected research data:  of the four 
observed decision-making meetings in the case study and the follow-up interviews 
with the case participants. The interview data findings are triangulated against the 
meeting data within a common coding system. 
The detailed description of the meeting data and assessment against the developed 
analytical codes are contained in the preceding chapter. The findings were analysed 
within the developed conceptual framework and against the original research 
objectives of the project. The findings analysis formed the basis for the development 
of theory provided in the next chapter.   
This section provides reconciliation of the research findings with the originally stated 
research objectives. The project research question was “What are the factors that 
influence strategic decisions in healthcare commissioning: a negotiated order 
perspective” and the intended research objectives within the context of a strategic 
decision-making process:	
• How do the influencing factors on decision makers present themselves, how 
do interest groups become involved in the process and how do they exert 
influence?  
• How does this influence manifest itself in relation to the CCG’s cultural and 
power dimensions (its negotiated order)? 
• How may decision-making processes be improved to maximize utilization of 
resources consistent with the NHS and CCG strategies? 
The last objective of improving decision-making processes will also be considered in 
the following and conclusions chapters.  
This section provides: 
• The context of wider NHS strategy at the time of the case study and the 
organizational strategy in place at the CCG. 
• The appearance of the influencing factors in the research data and their 
analysis within the conceptual framework. 
• The use of language and conceptual frames within the observed discourse of 
the case study. 
National strategy - NHS England’s ‘Five Year Forward View’ 
The CCG strategy was developed before the arrival of a major strategic document in 
the year before the case study. In late 2014 NHS England (NHSE), the recently 
established national body directing the process of English healthcare commissioning, 
published this major strategic statement: the Five Year Forward View (5YFV). This 
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was a strategic planning document published prior to the start of the research. This 
document and its analysis in the case study shows the establishment of major themes 
developed by NHSE; referencing the 5YFV strategic themes to the CCG strategic 
objectives; and assessment of the role of the 5YFV in the CCG decision-making 
process. Here the major themes of the 5YFV are summarised below. 
5 Year Forward View Strategic Themes 
• The need for improvement in prevention and public health. This reflects an 
assessment of the relatively ‘weak’ implementation of the proposals from the 
Wanless (2002, 2007) reviews. Therefore, there is a need for ‘hard-hitting’ 
actions on reducing obesity, rates of smoking, and alcohol abuse. 
•  A greater use of patient control of services, particularly those requiring more 
intensive long-term packages of care, through mechanisms such as personal 
health budgets. This aimed to improve patient involvement in care planning 
(sometimes described as ‘co-production’) and was also hoped to reduce spend 
through patients and carers making more efficient decisions.  
• A reduction in the barriers between care provision, such as the evident 
separation between care designated as ‘health’ and that as ‘social’. In care 
areas such as that of continuing healthcare33 discussion often centred not on 
the care itself but on the question of ‘who pays’ between the NHS and Local 
Authorities.  
• Locally designed care delivery and a move away from the NHS as a ‘one size 
fits all’ system of care. Local health communities will be ‘supported’ in choosing 
the care delivery options suitable for their communities. 
• The development of alternative models of care delivery for out of hospital care. 
The models are labelled as, ‘Multispecialty Community Providers’ (MCP) and 
‘Primary And Acute Care Systems’ (PACS). The MCPs/PACS are seen as 
incorporating elements of GP services, social care, and mental health to 
support more care delivered in patients’ own residences.  
• Urgent care services (including GP out-of-hours care, Accident and Emergency, 
and ambulance services) should be delivered within greater integration 
between providers. The CCG in the case study had already gone down this 
road with the establishment of an integrated Urgent Care service immediately 
prior to the date of the study.  
• A requirement for a ‘new deal for primary care’ (NHS England 2014, p.4) with 
greater investment in General Practice but accompanied by changes in how 
primary care is delivered. This was followed shortly afterwards with a separate 
5 Year Forward View for General Practice.  
• A continued need for significant efficiencies within the NHS to deal with the 
forecast growing demand. This is estimated as a need to close a funding gap 
projected to be £30 billion by the year 2020/21. 5YFV infers there will need to 
be a major contribution to closing the gap from NHS efficiencies, but also a 
likely need for additional funding from tax revenues.  
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An early feature of the health policy of the coalition government was a renewed focus 
on the benefits of competition and market mechanisms (see Department of Health 
2010). This was a theme of the 2010 white paper, although arguably diluted by the 
time of the 2012 Act itself (Timmins 2012). The 5YFV in its 41 pages does not even 
use the word ‘competition’ once: suggesting a shift in emphasis. The shift may not 
reduce the need for NHS organizations to procure services through the appropriate 
market mechanisms and section 75 in the 2012 Health and Social Care Act enshrines 
a need to consider how services are procured and the opportunity for all relevant 
providers to access open market procurement where provided. It may be, however, 
that the 5YFV removes the issues of ‘privatisation’ and ‘competition’ from the centre 
of the policy debate. This may be seen as messages sent to the NHS commissioning 
architecture that competition is no longer a criterion against which success will be 
judged; at least not in isolation.  
The 5YFV was published 8 months prior to a UK general election. Produced from a 
public service by intention seen as party-politically neutral it may be seen as, to some 
degree, an attempt to shape the likely health policy for any potential government and 
thus allow a degree of stability in the NHS. Consequently, there may be observed a 
conflicting sense of, on the one hand discussion on the need to transform the NHS 
and respond to the economic environment by service overhaul; and on the other a 
need to prescribe policy recommendations that are likely to be palatable to all of the 
major parties of the next government. Overall its direction and content does not appear 
to stray dramatically from previous strategy documents over the last two decades (see 
Strategic approaches to commissioning in Literature Review sub-section 2).  
The organization strategy in the case study 
The CCG had developed an organizational strategy as part of its requirement to gain 
authorisation as a statutory body in 2012. The strategy described a plan from 2012-
16. This had been refreshed in the planning for subsequent financial years (including 
the 2015-16 year) but was largely unchanged in scope and direction. The CCG 
‘strategy refresh’ did take account of the 5YFV and its main themes, but these were 
not considered sufficiently different from the original strategic direction to warrant a 
significant change in direction. As above, it may be argued the strategic priorities of 
the NHS nationally and locally had not changed markedly over the preceding decade.  
The overarching mission statement of the CCG was to improve the health and 
wellbeing of its population and the three main dimensions of the strategy were (NHS 
Ellerton and Nortondale CCG Integrated Commissioning Strategy 2012-16): 
i. Commissioning sustainable, high-quality services within the available 
resources (people, money, buildings).  
ii. Delivered by a stronger community system, integrating care across the whole 
care economy.   
iii. Securing improvement in priority areas of health need and reducing health 
inequalities.  
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The first objective included reference to managing within the CCG’s financial 
resources. Two important historic elements were influential in this aspect: the previous 
Primary Care Trust’s (PCT) troubled financial history and the financial difficulties of the 
District General Hospital (DGH) in Ellerton. In the former of these this resulted in the 
CCG starting its history with an inherited deficit. This was successfully re-paid in its 
first year of operation, but the spectre of financial difficulty remained. In the case of the 
DGH, this had been recently acquired by a large local Foundation Trust with an 
agreement from the Department of Health for a period of additional funding: but this 
was recognised to end in 2017 and possibly add further financial difficulties to the 
health community.34 The third objective related to the generally poor health outcomes 
from the deprived urban communities in central Ellerton, as contrasting with the better 
health of the rural communities in wider Ellerton and Nortondale. The health challenge 
included a large population of the frail elderly, which placed a significant demand on 
community-based services (primary care, community therapy, district nursing, and 
social care). The second objective is the one driving the decision process in the case 
study and showed a strategic intention to move the focus of healthcare commissioning 
away from acute hospital care and to provide greater support to keep people, 
particularly the frail elderly, in their normal residences (own home of care home).  
In terms of the Porter (1985) and Miles et al (1978) typologies it is difficult to neatly fit 
the CCG strategy into one category. CCG Objective i appears as both Reactor 
(addressing chronic financial pressures) and Defender (in seeking to preserve services 
in a fragile DGH). Here the focus may be on cost leadership as for Porter (1985) but 
there is no obvious Porter equivalent for the need to preserve effective clinical services 
in a public service. CCG Objective iii appears also as Reactor in one respect as it is a 
reaction to the health need assessment in the locality. Conversely, this may be seen 
as a legitimate attempt to use an assessment of the corporate environment to shape 
strategy and improve outcomes, consistent with Boyne and Walker’s (2010) 
suggestion performance improvement is a higher priority for public services. Thus, this 
may be seen as largely Prospector, but in a Reactor strategic frame. CCG Objective ii 
may be that which is most consistent with the Prospector definition, but with an element 
of Defender in relation to preserving the primacy and capacity in primary care. Thus, 
this is a Prospector based Analyzer strategy. Overall the CCG strategy, as many in 
the public sector may be, is largely a Reactor strategy with Prospector influenced 
Analyzer tendencies. In the Mintzberg et al. (2009) typology the strategy appears most 
obviously to fit with the Planning and Design schools. (Assessing some of the 
emergent schools from the document alone would appear to be difficult, as 
assessment of strategy as practice in retrospect is probably required.) 
Rumelt (2012) provides four signs of ‘bad strategy’: fancy words masquerading as 
strategic concepts (‘fluff’); a failure to face the real corporate challenges; confusing 
goals and strategic objectives; and ‘bad’ objectives that are unrealistic or don’t address 
major issues. The CCG strategy would appear to face the challenges of its community 
particularly the historically difficult finances and operational performance of its hospital 
sector. The objective of strengthening community-based care did appear as a realistic 
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means of addressing the weak hospital system and of improving care outcomes (if 
primarily for the frail elderly). There may be seen to be some confusing of goals and 
objectives, and indeed the overlapping of definitions may be problematic. For Rumelt 
(2012) strategic objectives should address a specific issue or direct a particular action. 
This may be seen to be true in objectives i and ii but for ‘Securing improvement in 
priority areas of health need and reducing health inequalities’ this may be seen as 
relatively vague, although the objective was underpinned by more specific actions 
around targeting smoking and obesity. NHS leaders may have become anaesthetised 
against an overdose of grand sounding words and jargon, thus there may be legitimate 
accusations of elements of ‘fluff’ in the strategy. An example may be the use of 
‘transformation’. This is used as a term for change and improvement (for example in 
the 5YFV), but it may be questioned whether much of the aspired ‘transformation’ is 
genuinely ‘a marked change in form, nature, or appearance’ but rather a series of 
incremental improvements.  
Strategic decision-making and the execution of strategy 
In the review of concepts of strategy, consideration was given to the typology of Miles 
et al. (1978). This included the definition of some strategies being those of ‘engineering 
problems’: that of implementing what the organization wants to do. In this case study 
the issue of the case study was significant in terms of its financial size, its importance 
on patient care and service performance, and the political and partnership implications 
of how it would be managed. It was, however, less a decision about what direction the 
organization should take and more one of how the strategy should be implemented, 
specifically its second strategic objective: “a stronger community system, integrating 
care across the whole care economy” (CCG Integrated Commissioning Strategy 2012-
2016). That it is a decision regarding strategy execution should not be seen as 
reducing its importance or its qualification as strategic. Bossidy (2002), as one 
example, suggests that the execution of strategy may be the biggest challenge to 
business organizations, more so than the development of strategies. Thus, “strategies 
most often fail because they aren’t executed well” (Bossidy 2002, p.15).  
The case study is, therefore, a study of a strategic decision regarding strategy 
execution and implementation. This may explain some of the balances described in 
the influences on the decision-making process and indeed some of the discussion of 
the participants. The decision was one of ‘engineering’ problem solving. Consequently, 
the engagement of wider stakeholders, such as patient and user groups, which may 
be expected to occur more evidently in the development of strategy was largely absent 
in the study. Similarly, as the discussion included that of whether to use open market 
procurement, detailed engagement with potential providers was shaped by the need 
to consider good procurement practice and commercial confidentiality.  
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Influencing factors: their manifestation and relation to the 
negotiated order 
All of the influencing factors appeared within, and were inevitably shaped by, the wider 
strategic context of the decision. The influencing factors were in part linked to 
demographic and background profiles of the decision-makers and appeared at the 
three framing levels. The influences as developed in the conceptual framework are 
considered from the analysis of the research data, in particular the linguistic reference 
to concepts within the case study discourse.  
 
The macro influences were those of the overall decision-making environment, and 
decision actors did reference the legal framework and the NHS regulatory 
environment. For example, NHS England and NHS Improvement (formerly Monitor) 
were discussed, “There is a risk that our assurers, such as NHSE see us as not doing 
our job” (AD Commissioning, Meeting 2)35. These factors appeared as shaping the 
general decision-making theatre but had only limited reference in the meetings or in 
the interview data. The regulatory environment was referred to almost as a pretext 
upon which to take an already preferred course of action: “I don’t know why we don’t 
just say we are tendering because of the legal obligations?” (Chief Nurse).  
Evidence 
There was little reference to published evidence, in part as the participants appeared 
to conclude there was limited published research that was useful, the CFO 
commenting, “I don’t think really there was any hard evidence all the way through it” 
(CFO, interview). For the Governing Body clinicians this appeared problematic as, 
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“people like the GPs who like evidence, don’t they, before they will make a decision 
and I think they really struggled with the fact that you are basing it on ad hoc 
information” (AD Commissioning, interview). But also, that individual decision-maker 
bias had to be recognised: “I sometimes think people just don’t hear it if they have got 
a view then however good the evidence is for something else then they will find a way 
of just not hearing it and if there are enough of them of the same view” (Deputy CFO, 
interview). There also appeared for some participants a lack of clarity about what 
evidence may have been needed. Thus, an interview response was: 
Question – was there sense, from your perspective as a Lay Member, where 
you feel you would have benefited from more data or was the information in the 
business case sufficient really? 
Lay member Audit – I actually don’t know. 
The individual evidence of experience was considered both important and also a 
necessary substitute where empirical information was lacking. Thus, the GP clinical 
chair commenting, “It’s not strictly evidence-based in what you term the scientific 
nature, but it is evidence-based because it’s based on your own experience” (Clinical 
Chair, interview). Furthermore, this experiential evidence was seen by some as the 
only clinical evidence that could be used: “I suppose in terms of that sort of lack of 
evidence you kind of then assume the worst. That they haven’t got any evidence to 
show us value for money therefore you have to assume there probably isn’t” (Project 
Manager, interview). Some GPs even suggesting that in some cases their personal 
experience may be more useful than published evidence: 
what we have now is true insight into what the theoretical models on paper are 
delivering in real life. So rather than sitting in a room and designing a model that 
looks perfect but on the ground isn’t delivering we now know which ones are 
delivering and not delivering… so there is I think a very positive outcome from 
having that ability but I also think that if we put in a strategic view I think it does 
form a bit of bias which might make the decision a bit skewed (Ellerton GP). 
Or alternatively that the quality of the published evidence was low:  
I spent an enormous amount of time and energy trawling through the evidence 
base that exists around outcomes in community and primary care and there is 
an absolute dearth of it out there, there is nothing, there is a desert of 
information around that and in a truly objective way all the papers that I read 
were based on anecdote and were entirely subjective (Clinical Chair). 
Whilst expert opinion is a recognised form of evidence in the hierarchy, it is accepted 
to be generally a lower quality of evidence (Evans 2003). Although Schwenk (1990) 
suggests expert decision-making may be effective when the context corresponds to 
the experts’ knowledge base, even this may be problematic. Einhorn’s (1974) study of 
pathologists describes variability of decision-making both between experts and within 
experts asked to repeat similar tasks. Whilst forensic analysis of pathology specimens 
may reasonably always have a degree of error, it may be necessary to recognise this 
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margin and consider that in strategic decision-making such margins of error may be 
as wide or wider. The margin of error, even for experts, may widen where decisions 
are subject to competing sources of data and influences, sometimes described as 
‘noise’ (Kahneman 2016). Noise may be ever present in strategic decisions, as the 
differing levels of influence explored in this case study demonstrate.   
Clinical ‘experts’ as a source of evidence in a decision-making process may be helpful 
in support of rational decisions. But the clinicians in this study were predominantly from 
one main clinical background (6 GPs and one GP practice manager in the 13 decision-
makers, and 6 of the 8 clinicians being GPs). So just as the comments of Chan et al 
(2005) that the published medical evidence is a selective sub-set of potential evidence, 
so the clinical decision-makers in this study were a selective sub-set of all available 
clinical opinions. It may be argued that for ‘clinical commissioning’ to effectively use 
the available evidence in a balanced manner it may require clinical decision-makers 
to be drawn from a broad cross-section of the clinical community. As such CCGs may 
be seen to fail in providing a balanced source of clinical, expert opinion.  
Although the use of evidence to support decision-making may be seen as beneficial 
(Kovner 2009) it may be overly optimistic to assume that the evidential assessment 
made from drug therapy Randomised Controlled Trials (for example) can apply in 
strategic decisions. Rather decision-makers will need to use subtle judgement to 
assess complex choices with competing influences, conforming to the description of 
being decision under risk (Kahneman and Tversky 1983). Furthermore, decision 
models may always be ‘non-rational’: or more appropriately boundedly rational (Simon 
1997). That is, decision-making within an environment of: corporate performance 
management (satisficing); inadequate or incomplete information; decision-makers 
subject to heuristics and biases; and a decision process shaped by cognitive frames. 
Despite its boundedness, CCG/NHS (and wider public sector) decision-making may 
be more rational and effective if decisions are at least in part driven by a clear 
corporate strategy, as will be explored later.  
National policy 
National policy was referenced in relation to the overall CCG strategy in terms of 
supporting greater capacity in community care, but it did not appear to shape the actual 
decision. However, the main business case (Out of Hospital Business Case) did cite 
national policy documents, such as the 5YFV, as supporting references for the strategy 
and the recommendations in the case. National policy is more obviously evident in the 
wider CCG strategy, which was seen as driving the business case: “There is a model 
consistent with that in the CCG strategic Plan” (AD Commissioning, Meeting 1).  
The improvement codes were primarily driven by active clinicians or those with recent 
experience (often negative) in trying to redesign clinical services. This appears 
consistent with the original intentions of the 2012 Health and Social Care Act: that is 
to make clinical leaders central to NHS decision-making. Thus, although the context 
suggests a focus on cost reduction, decision types will continue to also be driven by a 
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desire to improve the quality of patient services. The national drive for clinicians being 
empowered to shape commissioning decision-making appeared to be manifested in 
the case study.  
Public expectations 
Public expectations were not mentioned to any great degree and the word ‘patient’ 
appeared infrequently through the meetings (35 occasions) and interviews (10). The 
CCG had engaged in wider public consultation of the current service but had not done 
a specific consultation on the proposed model, possibly due to the uncertainty if a new 
provider suggested a very different delivery method of the model. Thus, one 
interviewee commented, “there wasn’t really anything to engage on – because you 
would be going and saying would you like a service where lots of different people come 
at different times, a disconnected service, or would you actually like a seamless service 
where the same person comes” (AD Primary Care, interview). Similarly, there was little 
discussion as to local politics (as opposed to the organizational politics within the NHS 
and public services).  
It is worth recording at this point that the CCG had undertaken wider consultation and 
discussion with patient groups in developing it model for community services and this 
engagement was referenced in the Out of Hospital Care Business Case. The Project 
Director commented, “we had also done some stakeholder analysis prior to going 
through those sorts of meetings so we could bring that to the table as well as this is 
what the patients are telling us” (Project Director, interview), reflecting the discussion 
was on the clinical model and not the route to delivery.  
It may be argued that the decision under question was primarily a decision of strategic 
implementation and as such was not one that would be typically discussed with 
patients or the wider public.  
Resource constraints of finance and workforce 
Resource constraints, primarily financial were recognised as a limiting factor of 
decision scope, for example the limited ability of the CCG to invest further in the 
services in the case study. The proposed financial budget for the service in the 
business case was set at that of the existing service cost. This did reflect the inability 
of the CCG at this time to consider additional investment, whilst also rejecting the 
opportunity to try and find direct cost savings. Clinical decision-makers were clearly 
concerned the project should not be seen as a means to save money only: “Or there 
is a £1m coming out of community services and filling the black hole from secondary 
care” (Peripatetic GP, Meeting 2). This is consistent with the original spirit of the NHS 
reforms white paper (Department of Health 2010) in allowing local clinical leaders to 
prioritise decision-making. It may, however, be seen as an impediment to financial 
control in an age of austerity, if clinicians are unwilling to risk service reduction in 
search of cost savings.  
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The type of strategic decision may be referenced to the earlier assessment of the CCG 
strategy as balanced between Reactor and Prospector (within the Miles et al. (1978) 
typology). Thus, the clinical driver for improvement tended this decision towards a 
Prospector/improvement direction, which although reactive to some extent did not 
focus on cost reduction. This may have been more likely as the CCG was not in 
financial difficulty at the time of the study. (Latterly the CCG did post a deficit in the 
following financial year and speculation may arise whether the same approach would 
be taken in a deficit environment, or with the benefit of hindsight public services should 
always focus on cost reduction, even during financially stable periods.) However, the 
decision subject and the general discussion in the process appeared consistent with 
the CCG’s strategic objective regarding stronger, more integrated community services. 
Furthermore, the references to staffing instability and concerns regarding maintaining 
workforce levels (“But the staff are leaving” Chief Nurse, Meeting 1) may have provided 
a general influence that the workforce constraints, at least in the short-term may be 
more significant than those of finance.  
Influences on the meso frame 
 
Meso influences were more obviously apparent in the data, although the influences 
described in the original conceptual framework tended to merge into each other as 
seen in the data.  
Environmental and corporate memory 
Both the environmental and corporate memory influences may be seen to include 
recent examples from the case study locality and neighbouring areas of similar 
decisions. Two referenced in the data were recent open market procurements, both 
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with, at the time of the study, less than successful outcomes. These influences 
appeared to have a polarising effect on the decision-makers. Thus, one quoted,  
it has made the people who are already quite sceptical about procurement more 
sceptical, but I think it’s made some of the people on the Governing Body more 
entrenched in saying you learn from that …I think that strengthened the view 
amongst people in the Governing Body that we should be going out to tender. 
(Chief Nurse, interview) 
Conversely, the more risk averse CFO stated, “having been through a big procurement 
and having seen some of the things that had happened with procurements elsewhere 
I was coming along with the fact that procure if we must rather than is it the right thing” 
(CFO, interview). Thus, Dennett’s “crashing obviousness” ((Dennett 1992, p.80) was 
not seen in the varied interpretations of the previous CCG procurement. Without this 
common assessment, there appeared no sense of an agreed ‘objective’ conclusion to 
the learning from the experience. As this was a recent and major event, its importance 
was high and its consequent polarizing effect significant.  
The environmental influences included that provided through the CCG’s stakeholder 
community and manifested itself as reputational and political risk, also associated with 
the stakeholder code. This provided a degree of polarization across the decision-
makers. Some saw the major risk as the NHS political risk of alienating a major partner 
(the FT running the current service): “if you bring in new providers, they may be able 
to make more radical changes, but it will bring risks on instability” (CEO, Meeting 1). 
Others the impact of the CCG’s reputation with its constituent GP practices, “If we 
continue with the current service it is a big reputational risk with our current practices” 
(Nortondale GP, Meeting 3). 
Finance 
The research context was during a period of public sector austerity. This may have 
suggested that strategic decisions would have a strong financial element: that of cost 
reduction or productivity increase. This was not evident as a significant direct driver in 
the project, although by no means absent. The desire to improve community services 
would likely increase productivity and efficiency, but there was no clear financial 
efficiency quantification expressed in documents, meeting discussion, or interviews. 
In an age of austerity, finance would be an expected influence factor. In the case study, 
finance appeared most visibly as a risk factor, particularly in terms of moving to open-
market procurement. Using procurement was not seen as a likely opportunity for cost 
reduction, despite other public services using tendering to that end. This risk aversion 
may have been stimulated by existing financial pressures promoting a desire to avoid 
further deterioration. This having primacy over opportunities to improve finances. 
Thus, finance would be seen as risk avoiding within the spectrum of Prospect Theory 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1981), suggesting the financial influence and the Risk 
concept was to make decisions that did not make the finances any worse. (Although 
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the cases study occurred within a period of public sector financial tightening, it was 
also in a year where the CCG under scrutiny achieved its financial targets.) 
Organizational dynamics 
The organizational environment and the external organizational dynamics included the 
consideration of the impact on local politics within the health community. One of the 
discovered risk codes was the political risk of impact on other, particularly NHS, 
organizations: both risks to the partner body and risks to the quality of the CCG’s 
relationships. Thus, in Meeting 2 there was discussion of ‘destabilisation’ and 
‘disintegration’: 
Clinical Chair – One of the main risks for me is the relationship with our current 
provider. 
Project Director – It may affect the levels of negotiation. 
Chief Nurse – You could argue it will strengthen our relationship with our current 
provider. Because at least they will know we are prepared to go to the market, 
whilst at the moment they don’t. 
CEO – I do think it will negatively affect our relationship. I do think it potentially 
undermines the wider strategic programme. 
The debate reflected the level of discontent expressed by a number of decision-
makers regarding the existing service provider. This appeared to be a major factor in 
driving the improvement theme and was demonstrated most obviously by the Ellerton 
GPs and who were part of the Group 1 coalition (see below). The CCG Clinical Chair 
stating: 
part of me was saying well just learn by people’s historical behaviour and 
relationships that you currently have with the acute Trust and say to yourself is 
that likely to give you a successful outcome or as successful an outcome as 
going out to tender. (Clinical Chair, interview).  
Later in the interview the chair was even stronger on the relationship with the FT: 
That was the one killer blow was the way that the Trust behaviour had actually 
destroyed some of those relationships and the perception from certainly the 
GPs and from other practice staff I talked to as well. As I didn’t just talk to my 
colleagues I talked to other practice staff as well and the perception was that 
they had actually messed it up and what was a good service had become a less 
good service, despite what they were purporting to be ways of improving the 
service and I think that’s what annoyed people really (Clinical Chair, interview). 
Similarly, the Chief Nurse commented, “just put aside any relationships that were 
already there and get rid of some of the baggage” (Chief Nurse, interview). From 
another perspective, “It’s impossible to ignore what people say isn’t it and at the 
Council of Clinical Representatives people have kind of rubbished the community 
services” (Assistant Director of Commissioning, Interview). 
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The balancing discussion, as seen by the CEO in the exchange above, was less in 
terms of defending the existing service, and more in terms of needing to maintain a 
reasonable working relationship with the Foundation Trust, who would still be a partner 
in the health care system. The debate on organizational dynamics became more of a 
discussion as to the decision-makers opinions of the current provider of the service 
under scrutiny, as seen above, than an objective assessment of the future provision.  
As with the risk concept throughout, there appeared a relatively polarised discussion 
as to the relative risks presented and the scale of risk the CCG should accept. The 
evident polarisation is considered as a factor in the process of creating the negotiated 
order.  
Cultural and power dimensions in the negotiated order 
The influences identified in the micro framing level can be considered with the 
assessment of how culture and power were demonstrated.  
 
The demonstration of the negotiated order 
The negotiated order concept appeared to manifest itself in relation to the decision-
making team composition and the internal organizational dynamics, and indeed all of 
the influences originally identified in the micro frame. Thus, the clinical members of the 
CCG Governing Body tended towards being mostly ‘pro-tender’ and driven most 
heavily by the Improvement theme. The meeting dynamics may have suggested a 
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greater unity of thought in terms of the need to improve. Furthermore, the Improvement 
theme included emotional drivers, such as the frustration code. Thus, in Meeting 1 the 
frustration elements emerged in the following exchange: 
Chief Nurse – The biggest risk is to do nothing. 
CEO –That seems like it now, but after a major change it may look different. 
Chief Nurse – Yes but we are already seeing lots of staff leaving community 
services and going to work for GP practices. 
Peripatetic GP – We are not losing staff from the heath community. 
Project Manager – I am less concerned people don’t want to change. The staff 
engagement exercise showed the staff did want things to change. 
 
The frustration was in part a desire to improve current services, but also appeared to 
stem from previous attempts to change service delivery with the current service 
provider. For example one stating: “I think we have been here before with [the FT] and 
they are not going to change if we don’t push the button on that” (Chief Nurse, Meeting 
3); and a GP referencing the difficulty in achieving management support, “the issue is 
the blockage in the systems that are put in place by the management” (Ellerton GP, 
Meeting 1). A further exchange in Meeting 1 referencing other services run by the FT: 
Peripatetic GP - When we realise we may not be getting where we want to be, 
then we tender. We have not tried this with this service. 
Ellerton GP – Not with this service but with many others. We have tried that, 
and it didn’t work. 
AD Commissioning – We have an improvement trajectory for A&E and it is going 
backwards. 
This appeared possibly to generate an informal coalition from the combination of active 
intervention (the Improvement theme) and emotional recognition of shared difficulties 
(such as the Frustration code).  There was, nevertheless, a general consensus that 
the services in question needed to be improved, as confirmed by the CCG Chair, “The 
fundamental question here is do we want to continue with the current service or change 
it” (Clinical Chair, Meeting 2).  
The senior non-clinical officers were more cautious regarding open market 
procurement, in particular focussing on various forms of risk. Conversely, the junior 
CCG officers who had struggled to achieve service change with the existing providers, 
also showed the same frustration theme. Thus, the decision-makers who were most 
obviously nervous about tender, may be seen as those with the highest level of formal 
accountability and responsibilities: particularly the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and 
Chief Finance Officer (CFO). For them risks were possibly more tangible.  Contrary to 
the pro-tender coalition, it may have been more difficult to generate a coalition and 
fellow-feeling for the Risk themes, as these were largely defensive (trying to stop things 
getting worse) and also based on rational assessment (such as political risks) rather 
than an appeal to more emotional drivers. Such polarisation may be seen to present a 
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challenge to the concept of clinically led commissioning. Facilitating clinical 
commissioning may be seen to involve creating an environment where clinical leaders 
can shape healthcare policy: but ideally a safe environment. Making space for 
clinicians requires providing opportunities and capacity to make the necessary 
decisions: ultimately allowing clinicians to decide on policy according to their objectives 
for improving healthcare delivery. The safety requires ensuring that this space 
excludes opportunities that take the CCG and its leaders into dangerous places: 
potentially steering a decision-making process away from areas that may breach 
statutory guidance, allow bodies to mount a legal challenge the CCG, or take financial 
decisions that will undermine the corporate sustainability. This decision involved forces 
driving simultaneously in opposite directions. One example debate shows differing 
approaches to risk in the second meeting: 
Clinical Chair – One of the main risks for me is the relationship with our current 
provider. 
Project Director – It may affect the levels of negotiation. 
Chief Nurse – You could argue it will strengthen our relationship with our current 
provider. Because at least they will know we are prepared to go to the market, 
whilst at the moment they don’t. 
CEO – I do think it will negatively affect our relationship. I do think it potentially 
undermines the wider strategic programme. 
The CCG Chair perhaps summarized the differing approaches to risk in Meeting 3 
showing the juxtaposition between the improvement and risk themes: 
The bottom line for me, is there a benefit from tendering the whole lot worth the 
higher risk, and if not, it isn’t worth tendering it all. You take the more moderate 
option of the hybrid option, which is potentially lower risk. That is the 
fundamental question for me. It is basically how pissed off you are with the 
current service. (Clinical Chair, Meeting 3) 
Interview participants recognised the different status of services within a sub-locality 
of the CCG, the Nortondale area (Nortondale identified as a coding theme above but 
having a significant impact on the process). This was recognised in part due to the 
quality of services being considered of better quality, and in part from the desire for 
the Nortondale GPs not to want (or need) the same level of change as the rest of the 
CCG locality. Interviewees made explicit references to the area, often implying that the 
Nortondale GP group needed to be accommodated in a pragmatic solution. This 
extended to a GP prioritising the preservation of the services received by their own 
practice to what may have been a better overall outcome for the CCG. Thus, is 
responding to a question regarding the appropriateness of using different lots in the 
tender process they commented: 
From my personal perspective yes because it meant we could keep Nortondale out 
of it but from the perspective of the CCG I think it was probably not such a good 
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idea because it made it more complicated so you going to have to spend much 
more management time. (Notlam GP, Interview) 
Interview participants tended to suggest that the need to avoid Nortondale being part 
of any tender was an unspoken assumption at the outset. Although this was not the 
decision of the business committee (Meeting 3) there was an acknowledgement this 
may need to be accommodated to keep the Nortondale GPs content. The Chief Nurse 
recommending an option of tendering separate lots, despite voting for the whole 
procurement option and this being overwhelmingly supported in the meeting: “The lots 
last year defined Nortondale as a separate package, and that may make a lot of sense” 
(Chief Nurse, Meeting 3). The development of the option appraisal (see page 184) 
demonstrates how the proposed options and business case were amended between 
meetings 3 and 4, to accommodate a different option allowing the Nortondale service 
to be excluded from open tender.  
Whilst there were no explicitly defined coalitions stated in the case study, from the 
behaviours in the observed meetings and from analysis of the interviews, there were 
several groupings that operated in the process. The organizational coalitions may be 
seen as: 
• Group 1, the pro-tender grouping – membership GP Vice Chair, Ellerton GP, 
Hospital Consultant, Chief Nurse, Practice Manager, Project Director, AD 
Commissioning, AD Primary Care.  This grouping included the strongest 
clinical voices for improvement and the officer members who had experienced 
the most disappointment about redesign work with the existing providers. The 
group has an aggressive approach to risk taking, and saw limited downsides 
to tender: “How will it be any worse?” (AD Commissioning, Meeting 2).  
• Group 2, the risk management grouping – Peripatetic GP, Audit Chair, CFO, 
CEO, Deputy CFO. The group has only one Governing Body clinician and 
included the two senior finance professionals in the decision-making group. 
The grouping appeared concerned regarding the financial risks associated 
with the uncertainty of tender responses, and the political effects of 
destabilising the current providers, who would remain providers in other local 
service areas.  
• Group 3, the balanced grouping – Clinical Chair, Notlam GP, Nortondale GP, 
Lay Patient Rep, Project Manager. Here members could see the benefits of 
the pro-tender grouping (acknowledging the Improvement theme) but 
recognised there were risks, accepting things could indeed get worse 
following a tender.  
• Group 4, the Nortondale grouping – Notlam GP, Nortondale GP. This was a 
small subset composed of the two Governing Body members from the 
Nortondale area. This grouping functioned primarily to preserve the status quo 
in the Nortondale area, whilst simultaneously supporting more radical change 
across the rest of the CCG.  
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• Group 5, the corporate grouping – Audit Chair, Project Director, AD 
Commissioning, AD Primary Care. This grouping coalesced around the need 
to follow corporate processes and focussed on legal requirements and what 
was necessary to functionally proceed with the process. This grouping was 
less driven by the achievement of an outcome and more by ensuring proper 
processes were followed.  
As can be seen by the membership, the groups had some overlap.  
The negotiated order concept and the role of power within the CCG may be seen as 
evident in the agenda shaping and option appraisal, where certain individuals (and by 
extension any related coalition) had influence over the process. The use of slide 
presentations and meeting documents were used as multiple devices. One device 
being that of discussion shaping: although this shaping may not necessarily create 
frames itself, it may nevertheless provide a framework.  This framework creates 
limitations and boundaries for the ensuing discussion. The meeting members are thus 
directed towards discussing the provided content. They are not formally forbidden from 
introducing other issues or items; but the process of agenda setting makes it more 
difficult to move outside of the framework. This is consistent with the project’s use of 
Lukes (2005) three-dimensional view of power. For a deciding body such as a 
corporate board this suggests there is a requirement to understand who controls and 
how they control the agenda setting. Without this understanding boards may be 
confronted with requests to make a decision on the issue to which they are presented: 
but not, necessarily the issue that they want to decide on. This may go much further 
than mere ‘agenda setting’. Not merely creating a list of things to talk about in a 
meeting, it is creating a framework of the subjects to discuss, in what depth and relating 
to what information. This should not be seen as creating psychic jails, which imprison 
decision-makers. But it is very much not presenting decision-makers with a blank sheet 
upon which to write a new narrative for a specific issue. The concept of framing may 
be instructive here. The frames of the agenda setters create, or modify, a framework, 
which then shapes subsequent frames, and so on. An observation about corporate 
decision-making is that it may often ignore stated corporate objective and values. 
Thus, for Keeney (1992, p.3), 
Values are what we care about. As such, values should be the driving force for 
our decision-making… Instead, decision-making usually focuses on the choice 
among alternatives. Indeed, it is common to characterise a decision problem by 
the alternatives available. It seems as if the alternatives present themselves 
and the decision problem begins when at least two alternatives have appeared.  
The role of power in this scenario (possibly neglected by Keeney (1992)) is in part to 
shape the discussion both to shift focus away from values and objectives (for whatever 
reasons) and to control the posing of alternatives. Therefore, the frame in use at the 
points of decision-making will be influenced by the powers of certain actors. Some of 
who will have greater power than others. This may be most obviously seen as 
belonging to the executive officers. They will have greater time, being fully employed 
  203 
as professional managers in the organization, and will also usually have some degree 
of line management responsibility (and thus power) over other officers who may be 
involved in creating business case and similar documents.  
Discourse framing and the negotiated order 
The discourse analysis of language used in the case study may be seen to 
demonstrate mechanisms at work in managing the CCG negotiated order and shifting 
power relationships to deliver the observed decision.  
The Group 1 used the language of the Improvement theme to establish a frame on a 
drive to improve patient services alongside a dissatisfaction with current service 
delivery. This was enhanced by somewhat antagonistic language about the current 
service provider (at one point referred, tongue-in-cheek, as like a marriage with 
“domestic abuse” (Meeting 1)). As discussed above, this may be seen as a risk-
seeking discourse with an acceptance that losses in service provision had already 
occurred. This may be seen a frame and discourse with a strong emotional element: 
in part due to the absence of balancing empirical evidence.  
Group 2 used language more couched in a fear of deterioration: particularly financial, 
and the political impact on partner relations. Thus, Group 2 appeared as risk avoiding 
within prospect theory, and tended to use language focussed on the potential negative 
impact of more radical changes. This appeared as appeals to moderation and 
considered assessment and may have been a less powerful communicative discourse 
than the more emotional style improvement appeals of Group 1. The recent experience 
of some members from Group 1 in unsuccessfully attempting to improve services may 
be seen to add weight to their arguments and to influence Group 3. For example, “Not 
with this service but with many others. We have tried that and it didn’t work” (Ellerton 
GP, Meeting 1) and “We have an improvement trajectory for A&E and it is going 
backwards” (AD Commissioning, Meeting 1).  
The apparent imbalance in emotional strength of the competing frames may have been 
important on the impact of the decision-making discourse on Group 3, who, through 
taking a balanced position, were assessing the relative strength of opinions expressed 
by the other decision-makers. The lack of empirical evidence provided in the process 
may have added to the strength of the more emotional arguments: the 
counterbalancing influence of factual information was largely absent. Thus, in Meeting 
3 it was stated, “We don’t have a great deal of information on the services and these 
are essentially contract value lines” (Project Director, Meeting 3), followed by further 
discussion on the quality of available service data. 
Project Director – It is probably worth saying we are working to get some more 
activity information and some more detail, so we can do a proper analysis. 
Nortondale GP – Is there not a duty for them to provide the information?  
Deputy CFO – We are not sure what information is supposed to be provided 
within the community MDS [Minimum Data Set].  
Chief Nurse – It has been delayed. 
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Project Director – There was some national work on community services 
benchmarking. At the moment we haven’t seen anything from that. 
This example is consistent with one of the axioms of bounded rationality (Simon 1997, 
1972): that of decision-makers having imperfect information. This lack of data and 
empirical information may have strengthened the position of Group 1, relying on more 
personally, if professionally, based evidence. Similarly, it may be seen as an example 
of satisficing (Simon 1997): decision-makers will find the best available option from the 
available information and not necessarily attempt to get the best possible option. Thus, 
the lack of evidence from service information appeared to be accepted by meetings 
participants, and there was little discussion as to how further higher quality information 
could be created.  
When the more emotional arguments were led by clinicians, driven by an improvement 
led discourse, the counterbalancing elements, even accepting the levels of risk, 
appeared as relatively weak. Indeed, the Group 1 discourse did not ignore or even 
minimise the attendant risks: rather they accepted them as the necessary price for 
improvement, “There are risks attached to it, but we are at stage where we have to 
take risks” (GP Vice Chair, Meeting 4). This may have been a mechanism in securing 
the support of the Group 3 members in establishing the eventual majority for the 
decision. The acceptance by most of the group of a different solution to the Nortondale 
was another means of achieving a near-consensus for a decision. This arose as a 
pragmatic solution and recognised early in the process. Whether this was objectively 
seen as appropriate was not challenged. Some decision-makers accepted that a 
compromise around Nortondale would be inevitable: “There is always the empire of 
Notlam”36 (Hospital Consultant). (Notlam being a market town and largest population 
centre within Nortondale and the site of the Nortondale community hospital.) This 
approach of seeking to both marginalise the voices opposing Group 1 (that is 
accepting risk as necessary and not be avoided) and to accommodate the most militant 
opposition (that is accommodating a different Nortondale) was reminiscent of a 
favoured change management approach, Force Field Analysis (Hooper 2000). Thus, 
effective strategies do not merely seek to increase the pressure of driving forces but 
seek to reduce the effect of restraining forces. This appeared to be effective in 
reconciling Group 3 and 4 with Group 1 and establishing a relative hegemony over the 
Governing Body. 
A further consideration from analysing the discourse was the asymmetry between 
perceived loss and gain between Group 1 and Group 2. The asymmetry across 
prospect theory between risk seeking ‘loss recovery’ (Group 1) and risk avoiding ‘gain 
protection’ (Group 2) may be seen as unbalanced due to the impact of prospect theory 
and also the overall majority of clinicians in the Governing Body (who tended towards 
supporting Group 1). In some of the language used (again, “There are risks attached 
to it, but we are at stage where we have to take risks” (GP Vice Chair, Meeting 4)) 
Group 1 displayed traits similar to those described by Navon (2013). Thus, perceived 
gains or outcomes varied from the likely actual outcome. Navon describes the 
tendency for ‘switch seekers’: those who in certain situations will choose to switch to 
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another options (for example sell-off poorly performing financial assets, or switch lanes 
in a busy motorway) even when the evident benefit of switching is minimal or absent. 
Navon explains this partially through a consideration of the envelopes problem37 
where paradoxical decision-making may arise through incorrect framing of the problem 
(see Navon 2013). In the case study Group 1 being driven by dissatisfaction with the 
current service and service provider: “poor experience of partnership working with the 
current provider” (Chief Nurse); “the acute Trust had taken on the contract and done 
very little to improve it and in fact in some cases people’s perception was that they had 
actually caused a deterioration” (Clinical Chair). The discourse almost assumed that a 
likely outcome from a tender would be a new provider: however, objectively in an open 
tender process the current provider, having greater knowledge of the services under 
tender would have as good, if not better chance, of winning any tender process 
(assuming they were a bidder). This may be seen as an example of egocentric framing 
(Navon 2013): seeing problems from one’s own perspective alone and assuming one’s 
own situation is fixed. For the negotiated order this may be a useful means of 
influencing the undecided (Group 3) with the promise of a possibly attractive outcome 
(‘you may get a new provider’) not entirely balanced by a corporate process argument 
(from Group 5) that a different provider is by no means certain. In situations of 
dissatisfaction, risk seeking and switch seeking may seem attractive as they are the 
active options, they involve a positive action, rather than passive (not changing 
providers or staying in the same motorway lane).   
Although it would be a mistake to over-simplify positions into a binary opposition, in 
some respects the data may suggest a stronger emotional group with supporting 
arguments against a weaker emotional, but more analytically based risk group. Healey 
and Hodgkinson (2017, p.112) state that, “when personal and financial stakes are high, 
the brain is awash with emotions”, which may suggest in situations such as the case 
study, the strength of emotionally based arguments, when linked to the pre-existing 
biases of decision-makers, may be stronger than apparently rational arguments, based 
on information. Furthermore, in some cases counter-balancing information may have 
limited appeal. Karlsson et al. (2009, p.23) discuss research into investors decision-
making where, they “collect additional information conditional on favourable news and 
avoid information following neutral or bad news”. They call this behaviour the ‘ostrich 
effect’, in reality probably best seen as a nuanced version of the confirmation bias 
(Nickerson 1998).   
The framing of arguments in the process, particularly the juxtaposition of Groups 1 and 
2, and Group 1’s ability to both influence Group 3 and reconcile Group 4, demonstrated 
the powerful use of framing in support of creating the negotiated order. Despite what 
appeared to be reservations about the tender option from Group 2 participants. 
Returning to the framing level summary table of codes (from the Methodology chapter) 
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Framing Level Research Codes 
Micro Improvement 
Service redesign 
Behaviour 
Meso Stakeholder 
Corporate process 
Risk 
Macro Risk 
Corporate process 
Stakeholder 
 
it may be observed that the most powerful frames in establishing coalitions, particularly 
those that bound Group 1, and shifted Group 3, were those from a micro level. Thus, 
the frames that may be most important in establishing coalitions and shaping a 
negotiated order may be those that relate more closely to individual experience and 
perspective. This is consistent with the influence generated by the availability heuristic 
(Tversky 1974): one may overstate the likelihood of events based on one’s ability to 
recall similar events. There appeared to be little challenge of the clinical view that 
services were poor or deteriorating, even though the Nortondale experience, from the 
same service provider, was superior. Thus, the Group 2 challenge was not of the 
arguments (and thus codes) used by Group 1, but rather from resulting risks inherent 
in the proposed solution. It was also evident, as described above that the Group 1 
arguments were seen as being based on positive objectives (contained within the 
Improvement code) and linked to emotional positions within certain, particularly clinical 
decision makers.  
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Reflexive view of research objectives 
Background and context 
As a Chief Officer the decision certainly did feel strategic, in that it was of large financial 
value, of strategic importance in linking to a major objective of the corporate strategy, 
and it was considered of high clinical importance by the CCG GPs. It was also of no 
surprise that such a decision subject and its decision-making process should be 
complex and messy. In my opinion, they almost always are. Thus, my role as CO in 
the process was not to avoid the complexity or the mess (this may be a futile attempt 
to confront an unavoidable corporate reality). Rather it was to assist the CCG in 
navigating through the complexity, so that despite it boundedness, the process was as 
rational as possible. The challenge in the organizational context is often that 
colleagues do not expect or sometimes accept the complexity and messiness of the 
decision-making process. Thus, organizations can be beset with decision-making tools 
such as ‘decision trees’ and ‘critical paths’, which although containing some degree of 
utility, may also imply the (probably) false possibility of a truly ‘scientific’ technique that 
can arrive at the allegedly ‘correct’ decision. The case study did not see the use of 
anything particularly complicated in support of the decision: a fairly common scoring 
matrix provided a means of establishing the best option from the option appraisal.  
The assessment of finance as not a major factor in driving the decision is not 
particularly surprising from the perspective of the CCG CO. Although NHS 
commissioning organizations will have the responsibility for allocating large amounts 
of resource, most of this will be effectively ‘pre-committed’ on existing services. 
Consequently, financial improvement tends to focus on incremental in-year attempts 
at cost improvement and cost containment, often through a large series of smaller 
financially targeted actions. It will also be difficult to maintain the support of senior 
clinical colleagues in any major change process if the only objective is financial.  
Influencing factors 
The external influencing factors presented a challenge for the participant researcher. 
The research exposed differences in approach due to background and position of the 
individual decision-makers. Thus, as a decision-maker with a particular place in the 
process, my interpretation of the significant influences may reflect a bias towards those 
that I consider important. Specifically, I was considered to be a member of Group 2, 
the risk management grouping, and thus exhibited, and documented the belief in the 
significance of the risks associated with the project, and an aversion to the tender 
route, in part as this was considered a riskier option. The risks felt more evident in the 
aftermath of the CCG’s Urgent Care procurement in the previous year. Furthermore, 
the emergence of a national direction towards greater service integration implied a 
lesser emphasis on competition and thus tendering. This direction to service 
integration encouraged the existing Foundation Trust (FT) provider to suggest that 
tendering was bad idea and one that would possibly deteriorate relations between 
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themselves and the CCG. This may have been seen as a veiled threat; or a realistic 
assessment that as the current provide a decision to tender the service would 
inevitably be seen as a significant criticism of them as a provider. This provided an 
interesting dynamic for me as the Chief Executive Officer, as I had a higher level of 
engagement with the senior FT team than most of the other decision-makers. This 
may have made me, or at least appear to be, more sympathetic to the FT, a view 
expressed by other participants in the process.  
The impact of corporate memory on perception of influence was also affected by the 
position of the researcher. The influence of corporate memory was likely to show to 
some degree the experiential learning of my role as the chief officer in charge of the 
organization who managed the Urgent Care procurement undertaken in the year prior 
to the case study. This was raised as an issue by interviewees and within the 
discussion of the management meetings. At the time of the study, in my role as CEO 
I had, at that point, a somewhat negative view of that procurement, as its early stages 
of implementation were flawed. (The service delivery did not fully meet the tender 
specification until the very end of the first financial year of the contract and was, 
therefore, only partly meeting the specification at the time of the case study.) This may 
have been communicated through discussion in questioning and in my contributions 
in the meeting discussion. None of this contribution, however, may be seen as invalid. 
Rather the reflexive element arguably enriches further the discussion as to recent 
corporate experience and how procurement was seen in the organization.  
Cultural and power dimensions in the negotiated order 
The dynamic of the negotiated order provides an interesting perspective for the 
reflexive critique. This included the consideration of the organizational coalition and 
thus the potential development of groupings within the process. This was possibly 
shaped in the research reporting by the perspective of the researcher: how did 
coalitions appear to me?  
What was evident before the process began, or at least the start point of the process 
documented as the case study, was that certain colleagues had a very critical view of 
the FT provider who ran community services. This tendency appeared to promote a 
culture of ‘anyone but them’ in looking at how to improve community care. 
Consequently, I was aware as we moved in to the process of deciding how community 
services would be improved there would be a strong move to include tendering as a 
solution. What is evident as I reviewed the research data was that the ‘tender or no-
tender’ discussion appeared to become the dominant theme in the process. Thus, 
colleagues may have felt that the service model of integrated community care wrapped 
around General Practice was already agreed and thus didn’t need to be discussed in 
detail. If this was the case, as it appeared, then the major discussion point would then 
be how to deliver and achieve the model, rather than the service model itself. However, 
the strong sense of frustration (a key word in the discourse) felt by some individuals 
did seem to drive a strong emphasis on creating a new provider. If this was indeed the 
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view (‘anyone but them’) then achieving this end required, almost by definition, a move 
to open tender. Thus, the discussion moved quite quickly to a split between what may 
be seen as, on the one hand a drive to move to open market tender, and on the other 
an attempt to assess the risks of the tender option and the other alternatives.  
Reflecting on my initial order data coding, I had first of all developed a ‘frustration’ 
theme, but on consideration this did seem to over-state the negative driver in many 
colleagues. Although frustration remain as a second level code, it felt appropriate to 
be more balanced and to accommodate frustration within a wider improvement code. 
Frustration was a factor but overstating this theme would neglect the genuine desire 
to improve services apparent in all colleagues.  
The interview process, by dint of using language to frame discussions, was heavily 
influenced by the researcher. Thus, the interview questions were the creation of the 
researcher. They were generated after consideration of the content of the observed 
decision-making meetings. As these were transcripted verbatim, there was a 
transparency of the content against questions and thus would allow critique by any 
external reviewer. That said, although the process was transparent, and one would 
argue valid in research terms, there was a clear steer from the researcher towards the 
issues that I considered important. As this steer was considered to be consistent with 
the research question and objectives, this would again not undermine the research 
validity. There may, however, have been the use of certain terms, such as ‘frustration’, 
which although volunteered by interviewees in the earlier interviews were then fed 
back in later questioning. This would be seen as an appropriate generation of research 
data through an iterative process; however, certain terms may have assumed greater 
importance to me as a researcher. Nevertheless, the impression of importance of 
certain terms within the discourse arguably provides the embedded researcher with a 
stronger sense of which terms are significant in the discourse: that is those that shape 
the social construction of meaning within the case study.  
Views of the reflexive researcher shaping the thesis 
The negotiated order is an established and observed social construct (Fine 1984). It 
may not, necessarily, be stated that it is always observed or always present. Strauss 
(1963, 1982) may have demonstrated that when organizations are researched with a 
view that allows the discovery of the negotiated order, the negotiated order is indeed 
found to be present. This does not, however, necessarily provide evidence of the 
negotiated order as a constant feature of organizational behaviour. And despite 
research demonstrating evidence for the negotiated order (Strauss 1963, 1982, Fine 
1984), and theoretically developed causal mechanisms for the order, the evidence 
may not be seen to support establishing any form of social law that dictates the order 
will always be present. Consequently, the reflexive critique must acknowledge the 
researcher’s pre-existing observations on the behaviour of negotiation within his 
experience of organizational behaviour. The conclusions from the observations were 
reinforced by literature such as that of Strauss (1982). Thus, the research needs to 
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recognise the potential for confirmation bias, through the researcher seeking to find 
the phenomena they believe to be present. Similarly, any analysed causal 
mechanisms need to be triangulated against the recorded data and further scrutinised 
against alternative explanations. This would appear to be a beneficial aspect of the 
rival explanations approach.  
Areas where my views as a researcher were modified, somewhat, by the research 
process were in decision-making and the role of strategy. In the research design of 
thesis project as with previous research (Cox 2012) there was a strong influence of 
the concept of bounded rationality (Simon 1997). My tendency in this stream of thinking 
was to see that although there may be elements of a general rationality, decision-
making often is remarkable by its limitations and distortions (for Simon (1997) the 
boundaries, for Kahneman (2012) the biases and use of intellectual short-cuts). Whilst 
the research and personal experience appears to confirm bounded rationality as a 
feature of management decision-making, this project does confirm that decision actors 
may often seek rational solutions. Thus, Cohen’s (1972) ‘garbage can’ model of 
decision-making should not be seen as a description of decision-making anarchy, but 
another exploration of bounded rationality. My experience of the process was that my 
colleagues were limited by context and information in the messy environment; but 
decision-makers did not appear to give up on the search for the best reasonable 
exploration.  
As described in the chapter on conclusions and implications for practice, the research 
slightly reoriented my approach to strategy. As the process of strategy is also messy 
and complicated it has been tempted to be somewhat cynical about the resulting 
documents and statements which the process produces. Much of my earlier thinking 
on strategy was influenced by Mintzberg (2007, 2009) and to a lesser extent by Weick 
(2001). I would not infer a major change in assessing the importance of Mintzberg in 
the realm of strategic thinking. Arguably any suggestion that his discussion of the 
emergent nature of strategic thinking undermines strategy as a process may be 
misplaced. As is discussed in the literature review Mintzberg is a subtle and balanced 
commentator. Thus, Mintzberg’s influence on me may not have changed too much, 
but the need for strategy as an intentional, directional process may have been 
strengthened. Thus, no less Mintzberg, but possibly more Porter. Similarly, the much 
less intentional, ‘planned’ approach to strategy as discussed by Weick (2001), seems 
to be now more of an entertaining and thought-provoking commentary on 
organizational behaviour than analysis of the practice of strategic management.  
The rival explanations were seen as a means of challenging the researcher’s own 
assumptions and testing hypotheses for the causal mechanisms. It may be seen, 
however, that the likely hypothetical explanations provided will tend to be generated 
from the researcher’s own experience and knowledge base. Two of the rival 
explanations (TP2 the Balinese cockfight, and TP4 the dialectical model) reflected 
conceptual thinking the researcher had been exposed to prior to the start of the project. 
The other two explanations (TP1 the orderly process improvement, and TP3 actors in 
  211 
search of a strategy) had some reference to the researcher’s experience of 
organizational decision-making, both in its ‘model’ form (TP1) and its more chaotic 
practice (TP3). Consequently, one may ask whether the rival explanations analysis is 
appropriately exhaustive and whether plausible explanations were ignored.  
The test of the appropriateness returns to the research methodology and whether the 
proposed causal mechanisms proposed are sufficiently plausible to explain the 
observed outcomes. Furthermore, the model appears to satisfy Clegg’s (1989) tests 
for theoretical adequacy: exhaustiveness, independence, and consistency. To test the 
model further, however, it may be helpful to consider multiple researcher approaches 
to the subject and its application to minimise researcher bias.  
How will I see this project influencing my future approach to research? I would see this 
as a model that could and arguably should be used in future research. It may always 
be unusual for chief executives of organizations to conduct such research. They would 
need to have the energy and appetite to do so, and for most busy executives this 
seems unlikely. That said, managers across differing levels of management may 
consider it as a model, although probably more suited to doctoral level study than 
masters, due to the possibly lengthy timescale of data collection.  
The potential conflicts imposed upon the researcher provide challenges to the validity 
of the research and the veracity of the project overall. This may be merely a different 
series of challenges than those that meet the researcher in general; but nevertheless, 
the conflicts need to be exposed and explained. The reflexive critique as provided here 
may be considered necessary, as does an explicit description of how the challenges 
are managed within the methodology chapter.  
As a practicing manager it seems important to research subjects that are important as 
a practitioner, not merely subjects that are deemed to be of academic interest. The 
case study here has been instructive in my ongoing management education, possibly 
echoing Mintzberg’s earlier assertion that, “managing is neither a science nor a 
profession; it is a practice, learned primarily through experience, and rooted in context” 
(Mintzberg, 2009, p.9). Therefore, future explorations for me will continue the search 
into how we make decisions in organizations and how we behave in the decision-
making process.  
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Chapter	7	–	Interpretation	of	Findings	and	
Development	of	Theory	
Heaven in a grain of sand? 
After the hard work of data analysis, the journey then allows for the interpretation of 
what has gone on and seek to gain learning about what has gone on and how this may 
inform future work and thinking. In his work on cultural interpretation Geertz (1973, 
p.44) defends the cultural analysis of anthropology from some of its critics:  
It is not whether phenomena are empirically common that is critical in 
science…but whether they can be made to reveal the enduring natural 
processes that underly them. Seeing heaven in a grain of sand is not a trick 
only poets can accomplish. 
Thus, the development of theory and attempts to make analytical sense of the research 
data is the task of this chapter. Although it seems that aiming to see heaven may be a 
little ambitious. 
Introduction 
From the discussion of the findings within the conceptual framework it is now possible 
to conduct interpretation of the analysis and develop theoretical understanding of the 
findings. The theory will then provide overall conclusions, identify the contributions to 
knowledge, and establish the practical management implications of the research. In 
this chapter the findings will be analysed through the prisms of theoretical models as 
rival explanations, producing a synthesised overall explanatory model. This is then 
further developed as the main theoretical output of the thesis: a social power model 
for negotiated order.  
Meyer (Wodak and Meyer 2001, p.19) provides a circular description of the empirical 
research process using discourse analysis: the interpretation cycle.  
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Figure 22 - Empirical research as a circular process (from Meyer 2001) 
 
Fitting the theoretical perspective into the model we may summarise the analytical 
process of the research project: 
• Development of data coding 
• Triangulation of coded themes across the data sources 
• Production of theoretical perspectives 
• Re-examination of perspectives against the discourse analysis 
• Synthesis of explanations into case study providing model for causal 
mechanisms in the CMO framework 
This chapter provides the analysis of research data through: 
• The theoretical models developed through the analytical process are described 
as three competing explanations.  
• A fourth explanation, synthesising the three competing explanations, provides 
the summary theoretical explanation from the analysis.  
• The explanations produce a resulting social power model as the means to 
describe the discovered causal mechanisms in the project,  
Rival explanations 
Yin (2009, p.133) suggests a useful analytical strategy in case studies is that of rival 
explanations. The following describes alternative competing explanations that attempt 
to provide a theoretical explanation of the mechanisms explored in the study. 
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Theoretical perspective 1 – Decision-making as an orderly process of 
corporate improvement 
The literature review section on strategy included descriptions of strategy in its more 
classical corporate terms as an orderly intentional process. This is consistent with the 
economic rational model (Smith 1950, Blume and Easley 2007) and even if the 
boundedly rational model (Simon 1997) puts limitations on decision-making’s 
effectiveness and efficiency, it is still describing a largely rational process with utility to 
the organization. Simon (1978, p.14) states, “reasonable men reach reasonable 
conclusions in circumstances where they have no prospect on applying classical 
models of substantive rationality”. Thus, from this perspective the case study ultimately 
described a path of: identified need; confirmed desired service model; appraisal of 
potential options; evaluation to preferred model; and decision to agree preferred model 
and instruction to implement decision. In this version of events the apparent coalitions 
and cliques described by some decision-makers were largely an insignificant 
superficiality that didn’t affect the process. Rather the discussion between the different 
groups was not a struggle of power and influence but a rational debate between 
competing opinions. Thus, the preferred option emerged from what appeared as a 
rational desire to improve service quality (the improvement codes) and the subsequent 
discussion refined the proposal to account for competing concerns (for example, the 
risk codes), producing the preferred option through rational examination.  
This is the simplest explanation and suggests power was mainly exercised in Lukes’ 
(2005) first dimension. The apparent coherence of the Governing Body clinicians was 
not principally a collective use of power, but rather an expression of clinically led 
decision-making consistent with the original intentions of CCG commissioning 
(Department of Health 2010).  
This perspective does not adequately explain the different groupings that appeared, 
some of which seemed to hold relatively static positions and represent particular views 
throughout much of the process. The negotiation around the Nortondale code 
appeared to be driven from a pragmatic desire to accommodate a sub-group, not a 
rational assessment of whether different Lots between Ellerton and Nortondale 
achieved better outcomes. However, some participants considered the process fair 
and transparent for example: 
I didn’t think there were any hidden agendas, I have been in the game a long 
time and you can sometimes recognise when deals have been done over the 
table and around the committee room, you vote for me and I will vote for you.  
There was none of that and has never been a hint of that. (Lay Patient Rep 
interview) 
The other shortfall in this explanation is that it may not adequately account for the 
importance of power in the process. The genesis of the research project began 
primarily as an attempt to study decision-making. As the project developed although 
decision-making remained at the core of the case study, the analysis shifted 
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increasingly to the behaviour of the individuals and groups within the process. Linked 
to this was a consequent focus on different degrees and uses of power and influence. 
Therefore, it may be inferred that a first-dimension, pluralist description of power will 
inadequately account for the differing approaches to risk; the movements between 
different coalitions in creating the ultimate negotiated order; and the evolution of the 
option appraisal and final decision option.  
Theoretical perspective 2 – Decision-making as a Balinese cockfight 
The negotiated order concept appeared to be demonstrated through the research and 
may prompt the question as to whether the order was static (largely as the power 
dynamics were at the start of the process) or dynamic (shifting and re-created in the 
decision-making process). The question aligns with the exploration of framing. Thus, 
the macro frames may be relatively fixed (national context and regulatory guidance) 
but open to interpretation; the meso/organizational frames notionally agreed but 
subject to re-negotiation; and the micro level based on pre-existing experience (thus 
partly determined) but subject to group influences.  
Geertz (1973), in a celebrated monograph, describes the cultural significance of the 
cockfight in Balinese society. His ‘thick description’ interprets the occurrence not 
merely as a local sporting event, but as one deep with cultural importance for the 
society. Thus, the cockfight is,  
An image, fiction, a model, a metaphor, the cockfight is a means of expression; 
its function is neither to assuage social passions nor to heighten them (though, 
in its play-with fire way, it does a bit of both), but, in a medium of feathers, blood, 
crowds, and money, to display them. (Geertz 1973, p.444) 
For Geertz (1973) the event does not simply demonstrate social characteristics (power 
relations, hierarchies, etc.) but helps to reinforce them. But this is not just 
reinforcement but interpretation on behalf of the community allowing it to make sense 
of its social stratification.    
What sets the cockfight apart from the ordinary course of life, lifts it from the 
realm of everyday practical affairs, and surrounds it with an aura of enlarged 
importance is not, as functionalist sociology would have it, that it reinforces 
status discriminations (such reinforcement is hardly necessary in a society 
where every act proclaims them), but that it provides a meta-social commentary 
upon the whole matter of assorting human beings into fixed hierarchical ranks 
and then organizing the major part of collective existence around that 
assortment. Its function, if you want to call it that, is interpretive: it is a Balinese 
reading of Balinese experience; a story they tell themselves about themselves. 
(Geertz 1973, p.448) 
This view of mutual interpretation of position within a community is consistent with 
Parsons’ description of power as reflecting a “normative determinism” (Clegg 2006, 
p.194) and driven by socialization.  
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If large scale (strategic) decisions are the main events of the CCG, does the decision-
making process act to reinforce the demonstrated negotiated order and to promote 
self-interpretation from the members of the organization? Using Lukes (2005) three-
dimensional model of power, the decision-making process may be seen as 
demonstrating in management practice the spread of power and influence in the CCG. 
Furthermore, the power relations may be considered to be largely present and 
underlying within the CCG. Thus, the decision-making process demonstrates: 
• Who holds different types of power according to the three dimensions 
• How interpretive frames are used in the process 
• Which decision actors sponsor particular frames 
In this interpretation the outcome of the process is largely determined by the initial 
conditions. In the CMO model the conditions having a predominant role as 
mechanisms driving the outcome.  
The pro-tender coalition included a significant number of clinical decision-makers. The 
reassertion of clinical priority in the CCG decision-making process may be seen as a 
result of the case study. CCGs originated from a desire from the then Secretary of 
State for Health to promote decision autonomy. Thus, the 2010 White Paper stated, 
“The Government will devolve power and responsibility for commissioning services to 
the healthcare professionals closest to patients: GPs and their practice teams working 
in consortia” (Department of Health 2010, p.4). Thus, the clinical Governing Body 
members in part acted as a (loosely) coherent group and may be seen as driving 
through a starting presumption (on the quality of experienced services) despite 
objections or problems.  
This perspective does, however, describe a relatively fixed series of relations and 
power balances within the organization. Thus, this may assist in explaining the creation 
of the observed coalitions, and their power bases. The coalition formation and 
dynamics appeared to be subject rather than power based. Thus, the professional and 
demographic backgrounds of participants may have influenced their opinions and 
ultimate decision-making, but this was driven by the subject matter, more than 
obviously a desire to gain or reinforce power and position in themselves. Furthermore, 
this model may not help to explain the evolution of the options in the process of the 
accommodation between certain groups that drove the eventual decision consensus. 
The observed process of negotiation and tensions between groups in the process 
appears more as a struggle to achieve either predominance or accommodation: not 
obviously a process to reinforce previously determined relations.  
Theoretical perspective 3 – Decision-making as actors in search of a 
strategy  
Many texts on corporate strategy identify the importance of the corporate environment 
within which the strategy is developed (Johnson 2005). Models such as PESTLE38 
(Johnson 2005) explicitly recognise strategy doesn’t happen in isolation of the wider 
  217 
environment. Similarly, Thompson (1993) identifies the necessary balanced 
requirements for successful strategy: Environment-Values-Resources (EVR) 
congruence. We may align this concept of strategic balance with both the concept of 
the structure-agency relationship, and the multiple layers of framing (macro-meso-
micro). Thus, in the case study the outcome may be seen as the result of the framing 
mechanisms, being both a product of and an influence on the corporate environment.  
The issue of framing is not merely the presence of the wider corporate environment: 
the role this environment will play on creating the negotiated order is how this is 
interpreted and used in creating order. Thus, the cognitive frames used in relation to 
the wider environment (essentially the macro frames) will provide a view of this 
external world. But it will be a created and interpreted world. This was demonstrated 
in the study with a different interpretation of the legal constraints on the decision: the 
importance of legal procurement issues needed to be interpreted and agreed. By the 
stage of the decision itself this appeared as a minor issue, possibly in part due to the 
lack of agreement amongst decision-makers as to its relevance.  
The meso (corporate) level did not concern itself only with resources, but also 
corporate memory of previous decisions including how resources were used. This area 
also showed how different actors provided varying interpretations of commonly 
experienced events. Indeed, the variance appeared to work to polarise groups rather 
move to a consensus. Thus, pace Dennett (1992), when the waves of obviousness 
are not crashing on the shore, the scope for polarisation is greater.  
One may expect the scope for difference across decision-makers to be greatest at the 
individual level. From the case study this level may be seen as being the most 
important framing mechanism in driving the outcome of the negotiated order. 
Paradoxically, for the individual members of the observed coalitions, the intragroup 
variation of individual frames was small. (For example, the personal experience of 
clinicians within Group 1 was largely uniform.) Thus, the creation of the negotiated 
order described a struggle between groups to establish hegemony over the process, 
rather than a debate between individuals to establish a common set of values. It may 
be seen that the superordinate values (such as strategic objectives to improve patient 
care) were largely common and almost taken for granted. But the means to achieve 
the value set and the prioritisation of actions was debated between the active coalitions 
in the process.  
All of which infers that if good corporate strategy demands a congruence of 
environment (internal and external), available resources, and values, the 
implementation of strategy will involve a negotiated order that also synthesises the 
different levels of cognitive framing.  An implication for organizations may be that 
development and implication of strategy may need to take account of those involved 
in its development and execution. This is reminiscent of Vail’s comment (quoted in 
Weick 2001, p. 57):  
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One mistake the arts would never make is to presume that a part or role can be 
exactly specified independent of the performer, yet this is the idea that has 
dominated work organizations for most of the twentieth century. 
From this, consideration may be given as to how strategies can be flexed according to 
the individuals involved in developing and implementing those strategies. If strategy 
is, from one interpretation, about ‘where we want to go’ and ‘how we want to get there’: 
in this interpretation actors may have differing pictures of what ‘where’ looks like; and 
changing views what ‘how’ means. Thus, for this interpretation, the negotiated order is 
a constant process of synthesising different views of the strategic objectives and 
creating a consensus as to how implementation will unfold. Each event will create its 
own negotiated order anew, evolving from what came before.  
This perspective may be in danger of moving too far away from the project’s realist 
methodology and towards an overt relativism. Thus, whilst the corporate world does 
need to be interpreted, not all interpretation may be considered equal; and the external 
structural world will provide an overarching context for the decision process. The 
interpretation will occur in a context and the pre-existing power relations may be of 
importance: corporate and personal histories cannot be ignored. However, this model 
does identify the concept of the struggle of ideas in the process and the outcome of 
the process being one of either resolution to consensus agreement across all, or the 
emergence of a predominant view achieving hegemony over the organization.  
Synthesised Theoretical perspective 4 – A dialectical decision-making 
model of the negotiated order 
Although Yin (2009) states rival explanations are mutually exclusive and cannot 
coexist, the rival explanations described above appear to have some overlap and 
support developing a coherent overall theoretical perspective of the case study. This 
may be more analogous with the narrative analysis of Czarniawska (2004) who 
discusses narratives as often having multiple plots. Thus, the rival explanations are 
synthesised into an integrated theoretical view of the case study.  
Theoretical perspective 1 (TP1) assumes the decision-making process as a relatively 
orderly, rational process in support of corporate process, but may be seen to fit the 
real-world events to an abstract model of how decision-making ‘should be’. The 
interpretation of theoretical perspective 2 (TP2) describes a relatively static process. 
Conversely, for theoretical perspective 3 (TP3), there may be an over-estimation of 
individual perspective and looseness of process. For TP2 structure and history may 
be over-stated; for TP3 they may be under-stated, and the role of agency inflated. 
(This may return to Archer’s (1995) critique of upwards and downwards conflation of 
structure and agency.)  
The integrated synthesis of the case study uses the frame of dialectics. (One summary 
of dialectical thinking is provided in Harvey (1996).) A dialectical approach may be 
summarised as: 
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• An emphasis on process and flow rather than fixed structure 
• Parts and wholes are mutually constitutive of each other 
• The interlocking of factors entails “the interchangeability of subject and object, 
of cause and effect” (Levins and Lewontin, 1985, p.274)”.   
• Systems tend to be internally heterogeneous and internally contradictory 
• Transformative and creative behaviour flows from these internal contradictions 
• Change is a characteristic of all systems 
Dialectics describe a complex process of contradictions: contradictions that are a 
necessary part of the system’s unity (Winter 1989). The resolution to the contradictions 
is seen as the establishment of the negotiated order. As this order does not produce 
a uniform consensus it requires the achievement of a cultural and ideological 
predominance and authority: hegemony (see Clegg (2006) and Anderson (2017)). 
Using a dialectical approach, the different perspectives may be synthesised into a 
unified explanation of the decision-making in the case study.  
The identification of coalitions within the negotiated order is representative of not 
merely the power relations of a point in time; but furthermore, those that have 
developed over time. Consequently, some relations will be transient and variably 
'fragile'. In some cases, actors may revert back to older alliances if they appear more 
substantial, or if the evident contextual pressures change. But where power, position, 
and hierarchy exist one task for those in position may be to try and reinforce their 
power. Clegg (2006), in discussing Giddens, differentiates between allocative and 
authoritative powers. In this context allocative power may be seen as the respective 
professional backgrounds (clinical, managerial, non-executive) of decision-makers; 
whereas authoritative power will be that emerging from the process and calibrated 
within the negotiated order. The balance between allocative and authoritative power 
in the negotiated order of a CCG may be dependent on the decision subject. (This may 
be different from situations where the exercise of power involves economic or military 
resources as allocative power.) Where there is a stronger clinical element to the 
subject the allocative power of clinical professionals may be consolidated into 
authoritative power through the emerging negotiation. Conversely, more obviously 
financial or corporate subjects may emphasise the allocative power of executive 
officers. Thus, in the CCG power and influence was both historic and present; and 
fixed and emergent. The engagement between decision makers will determine how 
the power balance plays out to the point of decision.  
The contradictions evident within CCGs have been seen as inevitable (Cox 2013). 
Thus, there may be little point in seeking to eliminate them or even to reconcile them 
completely. Rather the corporate necessity is to achieve a sufficient consensus and 
accommodation of ideas so that decision can be made and then implemented. 
Consequently, the task is less the complete reconciliation of differences; but more to 
secure an overall commitment to a course of actions that allows the contradictions to 
be managed without de-railing an initiative. The improvement code-risk code tension 
demonstrated a likely contradiction within a CCG between the clinically led desire to 
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improve care (even at considerable risk) against the desire to manage risk and reduce 
exposure to corporate harm.  
The belief in strategic decision-making as an orderly process to achieve corporate 
objectives (as TP1) was demonstrated unevenly in the study. There was reference to 
wider strategy (national and local) but the complex collection of interests was 
reminiscent of the ‘garbage can’ decision model (Cohen et al. 1972). Thus, values and 
objectives may appear throughout (and even at the end) of a decision-making process, 
not merely at the beginning to inform a process. In similar terms, in his critique of 
Parsons, Giddens (1968) comments: 
That collective ‘goals’, or even the values that lie behind them, may be the 
outcome of a ‘negotiated order’ built on the conflicts between parties holding 
differential power is ignored, since for Parsons ‘power’ assumes the prior 
existence of collective goals.  
Thus, in this study, a strategic decision subject appeared to produce a decision-making 
process focussed on operational implementation, arguably backed-up by underpinning 
values. However, this was a complex mix of power relations, corporate objectives, 
values, and consequent negotiations.  
The decision-making process is not self-contained but occurring within a wider 
strategic context; one that influences and is part of the process throughout. 
Interdigitation is apparent in the micro-meso-macro levels being part of each other. 
Thus, although the three levels can be identified and described they remain 
interlocking with each other. Again, with Archer (1995) the process identifies both the 
separate presence of structure and agency and their interdependence. This is true of 
the process and of the individual decision-makers in the process, all who have roles 
beyond and outside the case study issue itself, influencing their decision-making in the 
case.  
Thus, in this interpretation each strategic decision, although discreet, is the latest in a 
continual business process. Where path dependence (Arthur 1989) applies, the impact 
of the decisions taken in the previous periods of the business process may still be in 
play. Although at points of decision, reconciliation or accommodation may be reached, 
this may not resolve contradictions, or where contradictions are resolved the resolution 
will create new contradictions.  Therefore, the negotiated order is a means to get to 
the point where a decision can be taken. From that point on, the negotiated order then 
begins to engage and resolve the new set of emerging contradictions.  
Thus, the theoretical model of the case study describes the CCG decision-making as 
follows. 
Firstly, the initiation of the process is an intention to act promoted by a combination of 
improvement drivers to develop service provision within a wider corporate strategic 
framework of commissioning objectives. The decision in the case study did not emerge 
randomly, but from a number of factors including opportunistic timing (contracts 
coming to their end date), local and national strategy (improving home-based care), 
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and clinical evidence of service imperfections. Thus, there is a rational basis for the 
process and the shape of the decision-making process followed a rationally 
constructed order of business case development (as in TP1).  
Secondly, structural context drives the macro interpretive frames at work. These 
frames were largely unchanging through the decision and are often used to reinforce 
power relations, for example the reference to legal and regulatory frameworks (as in 
TP2). Although the frames may not change through a major decision-making process, 
the different macro frames may not necessarily be coherent (national policy for 
example, may be inconsistent and self-contradictory). At this level the contradiction is 
between the use of frames to reinforce position and obstruct change and to argue for 
the need for local interpretation of strategic guidance to implement strategic objectives 
in a local setting. 
Thirdly, a local contextual and meso frame level of organizational culture which 
determines how structural frames were used and how the process developed. The 
organizational culture, shaped by historic negotiated orders and then shaping the 
current order, was an ongoing process of morphogenesis. In the study the decision 
actors search may be seen as less than a hunt for a strategy (TP3) and more as a 
struggle to reconcile the corporate strategy in place with individual aspirations and 
fears. For some this may be a conscious or unconscious process or retro-fitting a 
strategy to a decision taken or a belief held. The development of thinking at individual 
and smaller group levels that shaped specific thinking on issues, occurred within an 
already developed framework. This micro level framing may be inevitably influenced 
by wider contextual issues ‘of the moment’ which may or may not appear in 
subsequent strategic decisions. Thus, for any theoretical assessment of strategic 
commissioning decision-making, the fact that the decisions will be made by people, 
from differing backgrounds, with differing priorities, and access to varying information 
has to be recognised. (Consequently, it may be inferred that for complex strategic 
decisions purely ‘rational’ decision-making, objectively assessing available evidence 
may be impossible?)  
Fourthly, language occurred more as a tool providing reinforcement to position and 
opinion and less to debate rationally and convince. The different backgrounds of 
individuals and groups and the differing strengths of coalitions may explain how 
discourse shaped the power relations and the negotiated order. The power differentials 
seen suggest the case study does not support Foucault’s rather ambiguous term 
“Power is everywhere…because it comes from everywhere” (Gaventa 2003, p.4). 
There is, however, agreement with his later comment that “Discourse transmits and 
produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile 
and makes it possible to thwart” (ibid). Thus, discourse is the vehicle playing out the 
struggle for hegemony in the process. This struggle will link to structural and power 
relations. As in their study of McKinsey, O’Mahoney and Sturdy (2016, p.259) state 
that, “most displays of resource power also entail power over meaning through their 
symbolic consequences”. The discourse in the study appeared to produce ‘index 
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codes’ that represented the main themes of the differing coalitions and became the 
tools which created the negotiated order.  
Throughout the earlier analysis, Lukes (2005) three-dimensional model has been a 
useful framework to assess the feature of power in the case study. In developing a 
theoretical model from the data, in may be necessary to go beyond this approach. The 
dialectical perspective may suggest the dimensions are not neatly stratified in 
organizational politics (possible as opposed to wider social analysis). Haugaard (2003) 
attempts to synthesise various theories of power (including Lukes) into a typology of 
seven forms of power and then later, influenced by Wittgenstein, describes power not 
as specific definitions but as contextually dependent ‘family resemblances’ (Haugaard 
2010). To some degree it is less important to establish whether power is at three or 
seven levels, but rather as Clegg (1989, p.18) states: 
Power is better regarded not as having two faces or being layered in three 
dimensions but as a process which may pass through distinct circuits of power 
and resistance. 
In the dialectical decision model, synthesising the perspectives above, power in the 
negotiated order demonstrates the circuits of power and resistance (borrowing a term 
from Clegg 1989) and is, therefore, categorised according to a social power model. 
Critically this is analysis of how power was used to create the negotiated order in the 
decision process, not necessarily an analysis of the wider power relations in the 
organization.  
A Social Power Model for the CCG Negotiated Order 
The results of the analysis of the findings is, therefore, the social power model 
describing the four social powers at work in the CCG. This is consistent with the 
assertion that power is “a phenomenon which can be grasped only relationally” (Clegg 
2009, p.207).  
Power of argument  
The power of argument is demonstrated through agent’s ability to make convincing 
rational arguments, based on available (and presented) evidence. The importance in 
the context of decision-making is less regarding the objective quality of the rational 
statement and more in terms of its ability to convince others in the creation of the 
negotiated order. The useful reference point here is Toulmin’s (1964) layout of rational 
argument: an argument having a claim supported by data, with the justification for the 
claim being the warrant that links the claim to the data39. Thus, data in itself does not 
present an argument; and a claim without data remains an unsubstantiated assertion. 
In the absence of ‘crashing objectivity’ the decision-making theatre may see claim and 
counter claim with a conflict of warrants seeking to claim ownership of the available 
data. (Bounded rationality again putting limits on the ‘knowable’ information.) Where 
supporting evidence (data) is weak, there may be aggressive debate between 
competing argument to establish a hegemonic, or compromise position. (This may be 
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desirable. Ready acceptance of weakly supported arguments may be indicative of 
groupthink (Janis 1982)). The strengths of a warrant are not merely their content or 
the agent of delivery: but critically the audience receiving the argument. The data from 
the observed meetings and the interviews demonstrates:  
• A general lack of hard evidence (either published studies or service data);  
• A view that some of the available evidence was of low quality (“all the papers 
that I read were based on anecdote and were entirely subjective” Clinical Chair); 
• For some, local clinical experience on the ground was more useful, providing 
“true insight into what the theoretical models on paper are delivering in real life” 
(Ellerton GP); and, 
• For some participants when asked about whether more evidence would have 
been useful an honest answer of “I actually don’t know” (Audit Chair).  
Thus, from the above it may be speculated that potentially available evidence may be 
almost irrelevant to the actual decision-making process. Rather, evidence has to 
satisfy a number of tests to become relevant. It needs to be known; recognised as 
having an appropriate status for the subject of the decision; be relevant to the decision-
makers; and be presented in a form that can be understood and useful to the process. 
Thus, the power of argument is less concerned with the objective presence or truth-
value of evidence: but more with its eventual consumption and use-value.  
Furthermore, the power of argument will be both the argument itself and also the status 
and authenticity of the arguer. Thus, Haugaard (2012) discusses the power of the 
‘expert’ in language games, using the concept of ‘truth’: “the use of truth creates the 
conditions of possibility for power” (Haugaard 2012, p.86); and “truth is the final 
vocabulary of power; it is the ultimate appeal beyond which lies unreason” (ibid, p.90). 
The authenticity of the argument, and thus a feature that calibrates the argument’s 
power is the power of position.  
Power of position  
This power relates to status, professional authority, and technical expertise. Thus, 
using truth from the vocabulary of power, presupposes the speaker is both fluent in its 
language and recognised as an expert speaker. In the case study the GP clinical 
decision-makers were recognised as experts and their semi-privileged access to local 
clinical evidence (amplified by the paucity of empirical evidence) gave them power of 
position.  
As against the power of position of the expert were the power of position of the non-
clinical participants, based around their organizational authority. This includes formal 
authority (for example senior executive officers) and is often associated with theories 
of bureaucracy (literally ‘rule from office’) and governance (Weber 1978). This has 
suggested formal power and legitimacy rest with bureaucratic rules, and thus position, 
and are taken as a ‘given’ (“legitimacy of formal structures and rule-based authority 
cannot be taken for granted” Gordon et al. 2009, p.16). The assumption of a given has 
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been challenged and may not be supported by empirical data (Gordon et al 2009); and 
thus, although official position will imbue power within the observed case study 
process, this is contextually dependent, and only one of the powers of position. Gordon 
(2009) discusses the ‘right to power’ which in the case of a CCG, for example, may 
determine which positional power may have most influence in a particular scenario.  
Power of position also includes the ability to shape agendas, papers, and structure 
meetings and indeed the form of a whole decision-making process. This may be 
demonstrated as power of information. 
Power of information  
Information has been described as “knowledge made visible” (Orna 2004, p.7). 
Consequently, the control of how, when, and indeed whether or not information is 
made available is a potential power. Some actors will “have the right to produce texts, 
to engage in discursive practice, are able to engage in the process of shaping 
concepts” (Clegg et al. 2006, p.304). In a decision-making process like the case study, 
this power may be considerable. The dual nature of power of position may be 
replicated in power of information. Thus, there is the information control power that 
comes from corporate authority. This may include agenda setting, control of meeting 
minutes, document production and version control, diary management, and the 
general flow of information circulated to decision makers. Alternatively, technical 
experts may have control over how much of their technical knowledge is shared and 
also which other (potentially competing) sources of information may be edited or 
discounted.  
The power of information may work in concert with the power of argument: less in 
terms of the argument itself but more in terms of how the argument is communicated. 
Thus, if Media Richness Theory (MRT) (Daft et al. 1987) has validity, then the relative 
richness of certain types of information communication may influence the power of 
users in using the information to affect decision-making40. Thus, power of information 
will also be the power to affect its communication to others in the process. This may 
be linked to the power of relations.  
Power of relations  
Here are seen as threefold powers of relations: organizational authority; professional 
recognition; and personal.  
Some members of the decision-making group were directly line managed by others in 
the process; particularly the officer group. Although such an officer group may come 
from diverse backgrounds, there may be some consistency regarding corporate 
purpose. Even without common purpose the impact of line management hierarchies 
may still be influential. In the case study all of the professional officers in the process 
had an ultimate (although not all direct) line management to the CEO. There was, 
however, no evidence this unduly influenced those in process, or that CEO used 
position inappropriately.  
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Professional recognition may allow those who share a common professional 
background (including training) or position to communicate more effectively and to be 
‘believed’ more strongly in their arguments. (As described above strength of an 
argument warrant may be influenced by those presenting and receiving the argument). 
Thus, in a CCG a GP may be influenced more by the views of another GP; a little less 
by the views of a more general doctor; less still be another healthcare professional; 
and even less by non-clinicians such as professional managers. Conversely in the 
subject matter is non-clinical, the reverse may apply. The use of technical jargon may 
be another way that relations within intra-group cliques will be strengthened. (This may 
be a practical example of the use shibboleth in discourse41.)  
Personal relations (however, they may have developed) may influence the value given 
to particular positions. Furthermore, following Daft’s MRT above, where individuals 
have established personal relations with individuals this may allow ‘richer’, that is more 
face-to-face communication, which may make arguments more persuasive. 
Roghanizad and Bohns (2017) conclude that face-to-face communications may be 
many times more effective than email or social media communication. If this research 
is generalizable to a CCG, for example, it may suggest personal relationships (which 
allow greater direct access) may promote more effective message delivery and thus 
imbue greater social power.  
The literature review included analysis of group decision-making, recognising the risks 
of groupthink (Janis 1982) (the tendency for views to converge artificially from desire 
for group census) and group polarisation (Isenberg 1986) (views becoming more 
extreme through group discussions reinforcing and deepening initial positions). 
Various research on rationality (summarised in Pinker 2018) suggests wider social 
drivers may also influence decision-making in groups. Thus, the instincts for 
‘coalitional loyalty’ (Pinker 2018, p.359) may encourage individuals to make decisions 
that support their membership of the social group42. Thus, the power of relations may 
work independently of a decision-maker’s assessment of evidence.  
Conclusion of the social power model 
All four powers are seen as operating in the decision-making arena of the negotiated 
order, with the language of discourse demonstrating how the powers are exercised 
(actually or latently) in practice. Clegg et al. (2006), following Wittgenstein and 
Garfinkel, discusses ‘indexicality’: the concept that language assumes its power from 
the context in which it is used43. Thus, the power dimensions above are contextually 
dependent in terms of how the groups form and which latent powers they already 
possess. But also, the exercise of power through discourse suggests certain themes 
(memes, tropes, concepts, or technical jargon) will assume greater of lesser power 
dependent on their wider environment. Thus, the cognitive frames identified above, 
discoverable through the discourse, are the tools of the power-play in creating the 
negotiated order.  This is consistent with the observations of Beaver et al. (2007) who 
suggest ‘harmonious’ 44  boards are those that can tolerate a range of different 
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individual objectives. This recognises, “a pattern of personal deals, often 
unconsciously, so that there is no common agreement to put the interests of the 
company consistently above those of its directors” (Beaver et al. 2007, p.322). This 
returns to the necessary conditions for negotiated order as described by Nadai (2008) 
of tensions between participants, but opportunity for exchange and compromise. Thus, 
the social power model recognises that powers will be spread across individuals and 
groups; that the exercise of power also implies resistance to it (Barbalet 1985); that 
resistance does not necessarily imply conflict (ibid).  
The degree of influence of different social powers is contextually dependent and 
related to the dynamic interaction between the interest groups within the overall 
organizational coalition. The model thus agrees with Barbalet (1985, p.541) in that 
social power relations will be “asymmetrical and reciprocal”. The hypothesis resulting 
from the model is that in a CCG environment the ultimate consensus of a decision-
making process with be driven by the produced negotiated order. The CCG negotiated 
order will be a product of the balance between different groups and individuals in the 
process: for Giddens “power relations are always two-way” (quoted in Barbalet 1985, 
p.542). The final balance dependent on the degree of the four social powers lying with 
the respective groups. Discourse thus becomes the apparent form of the social powers 
are used in the creation of the negotiated order. Clegg et al. (2006) describe the mutual 
relationship between power and discourse in an organization. This is consistent with 
the analytical dualism of the research ontology, maintaining theoretical orientation to 
both structure and agency within the project, consistent with Archer (1995) and 
Fairclough’s (2005) siting of discourse analysis in critical realism. 
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Figure 23 - Relationship between discourse and power (from Clegg 2006) 
 
Thus, for the coalition of Group 1, the lack of objective empirical evidence regarding 
service quality gave their personal experiential evidence greater power of argument, 
supported by power of relations within the Governing Body (many members working 
in primary care) and power of relations with the wider GP community, underwritten by 
the latent power of position in being expert professionals in community care. In the 
discourse the dialogue on improvement included more emotive terms that if 
recognised by other participants may have had an emotionally binding effect, for 
example, “I think the frustration of not making any improvements or not making any 
progress was felt by everybody” (GP Vice Chair, Interview). Thus, the contextual 
power in such a discourse is the association with others, the emphasis on not just 
improvement but on lack of attempted improvement, and also the relational word 
‘everybody’ staking a claim that the feelings were felt widely across the health 
community.  
From an opposite perspective Group 2 had a much weaker claim to wider GP support, 
and although the senior officers had more control over information flows, the 
‘knowledge made visible’ was more from clinical experience and thus outside of direct 
officer control as power of information. The risk concept was strongly felt, but 
somewhat overridden by the desire to improve care: this may have been reversed if 
the financial environment within which the CCG was operating had been much worse. 
Thus, in such circumstances the financial risk factor, possibly supported by financial 
pressure from regulators, would have increased the power of position of CFO and CEO 
(and thus Group 2).  
This analysis is the genesis for the proposed organizational social power matrix. The 
matrix identifies sources of power within the coalitions discovered in the research. 
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Furthermore, the power relations then influence the negotiated order at the end point 
of the decision point. For example, the accommodation of Group 3 (the balanced 
group) with Group 1 may have been influenced by power of position (of the clinical 
professionals) and of power of relation (as co-professionals with an historic 
professional and personal association). The ultimate hegemony within the CCG seen 
as power related group to group negotiation bringing Group 3 and Group 1 together, 
added to the pragmatic negotiation of adjusting the tender basket to exclude items 
controversial to Group 4 (the Nortondale group).  This was most obviously 
demonstrated in the changes observed between meetings 3 and 4. The change in the 
business case option appraisal (see page 184) to exclude a ‘tender all’ option brought 
Groups 1, 3, and 4 together into a political accommodation where the positions of 1 
and 4 were reconciled and where the risk concerns of Group 3 were minimised. Group 
5, by focussing more on process were seen to follow the clinically led majority as long 
as due processes were observed. Thus, by the time of meeting 4, all but one of the 
decision-makers was content to support the recommended options. 
Figure 24 - Organizational Social Power Matrix 
 
The model sees the negotiated order as the product of the power relations. Those 
working in the decision-making process will have differing levels of each power, 
depending on both the structural context and the relations with other agents. Thus, a 
financially driven strategic decision, for a financially challenged organization, in a time 
of general NHS austerity may increase the power of position of finance professionals 
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(possibly enhanced by their ability to control data and thus have power of information). 
Conversely, where the focus may be on improving a clinically unsafe service (possibly 
under a public spotlight of safety concerns), powers may rest more strongly with clinical 
professionals (even if a decision had a negative financial consequence). Thus, each 
social power dimension has reference to its contextual influences and uses and 
shapes cognitive frames. Groups and individuals with specific powers will use 
particular frames and certain texts will consequently appear to control ‘ownership of 
the text’. Therefore, it is possible to return to the concept codes from the data and 
describe them through the prism of the social power model. This affirms that the field 
of play in the power struggle of the negotiated order in the CCG, is that of discourse.  
• The improvement code was a useful element as all parties would subscribe to 
improving the quality of services. In the CCG strategy documents, there was an 
objective to strengthen community-based care, and a developed model of 
integrated care across different disciplines. This was, indeed, the motivation for 
the issue in the first place. This was, however, owned by Group 1, co-opting 
Group 3, within the dialogue of ‘something must be done’ and ‘risks are worth 
taking. Thus, this part of the discourse assumed the clinically led power of 
argument, supported by power of information (sitting more in some decision-
makers heads than in empirical evidence). The Group 1 – Group 3 co-option 
appears to have been in part based on professional recognition, thus power of 
position and power of relations. Not only did the improvement code reference a 
need for services getting better, but also by the frequent (46 words and 135 
codes) use of the frustration sub-code, referenced a more emotional feeling of 
obstruction and delay, and reinforcing the power of relations between those who 
recognised the frustration.  
• The risk codes sought rather than to compete with the improvement code but 
to soften its impact, and thus may be seen as having a lower power of argument 
(along the lines of ‘we know we need to do this, but there are risks’).  The very 
nature of the risk concept is a measure of uncertainty and thus, the competing 
codes were between improvement of an under-performing service area (a 
given) and a risk of deleterious effects if change takes place (an uncertainty). 
The framing of the discourse, particularly in the absence of an acute financial 
position, weighed a largely clinical decision-making group away from risk. In the 
discourse risk thus assumed a somewhat defensive tone. Furthermore, the 
typical association of risk and reward may have made the contextual (indexical) 
use of risk as merely a necessary consequence of taking action.  
• The corporate process codes used in the discourse were primarily concerned 
with the constraints imposed on the CCG and the process of the case. The early 
‘struggle’ to own the legal issue (was the CCG required to tender or not) was 
ambiguous and seemed to disappear from the meeting debate by the time of 
Meeting 4. The other discussions were largely about the conduct of the process 
and there may have been the most ‘rational’ discussions, thus seeking to 
achieve a consensus of view, rather than compete for power of argument. 
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Corporate process may suggest powers that would sit with the organizational 
professionals within a power of position. 
• The behaviour codes showed competing versions of events: some suggesting 
cabal-like decision-making of certain groups, others that the process was 
transparent and open. This despite the relative maturity of the decision-making 
group.  
• The Nortondale code demonstrated a relationship between the expert 
professional power of position and the power of relations. Thus, the Nortondale 
GPs deferred to the views of the Ellerton GPs once the issue of Nortondale was 
removed as part of the Tender Lots, even despite one of the Nortondale GPs 
stating they didn’t agree with tendering NHS services as a principle. Thus, the 
Group 1 pragmatism was mirrored by Group 4 and may be supported by 
reflection of mutual technical expertise (common professional training and 
clinical occupation) and established personal relations over time. Again, there 
was little rational debate (thus limited power of argument) as to why Ellerton 
and Nortondale should be so different. 
• The stakeholder code referenced wider relations and was in some respects a 
competing field of different groups seeking to use differing stakeholders as 
support for their case. Thus Group 1 appeared to own the support of the wider 
(largely Ellerton) GP community: as against Group 2 who described the risks to 
the relationships with others, particularly existing NHS providers. The 
aforementioned power of argument that the services needed to improve from 
that currently provided by the local FT, may have weakened Group 2’s power 
in this dimension.  
• The service design code was focussed on the design of a new service model 
and how this may support service evaluation through a process. It was largely 
a power of argument and probably seen as a mutual forum for discussion of 
development and not a ground for a power struggle.  
It is proposed that this model can be applied to other strategic decision-making in the 
NHS and potentially much wider. The ultimate decisions made may reflect more the 
allocation of power and the creation of cultural hegemony within a group, than an 
objective assessment of what may or may not be the objectively best decision. The 
creation of the negotiated order then is the mechanism where the power relations take 
place and ultimate order the deciding point in what decisions are taken. As this model 
encompasses Simon’s (1972, 1978, 1997) main rationality boundaries (cognitive 
limitations, information limitations, leading to satisficing behaviour), it is proposed that 
the model is a more comprehensive form of assessing bounded rationality within 
strategic decision-making. As the exertion of power and influence in decision-making 
reflects internal and external factors, of agency and structure, the model allows an 
effective means of addressing the research objectives.  
Triangulating the power model with the original conceptual framework produced a 
synthesised social power model of the negotiated order within three framing levels: 
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Figure 25 - Social Power Model of Negotiated Order Within 3 Framing Levels 
 
Thus, within the critical realist framework, the decision outcomes and the observed 
discourse appear within the empirical domain. The coalitions and behaviours of the 
decision actors in the practice of decision-making were in the domain of the actual. 
The social power matrix is the analysed theoretical mechanism that occurs in the 
domain of the real.  
In concluding its development, the model may be tested against three criteria for a 
theory’s adequacy as listed by Clegg (1989): exhaustiveness, independence, and 
consistency. The model is considered to be exhausted within the project as analysed 
in that it contains the elements of power demonstrated in the case but would allow the 
introduction of differing power dimensions within the three levels of framing. The model 
is independently verifiable within a stand-alone case-study framework, and although 
socially occurring can be assessed independently of other social phenomena. The 
model is considered to be logically consistent with the analysis presented from the 
literature review, the research data in the project, and theoretical analysis. 
Furthermore, the model is consistent with the dialectical approach (Winter 1989, p.49) 
in describing not a fixed state of affairs within the case study; but its emergence as a 
morphogenetic product from the socio-economic context, thus also describing how the 
social power relations, and their cognitive frames, will continue to change. 
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Chapter	8	–	Implications	for	Strategic	Management	in	
the	NHS	
Blah, blah, blah 
As a management practitioner, research may be of interest for many reasons; but to 
be truly useful it should inform management practice. Thus, for Freire (1998, p.30), 
"Critical reflection on practice is a requirement of the relationship between theory and 
practice. Otherwise theory becomes simply ‘blah, blah, blah,’ and practice, pure 
activism”. As a practitioner ‘pure activism’ doesn’t seem too dreadful, but for informed 
rational management decision-making, perhaps the learning from research and the 
theory it generates should be the ultimate aim. So not ‘blah, blah, blah’, but hopefully 
practical actions that may improve how organizations make their decisions, or at least 
make their decision-making.  
Introduction 
Following the research findings and developed theory this section describes the 
implications for management practice, applicable to both NHS organizations and 
management practice more generally. The issues identified here are not considered 
exhaustive but aim to select what appear to be the most salient points of learning from 
the research. One of the motivating factors in initiating the project was the desire to 
learn from the research to inform management practice and thus this chapter is seen 
as providing potentially valuable insights for management and leadership.  
The chapter discusses the identified implications for management practice: 
• The influence of evidence, its use and non-use on decision-makers. 
• The role of emotion and intuition in the decision-making process 
• How the presence of individuals within the decision-making process may affect 
outcomes 
• Attitudes to risk management, including financial risk 
• The potential benefits of scenario modelling as a management tool 
• The roles of strategy and leadership 
Influence of evidence, decision heuristics and external review 
Evidential decision-making may be an appropriate aspiration for strategic decisions, 
but the quality of available evidence may vary, and on occasions lack high quality 
empirical sources. The ‘hierarchy of evidence’ as used in healthcare decision-making, 
particularly within the conceptual approach of evidence-based medicine (EBM) (Gray 
2009, Greenhalgh 2010), may be a useful reference model for evidential decision-
making in management (Briner 2014); however, it may not be easily replicated in 
complex strategic decision-making processes. Rarely there may be an equivalent 
source of evidence to a Randomized Control Trial (RCT), seen as the ‘gold standard’ 
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of EBM (Greenhalgh 2010). Instead in strategic decisions the available evidence may 
be in multiple layers of uncertain quality and volume.   
The use of clinical decision-makers does provide a local, experience-based evidence 
form that may be useful where high quality evidence is lacking. In such cases, 
however, consideration may need to be given to the role of decision bias (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974) and how decision-making bodies may mitigate against such biases. 
The composition of decision-making bodies may be important in this respect, and the 
selection and development of members of such bodies may need to explicitly accept 
a need to form balance. Thus, for management practice selection needs to consider 
the group as a whole, rather than merely selecting the most able or most qualified. For 
strategic decisions that require some element of clinical evaluation the use of external, 
third party expertise may be beneficial and guard against groupthink and group 
polarisation.  
Local expert views as evidence can be appropriate (Gray 2009) but where they are 
not balanced by significant higher quality evidence it may be suggested that decision-
making processes should use a formal collection of local expert views (thereby 
avoiding accusations of using anecdotal evidence) and possibly submit such local 
views to external evidential review. This may be dependent on timescales and where 
rapid decision are needed such review may not be possible. However, in cases such 
as this one where processes are mapped into a lengthier timescale such a formal 
external review may be helpful in attempting to create more objectivity. Balanced 
against this may be the need to act more quickly and not necessarily for all decisions 
to follow an evidence-based medicine model. (Goodwin 2011, reports frustrations 
expressed as to the NHS ‘obsession’ with the use of Randomised Controlled Trials, 
particularly in service change, where they may be seen as too slow and expensive.) 
Returning to the theme of complexity and ‘messiness’ (Pidd 1996), it may be inferred 
that in strategic decision-making an expectation of a precise role for evidence as 
providing a clear decision solution may be illusory45.  
This is not to say that the approach of evidential decision-making (such as Kovner 
2009) or the tools of evidence-based medicine (see Gray 2009) have no value in 
strategic decision-making. But their use needs to be accepted as containing inevitable 
limitations. Strategic ‘messy’ decision processes may rarely produce a clear outcome 
as to what action to take: even so, transparency regarding the grounds supporting 
options and the reasons for decision should be as explicit as possible. There may be 
benefit in organizations seeking to promote actively the use of evidence, particular 
within management decision-making. A report from CIPD (2017) into the practice of 
human resources managers reported that of the 629 respondents, 26% rarely or never 
used management literature in support of decision-making; and 42% rarely or never 
used consulted results from scientific research. Although this sample may not be 
representative of managers in other organizations, such as CCGs, it may show a 
tendency not to seek higher quality evidence in management decision-making. This 
may further accentuate the bias that could be provided by a selective group of clinical 
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experts. Thus, the task for those overseeing strategic decision-making should include 
managing the use of evidence and the likely biases of those considered to be experts 
in their field.  
Emotion and intuition as frame shapers 
The Pizarro and Bloom (2003) position of intuition from experience as an explanation 
for much of the clinician decision-making, may be a more appropriate than emotion 
being a driver of intuitive decision-making. This is not to underplay the potential role of 
emotion in such practices, but rather not to underestimate the importance for some of 
the decision-makers of their long professional experience. Experience that may 
inevitably shape their views. This may be further emphasised by neurobiological 
research into the construction of human emotion (see Barrett 2017). Thus, for Barrett 
(2017, p.31): 
Emotions are not reactions to the world. You are not a passive receiver of 
sensory input but an active constructor of your emotions. From sensory input 
and past experience, your brain constructs meaning and prescribes action.  
From this perspective, the decision-making process may not be seen as evidential vs 
non-evidential, or rational vs emotional. Rather it is to recognise the background 
experiences of individual and group decision-makers that will influence the decision 
process. This influence will shape how evidence is sourced and used, and where 
evidence is unavailable the non-evidential criteria that will be used.  
As with the evidential point above, where an appropriate level of empirical evidence is 
lacking decision-making bodies will need to be aware of the influence of biases such 
as the availability heuristic (Tversky 1974). Where strong positions are established 
quickly in a process, as was seen by the views of Group 1 in this study, critical 
challenge should be applied to review any founding assumptions for their validity.  
The role of intuition and emotion thus presents a challenge similar to the concept of 
‘conflicts of interest’ (COI). COI is recognised in the public sector as requiring formal 
management (through declaration of individual conflicts, for example and as 
summarised in the National Audit Office report (NAO 2015)). Potentially this is of even 
greater importance during service procurement. The case study shows that it may be 
important to assess demographics, social background and individual opinion shaping 
within a decision-making group, not merely whether individuals have a directly obvious 
personal interest in the process. Again, the promotion of diversity in a decision-making 
group may be necessary to ensure optimal evaluation of options in a strategic decision. 
At the outset of a strategic decision-making process it may be helpful to audit the 
decision-making group and assess the composition, conflicts of interest, and 
perspectives of those involved. This may indicate whether external support would 
promote improved decision-making.  
Similarly, whilst it may be a mistake to assume positions taken quickly in process are 
the result of simple emotion, when intuition and learnt behaviour may be the underlying 
  235 
factors, there should be an explicit acceptance that emotion will be a factor in decision-
making, strategic or otherwise. Healey and Hodgkinson (2017, p.112) suggest that 
“many organizations go about formulating their strategies and implementing them as 
if emotions do not exist”. They recommend that organizational leaders should consider 
the presence and role of emotions in strategy, accepting, in their terms, that strategy 
will not be a cool, rational process, but actually ‘hot’ with emotion. This may confirm 
the benefits for senior managers in organizations having well developed emotional 
intelligence, as much as well-developed rational analytical thinking. Thus, if emotion is 
ever present and probably more obviously present the larger the significance of the 
decision, it may be helpful for decision-makers to be more explicit about how they feel 
about a decision subject and the options presented. The cognitive frames in use will, 
perhaps inevitably, be partly shaped by emotions. As such it may be helpful to try and 
openly identify the emotional factors in play.  
Influence of collective presence 
Testing the hypothesis of Cohen et al. (1972) the study confirmed that decision actors 
had variable levels of involvement (presence). Inspired by Bezemer (2014) the 
comparison of decision-maker input confirmed even more the variability of presence, 
acknowledging that this was the visible presence (what was seen and heard) not 
necessarily an invisible presence: that is more general and ‘behind the scenes’ 
influence. The summary table and graphs in chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate the range 
of ‘presence’ in the formal meetings of the case study. This clearly shows that, at least 
in the management meetings themselves, the input of decision-makers varied hugely.  
Decision-making bodies may benefit from recognising the possibility of this variability 
and consider whether in certain circumstances some decision-makers could be 
removed from a voting process, if their background involvement up to that point is too 
limited. Thus, decision-making processes may need structured meetings arranging at 
the outset and clearer recommendations as to minimum input levels for decision-
makers. It is unclear as to specifying minimum levels of presence will change the level 
of influence individuals or groups may have within a process.  
The level of input from individuals should also be considered within the realm of 
meeting structure and agenda management (agenda management in its widest 
sense). In figure 20 the single biggest contributor was the Project Director. Often the 
large meeting contribution from the Project Director began with a lengthy introduction 
of a documentary business case and (on two occasions) PowerPoint slide 
presentation. The implication of this may not only be that it tends to allow the 
director/introducer of subjects to become dominant in discussion (at least in terms of 
contribution volume), but also that any subsequent debate will be framed to some 
degree by the introduction. Thus, if we add in the possibility of the anchoring heuristic, 
then for significant decision-making meetings the early framing of discussions may 
reduce the subsequent opportunity for wider discussion. Challenge may be important 
and necessary, but it will be only that: challenge to a previously stated position. And if 
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this position is contained within a formal presentation or business case it may be seen 
to be difficult to oppose, or at least that a stated position becomes the default. To 
improve management practice, it may be necessary to recognise this factor and, 
perhaps, introduce business cases later in meetings rather than at the start.  
Differing attitudes to risk  
Whist there was no suggestion from any parties that the decision did not involve risk, 
the attitude and appetite for risk varied significantly. The obvious difference was 
between the risk approaches of Group 1 and Group 2: within this distinction between 
the clinically focussed group and the corporate/finance focussed group. This may be 
seen to echo the entrepreneurial-manager distinction described by Busenitz (1999, 
and Busenitz and Barney 1997): entrepreneurs having a lower appreciation of risk and 
greater use of heuristics in decision-making. Similarly, Joyce (2015) describes the 
tension between elected politicians in the UK government wanting to take more risks 
(as with the CCG GPs) and their professional civil servants who wanted to counter-
balance the risk taking. Again, this may suggest decision-making bodies should search 
for balance in their composition. Furthermore, clinicians/entrepreneurs may need to 
accept they under-estimate risk; senior officers may need to accept the reverse.  
Organizations will need to discreetly identify their risk appetite within all strategic 
decisions. As prospect theory appears to be a well-established (if nevertheless still 
contested (Levy and Levy 2002)) decision-making concept, in strategic decisions it 
may be worth bodies recognising the risk asymmetry and assessing how individuals 
fit within an asymmetric risk assessment. This may allow challenge and review of risk 
positions and a resulting more consensual approach to corporate risk. A diagrammatic 
representation of risk as in the prospect theory value function (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979, 1992) may provide a more sophisticated risk assessment than the conventional 
‘impact multiplied by likelihood’ scoring system alone.  
Importance of collective views in framing  
The process involved in the case study did not include any explicit reflective analysis 
by the organization or the decision-makers. Although such reflections occurred as part 
of this study there was nothing planned within the process itself. Thus, a desire ‘to get 
on with the business’ may encourage decision makers not to consider what they are 
doing as they are doing it. Ron et al. (2006) discuss the use of post-flight debriefing of 
fighter pilots as a model for use in the ‘learning organization’ with so-called ‘after-action 
reviews’: “Post-flight reviews are first and foremost vehicles for learning from 
experience to improve individual, group and organizational performance” (Ron et al., 
2006, p.1077). The apparently rich learning seen in the detailed study of actions 
through the research interviews may suggest there would be benefit in sourcing some 
of this type of reflection and analysis in the process itself. This may be unnatural to 
decision-makers but may support improved process management and organizational 
learning for future decisions. (The case study data included reference to a recent 
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procurement experience, which appeared to be significant for some participants: 
however, there was no reference to a post-procedure review of the process.) 
Therefore, this suggests strategic decision-making, particularly when occurring over 
an extended period, should schedule de-briefing sessions that review not merely the 
decision (or progress to decision) but actually the process of decision-making itself. 
Deliberate time for reflection in a strategic decision-making process may allow the 
greater explicit discussion of cognitive frames (even if not described as such) and thus 
the more open development of a collective view on cognitive framing. One may 
consider going even further and exploring whether there are opportunities for more 
explicitly merging techniques of management and research. Thus, the study of 
meeting behaviour and interviewer reflection sued as research tools in this project may 
be adapted for use ‘in the field’ to aid reflection and guard against sub-optimal 
decision-making practices.   
Scenario modelling and ‘pre-mortem’ 
Klein (2007) discusses the use of the pre-mortem technique (the hypothetical opposite 
of a post-mortem), seeking to achieve ‘prospective hindsight’. This may be seen as a 
version of scenario modelling, but with a specific focus on decision-makers exploring 
what may go wrong. Such an approach be most useful when participants deliberately 
attempt to critique their own preferred option. Pre-mortem type analysis was not 
observed during the case study and there may be benefit in adopting the tool as a 
regular part of any major decision-making process. This may assist assessing risk in 
a project, accepting that different cognitive frames may produce a varying appetite for 
risk. Therefore, it may be worth organizations considering that alongside the 
development of decision option appraisals they may establish ‘scenario appraisal’. 
After the selection of a preferred option organizations may benefit from a detailed pre-
mortem analysis of what may be the negative and positive outcomes from the preferred 
option.  
The use of alternative means of discussion decision subjects, such as pre-mortem, 
may allow a richer body of analytical information to be generated in a decision process. 
Similarly, Watson (2003) discusses the use of ‘playfulness’ in decision-making 
discussion, with a ‘technology of foolishness’ complementing more traditional rational 
approaches. This may be of particular assistance where decisions are very complex 
or where evidence is equivocal or absent.  
Financial risk boundaries 
The case study happened during a period of austerity and an atmosphere where the 
financial pressures in the NHS were continuing to increase. The CCG at the time, 
however, was still in relative financial health. The risk discussions in the case study 
were the main focus of financial consideration. The financial risk assessment was 
discussed and owned by the finance managers: but there was arguably insufficient 
detailed assessment of the financial risks. This seems to be largely due to the inexact 
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nature of the risks known (an obvious feature of risk itself) but without a degree of 
greater clarity it appears that the financial risks were only really owned by a group of 
officers in the process all of whom had some financial accountability. This despite the 
Governing Body as a whole having accountability for CCG financial performance. As 
the impact of austerity may bite ever deeper in the public sector, strategic decisions 
may benefit from a clear financial framework at the outset, including whether major 
changes can even be considered if they do not support financial improvement.  
The need for strategy 
Earlier it was recognised that in public sector bodies, strategy will have three main 
functions: long-term corporate plan; stakeholder communication device; and 
performance management tool. With the increasing focus on public sector 
performance management there may be a danger that strategy development will focus 
on addressing desired performance management objectives and become un-owned 
by organizational leaders, or so large and complex that clear strategic objectives are 
lost. This may be an example of Mintzberg’s ‘strategic planning not strategic thinking’. 
For management practice this affirms the need for organizations to have their own 
strategy; that corporate leaders and stakeholders recognise the strategic objectives as 
their own; and that the strategy and main objectives are clearly articulated. The 
decision process did generally follow the CCG’s developed, published strategy. 
Although the research confirms the Cyert and March (1992) assertion that 
organizations tend to lack ‘goal consistency’, and that objectives are a “continuous 
bargaining-learning process” (Op cit, p.33), it does not reduce the benefits of strategy 
as an essential part of corporate leadership. Indeed, Cyert and March (1992) also 
describe objectives, rather than seeking to ‘maximise’ or ‘minimise’ outcomes, as 
providing an ‘aspirational level’ that may change according to circumstance. This is 
presented by them in terms suggesting it reduces the benefits of and need for formal 
strategy. The research here infers the opposite: the presence of diverse interest 
groups, uncertain data, conflicting political priorities, and a generally ‘messy’ 
organizational environment affirms the need for overarching strategy and strategic 
objectives. Moreover, despite the CCG being part of a wider NHS, it may be argued 
that any statutorily autonomous public sector body (CCG, FT, Local Authority) needs 
to perform its own strategic thinking and develop its own strategy. A strategy that, 
despite the presence of ambiguity and scope for interpretation, is owned by the 
corporate leadership.  
The role of leadership 
If the presence of the negotiated order as shown in the case study is a regular social 
phenomenon in organizations, one may ask whether its ‘ordering’ requires any form of 
coordination or orchestration. If it does, the follow-on question may be who the person 
in the organization is responsible for this facilitation. This role may sit with those in 
leadership positions, particularly CEOs and Board Chairs. Although some authors may 
propose that the concept of leadership is ambiguous (Pfeffer 1977), or that much of its 
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usefulness relates to its ‘romantic’ element (Meindl et al. 1985), there remains a belief 
that leadership is a necessary and important part of the modern organization (Hooper 
2000, Grint 2010a, Joyce 2017). The NHS has developed examples of leadership 
frameworks to demonstrate how it sees leadership being performed and leaders 
developing (for example, see NHS Leadership Academy 2011). Such frameworks may 
include competencies that support the coordination and oversight of negotiated order, 
if not explicitly. They may not, however, recognise the benefit in considering an explicit 
role of facilitation and coordination of a negotiated order process, particularly when 
strategic decisions are being undertaken.  The case study, by supporting the concept 
of the organizational coalition, may infer that in managing strategic decisions leaders 
may have limited scope for visionary leadership. Communicating a single vision to a 
diverse group of decision-makers, influenced by a range of forces, may be difficult. 
Rather the role of organizational leadership may be to act as coach, coordinator, 
umpire, and provider of balance. This may promote assessment from organizations 
regarding whether their leadership development supports effective working and 
facilitation with a negotiated order. Leadership development framework may over 
emphasise the role of the leader as director, planner, and motivator; and under-
estimate the role of the leader as cultural navigator within the organization’s sociology. 
Joyce (2017) comments that during strategic implementation leaders may need to deal 
with organizational culture in one of three ways: ignore it; adapt the strategy to the 
culture; try to change the culture to fit the strategy. Such options may be a general 
choice for leaders in management practice. From this research, however, it may be 
inferred that culture may be a significant factor in major strategic decision-making 
processes: the negotiated order being, in one respect, the product of the factors of 
decision subject, corporate environment, and organizational culture. Thus, there may 
be benefits in leaders recognising (not ignoring) cultural factors; providing clarity as to 
strategic direction (but being aware of the possibility of needing to adapt strategy); and 
engaging in the negotiated order to support most effective decision-making. Returning 
to strategic decisions as messy and wicked issues, leaders may need to consider 
Grint’s (2010b, p.13) prescription: 
The leader’s role with a Wicked Problem, therefore, is to ask the right questions 
rather than provide the right answers because the answers may not be self-
evident and will require a collaborative process to make any kind of progress.  
An organization’s leadership may shoulder the major burden in seeking to achieve 
rational, evidence-based decision-making. Achieving this end may require 
understanding and working within the cultural context of the negotiated order. 
Consequently, well-ordered project plans may appear to manage the technical stages 
of strategic decision-making. For a process to be more wholly ‘rational’ and evidential, 
the leadership may need to consider a more comprehensive cultural decision-making 
framework, that recognises the presence of the negotiated order in strategic decisions.    
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Concluding thoughts on strategic implications 
For those familiar with the concept of bounded rationality much of what is considered 
as the implications described above may be unsurprising. The limits to cognitive 
capacity and the variability of evidence may be thought to be sufficiently well 
established that senior managers should make accommodation for such limitations in 
managing major decisions. What may have been insufficiently recognised is that the 
composition of decision-making bodies will shape the rational boundaries. Thus, the 
role of clinical leaders in CCG decision-making has its own impact on the creation of 
the negotiated order and the dynamics of decision-making.  
There does appear to be benefit in using more explicit and formal ways of detailing 
and discussing how and what evidence is used and how this may inform the use of 
tools such as scenario modelling. Similarly, as risk was a major factor in the case study 
this may be best treated by organizations seeking to agree a more uniform corporate 
risk position (even if negotiated) than by having a significant differential in risk 
assessment and appetite across decision-makers.  
The roles of strategy and leadership confirm the need that for strategic decisions to be 
as effective as possible it may require high quality senior management following good 
practice in larger-scale, longer-term thinking; supported by meaningful leadership of 
the organization and its major stakeholders. Fundamentally, the research also 
demonstrates the facet of strategic decision-making being a process and not an event. 
The concept of decision-making process has been used and evident throughout: 
however, it is important to recognise that the management of decision-making needs 
to address the process as a process, and not just as a series of discreet elements. 
Thus, for Witte (1972), "the organization of a process affects the efficiency of this very 
process". Those engaged in and particularly those tasked with leading and overseeing 
decision-making may need to manage the whole process and recognise the 
processual nature of the task. Improving, for example, the volume and quality of 
available evidence may not necessarily improve the decision outcome if other parts of 
a process provide equivalent distortion. The process as described in the research data 
and the resulting social power model suggest improving decision-making may require 
a balanced approach to understanding the power dynamics at play, an explicit 
recognition of individual and group biases, and a need to structure and manage the 
decision process as an organizational process.  
The structuring and management of the decision-making process may also need to 
take into account the type of decision at play and how a process relates to the available 
evidence. Thus, decision-makers may be confronted with various different types, four 
that require differing approaches may include: 
a) Operational with strong established evidence base and with clear decision 
point.  
b) Operational with established but possibly equivocal evidence base, where 
context and situation may be important. 
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c) Operational or strategic with equivocal evidence base, various contextual 
factors, but clarity on desired outcome and available resources. 
d) Strategic with a weak, equivocal or generally complex evidence base, multiple 
environmental and contextual factors, and uncertainty as to desired outcome 
and available resources. 
For a) research suggests (Meehl 1954) that the use of expert opinion is best served in 
developing algorithms to allow step by step detailed decision-making, which are then 
administered by a neutral administrator or computerized system (actuarial decision-
making).  Removing the individual or group discretion from the process allows more 
rigorous application of the algorithm with evidently greater decision success. 
In b) type decisions where, “the state of the world conforms to the expert’s 
assumptions” (Schwenk 1990, p. 172) it may be more effective to have one or a group 
of experts in a particular field. In such cases a degree of discretion and choice may be 
beneficial and simple algorithms not sufficient to cover all eventualities or to recognise 
the importance of context. 
For type c) decisions requiring the evaluation of evidence and options related to a 
defined outcome would suggest group decision-making may be more effective with a 
diverse group providing more consistent evaluation of evidence (Blinder and Morgan 
2000, Lombardelli et al. 2002) or where the collective knowledge base allows more 
sophisticated assessment of options (such as in healthcare multi-disciplinary teams, 
Gray 2009).  
Decision type d) may be described as the 'true' strategic decisions. That is, they are 
complex, multi-factorial, involve multiple agencies, with an uncertain evidence base, 
with conflicting assessment of the desired outcomes. Such a type is thus consistent 
with our definition of strategic decisions as described in the literature review and 
matches labels of strategic 'messes' or 'wicked problems'.  In such cases it appears 
beneficial for these decisions to be taken by a wide group of agents with diverse 
knowledge bases. The role of evidence here is important, but based on this research 
one may suggest two sub-categories: 
d1) may be complex strategic decisions where there is a significant body of 
evidence. This evidence base may be complex, equivocal, and subject to 
debate amongst decision-makers. As such this would not comply with the 
definitions of types a), b), or c) above. Nevertheless, with detailed analysis 
further clarity may emerge, particularly if the analysis occurs within the context 
of the organisational strategy. There should be no expectation that 'crashing 
obviousness' may emerge, but that with a diverse range of experts and 
stakeholders there may be a more evidential decision that can be seen as more 
rational and more likely to achieve corporate objectives. 
d2) may be types where a significant body of evidence would be ideal, but either 
largely absent or widely variable such that limited conclusions could be drawn 
from the presented information. The case study in this research may fall into 
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this definition. Further research may be required as to how best to manage such 
cases. From this research one may hypothesise that with a weak evidence 
base, and where there is not a very short timescale, decision-makers should 
consider accessing a wider range of experts and partners to develop an 
evidence base, even if a lower quality local base of practitioners and service 
users. In this case study the patient and public engagement occurred before 
the case study phase as part of service specification development. There was 
no active engagement of the public or wider partners during the case study 
period itself. In some cases, such as this one, consideration may need to be 
given to the complexities of market tendering, and conflict of interest. But that 
may not be a sufficient reason not to look at a more widespread way of 
generating evidence to support a decision.   
From all of the above we may suggest that one practical implication for decision-
makers is the benefit of stratifying decisions into the types that allow consideration as 
to the available evidence. This would infer that there should be differing approaches 
to decisions, based on the type and that a 'one size fits all' approach may be a sub-
optimal way to conduct decision-making. For strategic decisions in particular a 
differentiation between d1) and d2) may improve decision-making. This may 
immediately appear counter-intuitive to organizations who may assume they need 
decision-making consistency: in reality such differentiation may tailor the right 
approach to the needs of specific decision types.  
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Chapter	9	–	Conclusions	
Introduction 
The final section ends the project with a summary of the main conclusions from the 
research and the considered original contribution to theory. Discussion is also provided 
as to opportunities for future research and areas for management learning from the 
project.  
To succinctly answer the research question, one may state: the factors that influence 
strategic decisions in healthcare commissioning are those that emerge within the 
creation of the negotiated order in the organization. Thus, there will be external, 
internal, group, and individual influences at play: but how they actually influence the 
outcome of a decision will be shaped by the interaction of the group dynamics, 
hypothesised here as the activities of the social power model. Thus, the level of 
influence of any particular factor will be related to its level of power in the process. The 
level of power related to the particular form negotiated order in the decision praxis.  
From this summary we may further conclude that: 
• There is something observed that fits the description of the negotiated order 
• This process of constructing the order is the driver for the ultimate group 
decision outcome 
• This outcome is considered to be primarily the result of the distribution and 
accommodation of power within the decision-making group. 
• The power struggles and negotiation may be demonstrated through a 
combination of ‘deal-making’ accommodations and competitions between 
different cognitive frames.   
• The beneficial impact of clinicians being a significant voice within NHS 
commissioning may be as yet uncertain and whilst probably bringing 
advantages, may also expose other possibilities for bias.  
• The variable presence of evidence in strategic decisions may need to be 
explicitly recognised. Although in such decisions value-neutral evidence may 
be difficult to establish, there appears little reason to avoid a rigorous search 
for available evidence and where an initial search provides limited results 
widening evidence collection within the decision process.  
• There are a number of areas where decision-making may be improved, but 
there may need to be a real-world recognition of the role and place for emotions, 
biases, and the phenomena of bounded rationality.  
The negotiated order is alive and well… 
…and thriving in the world of strategic decision-making. The recognition of a 
negotiated order is not a novel finding. It may be concluded, however, that for strategic 
decision-making processes (involving scale, complexity, and uncertainty) all decision 
will be the outcome of negotiation. The negotiation between different groups (sub-
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coalitions) and multiple cognitive frames may tend to have three types: developmental 
(where the discourse synthesises different frames and ideas to produce improved 
understanding or better action planning); competitive (where discourse is between 
competing frames and the process will resolve the dominant theme); and 
accommodative (where the discourse allows pragmatic adjustment of position to 
accommodate multiple groups or frames).  
If information is ‘knowledge made visible’ (Orna 2005) then the study of texts and 
language use made discourse the means of allowing the creation of the negotiated 
order to become visible. Although, inevitably, there may have been latent powers, 
opinions, and relationships not visible in the discourse: the conclusion of the research 
is that analysis of the discourse allows the struggles, interactions, partnerships, and 
disagreements to be realised to the researcher.  
The research began with an attempt to explore strategic decision-making through the 
prism of the negotiated order: the organizational phenomenon perceived as being 
critically important in organizational behaviour. Strategic decision-making in the case 
study was not seen as a finely tuned rational process, but a dynamic social struggle. 
This was a struggle to achieve a better service outcome for patients that all decision-
makers would agree with; however, the influences demonstrated the role of negotiation 
and of how coalitions with a process may emerge. Furthermore, decision-making 
participants will not come to a process with a wholly neutral approach to the task. 
Watson (2003, p.101) suggests that decisions are events where people consciously 
or consciously seek to “fulfil duties; meet commitments; justify themselves; distribute 
glory and blame; exercise, challenge and reaffirm relationships; seek power and 
status; further personal interests; simply have a good time”. Thus, the constituent parts 
of the negotiated order re-form (morphogenesis) based on the structurally, contextually 
dependent power relations. It is this process that is proposed as the prime mechanism 
for strategic decision-making in CCGs.  
It may also be noted that the composition and variable commitments of CCG 
Governing Body members may amplify the feature of negotiation. Thus, the of the 13 
voting Governing Body members in the study, only three were full time employed 
members of the organization. The other members had time and related financial 
commitments typically of approximately one day per week, with their other time being 
occupied in their main employment relationship (for example working as a partner in a 
GP practice). The seniority of the decision-makers, their variable time commitment, 
and diverse employment relations with the CCG may all result in active negotiation 
being an inevitable part of any decision-making process. As a comparison, in the study 
of Midlands clothing factories, Ram (1994) suggests factors tending towards avoiding 
rigid bureaucratic approaches and thus promoting the high degree of negotiation, are 
that many are small business, with complex ethnic, familial, and cultural relationships.  
As is described in the implications for management chapter above, recognising the 
presence of the negotiated order may necessitate adapting the processes for decision-
making in cases of strategic complexity.  The social power model does not suggest 
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evidence-based analytical thinking is negated in strategic decision-making: far from it, 
as decision makers looked for and wanted to use evidence. Of the decision-making 
models described in the literature review, the case study may be seen as most 
consistent with the assumptions of the Garbage Can model (Cohen et al. 1972): the 
uncertainties of participants, problems, and solutions ‘resolved’ through the discourse 
of the social power model. Ultimately, the presence of the negotiated order may echo 
Watson’s (2003, p.102) comment that, “managerial work is essentially social and 
political rather than fundamentally analytical”.  
Influences presented as cognitive frames 
The influences hypothesised in the literature review explored in the data could be seen 
as discoverable through the cognitive frames presented in the analysed text. The 
frames were variously: influences on decision-makers (the strategic contexts within 
which the process operated); already present in the decision actors; and created 
through debate and the interchange of power relations in the process.  The importance 
and primacy of the various frames may be related to the strengths of the different 
power relations present. Thus, the discernible frames in any strategic decision-making 
process will ultimately be produced from the process itself, accepting that such a 
process will have significant external influencing factors. The negotiated order, 
consequently, becomes the synthesis of the various cognitive frames. The synthesis 
involving: the selection of competing frames (that represent the different conflicting 
social groupings); the integration of potentially complementary frames (representing 
possibly a higher level of developed cognitive frames through rational discussion); and 
the reconciliation of alternative frames either through partial substitution or integration 
(this representing the pragmatism inherent in establishing coalition – the broader the 
coalition, the more extensive the likely level of pragmatism). 
The mechanisms identified in the research described in the social power model do 
suggest that Watson (2003) may be correct in asserting that managerial work is more 
social than analytical. In which case the process of negotiation includes cognitive 
frames that are ultimately managed socially, rather than analytically. This is not to 
suggest an absence of analysis, but again to reference the bounded rationality 
concept, that scope and quality of analysis will be socially directed, so driven by any 
inherently objective reference point. For example, the decision-makers will decide 
what is useful evidence to consider: the evidence itself will be silent. The decision on 
what and how evidence is used driven by the force of external framing, and the pre-
existing views of those tasked with deciding. These forces evaluating evidence and 
information not necessarily against objective criteria alone, but within the perspective 
of cognitive framing.  
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Strategic thinking may be difficult in a complex environment  
Although the modern concept of strategy includes much beyond mere planning, it 
seems helpful to reiterate that a necessary element of strategy is producing an 
intentional plan. Recognising that there may be good and bad strategies, the presence 
of a coherent and, in principle, agreed strategic direction may help organizations avoid 
strategic decision-making becoming a series of ad-hoc, disconnected events. 
Furthermore, it may mitigate the impact of the social power struggle, if the participants 
are at least working within a common strategic framework. Thus, corporate strategy at 
an organizational level seems to remain important. That said, the case study suggests 
that as participants engage in decision-making they quickly move from strategy to 
implementation and the technical issues of achieving a solution may take over from a 
considered discussion of options.  In this sense Keeney’s (1992) comment regarding 
values, whilst important, may miss the point. Values are important, but unless values 
are codified into a coherent corporate strategy which is at least the basis for coalition 
development and negotiation, decision-making may be driven too much by individual 
value systems, with a consequent distraction of organizational purpose. As such the 
research appears to reaffirm the need for clarity in strategy development. For the 
author this suggests that even in a very heavily (centrally) directed political 
environment, each organization and leadership team needs to perform strategic 
thinking and develop its own strategy. The dynamic clinician-manager dynamic may 
suggest this is certainly true for CCGs, but one may suggest that any organization with 
tensions between technical experts and managers or between entrepreneurs and 
managers may benefit from an overarching narrative on the direction and scope of the 
business.  This research suggests, however, that whatever the quality and nature of a 
strategy, in implementation and decision-making its objectives and principles may still 
be continually debated and negotiated.   
The role of clinical leaders within clinical commissioning 
This study is one of the first (possibly the first) to analyse strategic decisions in CCGs. 
It is suggested that the composition of the Governing Body, by involving a large 
number of local clinicians, does provide a richer decision-making discussion. This 
appears consistent with the intentions of the original 2010 white paper, which stated: 
The Government will devolve power and responsibility for commissioning 
services to the healthcare professionals closest to patients: GPs and their 
practice teams working in consortia. (Department of Health, 2010, p.4) 
What is unclear is whether devolving power closer to professional who work most 
closely with patients necessarily produces decision-making more in patients’ best 
interests. There was no sign that clinicians were involved in CCG decision-making 
merely to rubber-stamp decisions proposed by professional managers. The clinical 
leaders brought a strong voice as to how services should be improved and 
demonstrated a willingness to take risks in pursuit of better patient care. Again, this 
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may be seen as being in the spirit of the white paper and the 2012 act. What is less 
clear from the case study is whether the clinical voice present is an appropriately 
balanced clinical view. Furthermore, does the presence of clinicians on a decision-
making body give the committee a distorted picture of what that clinical view 
represents. Thus, GPs are only one group of clinical staff, with a clinical view 
influenced by their experience and professional position. If the management of service 
planning and redesign, within a broader category of commissioning, is helped by 
significant clinical involvement (and it may be uncertain that it is) then there may be a 
case for redesigning the commissioning organizations (in this case CCGs) to 
encompass a much broader clinical composition than the current GP preponderance.  
Two considerations do emerge that may need attention from the NHS: one on the 
differing attitudes to risk and the other on the use of evidence.  
The differing risk appetite, in echoing the entrepreneur-manager and politician-civil-
servant dynamics (see above), may need to be measured against the strategic 
objectives of the organization. Accepting greater risk in pursuit of improved healthcare 
may be appropriate, but the risk quantification may need balancing against corporate 
survival. Importantly, the GPs in this study, as in most CCGs, were part-time 
contractors with the CCG and all received their main sources of income from other 
areas (usually their own general practices). Thus, risk taking to improve services that 
are close to a GP’s own area of work and influence, that is their general practice, may 
seem more acceptable and generate a greater risk appetite. A more balanced 
assessment of risk for the organization as a whole may produce a different approach.  
The role of evidence in strategic decision-making 
As described in the implications above, the varying level of empirical higher-quality 
evidence may shift the focus more towards the experiential, expert evidence provided 
by Governing Body clinicians. This may not be mere anecdotal evidence; but reflect a 
sound assessment of local experience from senior clinical leaders. Nevertheless, just 
as the published, higher quality evidence represents a “selective and biased subset of 
study outcomes” (Chan and Altman 2005, p.1), thus the views of local clinicians, 
whatever their attempted objectivity and validity, may also be a biased subset. The 
large body of work on heuristics and biases (for example, Kahneman 2012, Tversky 
and Kahneman 1981, Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Tversky 1974, Stanovich 1999, 
Slovic 2004) provides strong evidence supporting the assessment of boundedly 
rational decision-making influenced by such biases. Consequently, the benefits of local 
clinical input providing a championing role for the ‘family doctor’ must be weighed 
against the likely bias such clinicians may have on any decision subject. Particularly 
so where high quality evidence is weak, and where strategic decisions are at their 
‘messiest’.  
The case study may be seen to be another example of actors acting with incomplete 
information. Furthermore, although in complex ‘messy’ strategic decisions individual 
agents may never possess complete (or even close to complete) information, the 
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decision-making group may get closer to a holistic view if it considers the information 
and evidence in totality. This is expressed in a classic paper by Hayek (1945, p.519-
520): 
the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that 
the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in 
concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and 
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess… 
Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given 
to anyone in its totality. 
Thus, one conclusion for the case study is to confirm that narrowly ‘super-rational’ 
decision-making utilising a full view of all available and necessary evidence may be 
rarely if ever possible for large-scale, complex, that is strategic, decisions. Whilst this 
is scarcely a new or original conclusion (as demonstrated by Hayek (1945) and Simon 
(1972)), it may be worthwhile recognising this limitation at the outset of strategic 
decision-making. The recognition of the limitation, however, does not justify 
abandoning a search for evidence or attempts to use what evidence does exist.  It may 
require, though, there is explicit acceptance of framing. Evidence will rarely appear as 
value neutral (crashing obviousness a rarity in organizational decision-making at a 
strategic level). Rather the presentation of evidence will influence its interpretation. As 
discussed above in chapter 8, bodies may need to give consideration as to whether 
the structuring of decision-making processes may need to be amended to reflect the 
evidence available to decision makers.  
The social power model may assist in understanding how the negotiated order creates 
framing patterns. This may be particularly so if effective group engagement is seen as 
a more effective means of achieving rational outcomes. Mercier and Sperber (2011) 
discuss how more rational thinking can be achieved by argumentation, whereby 
individuals analyse and assess proposals through discussion and structured 
argument. Thus, “people are quite capable of reasoning in an unbiased manner, at 
least when they are evaluating arguments rather than producing them, and when they 
are after the truth rather than trying to win a debate” (Mercier and Sperber 2011, 
p.72)46. Consequently, evidence-based rational debate may be most effective where 
decision-makers are primarily those evaluating proposals and not merely promoting a 
position. The social power model may allow decision-making processes to assess how 
analysis can shift to rational evaluation away from partisan solution promotion. 
Nevertheless, decision-makers may need to still recognise that where decisions are 
genuinely strategic, they may be complex, messy, and thus with rationality strongly 
bounded. The thesis may infer that: where the power of argument is driven by limited 
high-quality data and limited access to wider knowledge (low power of information), 
the powers of position (organizational or reputational) and relations (professional or 
personal) will be stronger. One may hypothesize that in such circumstances 
organizational decision-making becomes super-bounded.  
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Contribution to knowledge 
The thesis confirms the original contribution to knowledge as forecast at the beginning 
of the project. The contribution is considered to be significant in the areas of: 
• The use of participant observation as a research method. 
• The reflexivity of the researcher within an ethnography 
• Developing the concept of the negotiated order and in particular the dimension 
of power usage within it. 
• The exploration of decision-making within one of the recently established NHS 
CCGs. 
• The development of management learning and practice 
There may be, at the time of production, no equivalent research into either CCG senior 
leadership behaviour or the progress of a strategic decision-making process of this 
kind. The access gained into the CCG may be difficult to replicate to the same degree 
and thus this study may remain a novel form of ethnographic investigation into an NHS 
organization of this type. It may also remain a relatively novel contribution to 
management and organizational literature, as there may be that few senior corporate 
leaders that will conduct such participant observer research. It may be seen as a 
potential model for this type of ethnography and could be seen as an exemplar of how 
an organizational leader may participate in studying their own organization. As such 
the research may be seen as an example of the ‘insider account’ approach to 
ethnography (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995) or ‘practitioner ethnography’ 
(Hammersley 1992) but at a more senior level than previous accounts (such as those 
cited by Hammersley and Atkinson 1995).  Returning to the Bryman and Bell (2003) 
descriptions of different roles of participant observer, the project may prompt the 
question of whether another type of role may be necessary. Thus, although the 
‘complete participant’ (Bryman and Bell 2003) may be consistent with the approach 
taken in the study, the general role described in ethnographies may still often see the 
researcher as ultimately distinct from the field of study. In this project the researcher 
was not only an active participant completely within the researched group: they were 
very much embedded as an experienced and well-established organizational leader. 
Thus, if one of the features of ethnography is “intense researcher involvement in the 
day-to-day running of an organization” (Bryman and Bell (2003, p.315) this was 
obviously evident in this study. It may be seen that the research provides an unusual 
example of researcher intensity due to the position of the researcher. Moreover, there 
may be cause to refine the participant researcher typologies as described in research 
methodologies (for example cited in Bryman and Bell 2003). Here the description of 
‘complete participant’ may be inadequate. A more accurate term may be the 
‘embedded participant’. Previous research of this level of depth in an organization may 
be limited. Ram (1994) may be seen as playing a similar role through exploring the 
behaviours in small companies (although the cultural factors arguably limited access), 
but there may be no obvious equivalent in the NHS or wider UK public sector. We 
propose that consideration is given to exploring the embedded participant as a sub-
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genre of ethnography. Although this may remain a small area for research due to the 
limited number of likely embedded researchers, it may still provide genuinely original 
insight. Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) cite positive examples from education where 
the practitioner researcher has been used. This has produced, “research that is more 
relevant and also transforms teaching” (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995, p.136). From 
this project may be argued that similar practitioner research in management, at a very 
senior level, may improve both the understanding and the practice of management. 
The research method employed here may be seen as a model for the embedded 
participant researcher role and an original contribution to the development of 
ethnography. 
The explicit reflexive critique by the participant observer may be seen as a valuable 
addition to the development of understanding reflexivity and of the role of the active 
participant in ethnography. Van Maanen (2011a) describes three categories of 
ethnography: realist; confessional; and impressionist. The current ethnography may 
be seen initially, as providing a confessional element through its reflexivity, but within 
an overall realist framework. On further reflection one may ask whether the 
ethnography as presented here may fit within Van Maanen’s (2011a) definition of the 
impressionist tale. This would still be within a realist framework, but the combination 
of researcher position, reflexive critique, and detailed discourse analysis of the 
conversations occurring in the case study may be seen as a rich and complex picture 
of organizational culture:“ Impressionist tales typically highlight the episodic, complex, 
and ambivalent realities” (Van Maanen 2011a, p.119).The research thus provides a 
valuable contribution to the reflexive approach developing further the theoretical 
position of Archer (2003) and the ethnographic research methodology of Hammersley 
and Atkinson (1995). This supports the development of participant observation 
ethnography as requiring a reflexive element (see above). More widely this also allows 
examination of how reflexivity within organizational research may be developed and 
explored, but within an appropriate (and possibly realist) conceptual framework. Thus, 
reflexivity is beneficial as supporting the development of theory, not merely as a means 
to allow personal reflection or management autobiography.  
In seeking to answer the research question as to decision influences the exploration 
demonstrates an original examination of the range of influences present. Although the 
stratification of frames into three levels is clearly an established technique 
(Cornelissen and Werner 2014), this project provides an original application and by 
aligning the frame stratification with the use of the negotiated order shows a rich 
analysis of the decision-making environment, the influences on it, and how the order 
itself generates influences. It is proposed that the understanding of the negotiated 
order and, in particular, the exploration of the power dimensions occurring within the 
specific influences on a public sector body, is an original and significant contribution 
to theory. The sociology of board level decision-making is clearly demonstrated, and 
the resulting theoretical production of a social power model may be seen as an original 
and valid analytical model that can be used to explore decision-making. The model 
further develops the concepts of power in organizations (as previously described by 
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Clegg (2006) for example), bounded rationality (Simon 1997), and the negotiated order 
(Strauss 1963, 1978). In these respects, the analysis of the research is a detailed 
exploration of the sociology of organizational decision-making in a CCG: this being 
unique as a study and an application of the negotiated order concept in a novel way. 
The negotiated order here is a tool to understand board level decision-making social 
relations and the research is a twenty first century application of the concept at an 
upper-echelon (board) level. It may be speculated that this research takes the early 
conceptual developments of Strauss (1963) into a more mature organizational form in 
a new millennium. Furthermore, the sociological approach to organizational dynamics 
is a novel development of the type of behavioural analysis, developed by Watson 
(2003) for example. This analysis is not just an updating of earlier negotiated order 
research, but a fusion of decision theory, particularly bounded rationality, with 
organizational social dynamics. The conclusion from the analytical models and the 
emerging social power model is that many influencing factors will be involved in 
shaping the outcomes of a decision process. These will include evidence, the wider 
social environment, and the specific situation of the decision agents, be they 
individuals or organizations. Although all these factors will be as important, possibly 
as significant as any will be the power dynamics within the decision-makers. As such 
the research confirms that any normative model of decision-making, such as being 
based on evidence for example, must still recognise the role of power in affecting the 
decision outcome.  
The emergence of the CCGs following the NHS reforms allowed the UK health system 
to test the benefit of decision-making bodies populated with a majority of clinicians. 
This study may be the first to explore in detail a decision taken by such a body and 
thus allows an original consideration of the organizational dynamics that such clinical 
preponderance may promote. As the NHS, and indeed healthcare management 
internationally, explore the role of medical professionals in decision-making, this study 
may usefully inform how the management roles of clinicians develop. The various 
papers discussing NHS boards (as described in the literature review) may not explore 
the impact of clinical input and thus this research does allow discussion as to how 
clinical involvement may affect the decision-making process. Consequently, one may 
infer that this research is the first that explores the impact that GPs in positions of 
decision-making authority in the NHS may have; and the implications of such a position 
of responsibility may have for the NHS in future. Clinicians may bring multiple benefits 
to a health commissioning decision-making process: but this may come with its own 
complications and costs. The study provides a detailed case study demonstrating 
some of the dynamics that may be present when there is clinical involvement in senior 
decision-making.  
It is suggested that this work may inform further understanding of organizational theory 
and assist in developing management practice. The implications for management 
practice described in the thesis provide a further contribution to management 
knowledge with practical benefits to future management practice and research. The 
implications for management practice from the research reinforce a need for more 
  252 
consideration to how strategic decision-making is conducted (as described in chapter 
7). It is not entirely clear that NHS organizations (or the wider public sector, or indeed 
organizations at all) are sufficiently reflective and reflexive47 on their practice and thus 
able to learn from experience. The fighter pilot de-brief example (Ron et al. 2006) may 
or may not be particularly applicable to settings such as a CCG, but there is, 
nevertheless, benefit in organizations understanding how they can be more reflective. 
There may also be a case for challenging academic institutions, business schools in 
particular, to be more practice focussed and to embed themselves in the corporate 
world. Consideration may be given to whether the research conducted here could be 
used as a model for strategic reflection and organizational development, facilitated by 
input from business schools. Thus, during the process of the current research project 
and previous post-graduate research the author has been reminded of the need for 
work to be appropriately ‘academic’. Arguably business schools need to be challenged 
to make sure that, despite the need for academic rigour, their research is practice 
based and potentially useful for the business environment.  
Areas for further research 
In following up on the case study subject it would be interesting and beneficial to 
conduct a retrospective study of the action taken following the decision point in the 
study. This would inform the links between decision-making and implementation and 
show how the power relations and negotiated order played out after the decision. It 
may also be beneficial, bearing in mind the question focussed on the influences on the 
decision-making process, for further research to investigate with some of the external 
agencies to the CCG their perspectives on the decision taken.  
The author would recommend researchers and a sponsoring business school consider 
a longitudinal piece of research over an extended period where organizational 
behaviour and strategic decision-making can be analysed over a longer time frame 
than this study. Although the CCG under scrutiny is not considered atypical, there may 
be some peculiarities in the organization that limit the ultimate generalizability of 
conclusions from this research to a wider organizational scope. Thus, one avenue for 
further study would be conduct a similar ethnography on a major decision but across 
two organizations simultaneously. A recent development in organizational thinking has 
been that of institutional logics (Thornton Ocasio 2008). This has been applied to the 
different approaches of professional groups in healthcare (Reay and Hinings 2009) 
and may provide a further sophistication to analysing the negotiated order in 
healthcare bodies. Due to the politically agenda driven nature of the NHS and wider 
public sector, this may be relatively straightforward to design. Gaining access to the 
decision makers and appropriate fora may be more difficult.  
Reflections on healthcare decision-making 
The ambition to improve the quality of healthcare whilst working within restrained 
financial resources remains one of the fundamental challenges facing healthcare 
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systems. This challenge, working within a currently ever difficult financial environment, 
provides the paradox that strategic commissioning decisions will become ever more 
important; but be taken in an increasingly complex and uncertain context. For those 
charged with the responsibility for decision-making passion may use reason as its tool. 
But a tool to help achieve the best outcomes for the passionate desires and not merely 
an excuse to justify decisions from emotion or prejudice. Sapolsky (2017) infers that 
rational reasoning and emotion are not antagonistic in human thinking but rather 
complementary: 
But while emotion and cognition can be somewhat separable, they’re rarely in 
opposition. Instead they are intertwined in a collaborative relationship needed 
for normal function, and as tasks with both emotive and cognitive components 
become more difficult (making an increasingly complex economic decision in a 
setting that is increasingly unfair), activity in the two structures becomes more 
synchronized. (Sapolsky 2017, p.58) 
(This complementary relationship is demonstrated in experimental decision-making 
research by Bechara et al (1997) based on the somatic marker hypothesis, described 
above.) 
Passion and emotion in decision-making should not be ignored or side-lined: they 
should be celebrated. To allow their celebration, however, organizations need to allow 
reasoned argument to have its place for the decision-making process to be as rational 
as it can be, bounded or not.  
The complex, ever-changing nature of strategic decision-making may be described as 
dynamically dialectical or just plain messy. Either way crashing obviousness may be 
in short supply. The power struggles of different interest groups and external pressures 
making claims to objectivity they may not deserve. This social nature of the decision-
making process is reflected in March (1988, p.14): 
Decision-making is a highly contextual, sacred activity, surrounded by myth and 
ritual, and as much concerned with the interpretative order as with the specifics 
of particular choices. 
Consequently, the task for those tasked with the decisions, navigating through the dark 
and tangled stretches, is nevertheless to construct processes that rise to the challenge 
as rationally and as (nearly) objectively, as they can.  
The view from the battlefield - Final thoughts of the researcher 
The thesis and its associated research project have been a journey of learning and 
exploration. My original motivation was to gain greater understanding of decision-
making in the NHS. Building on my masters’ research into the use of evidence, there 
seemed a benefit in studying the actual practice of decision-making. This progressed 
to the use of the negotiated order concept as an interpretive frame: a focus on the 
process of coalition forming, deal-making, and power struggle within the dynamics of 
the organization. The subject of analysis was primarily that of language: that used in 
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the discussions and reported observations and the texts available throughout the 
process. At this point the research explored the negotiated order behaviours in the 
case study. Methodologically the research started out considering the larger concepts 
- social structure, corporate strategy, organizational environment – and through 
analysis moved into the micro-foundations of the case study – codes, memes, tropes, 
various index words. The process of analysing research data then allowed a return to 
considering the strategic oversight of the subject (the ‘bigger picture’). This analytical 
cycle was consistent with the research methodology.  
Certain observed phenomena arising from the analysis were expected: the 
acknowledged presence of differing coordinated groups; the shifting positions and deal 
making; and the emergence of particular concepts (discovered as research codes). 
Others emerged after the analysis of the data. Thus, power was identified as a 
mechanism in forming the negotiated order at the outset, but the analysis suggested 
this may have a greater importance in the dynamics of the organization than first 
thought. Thus, along with the general return to the literature as the data was analysed, 
it was necessary to explore in depth organizational theories of power. This supported 
the creation of the social power model and for the author showed that in the process 
of organizational work, consideration should always be given to the concepts or power 
and influence: where it appears; who holds it; and how it is used. This assessment 
may be useful learning for the NHS Chief Executive: at any important decision points 
or when there is a need to drive through an objective or piece of policy, understand 
where power lies and how you can manage the distribution of power.  
The re-assertion of the importance of organizational strategy was, to the researcher, 
a surprising conclusion. At one level this learning was mundane: at another a certain 
moment of clarity. A complexity of the public sector is the lamination of authority: thus, 
the NHS commissioning system at the time of the case study had a national, ‘parent’, 
body (NHS England) and a series of local bodies tasked with enacting the national 
direction for healthcare (the CCGs). One could, therefore, ask whether there is a need 
for a genuine CCG strategy: isn’t it really just the job of CCGs to implement the national 
vision (5YFV at this juncture)? For the researcher at least, the case study seems to 
confirm the need for statutory organizations to have their own strategy: inevitably 
informed by a national direction, but locally sensitive, and, just as importantly, owned 
by those to whom it should be important.  
The ownership of a meaningful strategy related to the desired outcomes of the 
corporate body and its stakeholders is considered important. Its development and 
ongoing practice will occur in a complex environment. This environment may often not 
provide a clearly objective assessment of what can and should be done. Such 
objectivity may be difficult if not impossible. In complex, messy, and muddy waters 
features which appear obvious to all may be difficult to find. But in the absence of 
‘crashing obviousness’ strategic decision-makers should not abandon the search for 
objectivity and the use of a scientific method. This may be influenced by the higher 
level of clinical input in the CCG decision-making process.  
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In my MBA thesis I used a reference to Richard Dawkins (2005) Ancestor’s Tale as a 
comparison of how animal evolution may be compared to organizational behaviour. 
Here I used the example of the somewhat bizarre looking star-nosed mole: a creature 
that looks very odd, but whose anatomy is perfectly configured for its living 
environment. My conclusion was that in organizational decision-making, as with 
evolution, “an animal is the way it is because it needs to be” (Dawkins 2005, p. 250). 
Although I recognise this assertion may still be partially valid, probably only partially. It 
may be important that organizational actors do not have too deterministic view of their 
world, and how they use the available resources at their disposal in the quest for 
improvement. This brings to mind not the tale of the star-nosed mole, but the tale of 
the duck-billed platypus. This is another animal whose evolution makes them superbly 
adapted for their environment. Specifically, their bill has a major and very sophisticated 
function: 
The point is that the platypus bill is not just a pair of jaws for dabbling and 
feeding…But far more interestingly the platypus bill is a reconnaissance 
device…Platypuses hunt crustaceans, insect larvae and other small creatures 
in the mud at the bottom of streams. Eyes aren’t much use in mud, and the 
platypus keeps them tight shut while hunting. Not only that, it closes its nostrils 
and its ears as well. See no prey, hear no prey, smell no prey: yet it finds prey 
with great efficiency, catching half its own weight in a day…They switch off three 
senses which are important to us (and perhaps to them on land) as if to 
concentrate all their attention on some other sense. (Dawkins 2005, p.284) 
The lesson here may be that switching off the senses when only one is needed may 
be optimal. Switching off other sources of information and relying only on one (or 
principally on one), when it is not clear which is the most useful, may be less than 
optimal. Thus, for CCGs the rich and valuable information provided by local clinical 
leaders may not necessarily be of such quality that it should result in closing 
‘eyes…nostrils and ears as well’. As a corporate executive of a clinically led NHS body 
it prompts me to understand how to utilise the insight of clinicians without such insight 
becoming a distortion. Use the duck-bill but keep the eyes and ears open. 
Finally, the project has continually presented me with an image of my internal 
polarisation. That between me the social scientific researcher, fascinated by the 
complex, living tapestry and tangled webs of human behaviour in organizational 
sociology. As opposed to me the healthcare manager, who regardless of the sociology 
and the interesting observations, wants to find practical ways to make decision-making 
better. Without crashing obviousness, the path of strategic decision-making may be 
complex and messy. It should still be driven by the passions of those making the 
decisions, but beneficially the passions need to be managed within a wider corporate 
approach. For the management leaders in the organization the process needs to 
provide sufficient development of strategic thinking to work against anecdote and bias. 
But also, to recognise that the process of ‘negotiation everywhere’ may be ever-
present and a critical role is then to manage the process of negotiation. A negotiation 
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that could involve the expert, the ill-informed, the interested, the unconcerned, the 
present, and the absent. The practice of discourse may not, however, imbue any 
special status to expertise, information, interest, concern, presence, or absence. 
Discourse may, nevertheless, demonstrate that all are engaged in negotiating the 
organization’s order. The role of the organizational leader in this environment, 
perhaps, is to not to attempt to ‘manage’ or control the process (this may be very 
difficult or impossible) but rather to facilitate consideration, challenge, and debate. 
Ultimately the factors influencing strategic decision-making will emerge in the 
dynamics of the negotiated order. The degree of influence of the factors in play a 
feature of the power balances of those creating the negotiated order, driven by reason 
and passion.  
  
  257 
Glossary	of	definitions	used	in	the	thesis	
 
Bounded rationality – the limitations imposed on actors in organizations 
(‘organizational man’) the constrict their level of rationality in decision-making, 
specifically, their cognitive ability, the quality of available information, and the culture 
of satisficing. 
Case study research - an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin 2009, p. 18). 
Commissioning - the process used to plan, deliver and monitor services for a 
population, based on strong leadership and effective relationships, great outcomes 
and best value (NHS England 2014). Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) emerged 
from the 2012 Health and Social Care Act as the bodies responsible for the majority 
of NHS commissioning.  
Commissioning cycle – the description of the commissioning process, common 
features being: strategic needs assessment; deciding priorities and outcomes; 
planning and designing services; options appraisal; sourcing; delivery; and monitoring 
and review (Murray 2008, p. 91).   
Critical realism – a research project that is an attempt to reconcile elements of realist 
and subjective interpretivist approaches, with the emergence of an ontology that 
recognises necessary elements of multiple research approaches. 
Decision - a judgement to take action made from a range of alternatives, to achieve 
an objective, or bring resolution to an indeterminate issue. Decision, therefore, 
requires choice, a goal towards which the process strives and an action resulting from 
the judgement. 
Dual-process decision-making – often described as ‘System 1/System 2’ 
(Kahneman 2012) dual process separates decision-making into: a short-cut ‘fast’ 
process based on intuition, heuristics, and sometimes driven by bias; and a ‘slow’ 
measured process where information and evidence is evaluated with greater 
consideration.  
Ethnography – a form of social science research with the direct observation of 
subjects in their usual social environment (Watson 2003) over an extended period of 
time with the researcher actively participating with the subjects in the normal cultural 
setting (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). 
Frame – an interpretive device to give meaning and understanding to events and 
processes, based on knowledge and experience.  
Group polarisation - group decisions in certain situations may be riskier than the 
individual decisions of group members (Isenberg 1986). A group decision model where 
strong views become ever stronger through the decision process. 
  258 
Groupthink - when the members’ striving for unanimity override their motivation to 
realistically appraise alternative courses of action” (Janis 1982, p.9). 
Hegemony - the cultural predominance of a set of ideas and beliefs that is accepted 
by a social group. 
Heuristic – a mental shortcut (‘rules of thumb’ or ‘educated guess’) that allow speedy 
and pragmatic solutions to problem solving. 
Internal market – public sector reforms aimed at making public sector services 
operate more like private sector market-based services, through the use of techniques 
such as competition, tendering, and plurality of provision. 
Negotiation - observable attempts by decision actors to influence the organizational 
structures, power relations, and decision outcomes in the observed situation in 
accordance with the decision actors’ interests and objectives. 
Negotiated order - the pattern of organizational activities that has arisen or emerged 
over time as an outcome of the interplay of the variety of interests, understandings, 
reactions and initiatives of the individuals and groups involved in the organization” 
(Watson 2002, p. 76). 
Power – the ability to change something (‘power to’) or the ability to make another 
individual or group do something (‘power over’). 
Primary care – typically, but not exclusively, the first stage of healthcare provision, 
usually occurring in settings close to patients’ own homes. Primary care services 
include General Practice, Dentistry, and Community Pharmacy.  
Prospect theory – a theory of decision-making under conditions of uncertainty where 
decision-makers asymmetrically evaluate risk based on whether choices are framed 
as gain (promoting risk versions) or loss (promoting risk seeking). 
Rationality – a) the ‘weak’ definition: based on reason; b) the cognitive scientific 
definition: “the actions of an entity in its environment that serve its goals” (Stanovich 
2011, p.5) 
Rational selection - with the evaluation and selection of alternatives as part of a value 
system where knowledge of the consequences of the alternatives can be assessed. 
This is further separated into ‘objectively rational’ where a decision would be seen as 
rational if it maximized the outcomes in a situation; and ‘subjectively rational’ where it 
is seen to maximize the outcomes given the known information at the time of the 
decision, although subsequent knowledge may show this information to be inadequate 
(from Simon 1997). 
Secondary care – the term usually describes hospital-based care, occurring in District 
General Hospital type settings, where units typically serve a population of 200,000 or 
more. 
Sociology - the study of the relationships which develop between human beings as 
they organize themselves and are organized by others in societies and how these 
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patterns influence and are influenced by the actions and interactions of people and 
how they make sense of their lives and identities (Watson 2003, p.3).  
Strategy - The direction and scope of an organisation over the long term, which 
achieves advantage in a changing environment through its configuration of resources 
and competences with the aim of fulfilling stakeholder expectations. (Johnson et al. 
2005, p. 9) 
Strategic decision - An infrequent decision made by leaders of an organization that 
critically affects long-term organizational health, survival, and involve significant 
changes to resource allocation that impact on the organization’s stakeholders. 
Tertiary care – highly specialised hospital care usually delivered in larger specialist 
centres serving populations of 500,000 to 2 million across large geographical areas. 
Value – the achievement of social purposes (Moore 2000) 
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Appendix	1	-	Comparative	healthcare	commissioning	
Studies of comparative health systems (for example OECD 2008) show a number of 
discernible patterns (see graph below). Firstly, it appears as nations become more 
prosperous, they spend a larger proportion of their national wealth on healthcare. 
Associated with the higher national income and the greater expenses there tends to 
be an increase in life expectancy. But for the majority of developed countries the 
improvement in longevity appears to grow progressively smaller, demonstrating a ‘law 
of diminishing returns’. Some authors (LeFanu 2000) describe modern medicine as 
reaching a plateau where further improvement becomes ever more difficult. Such a 
picture implies one of the challenges facing commissioning is to maximize the scope 
for improvement, against the likely pattern of improvement delivering marginal 
incremental gain.  
The second obvious pattern is that whilst most countries conform to relationships 
between healthcare spend and life expectancy of slowing improvement (consistent 
with the logarithmic trend line below), outliers exist. At the time of the OECD 2008 
report, Japan shows the highest life expectancy for major developed countries with a 
lower spend than comparative nations, including less than half the per capita spend 
than the USA. Of the explanations postulated many include wider social and economic 
factors, such as a lower relative level of social and economic inequality (Wilkinson 
2010). Other cultural, dietary, and lifestyle factors may contribute to Japan’s 
performance (Hashimoto et al. 2011). But its lower level of health spend does not 
appear detrimental to population longevity. This may not be directly attributable to a 
system of health commissioning, or indeed of a system of healthcare at all necessarily. 
But it does indicate that a nation’s health may be influenced by how it uses its 
resources, and the search for value for money in healthcare may be a factor that 
should be of high priority for governments. (Shibuya et al. (2011) state new drugs take 
on average 3.7 years after first clinical use in the world to market launch in Japan. 
Whilst seeming to restrict the population’s access to newer drug therapies, such delays 
may significantly reduce overall drug costs, with evidently no population level impact 
on health outcomes.) 
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Figure 26 - OECD Review of Comparative Health Systems 2008 – funding 
compared to life expectancy 
This conclusion is amplified by consideration of the data’s ‘villain’: the USA. Spending 
more than twice as a proportion of GDP on health than Japan and substantially more 
than its major European comparators, the USA shows disappointingly poor health 
outcomes. Although there are wider contributory factors that influence the results, 
studies suggest that after accounting for possible causes such as violent crime, the 
results remain a significant outlier (Muennig 2010). Muennig (2010) suggests there 
may be links between the very fact of high cost and the poor outcomes:  
Finally, unregulated fee-for-service reimbursement and an emphasis on 
specialty care may contribute to high US health spending, while leading to 
unneeded procedures and fragmentation of care…unusually high medical 
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spending is associated with worsening, rather than improving, fifteen-year 
survival (Muennig 2010, p. 8).  
The graph below shows how USA health outcomes for 45-year-old women remain the 
worst of the peer group in 2005 compared to 30 years earlier. Furthermore, the USA 
in 2005 demonstrates outcomes marginally worse than the Netherlands 30 year prior.  
 
Figure 27 - 15-year survival for 45-year-old women USA and 12 comparators 
(from Muennig 2010) 
A fundamental feature of the USA health system is not only its insurance-based 
character, but also that there is currently no systematic coverage applied to the whole 
population. Thus, as of 2008, approximately 15% of the USA population did not have 
comprehensive health coverage (Krugman 2009). Although this population cohort will 
have access to emergency medical care, arguably this feature of the system distorts 
investment away from preventative care, in favour of more expensive treatment for 
more serious health conditions. This distortion may be further amplified by a smaller, 
but well-resourced population cohort who can afford expensive specialist care, even 
where such care has limited supporting evidence. Thus, provider organizations 
seeking to maximize financial gain invest more heavily in expensive specialist hospital 
care, as there may be more limited incentives to develop more ‘upstream’ primary and 
secondary prevention or screening initiatives. The USA provides a further example of 
resource allocation and the role of something resembling public sector commissioning 
in the UK. Thus, the US programmes of Medicare (health insurance coverage for the 
elderly) and Medicaid (coverage for those on social security benefit) are state funded 
care programmes. Evidence exists to show that whilst the other funding streams of 
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healthcare in the US have seen significant recent cost growth, that of Medicaid has 
seen largely flat growth (Chandra 2013) as demonstrated in the following graph. 
 
Figure 28 - US health spending by funding type from Chandra 2013 
At the time of writing it is unclear if the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(often abbreviated to Affordable Care Act) will lead to a substantial improvement in the 
overall health of the US population (Rak 20130).  
One of the complexities of evaluating different health systems is distinguishing what is 
commissioning, as other systems may look very different from the NHS. However, it 
may be possible to distinguish functions that resemble the system of commissioning 
in the UK. Indeed, arguably the relatively unique feature of the UK health system is a 
socialized system of planning and purchasing (commissioning) and a socialized 
system of care delivery, through what may be considered as largely nationalized 
hospitals, community, and primary care. But other countries may have systems that 
do contain elements consistent with commissioning. Examples of this are briefly 
described below. 
• Canada has a ‘single-payer’ system that provides comprehensive healthcare 
purchased by public funding, with very low administrative costs (Klein 2007, 
Krugman 2009). 
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• France and Germany provide a form of commissioning, with largely public 
funding, but through funding of insurance companies or “sickness funds”. 
Systems of co-payment and individual private additional insurance provide 
greater choice than the Canadian or British systems. But at higher 
administrative costs (Klein 2007, Krugman 2009). 
• Veterans’ Health Administration (VHA) provides a form of commissioning within 
the USA that resembles elements of European or Canadian commissioning. 
However, its obvious limitation is its exclusive access to former military 
personnel (Klein 2007). 
 
Analysis by the Commonwealth Fund (Squires and Anderson 2015) shows the pattern 
of international healthcare spending. This demonstrates a consistent trend amongst 
developed nations of reducing growth in healthcare spending as a consequence of the 
2008 economic slump. This shows the UK spending as still much lower than many 
comparative nations. 
 
 
Figure 29 - Figure 3 - Healthcare Spending a % of GDP from Squires and 
Anderson 2015 
Furthermore, it shows the UK as being only one of two countries in the group of 
developed nations with a real-terms negative growth rate in the post-slum period.  
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Table 22 - Comparative Healthcare Spending (from Squires and Anderson 2015) 
 
The consistent achievements of high-quality (if not necessarily highest quality) health 
outcomes from the NHS driven UK health system may indicate the potential for overall 
efficiency from a largely publicly funded healthcare system. However, it is also 
necessary to consider the wider picture of ‘care’ that needs to consider not only 
healthcare but also social care. Thus, the combined picture of care delivery provides 
a less severe assessment of the USA against comparative countries whilst maintaining 
the sense of higher priority for care funding in nations such as France and Sweden. 
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Figure 30 - Health and social care spending as % of GDP from Squires and 
Anderson 
As discussed, the outcomes emerging in the USA from the impact of the Affordable 
Care Act (Rak 2013) are unclear: however, the development of initiatives such 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACO) is likely to see the establishment of systems 
that may compare more obviously with UK style focus on population health and 
managing need.  
The comparative health analysis may present the following, tentative, conclusions: 
 Increased healthcare funding may often be associated with improvements in 
life expectancy, but continued improvement will not be linear. 
 The overall shape of healthcare systems, particularly its degree of population 
coverage and degree of focus on health improvement, will have a significant 
influence on health outcomes. 
 Publicly funded healthcare can achieve good health outcomes and higher value 
for money by restricting access to marginal benefit health interventions. 
 High-cost specialist hospital care may improve individual health outcomes, but 
the benefits at a population level are less certain.  
Despite the difficulties of comparing health systems, the international evidence 
appears to confirm there are benefits to some form of healthcare population strategy 
within a form of healthcare resourcing. This may be achieved by a process consistent 
  267 
with the NHS definition of commissioning although there may be many potential 
models. Furthermore, comprehensive access to care requires fitting healthcare usage 
within a limited, indeed increasingly limited, resource envelope. Consequently, 
achieving value for money from healthcare is a strategic issue: arguably for NHS 
commissioning the major strategic objective.  
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Appendix	2	–	A	Short	Organizational	History	of	the	
NHS	
Introduction 
This section provides a brief summary of the NHS from the perspective of its major 
organizational reconfigurations within their political policy context. More detailed 
history of the NHS can be found from Webster (2002), whilst Timmins (1996) provides 
a broader overview of the emergence of the UK welfare state, including the NHS.  
Conception from Beveridge to Bevan 1942 to 1948.  
The emergence of the modern welfare state in the UK does not have one single 
starting point. Various early attempts at forms of social welfare and ‘safety nets’ have 
been observed. But the point where, arguably, the modern form of a welfare state 
appears as a coherent concept may be seen as a range of initiatives and papers 
emerging in World War 2 (Timmins 1996). The most comprehensive statement as to 
a new type of state organized welfare was the Beveridge report in 1942 (Kynaston 
2007), targeting the ‘five giants of evil’, want, disease, ignorance, squalor, idleness. 
Arguably this was a critical step in developing a political consensus across parties for 
a general welfare state. This led to many of the reforms seen in the post-war Attlee 
government (1945-51), including the development of the NHS (Kynaston 2007).  
Early Years, 1948 to 1962 - Provision not Commission 
The Labour Government and its Health Minister Aneurin Bevan established the NHS 
despite opposition from the medical establishment and votes against its introduction 
by the Conservative Party (Kynaston 2007). This period was primarily concerned with 
establishing the service and creating one ‘free at the point of need’ from existing health 
services. Thus, the overall strategy of the period may be seen as bringing the disparate 
parts of existing healthcare under one service with some common standards. But there 
may have been relatively little focus on an intentional strategy for service development, 
and arguably commissioning in its current form was not explicitly evident. 
1951 is an important milestone for the purposes of analysis of systems for resource 
allocation, as it was the date Bevan resigned from the Cabinet due to the introduction 
of prescription charges for dental care and spectacles (Kynaston 2007). Although the 
specific issues at the time involved wider financial pressures (primarily the Korean 
War) it also reflected the growing financial pressure of a comprehensive, largely free 
at the point of need, healthcare system. Throughout this period cost growth outstripped 
financial forecasts and the early view of initial investment to make people well and then 
a smaller ongoing top-up to maintain health was proven to be completely erroneous 
(“The NHS proved spectacularly more expensive than expected” Timmins (1996, p. 
157). Some of the first inklings about the need for decisions on resource allocation 
came within 18 months of the service being established (Bevan commenting, “I 
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shudder to think of the ceaseless cascade of medicine which is pouring down British 
throats at the present time.” (Timmins, 1996, p. 131).  
Maturity 1962 to 1974 - Planning and reorganization 
This period saw a shift of focus towards the estate of the NHS and a greater focus on 
planning. Enoch Powell’s time as Health Minister produced the Hospital Plan, signaling 
the emergence of what may be considered the modern District General Hospital for 
populations of 125,000 or greater (Timmins 1996). As with many NHS plans, the costs 
of the programme were to prove significantly larger than the initial prediction. This shift 
to a more strategic intention on service planning with some deliberate statements as 
to future design and configuration (the concept of the District General Hospital (DGH) 
being of strategic significance) was more obvious turn towards an approach closer to 
modern commissioning. Thus, the service, now established, had to look to its future 
and how it managed it resources. The Powell era may be seen as the first coherent 
attempt to manage NHS capital at a strategic level and recognized the lack of both 
investment and planning in major NHS capital (Webster 2002).  
An important and arguably necessary element in the emergence of increased strategic 
focus may have been the establishment of a credible and sustained senior 
management at the top of the NHS. This provided focus, leadership, and the ability to 
effectively negotiate with the Treasury (Webster, 2002, p. 61). Similarly, as the NHS 
has been part of the Department of Health infrastructure and a large proportion of the 
overall public sector, it has at times had an ‘organization within an organization’ status. 
In the view of Webster (2002) the increasing status of healthcare as a government 
priority was accompanied by more senior figures occupying positions at the helm of 
the DoH with a consequent result of a larger share of public spending coming to 
healthcare.  
Health Authorities 1974 to 1983 
Something closer to the modern concept of commissioning initiated in this period: with 
the establishment of Regional and Area Health Authorities (RHA and AHA). 
Furthermore, the creation of the Resource Allocation Working Party (RAWP) was an 
attempt by central government to shape how resources were allotted across the 
system and reflected a belief that the existing resource allocation did not correspond 
to health need. The development occurred alongside extension of wider public sector 
spending controls such as cash-limits to the NHS, administered by the new RHAs and 
AHAs (Webster 2002). The structural re-organization was in retrospect one of an 
increasingly frequent process of NHS re-structuring.  
Thatcher and Griffiths 1983 to 1989 
The Thatcher administrations (beginning in 1979) commissioned two reports from Roy 
Griffiths (previously a senior figure in the Sainsbury’s supermarket chain) (Timmins 
1996, Webster 2002). The decade saw an attempt to use more open market 
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mechanisms in the service (through initiatives such as competitive tendering) and the 
introduction, particularly within the hospital sector, of ‘general management’. The end 
of this period and the appearance of Kenneth Clarke as Health Secretary appeared (in 
some authors’ views such as Timmins 1996) to herald an end to considerations for 
widespread privatisation of the NHS. Griffiths (Webster 2002) highlighted the 
perceived lack of management and accountability ('who was in charge') with the result 
of a focus less on how services were planned and delivered and more on the structure 
of the system and the relationship between those paying for services and those 
delivering.  
Emergence of the internal market 1989 to 1997 
This period saw the introduction of the internal market and the ‘purchaser-provider 
split’ between those with responsibility for purchasing (commissioning) healthcare and 
those delivering it. This formal split has been in place, in different guises, in the NHS 
from this period until the current day. In the 1990s government policy was influenced 
in part by foreign experts, such as Enthoven (Timmins 1996), who encouraged a move 
towards systems that were either actually based on, or mirrored, insurance type 
funding (the reference point often being the USA). The evidence for such systems 
either improving health outcomes or reducing cost was limited (Timmins 1996), but the 
drive towards privatisation of public services working as virtual markets was part of 
government policy: NHS policy thus reflected this drive.  
The purchaser-provider split was accompanied by (and in part required) the 
emergence of NHS Trusts as more autonomous provider bodies. Although hospital 
Trusts were still part of the NHS and remained nationalized institutions within a state-
run, tax funded system, they were now established as statutory bodies in their own 
right. This status included the formal production of published annual reports and 
audited annual accounts. After the introduction of hospital trusts there then saw the 
establishment of GP fundholding. This provided GP practices with direct responsibility 
for elements of NHS funding, again as an element of trying to make the NHS operate 
more like a traditional market (Timmins 1996).  
The NHS Plan 1997 to 2010 
Although the Labour Government was critical of the internal market it did not abandon 
the purchaser-provider separation. Primary Care Groups (PCGs) replaced GP 
Fundholding, but the function remained broadly the same, if allowing less obviously 
direct benefits to GP practices themselves (Timmins 2008). However, the NHS Plan 
was a more clearly centrally driven programme of health improvement, with a 
nationally mandated set of performance targets. This period saw significant growth in 
NHS spending (average annual growth in the period of 6%) with increases in capacity 
driving down waiting times and improving outcomes. But despite financial growth the 
NHS contained many organizations that were financially challenged (Timmins 2008).  
This period also included an energetic attempt to grow private sector involvement in 
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healthcare. Although partly successful, the private provision established was relatively 
limited and despite the government’s ambition to have up to 40% provided by the 
private sector (Mulholland 2006). From some perspectives the government in this 
period was more active in establishing NHS internal markets, as the period saw: the 
creation of Foundation Trusts, in theory with greater autonomy than NHS Trusts and 
allowed to secure their own private financing; and the introduction of a national pricing 
system (Payment by Results).  
Liberating the NHS 2010 to 2015 
As in the years of the early 1990s the reforms introduced from the 2010 White Paper 
(Department of Health 2010) were not directed primarily at how healthcare was to be 
delivered, but rather as to how service redesign and particularly commissioning should 
be conducted. The direction was for a clinically led commissioning system, leadership 
provided largely through GPs. The aim of the policy was to promote ‘bottom-up’ service 
redesign driven by local clinicians responsive to their patients. The policy seemed most 
consistent under the stewardship of the Secretary of State considered as its parent, 
Andrew Lansley. Early versions of the annual NHS guidance (previously called the 
operating framework) emphasised bottom-up redesign and ‘assumed liberty’. But the 
planning round of 2014-15 produced guidance 90 pages long with a return to top-down 
instructions, targets, and what may see a return to centralised strategic thinking not 
dissimilar to the Labour NHS Plan.  
The 5 Year Forward View (5YFV) (NHS England 2014) emerged as the strategy 
document describing NHS intentions for the period to 2020, receiving a level of support 
from all of the major political parties (demonstrated in policy statements made during 
the 2015 General election). This also appeared to signal a return to a more directive 
and prescriptive approach to NHS policy than contained within Lansley’s ‘assumed 
liberty’. The case study was undertaken in the aftermath of the 5YFV with NHS 
organizations assessing how the latest stage of NHS strategy will be implemented.  
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Appendix	3	–	A	Financial	History	of	the	NHS	
In addition to documenting the history of the NHS with a perspective on 
commissioning, it may be useful to briefly document the history from the perspective 
of its finances. In large part commissioning is a process of resource allocation and 
therefore, finance is a significant feature of the whole commissioning process. The 
financial context of commissioning may be seen as a major influence on the dynamics 
of NHS decision-making.  
The historic pattern of NHS spending from 1949 to 2010 is demonstrated below 
(Crawford and Emerson 2012): 
 
 
The chart demonstrates growth in actual spend and as percentage of national income 
(measured as Gross Domestic Product from OHE 2009). (Arguably the pattern of the 
graph overestimates the growth in later years, as the left scale is in actual £ spent 
providing an apparent sense of exponential growth in later years. Thus, the percentage 
of national income may be the more relevant measure.)  Appleby et al. (2009) 
describes a number of features and trends of NHS spending: 
• Spending has tended to increase consistently over the life of the NHS. 
• Although it has increased as a proportion of GDP this has not been uniform growth 
• UK spend on healthcare has been consistently lower than the European average as 
a percentage of GDP 
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• The Labour government of 1997-2010 had a deliberate target of increasing the 
proportion of national wealth spent on health 
• Despite this growth UK spending has remained below its richer European 
comparators (France and Germany) 
• The UK spend on healthcare is largely through the NHS with a much lower private 
sector healthcare spend.  
There appear to be no periods in the whole NHS history where actual health spend 
failed to increase. There is a brief period in the early 1950s where the real-terms 
(inflation adjusted) NHS spend decreased. This appeared at a time from 1950 where 
the NHS introduced limited charging for services (such as prescription charges). 
Although both Labour and Conservative administrations from the 1950s and 1960s 
either introduced or did not completely abandon limited charging, neither party showed 
any enthusiasm for more widespread charging and move away from the basic tenet of 
an NHS ‘free at the point of need’.  
The overall pattern of growth of the NHS and allocated to periods of political rule is 
summarised by Appleby (2009): 
 
Thus, there was a degree of overall consistency across governments until the later 
part of the Labour administration of 1997-2010. The most dramatic rise in real-terms 
growth was in the current century. The period from 2000-2010 saw the growth in NHS 
spending support significant increases in hospital capacity, in part driven by the high-
quality but expensive Private Finance Initiative (PFI). This growth may be seen as a 
step-change in funding growth and concomitant growth in service capacity. However, 
the implementation of new workforce policies (such as the European Working Time 
Directive) resulting in new contractual and payment frameworks also came at 
considerable cost. Mainstream media opinion in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis 
assumed a consensus of over-inflated and excessively funded public services, of 
which the NHS is part (Wren-Lewis 2015). But academic economic opinion (see Wren-
Lewis 2013) does not universally support the assertion of profligate public sector 
financing in this period and consequently it may not necessarily be assumed that the 
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NHS was over-funded. 
Throughout its history the NHS finances show not merely trends in financial 
performance but also contextual patterns that have, in part, informed commissioning 
strategies. There has been (since the very early days) an acceptance of the need for 
limited charging but limited to specific items of service such as drug prescriptions and 
sight testing. (Kynaston 2007). There has been and remains an unwillingness to 
charge for mainstream healthcare access (for example, attendances at a GP of A&E 
department). This is despite evidence of both differences in international comparisons 
being attributed to charging (Monitor 2014).  
The principle of ‘free at the point of need’ may be seen to promote expectations of 
access. Thus, the increase in demand for care resulted in lengthy waits for elective 
care by the mid 1990s (Thorlby and Maybin 2010). Responses of successive 
governments included a focus on performance targets to reduce waits and investment 
to increase capacity. However, it may be seen that improvements in access have 
increased expectations as to shorter and shorter waiting times and a desire for more 
convenient access. All of this improvement in access to care came at a significant 
financial cost (Thorlby and Maybin 2010).  
The limited level of private healthcare has been constant for most of the NHS history. 
The increase in public funding in the NHS from the late 1990s occurred at a time where 
private healthcare expenditure also increased, albeit at a slower rate than the rise in 
NHS expenditure. The respective growth in public and private sector healthcare 
expenditure is shown below (source ONS 2015): as of 2013 public sector funding 
equated to £125.5 billion and private sector £25.1 billion. (Private sector calculations 
include private healthcare spend by individuals, through private medical insurance and 
spend from NGOs such as registered charities.) 
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Attempts to increase the level of private funding and of private provision have had 
limited effect (ONS 2015). Little serious consideration has been given to the 
introduction of personal insurance-based services, or more widespread privatisation. 
Indeed, limited suggestions of greater involvement of a wider market of healthcare 
provision have sometimes been met with aggressively negative responses (Lafond 
2016).  
The emergence of the Five Year Forward View (5YFV) (NHS England 2014) occurred 
at a time of significant financial challenge for the NHS, within a wider programme of 
austerity level reduced public spending. The 5YFV included an explicit case for 
additional NHS funding above its recent historic levels. (Spending rose slightly above 
inflation from 2010-2015, but only by a very small degree.) This requirement for greater 
increases in resources reflected both: the higher than core inflation growth in 
healthcare costs; and the comparative reduction in healthcare spending as a 
proportion of GDP seen in the UK since the start of the financial downturn in 2008 
(Lafond et al. 2016).  
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Appendix	4	–	Sample	Interview	Questions	
 
1. Please provide a brief description of the issue under scrutiny from 
your perspective? 
2. Did you have any pre-conceptions about the issue for decision? 
3. What evidence informed your views in support of the decision-
making process? 
4. How important was personal experience of the services under 
consideration compared to the presence of empirical evidence?  
5. Did the decision-making process in the CCG change your opinions 
of the services under consideration? 
6. Was the eventual decision outcome close to what you expected at 
the outset of the process? 
7. What were the greatest influences on your decision-making in the 
process? 
8. Did you observe common interest groups emerging through the 
decision-making process? 
9. Did some decision-makers have more influence in the process? 
10. Did you perceive there was something everyone was 
responsible for in the process? 
11. How would you like CCG decision-making to change in the 
future? 
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Appendix	5	–	Discourse	Analysis	of	data	codes	
The method used in analysing the language in the coded data was the discourse 
‘building tasks’ described by Gee (2010): 
• Significance 
• Practices 
• Identities 
• Relationships 
• Politics 
• Connections 
• Sign system and knowledge 
Significance is when language is used to “render something significant or 
insignificant,” (Gee 2010, p.17).  
Practices are “social recognized and institutionally or culturally supported endeavour 
that usually involve sequencing or combining actions in certain ways” (Gee 2010, 
p.17).  
Identities are how language is used when we are “taking on a certain role or identity,” 
(p 18).  
Relationships are how language is used to express relationships “we have, want to 
have, or are trying to have” with others (Gee 2010, p.18). What relationship is the piece 
of language seeking to enact or reflect?  
Politics is “the use of language to build a perspective on social goods,” (Gee 2010, 
p.19): this being is something described as inadequate or adequate, good or bad, for 
a social group.  
Connections are “the use of language to render something connected or relevant to 
other things,” (Gee 2010, p.19): “How does this piece of language connect or 
disconnect things?” (Gee 2010, p.19). 
Sign Systems and Knowledge are how language and certain sign systems 
“privileged over others” (Gee 2010, p.20).  
Thus, we use the Gee typology to analyse the coding groups, with each coding 
category referenced to the discourse tasks. This analysis assesses how the codes 
relate to the framing environment and the three levels in the conceptual framework.  
Table 23 - Discourse analysis with building tasks of improvement codes 
Improvement	codes	
Building	Task	 How	used	in	the	discourse	Significance	 The	significance	of	these	codes	was	in	establishing	the	clinical	 justification	for	both	moving	to	a	more	radical	
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service	 change	 and	 for	 how	 the	 previous	 attempts	 at	incremental	changes	had	been	unsuccessful.		Practices	 The	codes	were	used	as	a	practice	to	describe	the	need	to	establish	improved	services	for	patients.	They	were	practiced	as	a	primary	reason	for	change,	regardless	of	practical	 problems	 of	 implementation	 or	 associated	risks.		Identities	 The	 codes	 were	 seen	 to	 identify	 those	 who	 were	strongest	 in	 favour	 of	 service	 improvement	 and	considering	 both	 current	 services	 and	 relationships	with	current	providers	as	inadequate.		Relationships	 These	codes	were	strongly	used	to	form	and	reinforce	relationships	 and	 may	 have	 been	 some	 of	 the	 main	discourse	supporting	coalitions	in	support	of	tendering.		Politics	 In	terms	of	social	goods	these	codes	see	the	role	of	the	current	service	delivery	(and	consequently	the	role	of	the	service	provider)	as	having	a	negative	social	impact.		Connections	 The	codes	connected	to	the	need	to	improve	services	in	the	 first	 place	 and	may	 be	 seen	 as	 some	 of	 the	most	important	primary	driving	concepts	 for	 the	subject	of	the	case	study.		Sign	system	and	knowledge	 These	codes	privileged	the	position	of	clinical	decision-makers	in	the	process,	due	to	their	experience	of	front-line	clinical	services.		Framing	level	 As	the	codes	were	driven	in	part	from	strong	personal	reflections,	they	operated	primarily	at	the	micro	level.		
 
Table 24 - Discourse analysis of risk codes 
Risk	codes	
Building	Task	 How	used	in	the	discourse	Significance	 The	significance	of	the	codes	was	the	potential	threats	to	 corporate	 objectives	 and	 sustainability.	 Although	there	 were	 risks	 discussed	 on	 not	 making	 more	significant	changes	(and	in	not	using	tendering)	but	the	majority	 of	 the	 risk	 codes	 were	 those	 relating	 to	 the	risks	of	using	tendering.		
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Practices	 The	codes	appeared	to	be	used	a	practice	of	‘restraining’	the	views	of	others,	in	particular	the	tender	coalition	as	a	means	of	tempering	the	impact	of	the	emotional	codes.		Identities	 The	 codes	 identified	 most	 obviously	 the	 professional	executive	officers	on	the	Governing	Body.		Relationships	 The	 codes	helped	establish	 the	 relationships	between	those	who	may	be	thought	to	be	more	concerned	with	risk,	 and	 those	 that	may	conform	 to	 the	 risk	aversion	side	of	the	prospect	theory	spectrum.		Politics	 These	codes	were	explicitly	political,	 in	relating	to	the	impact	 on	 other	 organizations	 and	 considering	 the	impact	on	wider	health	policy,	as	against	assessing	the	qualities	of	the	service	under	consideration	only.		Connections	 The	connections	of	the	codes	were	with	wider	elements	of	corporate	risk.		Sign	system	and	knowledge	 The	 codes	 prioritised	 the	 role	 of	 risk	 as	 a	 decision-making	 factor	 and	 emphasised	 the	 broader	 decision-making	context	and	thus	required	knowledge,	with	less	emphasis	on	the	quality	issues	of	the	service	itself.		Framing	level	 These	 codes	 operated	 primarily	 from	 the	 meso	 and	macro	 levels,	 referencing	 legal	 guidance,	 financial	consequences,	and	political	relationships.		
 
Table 25 - Discourse analysis of corporate process codes 
Corporate	process	codes	
Building	Task	 How	used	in	the	discourse	Significance	 The	 codes	 were	 significant	 in	 relating	 to	 corporate	governance	 and	 procedures,	 suggesting	 whether	decisions,	 actions,	 or	 behaviours	 are	 corporately	acceptable.		Practices	 These	 codes	were	 used	 as	 supporting	 codes	 that	 add	weight	to	another	code	or	position.	Thus,	they	may	be	either	restraining	or	driving	codes,	but	will	not	drive	a	decision	outcome	in	themselves.		Identities	 The	 codes	 identified	 with	 practitioners	 across	 the	process	 but	 tended	 to	 be	 the	 preserve	 of	 the	professional	officers.		
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Relationships	 The	codes	supported	existing	coalitions	or	relationships	but	 did	 not	 appear	 to	 establish	 relationships	themselves.		Politics	 These	 codes	 were	 implicitly	 political,	 with	 particular	reference	to	the	external	regulatory	framework	in	the	NHS.		Connections	 The	 codes	 connected	 to	 themselves	 as	 a	 web	 of	corporate	processes.		Sign	system	and	knowledge	 Codes	 show	 the	 signs	 of	 compliance	 with	 rules	 and	established	 norms	 and	 also	 imply	 a	 recognition	 of	understanding	of	existing	knowledge	in	processes.		Framing	level	 These	codes	operated	at	the	meso	level	
 
Table 26 - Discourse analysis of behaviour codes 
Behaviour	codes	
Building	Task	 How	used	in	the	discourse	Significance	 These	 codes	may	 be	 seen	 as	 similar	 to	 the	 corporate	codes.	 The	 corporate	 codes	 tended	 to	 describe	 how	decision-making	 ‘should’	 happen	 (that	 is	 following	rules	 and	 regulations,	 for	 example);	 the	 behaviour	codes	describe	how	decision-making	 ‘does’	 happen	 in	practice.	 The	 significance	 was	 in	 framing	 decision-making	towards	established	or	normative	practice.	Practices	 These	 codes,	 particularly	 the	 Nortondale	 code,	 were	used	 to	 amend	 preferences	 that	 allowed	 pragmatism	and	built	consensus.		Identities	 The	 codes	 identified	 how	 individuals	 would	 and	 did	behave	 in	 the	 process	 and	 allowed	 the	 behaviour	 of	decision-makers	to	be	reconciled	with	the	implications	of	corporate	processes.	Relationships	 The	codes	reinforced	existing	relationships	and	sought	to	 accommodate	 relationships	 within	 the	 decision	process.		Politics	 The	codes	were	political	within	the	context	of	internal	politics	of	the	CCG.	The	Nortondale	code	did	recognise	the	 potential	 political	 impact	 of	 the	 process	 on	 the	politically	sensitive	issue	of	Notlam	Hospital.		
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Connections	 The	 codes	 connected	 to	 the	 other	 coding	 groups,	 in	particular	 aligning	 the	 groups	 to	 the	 Improvement	theme,	without	disenfranchising	a	sub-group.	Sign	system	and	knowledge	 The	sign	system	was	of	accommodation	of	priorities	and	behaviours	within	the	group.			Framing	level	 This	 was	 primarily	 at	 the	 Meso	 level	 but	 referenced	elements	of	the	Macro	frame.		
 
Table 27 - Discourse analysis of stakeholder codes 
Stakeholder	codes	
Building	Task	 How	used	in	the	discourse	Significance	 The	 significance	 of	 theses	 codes	 was	 in	 aligning	arguments	to	both	add	force	(“x	supports	this	option”)	and	 to	 define	 bounds	 of	 acceptability	 (“x	 believes	we	cannot	or	should	not	do	this	option”)	Practices	 These	 codes	were	 used	 as	 supporting	 codes	 that	 add	weight	to	another	code.	They	may	be	either	restraining	or	driving	codes.	Identities	 The	 codes	 showed	 how	 decision-making	 groups	identified	with	the	wider	healthcare	community.	Relationships	 The	 codes	 were	 primarily	 regarding	 external	relationships	 and	 how	 the	 CCG	 affected	 its	 major	partnerships.		Politics	 The	political	impact	was	of	how	it	impacted	on	external	relationships	 and	 sought	 external	 permissions	 for	decision.	Connections	 The	connections	were	 to	 identify	a	stakeholder	group	and	then	it	links	it	to	another	code.	Sign	system	and	knowledge	 The	 sign	 system	 was	 of	 external	 permissions	 and	approval.	Framing	level	 The	framing	level	connected	Meso	and	Macro	levels	but	was	primarily	Macro.	
 
Table 28 - Discourse analysis of service design codes 
Service	design	codes	
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Building	Task	 How	used	in	the	discourse	Significance	 The	significance	of	the	codes	was	in	relation	to	the	detail	of	 services	 under	 consideration	 and	 how	 they	 may	change.	Practices	 These	were	 seen	 as	 foundation	 codes	 and	 referenced	previous	 discussions	 and	 policies	 in	 the	 CCG	 on	 how	healthcare	should	develop.		Identities	 The	codes	showed	how	decision-makers	identified	with	improvement	 and	 how	 they	 saw	 services	 changing	 in	time.	Relationships	 The	 codes	 were	 primarily	 concerned	 with	 service	content	 and	 less	 to	 with	 relationships,	 although	 the	stakeholder	views	on	service	design	were	recognised.	Politics	 The	codes	appeared	apolitical.		Connections	 The	connections	were	between	different	groups	within	the	 process	 recognising	 their	 priorities	 for	 service	change.	Sign	system	and	knowledge	 The	sign	was	of	system	improvement	Framing	level	 Primarily	at	the	micro	level.	
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Endnotes	
1 “The interpretation of fiction is undeniably do-able, with certain uncontroversial results. First, 
the fleshing out of the story, the exploration of ‘the world of Sherlock Holmes,’ for instance, is 
not pointless or idle; one can learn a great deal about a novel, about its text, about the point, 
about the author, even about the real world, by learning about the world portrayed by the novel. 
Second, if we are cautious about identifying and excluding judgments of taste or preference 
(e.g., ‘Watson is a boring prig’), we can amass a volume of unchallengingly objective fact about 
the world portrayed. All interpreters agree that Holmes was smarter than Watson; in crashing 
obviousness lies objectivity.” Daniel Dennett (1992, p.80) 
 
2 Interpretation and generation of consensus may be further complicated by the imprecision 
of information. Wright (2003, p.1) describes the ubiquity and usefulness of vagueness: 
Anyone must agree that vagueness pervades the lexicon of natural languages: almost 
everything we say is expressed in vague vocabulary. It is a little more controversial, 
but presumably true, that this is unavoidable: that a language stripped of vague 
expressions would suffer not merely in point of usefulness—often, a vague judgement 
is exactly what we need— but in its very expressive power. (We need concepts, for 
instance, of rough impressions, of casual appearances, and of circumstances in which 
a precise predication—say, "is more than six feet tall"—may justifiably be made on the 
basis of rough-and-ready observation; and we need to be able to express these 
concepts.)  
Accepting the place and usefulness of vagueness may not necessarily mean its appearance 
within strategic decision-making is always helpful! 
 
3 In the UK General Practitioners (GPs) working as community physicians are sometimes 
referred to as ‘family doctors’ in part as often an individual GP will have members of a whole 
family on their caseload. 
 
4 Bhaskar (1978) makes a similar point if from the reverse perspective. Thus, for critical 
realism, Bhaskar’s theoretical approach and the methodology used in the thesis, there are 
different perspectives, but recognising views of the same external reality (Bhaskar 1978, p.31): 
 
If changing experience of objects is to be possible, objects must have a distinct being 
in space and time from the experiences of which they are the objects. For Kepler to 
see the rim of the earth drop away, while Tycho Brahe watches the sun rise, we must 
suppose that there is something that they both see (in different ways). 
 
Thus, the different views of the decision-making battlefield will be different, but always of the 
same event and process, regardless of the divergence of interpretation.  
 
5 Winter (1989, p.vii) is dismissive of the quote attributed to Confucius that, “a fool learns from 
his own mistakes – a wise man learns from the mistakes of others”. Winter thinking that one’s 
own learning is often much richer than that seen merely from observation. One is also tempted 
to ask Confucius that if the whole population was indeed wise, whose mistakes would there 
be to learn from! 
 
6 “Finally, I believe that strategic thinking is a necessary but greatly overrated element of 
business success. If you know how to design great motorcycle engines, I can teach you all 
you need to know about strategy in a few days. If you have a Ph.D. in strategy, years of labor 
are unlikely to give you ability to design great new motorcycle engines.” (Rumelt 1996, p.110) 
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7 Porter’s earlier NEJM paper A Strategy for Health Care Reform — Toward a Value-Based 
System (Porter, NEJM 2009) does provide a strategy for healthcare, but primarily how applied 
to the USA and principally in relation to its funding and resourcing system through changing 
the system of insurance. It is not obviously a generic healthcare strategy that could be applied 
to other countries or systems.  
 
8 Thus, Andrews et al. (2006, p.58) state “Only one of the hypotheses for strategic action is 
supported by the empirical results. Organizations that move into new markets by identifying 
and serving new users are more likely to perform well. This can be seen as the most radical 
and innovative of the five strategic actions that we have identified, and it is consistent with the 
positive sign on the prospector variable.” Again, this may be a more realistic option for Local 
Authorities, with a broad service portfolio and the ability to increase income, and less 
applicable to the NHS, particularly CCGs where access to new markets and income growth is 
very limited.   
  
9 The project uses the definition of sociology from Watson (2003, p.3): 
The study of the relationships which develop between human beings as they organize 
themselves and are organized by others in societies and how these patterns influence 
and are influenced by the actions and interactions of people and how they make sense 
of their lives and identities.  
 
10 Thus, it may be considered the default concept of decision is that of an event: a judgement 
assumed to be identifiable to a date or series of dates. Intuitively this appears to be the closest 
to the definition provided in the literature review above. However, the complexity of strategic 
decisions suggests they are rarely taken over very short time scales, and tend to involve a 
web of analysis, debate, and multiple conferences. As such it may be more helpful to consider 
strategic decisions as processes: thus, our definition, in this dimension, is that of a judgemental 
process to achieve an objective. This concept of decision as process is consistent with the 
author’s previous research (Cox 2012) where of the three case studies studied, it was difficult 
to establish a specific point of decision for at least two of the three, and for all the start and 
finish of the processes took a number of months. A yet further dimension extends the thinking 
of Weick (for example Weick 2001), where the ‘decision’ is considered to be primarily a 
rationalisation and sense-making of actions taken at the outset. Thus, in this definition, the 
main work of any decision process is to justify, explain, and help those involved make sense 
of what is being done.  
The uncertainty as to the precise form of decision is no monopoly of management decision-
making. Libet (1983) conducted experiments on neurophysiology showing a difference in 
neurological activity suggesting the preparation for physical actions, measured through the 
readiness potential, happens before a conscious mind initiates the action. Thus: 
It is concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous, freely voluntary act can begin 
unconsciously, that is, before there is any (at least recallable) subjective awareness 
that a 'decision' to act has already been initiated cerebrally. This introduces certain 
constraints on the potentiality for conscious initiation and control of voluntary acts. 
(Libet 1983, p. 1) 
This was initially interpreted as a challenge to free will and to how decisions are made. The 
literature relating to and subsequent research generated by Libet is significant, and the original 
conclusions and implications have been challenged. A more balanced view that attempts to 
reconcile the various parts of the neuro-scientific research is the view that ‘decision’ may not 
necessarily be an event, or at least not only an event. Thus, it may be helpful to reconcile the 
multi-dimensional view of decisions through an assessment that: 
When we look closely at a person’s conscious decisions, we discover that this quest 
for spatio-temporal precision breaks down…We restore power…to the self by 
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recognizing that its duties are distributed in both space and time in the brain. (Dennett 
2003, p. 255) 
Therefore, we may helpful approach decisions not as phenomena requiring different 
competing definitions (which may be mutually exclusive) but rather phenomena existing in a 
distributed, multi-dimensional social space. 
 
11 Simon (1978, p.2) states that economic rational man is “a maximizer, who will settle for 
nothing less than the best”. Furthermore, he quotes a noted figure in defending the economic 
rational model, Gary Becker, as stating that the rational decision model extends to the most 
mundane decisions of life: “he would read in bed at night only if the value of reading exceeds 
the value (to him) of the loss of sleep suffered by his wife” (Simon 1978, p.2).  
 
12 Schutz (1943) further states the implications of definition of rational choice.  
 
This postulate implies:  
(a) Knowledge of the place of the end to be realised within the framework of the plans 
of the actor (which must be known by him, too).  
(b) Knowledge of its interrelations with other ends and its compatibility or incompatibility 
with them.  
(c) Knowledge of the desirable and undesirable consequences which may arise as by-
products of the realisation of the main end.  
(d) Knowledge of the different chains of means which technically or even ontologically 
are suitable for the accomplishment of this end, regardless of whether the actor has 
control of all or several of their elements.  
(e) Knowledge of the interference of such means with other ends or other chains of 
means including all their secondary effects and incidental consequences.  
(f) Knowledge of the accessibility of those means for the actor, picking out the means 
which are within his reach and which he can and may set going.  
 
13 In Tversky and Kahneman (1981) Participants were asked to "imagine that the U.S. is 
preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. 
Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume the exact 
scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are as follows." 
The first group of participants was presented with a choice between programs: In a group of 
600 people, 
• Program A: "200 people will be saved" 
• Program B: "there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and a 2/3 probability 
that no people will be saved" 
72 percent of participants preferred program A (the remainder, 28%, opting for program B). 
The second group of participants was presented with the choice between the following: In a 
group of 600 people, 
• Program C: "400 people will die" 
• Program D: "there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and a 2/3 probability that 600 
people will die" 
In this decision frame, 78% preferred program D, with the remaining 22% opting for program 
C. 
Programs A and C are identical, as are programs B and D. The change in the decision frame 
between the two groups of participants produced a preference reversal: when the programs 
were presented in terms of lives saved, the participants preferred the secure program, A (= 
C). When the programs were presented in terms of expected deaths, participants chose the 
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gamble D (= B) 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) described the celebrated and oft cited piece of psychological 
research into decision-making; since referred to as the ‘Asian Disease Problem’ (ADP). This 
has been instrumental in developing the modern theses of framing in decision-making. Pinker 
(2007) has described the ADP as the ‘gold standard of framing’ and is a frequent reference 
point for understanding differential approaches to risk. For Kahneman and Tversky the ADP 
is part of the programme of research and discussion for their wider concept of Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The fundamental principle for PT is that decision-makers are: 
risk averse for gains (they seek to hold on the sure-thing and avoid riskier attempts to gain 
more if they involve possible loss); and risk seeking for losses (they seek to risk further loss to 
avoid regaining what is already lost). Bless et al. (1998) provide an example where the 
repetition of the research problem from ADP produces a similar result to the original: however, 
when the problem is re-stated as a statistical one, the outcome changes. Bless et al. (1998) 
conclude this is an example of the impact of ‘context cues’. It may be debated as to whether 
‘context cues' are merely a form of ‘re-framing’ or whether frames themselves have an 
inevitable contextual dimension. If Goffman’s (1974) initial description of framing as the 
organization of experience is accepted, then the frame cannot be seen in isolation. Thus, it 
may be considered that decision-makers arrive at the point of decision with their own framing 
(either individually or as a group). This pre-frame may be important in shaping the decision 
frame as to ‘loss’ or ‘gain’. Within the negotiated order, the group discussion and context will 
create the evaluation of what is ‘loss’ or ‘gain’. Furthermore, the background knowledge of 
individuals (or groups) may influence not only the loss-gain dimension but also pre-existing 
experience may influence the option choice itself. Thus, Pinker (2007) suggests doctors (such 
as those participants in the original ADP) may treat the option of ‘save 200 lives’ as implying 
‘save at least 200’. Thus, option A then becomes potentially differential to Option B in statistical 
outcome. Their equivalence depends on an almost exact match between the outcomes of the 
two options treated iteratively over a series of occasions. If risk averse option A is treated not 
as 200 lives saved but as 200+ lives saved it becomes more attractive still. As option B in its 
best-case scenario (all lives saved) can only ever save 600 lives, then it only assumes 
comparative effectiveness if the saves all lives one time in three is matched against a literal 
option A of only 200 saved.   
 
14 “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to 
be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of 
law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.” (Geertz 1973, p. 5) 
 
15 Advocatus Diaboli "Advocate of the Devil" or "Devil's Advocate". A popular title given to one 
of the most important officers of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, established in 1587, 
by Sixtus V, to deal juridically with processes of beatification and canonization. His official title 
is Promoter of the Faith (Promotor Fidei). His duty requires him to prepare in writing all 
possible arguments, even at times seemingly slight, against the raising of any one to 
the honours of the altar. The interest and honour of the Church are concerned in preventing 
any one from receiving those honours whose death is not juridically proved to have been 
"precious in the sight of God". Prospero Lamertini, afterwards Pope Benedict XIV (1740-58), 
was the Promoter of the Faith for twenty years, and had every opportunity to study the 
workings of the Church in this most important function; he was, therefore, peculiarly qualified 
to compose his monumental work "On the Beatification and Canonization of Saints," which 
contains the complete vindication of the rights of the Church in this matter, and sets forth 
historically its extreme care of the use of this right. No important act in the process 
of beatification or canonization is valid unless performed in the presence of the Promoter of 
the Faith formally recognized. His duty is to protest against the omission of the forms laid 
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down, and to insist upon the consideration of any objection. The first formal mention of such 
an officer is found in the canonization of St. Lawrence Justinian under Leo X (1513-21). Urban 
VIII, in 1631, made his presence necessary, at least by deputy, for the validity of 
any act connected with the process of beatification or canonization. 
 
16 The performance of decision-makers in certain situations ay be improved not merely by the 
use of groups, but also decision-making models. Meehl’s (1954) early study comparing expert 
clinician with statistically generated decision-making outcomes has been replicated across a 
number of studies (see Dawes et al. 1989) to conclude that the use of models and algorithms 
appear to provide consistently better decision-making for clinical decision-making than the use 
of individual clinical experts. That said the models themselves are the product of experts, but 
groups of experts agreeing a systematic approach which may be less influenced by decision-
maker bias than the decision-making of individual experts in a clinical setting. Dana and David-
Stober (2016) suggest that research into actuarial models optimizes data in favour of the 
actuarial models and thus underestimate clinician decision-making. Dawes et al. (1989) 
concluded, at least at the time of writing, that despite the strength of the research, the use of 
actuarial models had “limited impact on everyday decision-making” (Dawes et al. 1989, p.243). 
 
17 March was one of the co-authors of the original Garbage Can paper (Cohen et al. 1972) 
and elements from the earlier work (Cyert and March 1962) such as variable attentional focus 
and the shifting nature of goal setting and prioritization are present in the later paper. 
 
18  The graph of health spend compared to life expectancy as provided in Appendix 1 
demonstrates a logarithmic curve of improved life expectancy against health spend (usually 
accompanying a similar increase in a country’s economy relative to comparators). Le Fanu 
(2000) in describing the declining impact of modern healthcare in terms of improving mortality, 
infers the period for significant improvements in life expectancy through healthcare 
intervention may be over. Subsequent improvements may see smaller and smaller gains.  
 
19 See Appendix 1. 
 
20 Shibuya (2011) summarises a number of the reasons for the apparent cost benefit efficiency 
of the Japanese healthcare system. One area of cost containment appears to be the much 
longer lead time for the introduction of new drugs and devices in Japan. Such new 
interventions will often be of drugs and devices on patent, and consequently may come at a 
premium cost. Thus: 
In Japan, there are substantial delays in the approval and introduction of new health 
technologies, including drugs, devices, and vaccines. New drugs took about 3·7 years 
after first world application before market launch in Japan during 1999–2003. This long 
period compared with delays in other developed countries is attributable to the longer 
processes required for undertaking clinical trials, delay in filing new drug applications 
in Japan, longer approval process by Japan’s regulatory authority, and tight price 
regulation that dampens incentives for pharmaceutical companies to enter the market. 
 
The delay is even longer for new devices in Japan. For example, Japan’s approved 
implantable artificial heart has been replaced with newer second-generation devices in 
other countries. As a result, the device used in Japan has disappeared from the global 
market, and the latest devices are not available to Japanese patients with end-stage 
heart failure. (Shibuya 2011, p.1268) 
 
21 The Muennig and Glied (2010) review of USA healthcare concludes, “rising health spending 
may be choking off public funding on more important life- saving programs... At current 
spending levels, investments in public health, education, public safety, safety-net, and 
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community development programs may be more efficient at increasing survival than further 
investments in medical care.”  
 
22 Pinker (2011, p.588-589) describes the more detailed view of different narratives: 
The Perpetrator’s Narrative: The story begins with the harmful act. At the time I had 
good reasons for doing it. Perhaps I was responding to an immediate provocation. Or 
I was just reacting to the situation in a way that any reasonable person would. I had a 
perfect right to do what I did, and it’s unfair to blame me for it. The harm was minor, 
and easily repaired, and I apologized. It’s time to get over it, put it behind us, let 
bygones be bygones.  
The Victim’s Narrative: The story begins long before the harmful act, which was just 
the latest incident in a long history of mistreatment. The perpetrator’s actions were 
incoherent, senseless, incomprehensible. Either that or he was an abnormal sadist, 
motivated only by a desire to see me suffer, though I was completely innocent. The 
harm he did is grievous and irreparable, with effects that will last forever. None of us 
should ever forget it. 
 
23 In a later paper Lord et al. (1984) conduct research that concludes bias can be effectively 
countered by encouraging participants to actively consider opposite and alternative positions.  
 
24 Bhaskar (1978) describes what he sees as the necessary approach of transcendental 
realism (critical realism) as being the appropriate realist position in dealing with open systems. 
Thus, positivism and empirical realism (in Bhaskar’s term) provides causal explanations 
effectively within closed systems. That is those where most factors and variables are known 
and where possible controlled, for example, in laboratory experiments in chemistry. In much 
of science, however, situations are not controlled and clearly defined: thus, they are open 
systems. This would appear to apply to all of social scientific exploration.  
 
25 Roy Bhaskar (1978) is considered a major original contributor to the development of critical 
realism (Johnson and Duberley 2000). Bhaskar (1978), despite being seen as the parent of 
critical realism, has preferred the term transcendental realism rather than critical realism. Thus, 
transcendental realism is seen to avoid the pitfalls (in Bhaskar’s view) of empirical realism 
(encompassing positivism) and transcendental idealism (encompassing various forms of 
interpretivism).  
 
26 Wittgenstein being one author suggesting causality may be a ‘superstition’: 
From Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:   
“5.135 In no way can an inference be made from the existence of one state of affairs 
to the  existence of another entirely different from it.  
 5.136 There is no causal nexus which justifies such an inference 
 5.1361 The events of the future cannot be inferred from those of the present.  
 Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus. 
5.1362 The freedom of the will consists in the fact that future actions cannot be known 
now.  We could only know them if causality were an inner necessity, like that of logical 
deduction. -  The connexion of knowledge and what is known is that of logical 
necessity. 
 
27 Bhaskar (1978) defends the concept of induction suggesting that it can be justified, but 
dependent on certain criteria being met. He is thus critical of Popper’s rejection of induction 
as not the scientific method, but also of an interesting defence of induction from Strawson 
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(1963) that induction is such a central part of the scientific method it needs no separate 
explanation.  
 
28  Anderson (2006) contrasts this approach with what he describes as “evocative 
autoethnography” which is seen as being more emotionally based, closer to autobiography, 
and often reflecting a postmodernist methodology. 
  
29 The workforce risks of the tender option were considered by some participants to increase 
as if the tender resulted in a change of provider, staff currently employed within a service would 
be transferred to a new provider under the TUPE regulations. This could include transfer to a 
non-NHS provider. Although TUPE would protect employment terms and conditions, some 
staff may worry about future terms and conditions and access to the NHS pension scheme. 
Even if the impact on actual terms and conditions may be small, the perceived change may 
be seen to be unsettling. Conversely, there was anecdotal information regarding staff leaving 
due to low morale. Although this was stated in the meeting and the referenced engagement 
events suggested staff wanted to see changes in the services, no statistical information was 
provided to show whether staff departures were happening at a greater or lesser rate than 
normal staff turnover.  
 
30 As an interesting and possibly relevant anecdote, the author remembered the behaviour of 
a senior hospital manager in a performance review meeting. At the start of the meeting the 
forum chair, the Hospital CEO, circulated the meeting agenda. Before he could start to work 
through it the General Manager (largely at the meeting to account for his division’s poor 
performance) place an alternative agenda on top of the CEO’s agenda and said, ‘before we 
begin the meeting can we just deal with some of our issues first?’ Slightly taken aback, the 
CEO accepted the proposal. The meeting time worked through the GM’s ‘agenda’ until there 
was no time to do the ‘formal’ agenda. All the performance issues were actually covered, but 
according to the frame of the GM, not the CEO. Inevitably the GM had a much easier time 
explaining poor preforming service after telling everyone how good other parts were.  
Consciously or unconsciously this was a masterly example of controlling a meeting to meet 
your needs, and assuming control at the outset. Whether the CEO recognized what had 
happened to him was unknown.  
 
31 Throughout the text the term ‘managed change’ refers to an approach of trying to achieve 
the desired outcomes through a process of negotiation with existing providers that would avoid 
a formal open market tender procurement.  
 
32 NOTLAM GP was present during Meeting 4 but they had lost their voice due to illness and 
did not actually speak in the session.  
 
33 Continuing Healthcare is a term describing care provide to those with very complex, severe, 
and ongoing care needs which are fully funded by the NHS.  
 
34 Although an NHS commissioning organization may not be directly liable to deficits sitting 
with a Foundation Trust, the FT would likely want to increase funding from its local NHS 
commissioner to help reduce (or eliminate) a deficit. As such any NHS financial pressure was 
treated as a ‘system pressure’ and had to be considered in any strategic thinking.  
 
35 Since the introduction of the NHS reforms in 2013 and by the time of the case study the 
NHS had a relatively complicated regulatory system. NHS England having responsivity and 
oversight for the commissioning organizations (CCGs); NHS Improvement responsibility for 
NHS provider organizations such as hospital and mental health providers; the Care Quality 
Commission having responsivity for safety and quality of care delivery including General 
Practice and social care providers.  
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36 Notlam the main population centre with 20,000 of the Nortondale overall CCG population of 
circa 30,000. Nortondale district extended into parts of a neighbouring CCG the residents of 
whom also used the community hospital. 
 
37 “Suppose both you and another person are given sealed envelopes with amounts of money 
that neither of you knows anything about except that one of them is either twice as large or 
twice as small as the other one. Would you prefer to keep your own envelope or rather trade 
it with the other player?” (Navon 2013, p.4)  
 
38 Strategic assessment tool assessing a number of critical contextual influences – Political 
Economic Social Technological Legal Environmental.  
39 Toulmin (1964) describes six parts to logical arguments (data, claim, and warrant being the 
primary elements of the structure. 
Data: The facts or evidence used to prove the argument 
Claim: The statement being argued (a thesis) 
Warrants: The general, hypothetical (and often implicit) logical statements that serve as 
bridges between the claim and the data. 
Qualifiers: Statements that limit the strength of the argument or statements that propose the 
conditions under which the argument is true. 
Rebuttals: Counter-arguments or statements indicating circumstances when the general 
argument does not hold true. 
Backing: Statements that serve to support the warrants (i.e., arguments that do not 
necessarily prove the main point being argued, but which do prove the warrants are true.)  
40 Media Richness Theory (MRT) (Daft et al. 1987) asserts that knowledge transfer through 
information can be most effective when the information delivery provides the appropriate level 
of ‘richness’ to manage ambiguity of information content. Where information has high 
‘equivocality’ (that is complex and needing a high level of interpretation) the use of delivery 
methods considered to be ‘rich’ (essentially those of face-to-face communication) will provide 
more effective communication.  
41 The origins of shibboleth being a Hebrew word contained in the Bible, literally meaning ‘ear 
of wheat’, was a dialect function that enabled distinctions to be made between friend and foe 
(McNamara 2012). McNamara (2012) discusses the role of shibboleth in Derrida’s language 
analysis. Thus, “the shibboleth necessarily acts as a two-edged sword, that inclusion always 
carries with it the potential for exclusion, that its potential for justice is simultaneously a 
potential for injustice, leads Derrida to speak of ‘the terrifying ambiguity of the shibboleth, sign 
of belonging, and threat of discrimination” (McNamara 2012, p.570). 
 
42 Pinker (2018, p.359) goes on to state: 
The anthropologist John Tooby adds that preposterous beliefs are more effective 
signals of coalitional loyalty than reasonable ones. Anyone can say that rocks fall down 
rather than up, but only a person who is truly committed to the brethren has a reason 
to say that God is three persons but also one person, or that the Democratic Party ran 
a child sex ring out of a Washington pizzeria.   
 
43 This is famously described in Wittgenstein’s (1967) consideration of language games and 
examples of how difficult it is to provide a precise definition for terms such as ‘game’ which are 
dependent on the context within which they are used. Interestingly Clegg et al. (2006) cite 
earlier work by Clegg (1975) researching how language is used within the ‘hard contracting’ 
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of the building contracting industry, where there may seem to be little scope for interpretation. 
Au contraire says Clegg (2006, p.295-296):  
Contractual specifications, typically, are large and complex bodies of documentation. 
Not only are there the documents on which the work is bid but there is also associated 
‘bill of works’ comprising detailed consultants’ reports and associated documents. In 
an ideal world these would exist in an absolute and seamless correspondence of all 
detail from one document to another such that no document ever contradicted another 
or was in conflict with it. Given the vast amount of paper - comprising detailed 
specifications, reports, and projections - associated with the relatively complex 
construction projects, that there actually is such correspondence is a large assumption 
to make. Many hands, at many times, with many distinct skills, produce the papers. 
More often than not there will be points of ambiguity or even disagreement between 
them. The precise meaning of them is not stipulated in the documents themselves. In 
Wittgenstein’s terms there is no meta-rule that provides the rules for how the meaning 
embedded in documents should be interpreted.  
 
44 ‘Harmonious’ here may be a somewhat misleading term, as the dynamic struggles of ideas 
may rarely produce harmony. The authors may be implying more effective than harmonious.  
 
45 Hayek (1945, p. 521) states: 
Today it is almost heresy to suggest that scientific knowledge is not the sum of all 
knowledge. But a little reflection will show that there is beyond question a body of very 
important but unorganized knowledge which cannot possibly be called scientific in the 
sense of knowledge of general rules: the knowledge of the particular circumstances of 
time and place. It is with respect to this that practically every individual has some 
advantage over all others because he possesses unique information of which 
beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be made only if the decisions 
depending on it are left to him or are made with his active cooperation. 
 
46 Mercier and Sperber (2011, p.72) further state, “People who have an opinion to defend 
don’t really evaluate the arguments of their interlocutors in a search for genuine information 
but rather consider them from the start as counter arguments to be rebutted.” Nevertheless, 
their assessment was, “Human reasoning is not a profoundly flawed general mechanism; it is 
a remarkably efficient specialized device adapted to a certain type of social and cognitive 
interaction at which it excels” (ibid).  
 
47 Winter (1989) describes reflexive analysis as learning where the view is ‘bent back’: thus, 
reflection is general consideration; reflexion self-analysis and consideration of one’s own 
actions. See the methodology chapter for a more extended discussion on reflexivity, and the 
reflexive critique chapter for its application in the project.  
 
	
	
	
 
